UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Class 


STUDIES 


IN  THE 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  EELIGION 


STUDIES 


IN   THE 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  EELIGION 


BY 


GEORGE   GALLOWAY,   B.D. 

^  \ 

FORMERLY  EXAMINER  IN  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  ST  ANDREWS 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

Of 


WILLIAM     BLACKWOOD     AND     SONS 

EDINBURGH    AND    LONDON 

MCMIV 


SENERAL 


PEEFACE. 


THIS  volume  does  not  claim  to  be  more  than  its 
title  indicates.  I  have  not  attempted,  more  Ger- 
manico,  to  deal  with  the  subject  systematically. 
On  the  one  hand,  I  doubt  my  own  competency 
for  the  task ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  seems 
to  me  that  in  the  present  condition  of  speculative 
thought  such  an  attempt  is  hardly  desirable.  But 
the  reader  will  find  that  the  following  essays,  so 
far  as  they  go,  form  a  fairly  connected  treatment. 
All  I  can  hope  is  that  at  points  I  have  dealt  sug- 
gestively with  a  deeply  important  subject. 

The  fourth  essay  is  the  statement  of  a  philos- 
ophical position,  which  I  try  to  develop  and  apply 
to  religion  in  the  essay  which  follows.  It  is 
reprinted  by  kind  permission  from  *  Mind/  My 
cordial  thanks  are  due  to  my  friend,  the  Eev.  D. 
Frew,  B.D.,  for  valuable  aid  in  revising  the  proof- 
sheets. 

G.  G. 

CASTLE-DOUGLAS,  N.B. 


CONTENTS. 


ESSAY    I. 

HEGEL  AND  THE  LATER  TENDENCY  OP  KELIGIOUS  PHILOSOPHY  3 

ESSAY    II. 

THE    NATURAL    SCIENCES,    ETHICS,    AND    RELIGION  .  .  41 

ESSAY    III. 

RELIGIOUS  DEVELOPMENT  :    ITS  HISTORY  AND  INTERPRETATION          97 

ESSAY    IV. 

ON    THE    DISTINCTION    OF    INNER    AND    OUTER   EXPERIENCE     .        169 

ESSAY    V. 

THE    ULTIMATE    BASIS    AND    MEANING    OP    RELIGION       .  .        209 

ESSAY    VI. 

PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY:    THE    RITSCHLIAN    STANDPOINT        291 
INDEX  325 


ESSAY    I. 

HEGEL  AND  THE  LATER  TENDENCY  OF 
RELIGIOUS  PHILOSOPHY 


ESSAY    I. 


IT  may  be  well  to  state  at  the  outset  the  object  we 
set  ourselves  in  the  present  paper.  We  have  no 
idea  of  attempting  to  give  a  history  of  the  Phil- 
osophy of  Keligion  from  Hegel  to  the  present  day. 
That  has  been  already  done,  and  by  more  competent 
hands.  Our  aim  here  is  a  more  restricted  one.  We 
wish  to  compare  and  contrast  the  method  and  spirit  of 
later  religious  philosophy  with  the  method  and  spirit 
in  which  the  subject  was  treated  by  Hegel.  To  go 
into  the  details  of  the  treatment,  however,  lies 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  essay.  We  shall  deal  more 
particularly  with  the  attitude  of  reason  to  religion, 
trying  to  show  the  difference  which  becomes  more 
and  more  apparent  between  the  view  of  later 
thinkers  on  this  point  and  the  view  of  Hegel.  The 
result,  we  think,  will  be  to  show  that  there  has  been 
a  very  marked  process  of  change.  This  change 
corresponds  to  a  general  change  in  the  philosophic 
standpoint.  The  consequence  has  been  new  ways 


4  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

of  regarding  religion  and  its  problems.  We  shall 
see  that  the  earlier  tendency  was  to  exalt  reason, 
while  the  later  makes  much  of  feeling :  the  earlier 
thinkers  sought  to  offer  something  like  a  complete 
explanation,  while  the  later  are  burdened  with  a 
sense  of  the  limitations  of  knowledge  and  the 
defects  of  human  insight.  Or,  what  is  the  same 
thing  from  a  slightly  different  point  of  view,  we 
begin  with  a  strong  constructive  movement  which 
gradually  exhausts  itself,  to  be  followed  by  a 
sceptical  and  critical  tendency. 

We  propose,  then,  to  begin  our  review  with 
Hegel's  '  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.'  * 
Hegel's  work  is  the  first  profound,  comprehensive, 
and  systematic  treatment  of  the  whole  subject.  It 
marks  the  rise  of  a  distinct  and  influential  tendency. 
Moreover,  Hegel  was  the  first  who  sharply  defined 
the  problem  of  Religionsphilosophie,  and  gave  the 
subject  a  determinate  place  in  the  body  of  the 
philosophical  sciences.  From  that  time  the  general 
scope  of  the  science  and  the  broad  outlines  of  its 

1  Hegel's  '  Vorlesungen  iiber  die  Philosophic  der  Keligion '  were 
published  in  1832,  after  his  death.  A  2nd  edition,  forming  vols.  xi. 
and  xii.  of  his  collected  works,  was  issued  in  1840.  I  have  given 
the  titles  of  the  works  referred  to  in  the  course  of  the  paper,  but 
have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  burden  the  article  with  continuous 
references  to  the  pages  of  the  books  themselves.  I  have  taken  pains 
to  present  accurately  the  views  of  the  different  writers.  But  if  any 
one  desires  to  verify  my  statements,  he  will,  I  think,  have  little 
difficulty  in  doing  so. 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  5 

treatment  have  been  more  or  less  fixed.  Earlier 
discussions  of  religious  problems  present  us  with 
the  religious  aspect  of  philosophy  rather  than  the 
Philosophy  of  Keligion  in  the  modern  sense.1 

Hegel  was  the  strong  son  of  an  age  when  hopes  in 
speculative  effort  ran  high.  As  we  all  know,  philos- 
ophy was  for  him  denkende  Anschauung  der  Welt, 
and  he  believed  the  universe  must  yield  its  secret 
at  the  pressure  of  thought.  Logic  lays  bare  the 
structure  of  the  Absolute,  and  the  philosopher 
traces  its  dialectic  evolution  in  the  spheres  of 
nature  and  mind.  In  that  evolution  religion  has 
its  place,  and  its  essence  and  meaning  can  be 
speculatively  determined  in  the  systematic  whole 
of  things.  That  place,  we  may  remind  our  readers, 
is  in  the  domain  of  mind  which  has  become  absolute 
spirit,  and  midway  between  Art  and  Speculative 
Philosophy.  Religion  manifests  the  Absolute  in  the 
form  of  representation  (Vorstellung),  while  philos- 
ophy grasps  it  as  the  notion  (Begriff).  So  religion 
shelters  no  mystery  which  thought  cannot  penetrate. 

Hegel's  general  method  is  now  tolerably  familiar 
to  us  in  this  country.  First  an  idea,  or  concept,  is 
analysed;  then  it  is  shown  by  its  own  immanent 
movement  to  specify  or  differentiate  itself  in  the 
judgment ;  and  finally  it  issues  in  the  conclusion, 
the  concrete  and  individual  whole.  Applying  this 

1  As  in  the  case,  e.g.,  of  Leibniz  and  Kant. 


6  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

method  to  the  matter  on  hand,  he  analyses  the 
general  or  abstract  concept  of  religion,  and  then 
passes  to  the  historic  religions  as  specific  forms  of 
the  religious  idea,  and  finally  treats  Christianity  as 
the  absolute  or  consummated  notion  of  religion. 

Without  denying  the  high  merits  of  Hegel's 
work,  it  is  clear  to  us  that  it  has  also  grave  defects. 
In  his  reaction  against  Schleiermacher  and  the 
Romantic  School,  Hegel  ignores  the  great  import- 
ance of  feeling  in  the  religious  consciousness.  If 
the  "feeling  of  dependence"  were  the  essence  of 
religion,  then,  he  remarks  scornfully,  the  dog  would 
be  the  most  religious  of  creatures.  The  animal,  we 
are  told,  feels,  but  it  is  the  characteristic  of  man  to 
think.  True,  but  man  also  feels,  and  he  does  not 
feel  as  the  animal  feels.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  if 
man  were  a  purely  thinking  being,  he  would  not  be 
the  religious  being  that  experience  shows  him  to 
be.  Occupying  the  standpoint  of  an  all-embracing 
idealism,  Hegel  gives  no  adequate  psychological 
analysis  of  the  religious  consciousness.  He  does  not 
treat  of  faith  in  its  specific  character ;  and  though 
he  indicates  the  dialectic  movement  by  which  feeling 
passes  into  representation,  he  fails  to  recognise  how 
essential  the  interplay  of  sentiment,  emotion,  and 
idea  is  in  the  maturest  spiritual  experience. 

It  would  be  unfair  to  criticise  Hegel  severely  for 
his  treatment  of  the  historic  religions  :  his  materials 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  7 

were  necessarily  scanty.  Suffice  it  to  note  that  the 
way  in  which  he  labels  the  particular  religions  is 
often  fanciful ;  as  every  religion  implies  a  complex 
process  of  development,  no  single  term  can  fairly 
describe  its  character.  The  logical  nexus  which  he 
discovers  between  the  different  religions  is  largely 
imaginary.  So,  profound  and  suggestive  though  it 
was,  the  weaker  elements  in  Hegel's  interpretation 
of  religion  were  bound  ere  long  to  be  recognised. 
Especially  was  this  the  case  when  the  Hegelian 
School  in  Germany  broke  up,  and  its  general 
method  and  principles  were  weighed  in  the  critical 
balance  and  found  wanting. 

But  there  were  interesting  survivals  of  what  we 
may  term  the  gnostic  attitude  in  the  Philosophy  of 
Keligion.  Such  a  survival  is  the  '  Christliche 
Dogmatik'  of  the  Zurich  theologian,  A.  E.  Bieder- 
mann.1  Yet  already  a  change  of  method  is  seen 
here.  Biedermann  does  not  seek  to  construe 
religion  by  applying  to  it  the  ready  key  of  the 
dialectic  process.  He  tries  rather  to  rise  to  the 
speculative  import  of  religion  by  analysing  the 
historic  phenomenon.  He  accepts  from  Hegel  the 
principle  that  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  must 

1  The  1st  edition  of  this  work  was  published  in  1869,  and  a  2nd 
edition,  with  a  new  epistemological  introduction,  in  1884.  Under 
the  same  general  category  would  fall,  I  believe,  Lasson's  'Ueber 
Gegenstand  und  Behandlung  der  Eeligionsphilosophie.'  But  I  have 
not  examined  the  book. 


8  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

exhibit  the  notion  of  what  is  historically  given  in 
the  form  of  representation,  or  figurative  thought. 
The  historic  matter  to  which  he  turns  is  the  dog- 
matic system  of  the  Christian  Church.  And  his 
aim  is  to  show  how  the  difficulties  and  contradic- 
tions which  exist  within  it  lead  up  to,  and  find  their 
solution  in,  the  concluding  and  speculative  part  of 
his  book. 

A  method  like  this  is  less  likely  to  do  violence  to 
the  facts.  At  the  same  time  Biedermann's  con- 
fidence in  his  ability  to  convey  the  whole  truth  in 
philosophic  terminology  is  curious.  When  we  read 
that  the  Absolute  Being  is  "reines  Insich  und 
Durchsichselbst-sein  und  in  sich  Grundsein  alles 
Seins  ausser  Sich,"  the  doubt  will  suggest  itself  how 
far  this  formidable  phraseology  really  takes  us.  The 
unsympathetic  will  recall  the  scoff  of  Goethe's 
Mephistopheles, 

"  An  Worte  lasst  sich  trefflich  glauben, 
Von  einem  Wort  lasst  sich  kein  Iota  rauben." 

Yet  despite  the  reproach  of  empty  logomachy 
levelled  at  it  by  theologians,  Biedermann's  work  has 
substantial  merits.  The  modern  student,  however, 
will  doubt  what  the  Swiss  theologian  did  not 
appear  to  doubt,  that  he  had  succeeded  in  present- 
ing in  a  final  form  the  philosophic  meaning  of 
religion. 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  9 

Another  noteworthy  example  of  the  idealistic 
standpoint  is  the  Philosophy  of  Eeligion  of  the 
late  Principal  Caird.1  This  well-known  and  sugges- 
tive book  states  the  Hegelian  position  with  great 
persuasiveness.  Yet  it  is  not  exactly  the  Hegelian- 
ism  of  the  older  time.  The  formal  dialectic  recedes 
into  the  background,  and  it  is  recognised  that  the 
emotions  have  a  place  in  the  religious  consciousness. 
But  still  it  is  thought  which  makes  religion  possible. 
And  Dr  Caird  believes  that  reason  can  criticise 
religious  experience,  and  resolve  the  contradictions 
of  ordinary  belief  in  the  speculative  interpreta- 
tion of  religion.  In  that  interpretation  God  is  the 
Absolute  Self- consciousness  to  which  all  finite  con- 
sciousnesses are  organically  related.  The  work  only 
professes  to  be  an  introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of 
Eeligion.  Yet  we  are  forced  to  ask  ourselves  if  the 
speculative  view  here  unfolded  could  justify  itself 
by  solving  the  time-worn  problems  which  confront 
the  theologian.  Is  there  proper  room  for  such  a 
view  of  human  personality  as  would  make  human 
responsibility  real  and  sin  possible?  If  nature 
has  no  reality  apart  from  God,  are  its  evils  only 
good  in  the  making?  For  a  human  consciousness 
which  blends  constantly  and  inevitably  with  the 
divine,  is  there  full  scope  for  faith  and  reverence  ? 
Finally,  in  what  sense  is  that  Self  ethical  and 

1  An  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Eeligion,  1880. 


i  o  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

personal  which  is  the  unity  of  all  thinkers  and  "  all 
objects  of  all  thought"  ?  One  cannot  but  doubt  if, 
within  the  general  speculative  view  outlined  in  this 
volume,  room  is  to  be  found  for  a  satisfactory  treat- 
ment of  these  problems.  One  also  misses  in  this 
book  the  explicit  recognition  of  the  truth,  that  the 
religious  idea  of  God  involves  ethical  predicates 
which  are  not  the  product  of  pure  thinking.  The 
careful  reader  carries  away  the  impression,  after  the 
perusal  of  the  book,  that  the  author's  genuine 
spiritual  feeling  unconsciously  led  him  to  a  more 
positive  and  theistic  view  than  his  speculative 
principles  strictly  warranted. 

The  '  Philosophy  of  Eeligion '  of  Otto  Pfleiderer  is 
a  work  of  wide  learning  and  penetrating  insight 
which  is  tempered  by  sound  judgment.1  While 
sympathising  with  the  idealism  of  an  earlier  day, 
Pfleiderer  modifies  it  at  essential  points  and  rejects 
the  claim  to  absolute  knowledge.  The  central  place 
of  reason  and  its  rights  are  fully  recognised,  but 
alongside  of  it  are  set  the  ideals  of  practical  reason. 
The  theoretical  and  the  practical  reason  must  have 
one  source,  but  to  grasp  and  formulate  their  unity  is 
not  an  achievement  of  thought  but  its  goal.  The 
method  by  which  Pfleiderer  sets  himself  to  work  out 

1  Keligionsphilosophie  auf  Geschichtlicher  Grundlage.  The  1st 
edition  was  published  in  1878,  the  3rd  edition,  largely  recast, 
in  1896. 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  1  1 

the  problem  of  Religionsphilosopliie  is,  in  his  own 
words,  "  the  genetic-speculative  method."  That  is 
to  say,  the  historic  evolution  of  religious  ideas  is 
traced,  and  through  the  study  of  their  development 
it  is  sought  to  determine  their  essence.  History 
criticises  itself,  and  its  larger  logic  corrects  subjective 
opinions  and  prejudices.  This  is,  in  fact,  the  Aris- 
totelian method  by  which  the  essential  nature  of 
an  object  is  brought  to  light  by  tracing  its  evolu- 
tion.1 Pfleiderer  works  on  these  lines  with  much 
success.  The  difficulty  is  that  the  wealth  of  historic 
detail  is  apt  to  overburden  the  religious  philosopher. 
And  where  materials  are  so  varied,  and  earlier  and 
later  elements  come  down  to  us  so  intermingled,  it 
is  hard  to  determine  their  relative  importance  and 
the  order  of  development.  On  the  one  hand,  there 
is  the  temptation  to  select  the  facts  which  suit  a 
preconceived  theory.  And  on  the  other  hand,  the 
very  desire  to  do  justice  to  all  the  facts  may  cause 
the  treatment  to  become  purely  historic.  In  which 
case  philosophic  principles  are  brought  in  afterwards 
to  explain  the  historic  process  rather  than  shown 
to  issue  from  it. 

The  epistemological  theory  which  Pfleiderer  adopts 
is  transcendental  realism.     The  conscious  self  builds 


1  Cp.,  e.g.,  Politics,  A.  1252,  a.  24  :  ei  Srj  TIS  e£  d 
<£vd/u.€va  /3Aei^€t€v  w<77rep  ev  rot?  aAAois  KOL  Iv  TOVTOIS,  KaAAicrr  av 

OVTO) 


1 2  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

up  the  world  of  experience  from  the  impressions  of 
sense.  But  the  laws  of  our  mind  are  not  identical 
with  the  laws  of  the  objective  world,  nor  is  thought 
the  same  as  the  being  of  things.  The  two  spheres 
correspond  to  one  another,  whence  we  infer  that  a 
universal  Keason  co-ordinates  the  world  of  being 
and  the  world  of  thought.  This,  we  are  told,  is 
the  true  form  of  the  metaphysical  proof  of  God's 
existence.  But  the  argument  from  the  moral  order 
must  supplement  this  proof  and  give  ethical  con- 
tent to  the  idea  of  the  Absolute  Being.  Pfleiderer 
thus  holds  a  midway  position  between  the  view  that 
asserts  the  perfect  cognisibility  of  God  and  the  view 
that  denies  all  theoretical  knowledge  of  Him.  We 
know  God  both  speculatively  and  practically,  but 
our  knowledge  though  real  is  limited.  The  whole 
inner  side  of  the  divine  life  is  beyond  our  grasp. 
And  when  we  try  to  express  the  idea  of  a  Being 
who  is  beyond  space  and  time,  our  thought  must 
perforce  be  figurative. 

To  our  mind  this  is  a  sound  and  satisfactory 
standpoint.  At  the  same  time  we  think  that  ob- 
jections can  be  urged  against  the  special  form  of 
transcendental  realism  which  Pfleiderer  accepts  as 
an  epistemological  theory,  though  this  is  not  the 
place  to  urge  them.1 

In  discussing  the  later  tendency  in  the  Philosophy 

1  Vid.  Essay  v.,  where  the  point  is  discussed. 


&f  Religious  Philosophy.  13 

of  .Religion  we  must  not  omit  the  name  of  Lotze 
from  our  survey.  No  doubt  Lotze's  direct  contri- 
bution to  the  subject  is  not  extensive,  and  is  con- 
tained in  a  small  volume  of  '  Outlines '  compiled 
after  his  death  from  class  lectures.1  In  the  '  Micro- 
cosmus,'  however,  he  had  handled  in  some  detail 
the  questions  of  the  personality  of  God  and  the 
nature  of  religion.  And  more  important  still,  his 
philosophical  principles  have  greatly  influenced  many 
who  have  worked  in  the  department  of  religious 
philosophy  and  speculative  theology. 

From  first  to  last  Lotze  was  the  strenuous  foe 
of  the  Hegelian  attempt  to  explain  the  universe  as 
the  work  of  thought.  He  constantly  recurs  to  the 
contrast  between  the  concrete  world  in  which  man 
acts  and  feels  and  the  spectral  region  of  thought 
formulae.  Thought,  he  tells  us,  interprets  but  does 
not  make  reality,  and  in  its  movement  it  always 
depends  on  something  which  is  not  itself.  Thought 
is  general,  but  the  core  of  reality  lies  in  the  indi- 
vidual self-feeling.  The  real  is  that  which  has 
being  for  itself.  Hence  Lotze,  following  in  the 
track  of  Leibniz,  builds  up  a  view  of  things  from  a 
pluralism  as  a  starting-point.  His  monads,  however, 
unlike  those  of  his  great  predecessor,  act  and  react 
on  one  another,  and  by  their  action  and  passion 
make  possible  the  orderly  system  of  things.  Here 

1  Grundziige  der  Keligionsphilosophie,  1884. 


14  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

we  can  only  note  the  highly  important  and  sig- 
nificant step  by  which  Lotze,  in  order  to  explain 
how  interaction  is  possible,  converts  his  pluralism 
into  a  monism.  Individuals  act  and  react  on  one 
another,  for  in  the  last  resort  they  all  fall  within 
the  one  real  Being. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  this  Absolute  Being, 
the  M.  of  the  '  Metaphysics/  seems  a  somewhat 
unpromising  object  for  a  Philosophy  of  Keligion  to 
deal  with.  One  cannot  help  thinking  of  the  Sub- 
stance of  Spinoza.  But  a  remarkable  change  seems 
to  come  over  Lotze's  thought  when  he  goes  on  to 
consider  his  Absolute  from  the  ethical  and  religious 
point  of  view.  The  Supreme  Being  is  personal,  or 
rather,  more  than  personal  in  the  human  sense,  for 
man  is  only  an  imperfect  personality.  The  inner 
distinction  of  the  Absolute  from  its  own  states 
makes  possible,  we  are  told,  its  personality.  The 
justification  for  attributing  ethical  and  spiritual 
content  to  the  idea  of  God,  Lotze  finds  in  the 
value- judgments  of  the  human  subject.  Man  claims 
that  the  Being  who  is  the  ground  of  all  things 
must  respond  to  the  demands  of  his  spiritual  life, 
and  what  ought  to  be  must  be  that  which  truly  is. 

The  stress  which  Lotze  laid  on  the  value-judg- 
ment has  had  a  marked  influence  on  subsequent 
religious  thought.  No  doubt  the  idea  in  its  first 
form  goes  back  to  Kant,  who  spoke  of  the  ends 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  15 

given  by  the  practical  reason,  and  of  the  moral 
imperative  laid  upon  the  subject  to  act  as  a  member 
of  a  kingdom  of  ends.  Here  under  another  name 
we  have  the  thought  of  a  system  of  values,  which 
has  its  source  in  the  demands  of  the  inner  life  of 
men.  Lotze,  however,  brought  the  conception  into 
vital  relation  with  the  emotional  and  spiritual  ex- 
perience of  the  individual,  and  asserted  for  it  a 
validity  independent  of  intellectual  processes.  Hence 
he  claims  the  right  to  speak  of  the  Infinite  Being 
as  Love,  and  to  regard  the  mechanism  of  nature 
and  the  course  of  history  as  the  unfolding  of  a 
loving  purpose.  We  are  now  listening  to  the 
language  of  theism.  But  whether  Lotze's  ethical 
construction  of  the  Absolute  coheres  with  the  meta- 
physical basis  on  which  it  rests  may  well  be 
doubted. 

Beyond  question  the  thought  of  Lotze  has  very 
materially  influenced  the  subsequent  development 
of  the  Philosophy  of  Eeligion.  Lotze's  continued 
reiteration  of  the  view  that  the  formal  activity  of 
thought  could  not  give  the  content  of  reality,  and 
that  the  categories  of  logic  could  neither  do  justice 
to  the  processes  of  nature  nor  to  the  movements 
of  history,  gave  strength  and  definiteness  to  the 
reaction  against  the  Hegelian  system.  His  insist- 
ance  on  the  uniqueness  of  individuality  tended  in 
the  same  direction,  and  imparted  vitality  to  the 


1 6  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

movement  towards  pluralism.  And  lastly,  in  set- 
ting the  claims  of  the  value-judgment  in  a  new  and 
fuller  light,  he  made  clear  the  right  of  spiritual 
consciousness  to  have  a  voice  in  the  final  interpre- 
tation of  reality.  No  one  who  is  acquainted  with 
recent  developments  in  philosophy  and  theology 
will  deny  the  great  influence  of  this  side  of  Lotze's 
work.  The  reader  will  no  doubt  be  able  to  trace  it 
in  the  works  we  have  still  to  mention. 

A  very  able  treatise  on  the  Philosophy  of  Eeligion, 
which,  while  showing  traces  of  Lotze's  influence,  is 
in  many  ways  an  independent  treatment  of  the 
subject,  is  the  work  of  Professor  Siebeck.1  Like 
Lotze  and  Pfleiderer,  he  does  not  admit  the  claim 
of  speculative  thought  to  know  God  fully.  But 
while  Siebeck  differs  from  Pfleiderer  in  the  view 
he  takes  of  the  essence  of  religion,  and  the  charac- 
teristic features  of  its  development,  he  is  at  one 
with  him  in  holding  that  we  have  some  speculative 
knowledge  of  the  Absolute  World-Ground.  Yet  he 
lays  less  stress  on  the  value  of  theoretical  cognition. 
It  is  a  means  and  not  an  end,  and  has  its  place  as 
an  element  in  the  personal  movement  of  the  ethical 
and  religious  life.  That  life,  expressing  itself  in 
value  -  judgments,  postulates  for  its  ground  and 
explanation  a  Supreme  Value.  The  theoretical 
conception  of  a  Highest  Being  finds  its  continua- 

1  Lehrbuch  der  Keligionsphilosophie,  1893. 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  17 

tion  and  conclusion  in  the  practical  belief  in  a 
Eeality  which  is  the  Highest  Good.  Siebeck  does 
not  think  it  necessarily  invalid  to  conceive  God 
ex  analogia  hominis.  But  he  holds  strongly  that 
pure  thought  cannot  give  us  the  idea  of  God,  who  is 
the  object  of  spiritual  faith,  and  the  source  and  end 
of  personal  religion.  Metaphysics,  he  contends,  is 
monistic ;  religion  is  individual ;  and  a  theoretical 
solution  of  this  difference  is  not  possible. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  movement  hostile 
to  a  theoretical  philosophy  of  religion  has  been 
powerfully  helped  by  the  theological  system  of 
Eitschl,  and  by  the  work  of  his  numerous  followers. 
Eitschl  at  one  period  was  disposed  to  admit  that 
it  was  the  function  of  philosophy  to  try  to  compre- 
hend the  world  as  a  whole,  and  so  religion  as  an 
element  in  it.  But  he  finally  abandoned  this  view, 
and  excluded  theoretical  philosophy  entirely  from 
the  domain  of  religion.1  Taking  stand  with  Kant, 
Eitschl  maintains  the  strict  limitation  of  the  theo- 
retical faculty,  and  insists  that  the  idea  of  God  is 
not  an  object  of  speculative  cognition  at  all.  The 
religious  consciousness  moves  altogether  in  the 
sphere  of  value -judgments.  God  ceases  to  be  a 
valid  conception  for  the  reason  which  is  common 

1  Vid.  Pfleiderer,  'Development  of  Theology,'  p.  184.  Kitschl's 
theological  system  is  unfolded  in  the  3rd  vol.  of  his  *  Christliche  Lehre 
der  Kechtfertigung  und  Versohnung.' 

B 


1 8  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

to  all  men,  but  is  posited  as  the  answer  to  inner 
needs  and  desires.  Hence  the  Kitschlian  system 
is  a  sort  of  theological  positivism  which  seeks  to 
rest  on,  and  to  elaborate  itself  out  of,  historical 
experience.  The  Christian  view  of  God,  and  the 
corresponding  view  of  the  world,  are  neither  justi- 
fied nor  refuted  by  reason.  Their  only  verification 
is  the  way  in  which  they  have  satisfied  and  still 
satisfy  the  needs  of  the  inner  life. 

In  a  similar  spirit  one  of  Ritschl's  best  known 
followers,  Kaftan,  expresses  himself  in  a  lecture  on 
'  Christianity  and  Philosophy/ *  There  is  no  way, 
he  tells  us,  leading  from  natural  science  and  psy- 
chology to  philosophy ;  nor  is  the  last  the  central 
science,  as  Aristotle  conceived  it.  Philosophy  only 
exists  in  the  true  sense  as  the  practical  reason  of 
Kant,  i.e.,  as  the  doctrine  of  the  highest  good ;  and 
here  only  do  we  have  the  key  to  the  meaning  of 
reality.  In  other  words,  the  idea  of  God  is  posited 
by  the  moral  and  spiritual  life,  and  receives  no 
justification  whatever  from  pure  reason.  The  func-  i 
tion  of  thought  is  subordinate ;  it  is  the  servant  of( 
the  ethical  will  from  which  it  derives  its  value. 

The  School  of  Bitschl  is  thus  thoroughly  opposed 
to  any  application  of  speculative  philosophy  to  the 
interpretation  of  religion.  It  treats  theology  as  a 
purely  historical  science,  and  justifies  its  principles 

1  Das  Christenthum  und  die  Philosophic,  1895. 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  19 

by  the  way  in  which  it  is  claimed  that  they  enter 
into  the  spiritual  experience  of  Christians.  Yet  one 
may  well  doubt  if  the  Eitschlian  notion  of  religion 
has  been  developed  without  any  aid  from  theoretical 
reflexion  on  the  nature  of  God  and  man.  The  norm 
by  which  we  appreciate  and  select  our  historical 
materials  can  hardly  be  a  merely  empirical  one. 
Eitschl's  speculative  agnosticism  has  found  a  wide 
following  in  Germany,  and  it  is  not  unintelligible  as 
a  reaction  against  the  earlier  gnosticism.  But  the 
foundations  of  the  system  are  so  unstable  that  one 
cannot  believe  the  superstructure  will  permanently 
withstand  the  tide  of  criticism. 

The  other  works  which  I  shall  mention — all  be- 
longing to  the  last  twenty  years — are  not  written 
by  Germans ;  but  they  bear  out  the  opinion  I  stated 
at  the  outset,  that  the  newer  attitude  in  Religions- 
philosophic  is  distinctly  critical  and  sceptical.  I  refer 
first  to  the  acute  and  powerful  book  of  a  distin- 
guished Dutch  scholar,  the  late  Prof.  Kauwenhoff.1 

The  Philosophy  of  Eeligion,  he  holds,  is  not  to 
be  treated  as  a  mere  aspect  of  general  philosophy. 
It  has  its  own  sphere  and  matter.  It  has  to  give 
a  psychological  account  of  the  origin  and  develop- 
ment of  religion,  and  then  goes  on  to  investigate 
its  essence  and  justification.  And  the  relation  into 

1  Philosophy  of  Eeligion.    The  original  Dutch  edition  appeared 
in  1887.    There  is  a  German  translation  by  Hanne. 


2O  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

which  it  enters  with  general  philosophy  will  depend 
on  the  results  at  which  it  arrives  in  treating  these 
subjects. 

The  foundation  of  religion,  according  to  Eauwen- 
hoff,  lies  in  the  unconditioned  consciousness  of  duty. 
The  ethical  consciousness  itself  postulates  religious 
faith.  But  the  essence  of  religious  faith  is  just 
faith  in  a  moral  order.  Unlike  Kant,  Kauwenhoff 
does  not  find  that  the  moral  consciousness  postulates 
the  idea  of  God  or  immortality.  Kant,  he  urges, 
was  really  bringing  in  the  theoretical  judgment  in 
an  illegitimate  way  when  he  sought  to  make  the 
conception  of  God  a  postulate  of  the  practical 
reason.  All  that  the  ethical  consciousness  pos- 
tulates is  the  existence  of  a  moral  order  of  things. 
The  necessary  implicate  of  this  faith  is,  that  the 
world  is  so  constituted  that  the  moral  law  can  rule 
therein.  Kant,  it  will  be  remembered,  refused  to 
admit  that  the  notion  of  end  or  final  cause  had 
objective  validity  in  nature.  Eauwenhoff,  however, 
finds  that  nature  not  only  allows  of  but  positively 
favours  the  idea  that  a  principle  of  teleological  con- 
nexion obtains  within  it. 

The  question  naturally  presses  itself  on  us,  What 
place  in  religion  does  Eauwenhoff  assign  to  the  idea 
of  God,  and  what  reality  does  he  concede  to  it  ?  If 
faith  in  an  ethical  order  is  the  essence  of  religion,  is 
that  order  only  another  name  for  God,  as  Fichte,  for 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  21 

example,  at  one  time  held  ?  It  was  to  be  expected 
that  one  deeply  imbued  with  the  Kantian  spirit  like 
this  writer  should  find  the  proofs  for  the  being  of 
God,  both  in  the  older  and  revised  form,  untenable. 
A  scientific  proof  of  the  divine  existence  is  im- 
possible, and  the  ethical  consciousness  fails  to  give 
us  the  assurance  that  an  objective  reality  corresponds 
to  our  notion  of  deity.  The  idea  of  God  which 
faith  gives  us  is  the  product  of  poetic  imagination. 
And  if  we  seek  a  counterpart  of  it  in  the  real  world, 
we  get  only  a  bare  scientific  notion.  Faith  creates 
for  us  a  picture  of  the  divine ;  and,  although  theo- 
retical proof  is  impossible,  we  can  at  least  apply  to 
it  the  negative  test  that  it  must  not  be  obviously 
false  when  translated  into  a  scientific  conception. 
Yet  it  seems  we  have  ground  for  believing  that  we 
have  truth  under  this  poetic  form,  truth  at  all  events 
so  far  as  our  stage  of  development  enables  us  to 
grasp  it,  truth  clad  in  a  partially  transparent  garb. 
And  we  accept  faith's  object  as  containing  truth, 
because  otherwise  the  realities  around  us  are  un- 
intelligible. But  EauwenhofF  denies  our  right  to 
construct  an  idea  of  God  ex  analogia  hominis : 
attributes  of  the  finite  are  not  to  be  transferred  to 
the  infinite.  On  the  other  hand,  he  maintains  that 
religious  imagination  has  a  claim  upon  belief  when 
its  object  corresponds  to  the  need  of  the  inner  life 
and  aids  the  realisation  of  our  spiritual  capacity. 


22  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

That  truth  underlies  the  symbolism  of  religious 
faith  we  have  practical  assurance.  At  most  thought 
can  only  furnish  religion  with  a  Weltanschauung  to 
which  faith  can  link  itself,  and  in  which  its  ideals 
can  be  realised. 

Rauwenhoff's  book  is  valuable  for  its  keen  and 
searching  analysis  and  its  criticism  of  religious 
conceptions.  His  critical  knife,  wielded  with  a 
fearless  hand,  leaves  nothing  untouched.  The 
reader  who  accepts  his  arguments  will  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  religion  offers  us  an  intoler- 
able deal  of  assumptions  with  a  poor  pittance  of 
assured  fact.  Still  Kauwenhoff  cannot  fairly  be 
accused  of  reducing  the  object  of  religion  to  a 
purely  subjective  creation  after  the  manner  of 
Feuerbach.  At  the  same  time  I  do  not  see  that, 
from  his  point  of  view,  any  convincing  reply  can 
be  given  to  those  who  ask  a  reason  for  the  faith  that 
is  in  us.  If  reason  is  impotent  to  lead  us  towards  a 
God,  why  should  not  faith  give  us  mere  mythology  ? 
Where  much  is  confessedly  pure  poetry,  why  may 
not  all  be  imagination  ?  To  satisfy  a  need  is  in 
itself  no  sufficient  guarantee  of  truth,  though  the 
fact  may  go  to  support  and  confirm  conclusions  to 
which  we  are  led  on  other  grounds. 

A  work  less  subtle  and  thorough  than  the  fore- 
going, though  interesting  and  eloquent  in  its  way, 
is  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  of  the  French  theo- 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  23 

logian  Auguste  Sabatier.1  The  larger  portion  of 
the  book  is  occupied  with  the  psychology  of  reli- 
gion and  a  critical  discussion  of  Christian  faith  and 
Christian  doctrines ;  it  does  not  concern  us  here. 
In  the  third  part  of  the  volume,  however,  there 
is  a  chapter  entitled  "  A  Critical  Theory  of  Religious 
Knowledge,"  to  which  we  may  refer. 

Sabatier  adopts  the  theory  that  the  God-con- 
sciousness is  the  solution  of  the  conflict  between 
the  ego  and  the  world,  and  between  the  pure  and 
practical  reason.  Without  at  present  impugning 
the  correctness  of  this  view  as  a  psychological 
explanation,  we  ask,  "What  is  supposed  to  be 
the  character  and  validity  of  the  knowledge  of 
God  attained  in  this  way  ? "  The  act,  says  Sabatier^ 
by  which  the  human  spirit  posits  God  is  an  act 
of  faith,  not  of  reason, — the  spiritual  counterpart 
of  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  in  the  natural 
world.  Yet  we  are  told  that  the  practical  solution 
implies  the  possibility  and  the  hope  of  a  theoretical 
solution.  For  the  pure  and  the  practical  reason 
are  united  in  the  subject  which  knows  and  acts.2 

1  Esquisse   d'une   Philosophie  de   la  Religion,  3rd  edition,  1897. 
Sabatier's  book  has  been  the  occasion  of  a  good  deal  of  criticism  and 
controversy  among  French  Protestant  theologians:   vid.t  e.g.,  'La 
Connaissance  Religieuse,'  by  H.  Bois,  of  Montauban,  and  '  Le  Danger 
Moral  de  1'Evolutionisme  Religieux,3  by  G.  Frommel. 

2  Compare  with  this  R.  A.  Lipsius,  '  Glauben  und  Wissen,'  p.  54  ff. 
But  I  cannot  see  that  Sabatier's  position,  as  it  is  further  denned, 
really  admits  of  such  a  hope. 


24  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

And  further,  in  asserting  the  sovereignty  of  spirit 
in  ourselves  and  in  the  world,  we  affirm  that  we 
and  the  world  have  in  spirit  the  principle  and  end 
of  our  being.  There  is  here  apparently  an  ontolog- 
ical  inference  from  a  psychological  experience  which 
at  least  needs  explanation  and  defence.  For  the 
movement  of  soul  which  finds  in  God  a  solution  of  its 
felt  inner  contradiction  does  not  in  itself  guarantee 
the  objective  supremacy  of  spirit  in  nature  and  life. 

Does  Sabatier,  then,  hold  that  our  knowledge  of 
God  which  is  subjectively  realised  is  at  the  same 
time  objectively  valid?  In  common  with  recent 
theologians  he  distinguishes  sharply  the  existential- 
judgment  from  the  value-judgment,  which  are  as 
the  foci  of  an  ellipse  in  relation  yet  always  apart. 
The  former  deals  with  the  external  facts  of  nature 
and  their  relations,  and  excludes  any  reference  to 
the  sentiment  or  will  of  the  subject.  In  the  latter 
the  reference  to  the  will  and  feeling  of  the  subject 
is  central  and  essential ;  and  to  this  order  belongs 
our  religious  knowledge.  We  do  not  apprehend 
God  as  a  being  without  us,  nor  do  we  grasp  Him 
by  logical  thought :  we  experience  Him  in  the 
heart.  Eeligious  knowledge  and  knowledge  of 
nature  are,  therefore,  two  separate  orders  not  to 
be  deduced  from  each  other;  the  passage  from  the 
one  to  the  other  is  a  ^era^acns  eis  aXXo  yeVos. 
Spiritual  truths  are  apprehended  by  a  subjective 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  25 

act,  an  act  of  the  "  heart,"  to  use  Pascal's  word. 
Headers  of  the  '  Pensees '  will  remember  the  sentence, 
"Le  coeur  a  ses  raisons  que  la  raison  ne  connait 
pas."  These  interior  reasons,  we  learn  from  Sabatier, 
are  as  sure  in  their  way  as  the  truths  of  science. 
An  objective  demonstration  of  God,  were  it  pos- 
sible, would  be  futile.  To  the  man  without  piety 
it  would  be  useless,  to  the  man  who  is  pious  it 
would  be  superfluous.  It  is  a  curious  symptom 
of  the  philosophic  temper  of  the  age  that  this 
clear-cut  division  of  knowledge  into  two  diverse 
kinds  should  seem  satisfactory  to  many.  I  cannot 
see  how  the  fact  that  both  orders  fall  within  the 
consciousness  of  the  subject  can  be  a  guarantee 
for  their  solidarity  and  correspondence,  unless  we 
further  grant  that  the  idea  of  God  as  unitary 
ground  of  both  series  has  theoretical  validity. 
Moreover  the  heart  is  semper  varium  et  mutabile; 
and  if  the  verities  of  religion  are  apprehended  only 
by  inner  spiritual  experience,  universality  and 
consistency  of  belief  appear  to  be  impossible. 

The  Danish  philosopher  Hoffding,  whose  intel- 
lectual affinity  is  more  with  Spinoza  than  with 
Kant,  has  lately  given  us  a  striking,  and  in  some 
respects  independent,  treatment  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Eeligion.1  The  book  offers  abundant  material 

1  Religionsphilosophie,  1901.  German  translation  with  the  co- 
operation of  the  author,  by  F.  Bendixen. 


26  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

for  discussion,  but  I  must  confine  myself  to  one 
or  two  salient  points  which  bear  on  the  subject 
in  hand. 

The  task  which  Hoffding  sets  to  himself  is  to 
determine  the  place  and  significance  of  religion  in 
life.  A  Philosophy  of  Keligion  instead  of  solving 
problems  rather  shows  how  these  arise,  and  ex- 
plains their  meaning  and  bearing.  He  begins 
with  an  epistemological  discussion  which  yields 
the  conclusion  that  religion  can  lay  no  claim  to 
explain  the  world  where  science  fails.  And  as  the 
result  of  an  interesting  argument,  Hoffding  finds 
that  theoretical  thought  gives  no  objective  validity 
to  the  idea  of  God.  What  is  given  in  experience 
is  totality;  multiplicity  and  unity  are  abstractions, 
and  the  one  is  not  to  be  deduced  from  the  other. 
Materialism  is  indeed  a  fallacy,  but  idealism  lacks 
cogent  proof.  It  is  even  possible  that  reality  may 
have  other  aspects  than  those  we  term  psychical 
and  material,  for  the  division  is  purely  empirical.1 
We  must,  no  doubt,  presuppose  some  kind  of 
ultimate  unity  as  the  ground  of  the  interaction 
and  interdependence  of  things,  but  this  is  the  goal 
to  which  knowledge  cannot  rise.  Hoffding  thinks 
his  standpoint  might  be  termed  "  critical  monism." 
He  denies  our  right  to  apply  analogically  concepts 

1  This  of  course  suggests  Spinoza.     But  how  much  is  a  possibility, 
which  has  no  positive  point  of  contact  with  reality,  worth  ? 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  27 

valid  within  experience  to  the  ultimate  ground  of 
all  experience.  Notions  like  '  personality '  and 
'  activity '  are  quite  inapplicable  to  God,  who  can 
mean  no  more  for  logical  thought  than  the  prin- 
ciple of  explanation.  Even  more  thoroughly  than 
Kauwenhoff,  Hoffding  reduces  the  dogmas  of 
religion  to  mere  poetry  and  symbolism. 

It  might  seem,  then,  that  religion  had  no  title  to 
exist  at  all.  That  depends,  however,  on  what  we 
mean  by  religion,  and  Hoffding  means  something 
curiously  vague  and  abstract.  In  his  c  Outlines  of 
Psychology'  he  defined  religion  as  "  cosmic  life-feel- 
ing," and  here  we  learn  that  it  signifies  a  "  Faith  in 
the  maintenance  of  Value"  (Erhaltung  des  Wertes), 
the  conviction  that  value  persists  in  the  world. 

Like  many  others  Hoffding  thinks  the  religious 
consciousness  expresses  itself  in  value -judgments ; 
but  in  place  of  the  ethical  order  which  Kauwenhoff 
found  to  be  its  presupposition,  he  finds  a  general 
principle  implied.  And  this  principle  is,  as  we  have 
said,  that  the  good  (value)  persists,  and  maintains 
itself,  through  all  the  changing  forms  it  assumes 
in  the  world -development.1  As  parallels  to  the 
spiritual  principle  we  have  the  conservation  of 
energy  in  nature,  and  the  principle  of  continuity  or 
causal  connexion  in  science.  All  three,  inasmuch  as 

1  With  this  we  may  compare  M.  Arnold's  faith  in  "  a  stream  of 
tendency  which  makes  for  righteousness." 


28  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

they  carry  in  them  an  inference  as  to  the  future 
from  the  basis  of  a  present  and  past  experience 
which  is  incomplete,  involve  faith. 

So  far  as  I  can  see,  the  Philosophy  of  Eeligion 
in  Hoffding's  hands  casts  no  light  on  the  deeper 
meaning  of  religion,  nor  discloses  any  satisfactory 
ground  for  its  emergence  on  the  stage  of  human 
history.  The  developed  religions,  on  this  view, 
contain  a  great  mass  of  spurious  accretions.  The 
latter  are  the  work  of  thought,  whose  proper 
function  in  religion  is  very  subordinate ;  but  it  has 
managed  to  import  into  religion  many  unwarrant- 
able assumptions.  It  has,  for  example,  illegitimately 
personified  the  notion  of  a  highest  value.  We  must 
discard,  however,  this  illegitimate  extra -belief,  for 
the  essence  of  religious  faith  is  no  more  than  faith 
in  an  abstract  principle  of  value.  Hoffding  thinks 
the  principle  can  be  shown  to  be  implicit  in  all  the 
historical  forms  of  religion.  Even  if  it  were  so,  it 
does  not  follow  that  a  colourless  common  residuum 
is  the  constitutive  idea.  And  I  cannot  comprehend 
how  "faith  in  the  persistence  of  value"  is  an 
adequate  psychological  motive  for  the  historic 
development  of  the  religious  consciousness.  But 
even  if  we  accept  HofFding's  view  of  the  essence  of 
religion,  its  validity  on  his  theory  remains  un- 
certain. For  we  cannot  pass  simply  from  ap- 
preciation of  value,  which  is  subjective,  to  the 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  29 

persistence   of  value  as   an   objective  principle  in 
the  universe. 

In  his  epistemology  Hoffding  leaves  the  gulf 
unbridged  between  the  value-series  in  the  mind  and 
the  real  or  causal  series  in  the  objective  world.  And 
to  do  him  justice,  he  admits  "  conservation  of  value  " 
is,  strictly  considered,  a  principle  held  by  faith,  which 
cannot  be  proved  by  reason  to  be  immanent  in  the 
world-process.  Faith,  however,  claims  its  object  to 
be  real :  it  does  not  say,  "  I  must  act  as  if  this  were 
true,"  but  "  This  is  true."  And  though  the  outlook 
of  JReligionsphilosophie  be  restricted  in  these  days, 
it  ought  at  least  to  say  something  to  justify  or  con- 
demn the  claims  of  faith.  But  Prof.  Hoffding  gives 
us  no  positive  ground  of  confidence  in  his  principle. 
He  only  goes  the  length  of  trying  to  remove  certain 
objections  which  may  be  urged  against  it.  He 
adduces  arguments  to  show  why  the  apparent  loss 
or  extinction  of  value  in  the  world-process  need  not 
be  so  in  fact.  Yet  when  all  is  said,  the  principle 
hangs  in  the  air  without  proper  support.  It  cannot 
be  argued  that  the  persistence  of  value  is  a  postulate 
of  the  existence  of  value ;  and  the  purely  empirical 
warrant  for  the  belief  is  by  no  means  convincing. 
We  may  fine  down  the  essence  of  religion  to  a  thin 
abstraction,  but  so  long  as  it  implies  that  we 
postulate  ethical  law  as  realised,  and  maintaining 
itself  in  the  objective  world,  we  must  seek  some 


30  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

guarantee  for  this  in  the  character  of  the  ultimate 
Keality.  And  the  vague  " critical  monism"  of 
Hoffding  gives  no  real  basis  to  the  conservation  of 
value  as  an  immanent  law  of  the  universe. 

I  shall  conclude  this  survey  by  a  short  reference 
to  the  philosophical  point  of  view  indicated  by 
Prof.  James  in  his  extremely  interesting  lectures  on 
'  Varieties  of  Eeligious  Experience/ 

"We  have  spoken  of  a  philosophical  point  of  view 
for  convenience'  sake,  but  Prof.  James  is  a  foe  to 
metaphysics  in  the  old  sense.  In  Plato's  days  he 
would  have  been  ranked  among  the  /uo-oXdyoi  or 
"haters  of  ideas."  Eeaders  of  his  book  will  re- 
member that  religious  experiences  somehow  well  up 
into  the  conscious  region  from  the  sub -conscious 
self.  Distinguishing  the  existential  from  the  value- 
judgment,  he  properly  remarks  that  the  description 
of  their  genesis  does  not  involve  a  pronouncement 
on  the  real  meaning  and  worth  of  these  experiences. 
Has  Prof.  James,  then,  any  theory  of  the  philosophic 
meaning  of  the  psychological  process  ?  He  will  not 
call  his  view  a  theory,  it  is  only  an  hypothesis ;  and 
"  who  says  hypothesis  renounces  the  ambition  to  be 
coercive  in  his  arguments  ? "  In  religious  experience 
we  feel  ourselves  to  be  connected  with  a  "  something 
more,"  we  feel  the  "conscious  person  to  be  con- 
tinuous with  a  wider  self  through  which  saving 
experiences  come."  But  James  declares  explicitly, 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  31 

"  What  the  more  characteristically  divine  facts  are 
apart  from  the  actual  inflow  of  energy  in  the  faith- 
state  and  the  prayer-state  I  know  not."  The  intel- 
lectual constructions  by  which  we  seek  to  explain 
our  religious  experiences  are  worthless.  They  are 
"  over-beliefs,"  unconvincing  structures  reared  by 
thought  on  the  basis  supplied  by  feeling.  Philos- 
ophy lives  in  words  and  fails  to  be  objectively  con- 
vincing. "  The  recesses  of  feeling  are  the  only  places 
in  the  world  in  which  we  can  catch  real  fact  in  the 
making."  So  apparently  Faust  was  right,  GefiM 
ist  Alles.  Naturally  God,  as  commonly  conceived, 
falls  to  be  reckoned  as  an  '  over-belief/  The  prac- 
tical needs  of  religion  are  satisfied  by  faith  in  a 
larger  power  friendly  to  us :  indeed  "  anything 
larger  will  do,  if  it  is  large  enough  to  trust  for  the 
next  step."  In  fact,  the  universe  "  may  be  a  collec- 
tion of  larger  selves  "  without  any  true  unity  in  it. 
On  such  high  matters  there  is  no  certainty,  but 
"  human  nature  is  willing  to  live  on  a  chance,"  II 
faut  parier.  And  Prof.  James  is  willing  to  make 
his  'personal  venture7  on  the  'over -belief  that 
there  is  something  divine  in  the  universe  after  all. 

If  we  are  to  believe  this  trenchant  writer,  theology 
and  philosophy  of  religion  are  deeply  discredited. 
Feeling  is  mistress  of  the  house,  and  reason  is  the 
obedient  drudge, — "  it  finds  arguments  for  our  con- 
victions, for,  indeed,  it  has  to  find  them."  The 


32  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

'  philosophic  climate '  in  which  Mr  James  lives  is 
radically  different  from  that  in  which  the  men 
flourished  who  trusted  thought  to  read  the  riddle 
of  things.  But  I  shall  not  attempt  to  criticise 
the  writer's  position  in  detail.  In  these  lectures 
he  only  indicates  his  philosophic  standpoint  in  out- 
line, reserving  its  fuller  development  for  another 
occasion.  But  we  are  told  enough  to  infer  that 
the  claim  of  any  religion  to  be  a  ( reasonable  ser- 
vice7 is  quite  unsubstantiated.  "We  hardly  ex- 
aggerate James's  point  of  view  when  we  say  that 
spiritual  experience  is  an  eruption  from  beneath, 
which  inundates  the  conscious  region, — an  experi- 
ence whose  ultimate  origin  and  meaning  we  may 
speculate  about,  if  we  please,  with  the  certainty 
that  no  certainty  is  possible  on  the  subject.  Prof. 
James's  hostility  to  speculative  construction  is  firmly 
rooted  in  his  first  principles.  Fundamental  fact  is 
given  only  by  feeling;  belief  is  a  matter  of  will 
rather  than  of  intellect.  In  conceptual  thinking 
we  dwell  in  a  shadowy  realm  of  abstractions,  the 
dim  reflection  of  the  world  of  living  realities.  The 
inherent  weakness  of  thought  makes  a  Philosophy 
of  Eeligion,  save  in  the  most  restricted  sense,  a 
fruitless  task.  We  have  reached  a  point  of  view 
the  polar  opposite  of  that  with  which  we  began. 

Here,  then,  we  close  our  short  survey.     It  lays 
no  claim  to  be  complete,  but  seeks  merely  to  in- 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  33 

dicate  in  a  general  way  the  growth  of  a  tendency. 
We  have  taken  Hegel's  work  as  representing  the 
high-water  mark  of  confidence  in  the  speculative 
method  and  in  its  power  of  solving  the  problems 
of  religion.  And  it  appeared  both  interesting  and 
instructive  to  point  out  the  difference  of  spirit 
and  aim  with  which  religious  philosophy  has  been 
pursued  during  the  past  generation.  It  would  not 
be  true  to  say  that  the  anti-speculative  tendency 
is  the  exclusive  tendency,  but  it  is,  on  the  whole, 
the  prevailing  tendency.  On  the  other  hand, 
thinkers  like  Dr  E.  Caird  and  Prof.  Eoyce  have 
made  important  contributions  to  the  subject  in 
quite  recent  times,  and  they  have  a  real  faith  in 
the  capacity  of  reason  to  deal  effectively  with  the 
highest  problems.  Works  like  these  at  least  serve 
to  show  that  idealism  in  one  form  or  another  is 
still  a  force  in  England  and  America,  and  that 
Pragmatism,  as  represented  by  Prof.  James,  will 
not  win  its  way  without  dispute.  But  the  per- 
sistence of  an  older  tendency  is  compatible  with 
the  growth  of  a  new  and  different  tendency,  and 
the  evidence  for  the  latter  is  convincing.  The 
general  direction  of  the  current  is  fairly  clear. 
We  begin  with  the  Hegelian  reaction  against  the 
exaltation  of  feeling  in  religion  by  the  Eomantic 
School  and  its  endeavour  to  explain  religion  through 
the  dialectic  of  thought.  The  absolute  claim  of 


34  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

reason  gradually  broke  down,  and  the  need  of  an 
unbiassed  study  of  historic  facts  asserted  itself. 
The  philosophic  standpoint  moved  back  towards 
Kant,  and  the  importance  of  feeling  was  again 
recognised  in  the  stress  which  Lotze  and  many 
after  him  laid  on  the  value-judgment.  Some  of 
the  best  work  in  the  Philosophy  of  Eeligion  has 
been  done  by  those  who  have  treated  the  pure  and 
the  practical  reason,  the  intellectual  and  the  value- 
judgment,  as  complementary  and  mutually  support- 
ing, and  so  have  endeavoured  to  rise  to  a  view  of 
God  which  satisfies  the  whole  man.  The  recogni- 
tion of  feeling  and  will  as  well  as  reason  was 
amply  justified,  and  is  indispensable  to  the  proper 
treatment  of  religious  phenomena. 

But  the  further  development  of  tendency  was 
to  reduce  thought  to  an  entirely  subordinate  place, 
and  to  regard  the  other  elements  alone  as  the 
essentials  of  the  religious  consciousness.  In  har- 
mony with  this  the  problem  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Religion  comes  to  be  viewed  as  a  much  narrower 
one.  Thought  is  sent  on  no  adventurous  task  of 
scaling  the  heavens,  but  is  put  to  the  humbler 
work  of  ordering  the  house  on  earth.  Little  is 
said  of  the  ontological  questions  raised  by  religion, 
and  that  little  is  mainly  negative.  We  are  rather 
invited  to  consider  the  rise  and  growth  of  religion 
as  an  element  in  human  culture,  to  determine  its 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  35 

relation  to  other  elements,  to  understand  its  func- 
tion and  to  appreciate  its  value  in  life.  One  has 
no  desire  to  ignore  the  worth  of  work  of  this 
kind,  and  the  Psychology  of  Keligion  has  profited 
much  in  recent  years  by  the  concentration  of  atten- 
tion on  the  subjective  aspects  of  religion.  At  the 
same  time,  there  is  a  danger  in  turning  away  from 
the  larger  problem  of  religious  philosophy.  Man 
is  not  merely  interested  in  knowing  how  religion 
works  in  life,  he  desires  also  to  know  how  far  the 
claim  which  religion  makes  of  setting  before  us  a 
true  view  of  the  world  can  be  justified.  If  he  is 
asked  to  look  on  theological  creeds  as  no  more 
than  poetry  and  symbol,  he  will  press  the  question, 
"  What,  then,  is  true  ? "  And  justly  so  ;  for  the 
effective  negation  is  only  made  from  a  positive 
standpoint.  When  the  philosopher  criticises  and 
finds  contradictions  in  the  current  religious  con- 
ceptions, he  must  try  to  vindicate  his  criticisms 
by  revealing  some  higher  and  more  harmonious 
point  of  view.  To  what  end?  cries  the  sceptic; 
the  new  view  will  turn  out  inadequate,  like  all 
those  which  have  gone  before.  There  is  no  doubt 
of  this.  Pure  truth,  as  Lessing  said,  is  for  God 
alone ;  but  to  man  belongs  the  right  and  the  duty 
to  search  for  truth.  It  will  be  enough  if  the  later 
synthesis  represent  a  further  stage  of  progress,  a 
more  advanced  point  at  which  the  pilgrim  spirit 


36  Hegel  and  the  later  Tendency 

of  humanity  pauses,  and  surveys  in  the  light  of 
reason  the  wide  fields  of  experience,  ere  it  again 
resumes  its  onward  journey  towards  the  kingdom 
of  all  truth.  Agnosticism  is  intelligible  as  a  re- 
action, but  it  can  never  be  an  abiding  attitude  of 
the  human  mind. 

Accordingly,  while  we  are  clear  that  the  claims 
of  Hegelianism  were  extravagant,  we  are  just  as 
clear  that  the  position  —  say  of  Prof.  James  —  is 
equally  extravagant.  Granted  that  a  purely  rational 
nature  would  not  be  religious,  it  is  no  less  true 
that  a  purely  feeling  and  willing  nature  would  not 
be  religious  either.  Thought  is  not  a  subordinate 
but  an  essential  element  in  the  religious  conscious- 
ness, for  feeling  and  will  are  useless  without  the 
presence  of  ideas.  We  cannot  discredit  reason 
without  likewise  casting  discredit  on  religion.  The 
self-conscious  spirit  demands  to  be  in  harmony  with 
itself,  and  this  it  cannot  be  if  reason  is  excluded 
from  its  deepest  experiences. 

It  is  usual  for  those  who  take  the  opposite  view 
to  urge  that  in  practice  thought  has  very  little  to 
do  with  the  making  or  unmaking  of  religion. 
Apollo  and  Minerva,  as  Comte  said,  were  never 
refuted  :  they  vanished  away  because  they  no  longer 
answered  a  spiritual  need.  Logic  does  not  create 
faith,  and  faith  often  resists  the  assaults  of  logic. 
There  is  an  element  of  truth  here.  No  one  will 


of  Religious  Philosophy.  37 

say  that  purely  intellectual  forces  built  up  any 
religion ;  and  we  know  that  the  conservative  in- 
fluence of  feeling  and  sentiment  can  keep  doctrines 
alive  long  after  they  have  been  disowned  by  reason. 
Yet  even  here  the  credulous  devotee  does  not  sup- 
pose his  belief  to  be  irrational,  although  he  is  not 
able  to  show  that  it  is  reasonable.  The  "credo, 
quia  absurdum  est "  of  Tertullian,  the  apotheosis  of 
purely  emotional  certainty,  is,  in  its  extravagance, 
an  impracticable  attitude  for  normal  human  nature. 
The  developed  religions  claim  to  be  consistent  with 
reason,  and  the  growth  of  doctrine  attests  the  need 
that  religion  should  appeal  to  the  mind  as  well  as 
satisfy  the  heart.  Indeed  the  secondary  function 
of  thought  in  religion  is  apparent  rather  than  real. 
Keligious  experience  inevitably  clothes  itself  in 
forms  of  thought,  and  acquires  meaning  and  general 
value  only  as  it  does  so.  And  the  intellectual  out- 
look reacts  on  the  religious  feelings,  and  gives  a 
tone  to  them.  The  subtle  change  of  spiritual 
climate  by  which  people  explain  the  decadence  of 
a  faith  once  vigorous  is  due  in  part  at  least  to 
intellectual  causes.  Greek  philosophy  had  much  to 
do  in  producing  the  religious  atmosphere  in  which 
Apollo  and  Minerva  withered  away.  And  the 
Christian  consciousness  to-day  reflects  in  an  un- 
mistakable way  the  influence  of  modern  science. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  fully  granted  that 


38      Later  Tendency  of  Religious  Philosophy. 

pure  thought  can  never  give  us  the  God  whom  the 
religious  consciousness  demands.  Hence  those  are 
right  who  urge  that  value- judgments  are  essential 
in  religion.  For  only  through  the  value  realised 
in  experience  can  we  give  positive  spiritual  content 
to  the  idea  of  Him  who  is  the  living  Source  and 
the  abiding  Ground  of  all  truth  and  goodness. 
The  error  which  the  religious  philosopher  must 
guard  against  is  one-sidedness.  Religion  is  a  rich 
and  complex  growth,  and  he  must  endeavour  to  do 
justice  to  all  its  elements. 


ESSAY     II. 

THE  NATURAL  SCIENCES,  ETHICS, 
AND  RELIGION 


"ME 

UNIVERSITY 

£*LfF 


ESSAY   II. 


DURING  tlie  first  two  or  three  decades  of  the  latter 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  much  was  heard  of 
the  disagreement  between  Science  and  Keligion. 
And  even  that  general  public  which  cares  nothing 
for  the  controversies  of  the  schools  was  in  this 
-case  interested  in  the  issues  of  the  dispute,  for 
views  were  being  urged  which,  it  was  thought, 
seriously  menaced  the  integrity  of  the  dominant 
Faith.  In  a  sense,  however,  it  was  only  an  old 
war  which  had  entered  on  a  new  phase.  The 
quarrel  between  Science  and  Eeligion  goes  at  least 
as  far  back  as  the  days  of  Anaxagoras,  who  was 
accused  of  impiety  because  he  ventured  to  say 
that  the  glorious  Sun -God  was  only  a  red-hot 
stone.  Such  incidents,  however,  were  isolated  and 
occasional ;  with  the  advent  of  the  modern  world 
the  protests  of  individuals  took  the  larger  and 
more  permanent  form  of  antagonism  between  two 
discordant  points  of  view. 


42     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

In  the  sixteenth  century  Natural  Science,  which 
had  so  far  won  its  independence  and  had  entered 
on  its  marvellous  career,  came  into  sharp  conflict 
with  the  Church.  Nor  can  we  wonder  that  the 
Church,  whose  way  of  thinking  was  based  on  the 
Ptolemaic  system,  found  the  Copernican  scheme  of 
the  universe  revolutionary  and  dangerous.  But 
the  new  Astronomy  was  not  to  be  denied ;  and  if 
Eeligion  protested  against  it  at  the  first,  it  was 
forced  to  come  to  terms  with  it  at  the  last.  Nor 
is  it  likely  that  the  result  will  be  different  in  the 
case  of  the  controversy  which  sprang  up  last 
century.  The  geologic  record  is  just  as  convinc- 
ing on  the  vast  age  of  the  earth  as  astronomy  is 
on  the  boundless  extension  of  the  heavens.  The 
Church,  as  many  now  recognise,  must  adjust  its 
outlook  to  the  larger  scheme  of  things.  We  have 
even  fallen  on  a  time  when  the  more  thoughtful 
public  is  no  longer  interested  in  attempts  to 
reconcile  Genesis  and  Geology.  The  Darwinian 
theory  of  the  Descent  of  Man  is  not,  of  course, 
universally  accepted  yet,  for  the  evidence  is  still 
incomplete.  But  the  old  prejudice  is  broken  down, 
and  the  general  readiness  to  regard  it  as  a  good 
working  hypothesis  is  a  victory  for  Science.  At 
the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  we  find  the 
doctrine  of  a  special  series  of  creative  acts  has 
fallen  into  the  background, — a  doctrine  religious 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     43 

in  its  origin  and  long  an  article  of  religious  belief. 
In  its  stead  the  notion  of  evolution,  or  of  con- 
tinuous development,  has  won  widespread  accept- 
ance as  a  sound  principle  of  scientific  method. 

The  dispassionate  observer  at  present  naturally 
asks,  What  have  been  the  gains  and  losses  on 
either  side  ?  In  what  case  have  the  so  -  called 
victories  of  Science  left  Eeligion?  It  is  histori- 
cally evident  that  Copernicus  dealt  piety  no  deadly 
blow,  nor  in  these  days  does  it  seem  hardly  smitten 
by  the  followers  of  Darwin.  Those  who  thought 
to  do  Eeligion  grievous  hurt  have  found  their 
sword  pass  through  no  earthly  body,  and  they 
have  seen  the  foeman,  like  the  legendary  heroes 
in  the  Norse  Walhalla,  still  vigorous  and  ready 
to  renew  the  fight.  The  votaries  of  Religion, 
proud  of  its  power  to  survive  assault,  might  say 
to  its  opponents, — 

"  You  do  it  wrong,  being  so  majestical, 
To  offer  it  the  show  of  violence ; 
For  it  is,  as  the  air,  invulnerable, 
And  your  vain  blows  malicious  mockery." 

Are  we  to  suppose,  then,  that  Eeligion  dwells  in 
some  supersensuous  region  where,  as  Kant  held, 
Science  can  neither  make  nor  mar?  Not  exactly 
so.  But  we  must  insist  that  it  is  necessary  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  substance  and  the  secondary 
products,  between  the  spiritual  life  and  the  theories 


44     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

and  inferences  which  have  grown  up  around  it. 
The  former  is  of  primary,  the  latter  of  lesser, 
importance.  Religion  gives  meaning  and  imparts 
a  purpose  to  life,  and  therefore  it  involves  a  general 
view  of  the  world.  It  bids  man  regard  himself 
and  his  surroundings,  the  world  and  historic 
events,  in  the  light  of  an  all-embracing  end. 
But  the  reality  of  the  object  of  religious  faith, 
and  the  value  of  the  spiritual  life,  do  not  stand 
or  fall  with  a  particular  interpretation  of  the 
connexion  of  phenomena  in  nature  or  the  order 
of  their  development  in  the  cosmic  whole.  One 
cannot  see  how  the  worth  of  Eeligion  is  impaired 
by  the  nebular  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  solar 
system,  or  by  the  Darwinian  account  of  the  descent 
of  our  race.  Certain  traditional  views  which  have 
been  associated  with  Religion  will  have  to  be 
corrected;  Religion  itself  is  not  discredited. 

Indeed,  when  we  look  into  the  matter  closely, 
we  see  that  the  quarrel  of  Science  has  been  much 
more  with  specific  theological  doctrines  than  with 
Religion  as  a  whole.  In  an  earlier  day  theology 
set  forth  what  it  thought  was  the  religious  ex- 
planation of  facts  in  nature.  There  was  no  ex- 
isting body  of  scientific  knowledge  to  control  its 
activity.  At  a  later  time,  when  Science  set  to 
work  in  this  field,  it  gradually  discovered  that 
these  facts  came  under  the  dominion  of  natural  law 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics ',  and  Religion.     45 

and  causality.  It  therefore  strenuously  resisted 
the  theological  dogma  as  an  explanation,  and 
upheld  the  sufficiency  of  the  mechanical  inter- 
pretation. Now  the  controversy  is  dying  down ; 
and  those  who  have  the  interests  of  Keligion  at 
heart  are  recognising  that  they  can  frequently 
accept  the  explanations  of  Science  as  valid  in  their 
sphere  without  sacrificing  the  spiritual  interests- 
they  hold  sacred. 

But  a  rapprochement  like  this  has  not  always 
been  possible.  For  Science  has  sometimes  not  been 
content  to  attack  weak  and  exposed  outposts  of  the 
spiritual  kingdom,  but  has  hurled  itself  against  the 
citadel.  And  Eeligion  has  had  to  fight  pro  aris  et 
focis.  I  refer  to  the  assaults  of  materialism  which, 
in  the  name  of  Science,  sought  to  reduce  life  and 
mind  to  matter  and  force.  One  can  understand  how 
vigorous  spirits,  elated  at  the  success  of  the  mechan- 
ical method  of  explanation,  were  bold  to  think  that 
the  principle  might  be  indefinitely  extended  in  its 
scope.  Thus  in  his  famous  Belfast  Address,  we  find 
Prof.  Tyndall  speaking  of  the  "  intellectual  neces- 
sity "  by  which  we  discern  in  matter  "  the  promise 
and  potency  of  all  terrestrial  life."  Another  well- 
known  writer  has  said,  "  As  surely  as  every  future 
grows  out  of  past  and  present,  so  will  the  physi- 
ology of  the  future  gradually  extend  the  realm  of 
matter  and  law  until  it  is  coextensive  with  know- 


46     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

ledge,  and  feeling,  and  action."  :  So  wrote  Prof. 
Huxley  in  1868;  and  though  he  never  repudiated 
the  words,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  he  would 
have  chosen  to  speak  so  confidently  twenty -five 
years  later.  For  the  discussions  of  the  last  thirty 
years  have  been  quite  unfavourable  to  the  conten- 
tion that  mental  and  spiritual  processes  can  ever  be 
explained  by  concepts  like  matter  and  force.  The 
"  beggarly  elements "  of  things  must  certainly  be 
very  much  better  than  they  are  supposed  to  be,  if 
they  are  to  beget  life  and  mind.  Materialism  really 
assumes  what  it  pretends  to  deduce.  And  while  it 
has  attacked  religion  in  the  name  of  Science,  in  the 
end  it  has  itself  been  discredited. 

But  it  is  not  only  with  Science  that  Religion  has 
had  disputes.  The  domain  of  Ethics  lies  so  near 
to  that  of  Religion  that  concord  between  them 
would  seem  to  be  essential  and  in  the  best  interests 
of  both.  Yet  though  near  relations  they  have  occa- 
sionally differed  with  one  another.  Historically  this 
has  usually  happened  when  the  moral  ideal  has 
advanced  beyond  the  level  represented  in  existing 
religious  thought  and  practice.  Thus  we  see  the 
Greek  dramatists  purifying  and  elevating  the  old 
stories  about  the  Gods,  which  had  the  sanction  of 
the  ancient  faith,  but  were  condemned  by  their 

1  It  ought  to  be  said,  however,  that  this  does  not  necessarily  mean 
more  than  a  thorough-going  psycho-physical  parallelism. 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     47 

moral  consciousness.  In  the  person  of  Xenophanes 
we  find  the  philospher  roundly  denouncing  the  tradi- 
tional way  of  representing  the  divine  powers  as  im- 
moral. Again,  among  the  Hebrews  the  prophetic 
movement  of  the  eighth  century  B.C.  reveals  the 
conflict  of  a  deeper  ethical  consciousness  with  a 
religion  which  had  stiffened  into  a  mechanical  and 
external  cult.  Indeed  the  uprising  of  the  ethical 
spirit  in  new  strength  has  always  been  a  powerful 
source  of  religious  reform  and  progress.  Here,  how- 
ever, it  is  plain  that  the  quarrel  of  Ethics  is  not 
with  Eeligion  as  such,  but  with  its  defective  or  un- 
satisfactory form.  The  demand  of  the  moral  con- 
sciousness is  for  a  purification  of  the  old  faith ;  it 
has  no  thought  of  offering  itself  as  the  substitute 
of  Eeligion. 

And  we  can  understand  why  it  has  been  so.  For 
Eeligion  is  older  than  Ethics,  and  under  its  shelter- 
ing shadow  the  virtues  have  grown  up.  To  cast  off 
piety  altogether  was  to  the  men  of  an  earlier  time 
to  pass  outside  the  social  bond,  to  break  with  im- 
memorial custom,  to  be  an  outcast  from  family  and 
tribe.  But  the  modern  world  has  witnessed  the 
rise  of  Ethics  to  a  new  importance  and  a  larger 
independence.  The  moral  life  is  no  longer  regarded 
simply  as  an  aspect  of  the  religious  life,  or  as  the 
outer  court  of  the  spiritual  temple.  Indeed  in  these 
days  the  demand  is  frequently  made  that  morality 


48      The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

should  be  cultivated  for  its  own  sake  entirely,  and 
we  are  told  it  needs  no  ulterior  sanctions.  Here  is 
something  sure,  it  is  urged,  on  which  many  may 
agree  and  whose  practical  value  no  one  doubts ;  but 
in  Eeligion  all  is  uncertainty  and  matter  of  dispute. 
Thus  in  recent  years  Ethical  Societies  have  sprung 
up  in  England  and  America,  which  aim  at  supplying 
moral  teaching  and  stimulus  apart  from  religious 
dogma.  The  leading  spirits  in  these  societies  do  not 
aim  at  a  reformation  of  the  Church ;  they  rather 
appeal  to  the  class  which  regards  Keligion  in  any  of 
its  historic  forms  as  unsatisfactory.  Morality,  it  is 
contended,  wants  no  religious  panoply;  it  is  itself 
the  guarantee  of  its  practical  validity  and  value. 
Although  individuals  may  disagree  about  the  ulti- 
mate foundations  of  Ethics,  they  can  co-operate  har- 
moniously in  an  association  which  seeks  to  deepen 
the  consciousness  of  duty  and  to  strengthen  the 
sentiment  of  social  obligation.1  Here,  then,  we 
have  a  denial  of  the  claim  of  Eeligion  to  be  the 
necessary  guide  of  life.  And  we  learn  that  ethical 
principles  supply  all  the  rules  of  conduct  men  re- 
quire. To  decide  as  to  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  this 
dispute  we  must  come  to  an  understanding  about 
the  meaning  and  function  of  Ethics  and  Eeligion. 

1  In  a  lecture  entitled  "The  Ethical  Movement  Defined,"  Dr 
Stanton  Coit  gives  as  its  main  doctrines — (1)  devotion  to  the  good 
of  the  world,  and  (2)  the  highest  reverence  for  individual  duty. 


The  Natural  Sciences^  Ethics,  and  Religion.     49 

The  fact  that  both  Natural  Science  and  Ethics 
have  been  at  variance  with  Eeligion  gives  point  and 
urgency  to  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  Eeligion 
to  the  other  elements  in  human  culture.  Before, 
then,  passing  to  the  further  questions  involved  in 
the  nature  and  origin,  the  value  and  ultimate 
validity  of  Eeligion,  we  may  clear  the  ground  a 
little  by  discussing  the  relation  of  Eeligion  to 
Natural  Science  and  to  Ethics.  This  preliminary 
investigation  will,  I  think,  be  useful  if,  by  way  of 
contrast  and  distinction,  it  helps  to  bring  into 
clearer  light  what  is  characteristic  in  Eeligion  as 
well  as  make  plain  the  significance  and  scope  of 
scientific  and  ethical  principles.  Whatever  view  is 
taken  of  them,  Natural  Science,  Ethics,  and  Ee- 
ligion are  three  normal  and  constant  aspects  of 
human  culture.  Each  has  its  practical  justification 
and  title  to  existence.  And  if  we  try  to  understand 
their  several  functions,  and  to  see  their  respective 
limitations,  we  may  perhaps  find  that  it  is  possible 
to  treat  them  as  coherent  elements  in  the  larger 
whole  of  human  experience. 

We  commonly  distinguish  between  a  scientific,  a 
religious,  and  a  philosophic  point  of  view.  Each 
offers  in  its  way  an  explanation  of  facts  in  experi- 
ence, but  the  explanations  are  on  different  levels. 
It  may  be  useful  for  us  to  touch  briefly  on  the  his- 
toric development  of  these  distinctions. 

D 


50     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

In  the  beginnings  of  culture  the  three  spheres 
were  not  differentiated ;  the  primitive  cosmogony 
or  religious  myth  was  at  once  science,  religion,  and 
philosophy  wrapt  up  in  one.  In  early  Greek 
thought  the  first  decisive  step  was  taken  which 
separated  the  scientific  from  the  religious  view  of 
things.  For  the  myths  of  the  popular  creed  an 
explanation  of  the  cosmos  by  known  causes  was 
substituted.  But  as  yet  no  distinction  was  drawn 
between  science  and  philosophy.  The  ovra  of  the 
Pre-Socratic  thinkers,  as  Aristotle  has  told  us,  were 
simply  the  alo-OrjTa.  Plato,  in  clearly  marking  off 
sense-perception  (aicr^cris)  from  thought  (vorjcns), 
opened  out  the  way  for  this  further  differentiation. 
In  the  Platonic  system  the  sciences  form  a  kind  of 
introductory  discipline  to  philosophy,  the  supreme 
science  of  StaXe/crt/c^.1  The  type  of  science  Plato 
found  in  mathematics,  and  he  has  the  mathematical 
sciences  always  in  view.  For  him  the  knowledge 
which  is  "scientific"  lies  between  mere  belief,  or 
uncriticised  opinion,  and  the  supreme  knowledge 
which  sees  all  the  facts  in  the  light  of  the  highest 
principle.  Science,  therefore,  to  Plato  represents  a 
real  but  an  incomplete  form  of  knowledge,  inasmuch 

1  Kep.,  vii.  533,  C. ;  Sympos.,  210,  C. 

The  '  Philebus '  marks  a  stage  of  Plato's  thought  considerably  later 
than  the  'Kepublic,'  but  the  view  of  dialectic  is  substantially  the 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     5 1 

as  it  does  not  dialectically  deduce  the  postulates 
from  which  it  sets  out.1  Or  as  we  might  put  it  in 
the  language  of  our  own  day,  science  is  an  advance 
on  the  common  consciousness,  but  it  makes  assump- 
tions which  philosophy  must  revise  and  correct  from 
the  higher  standpoint  of  system. 

With  Aristotle  we  note  the  beginning  of  a  division 
of  knowledge  into  special  disciplines.  The  Aristo- 
telian system  falls  into  two  parts,  theoretical  and 
practical ;  and  the  ^ecup^rt/cat  hrurnftud  are  divided 
into  Mathematics,  Physics,  and  Metaphysics  or 
Theology.  But,  as  we  might  expect  from  his 
method  and  point  of  view,  the  special  sciences 
have  a  more  independent  value  for  Aristotle  than 
for  Plato.  In  contrast  to  philosophy  they  are 
occupied  with  a  particular  phase  or  aspect  of  re- 
ality.2 On  the  other  hand,  Aristotle  makes  no 
sharp  distinction  between  the  special  sciences  and 
philosophy.  For  the  latter  is  simply  the  most 
general  and  so  the  central  science,  and  deals  with 
the  first  principles  of  reality  as  such.3  The  special 
sciences  investigate  grounds  or  causes  in  a  limited 
sphere,  while  Metaphysics  goes  back  to  the  ultimate 
grounds  of  all  things.  The  distinction  is  not  one 
of  method  but  of  scope.  It  should  also  be  said,  that 
neither  for  Plato  nor  Aristotle  does  the  religious 

1  Eep.,  vi.  510.  11. 

2  Meta.,  iv.  1.  1,  and  vi.  1.  3.  3  Meta.,  i.  2,  and  xi.  3.  1. 


5  2     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

view  of  the  world  have  any  validity  apart  from  the 
philosophic. 

The  close  relation  with  First  Philosophy  into 
which  Aristotle  brought  the  special  sciences  was  less 
difficult  then,  in  view  of  the  slender  development 
of  the  latter.  But  when  the  progress  in  this  direc- 
tion made  afterwards  in  Greece  was  continued  with 
marvellous  success  in  modern  times,  the  problem 
became  vastly  harder.  The  natural  sciences,  having 
gained  their  independence,  set  to  work  with  a  will ; 
and  they  have  amassed  a  great  body  of  detailed 
knowledge  in  various  departments,  which  it  becomes 
ever  less  easy  to  organise  into  a  systematic  whole. 
The  scientific  field  has  been  divided  and  subdivided, 
and  the  individual  investigator  has  usually  neither 
time  nor  interest  to  discuss  the  wider  bearings  of 
the  special  knowledge  with  which  he  deals.  The 
philosopher,  however,  cannot  evade  the  duty  of 
giving  some  general  pronouncement  on  the  meaning 
and  value  of  the  knowledge  supplied  by  the  par- 
ticular sciences.  Or  at  least  he  cannot  do  so  with- 
out abandoning  the  claim  to  be  'synoptic'  in  the 
sense  of  Plato.  For  the  modern  world  the  '  Critique ' 
of  Kant  set  this  problem  in  a  new  light.  The 
radical  result  of  Kantian  criticism,  embodied  in  the 
principle  that  "the  understanding  makes  nature," 
was  to  pronounce  the  accumulated  knowledge  of  the 
external  universe  to  be  phenomenal  merely.  Beyond 


The  Natural  Sciences ',  Ethics,  and  Religion.     5  3 

the  lower  realm  in  which  the  understanding  moves, 
above  the  region  of  things  in  space  and  time,  lies  a 
real  world ;  but  its  portals  are  for  ever  barred,  alike 
to  the  man  of  science  and  the  speculative  inquirer. 
In  this  supersensuous  world  faith  finds  God,  Free- 
dom, and  Immortality.  But  it  was  a  dubious  boon 
to  religion  to  deliver  it  from  the  assaults  of  the 
materialist  and  the  sceptic  at  the  expense  of  making 
it  theoretically  unintelligible.  Nor  could  the  scien- 
tific mind,  so  fruitful  in  practical  results,  feel  re- 
conciled to  a  criticism  which  cut  the  ground  from 
beneath  it,  and  refused  to  assign  to  its  work  any 
definite  degree  of  reality  in  the  ultimate  constitu- 
tion of  things. 

To  fill  up  the  chasm  left  by  the  Kantian  criticism, 
and  to  rethink  experience  in  a  more  thorough  way, 
became  an  urgent  task.  Hegel  sought  to  do  so  by 
abandoning  altogether  the  notion  of  '  things  in 
themselves,'  and  by  treating  reason  as  one  and 
continuous  through  all  the  stages  of  its  development 
from  mere  immediacy  of  consciousness, — pure  being 
— to  absolute  self-consciousness, — perfect  Keality. 
Broadly  speaking,  the  work  of  Hegel  was  to  in- 
terpret the  universe  as  an  evolution,  whose  stages 
are  stages  in  the  development  of  self-consciousness 
or  reason.  Accordingly  the  standpoint  of  science 
represents  a  level  of  development  above  that  of  the 
ordinary  consciousness  but  below  that  of  philosophy. 


54     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

The  similarity  to  Plato  is  thus  apparent.  Hegel's 
view  of  science  is  at  all  events  more  satisfactory 
than  that  of  Kant,  for  he  allows  to  it  a  definite 
degree  of  reality  and  a  value  in  the  larger  system 
of  experience.  And  it  had  the  undoubted  merit 
of  bringing  into  relief  the  truth  that  science  pro- 
ceeds by  abstraction ;  it  concentrates  attention  upon 
a  special  aspect  of  reality  and  neglects  the  rest. 
On  the  other  hand,  few  or  none  will  now  admit 
that  thought  has  succeeded  in  rising  to  the  absolute 
point  of  view,  and  has  given  the  final  reinterpre- 
tation  of  the  results  of  science.  Hegel's  own  efforts 
to  apply  the  dialectic  to  nature  were  by  no  means 
happy.  In  fact,  the  scientific  investigation  of 
nature  is  still  so  incomplete  that  the  present-day 
thinker,  with  a  better  intellectual  perspective,  re- 
frains from  publishing  a  '  Naturphilosophie.'  Our 
valuation  of  the  sciences  must  to  some  extent  be 
provisional,  and  cannot  go  beyond  certain  broad 
statements. 

We  may  take  it,  however,  that  Modern  Idealism 
has  made  it  clear  that  the  natural  sciences  are  ab- 
stract in  their  point  of  view,  therefore  partial  in 
their  explanations.  They  take  the  objects  of  outer 
experience  as  given,  they  raise  no  questions  how 
they  come  to  be  given.  Yet  a  fact  of  outer  experi- 
ence implies  concepts  as  well  as  percepts  in  space 
and  time.  Apart  from  the  activity  of  conscious 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     55 

subjects,  the  object  in  presentation  would  not  be 
what  it  is.  With  the  purpose  it  has  in  view  natural 
science  rightly  neglects  the  ideal  aspect  of  experi- 
ence, but  in  so  doing  it  inevitably  sacrifices  com- 
pleteness of  interpretation.  Accepting,  then,  reality 
as  given,  the  objective  sciences  restrict  themselves 
almost  entirely  to  the  mechanical  standpoint  in 
dealing  with  it.  They  are  engaged  in  determining 
the  quantitative  relations  of  things  ;  of  their  qualita- 
tive differences  they  have  little  to  say.  The  sensa- 
tion of  violet  is  qualitatively  distinct  from  that  of  red ; 
but  optics,  in  tracing  the  distinction  to  a  difference 
of  length  in  the  respective  light-waves  of  violet  and 
red,  furnishes  an  explanation  which,  if  important,  is 
obviously  incomplete.  Why  this  particular  light- 
wave should  give  this  particular  quality  of  sensation 
we  do  not  learn. 

In  general  the  method  of  the  Natural  Sciences  is 
to  establish  a  connection  between  things  by  the 
principle  of  causality.  They  endeavour  to  trans- 
form what  at  first  seem  isolated  events  into  a 
connected  series,  and  in  this  way  they  seek  to 
show  that  experience  is  rational.  To  know  what 
precedes  and  what  succeeds  a  certain  fact  is  practi- 
cally important ;  but  it  is,  even  from  the  standpoint 
of  science,  meagre  and  one-sided  as  an  explanation. 
Eeflexion  shows  that  elements  in  the  background  are 
also  indispensable  to  the  effect.  So,  as  a  more  com- 


56     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

plete  statement,  science  interprets  an  event  through 
an  assemblage  of  causes.  But  the  result  is  to  show 
that  a  perfectly  adequate  statement  of  the  total 
grounds  of  any  event  is  not  attainable.  Indeed  the 
full  presentation  of  the  conditions  of  an  effect  would 
involve  the  statement  of  the  effect  itself,  as  in  turn 
conditioning  the  action  of  its  causes.  Science,  how- 
ever, cuts  this  perplexing  knot;  and  in  practice  it 
works  well  by  explaining  an  event  through  its  more 
prominent,  or,  for  the  specific  purpose,  its  more  im- 
portant, conditions. 

Nevertheless  when  science,  though  refusing  to  go 
beyond  the  mechanical  point  of  view,  bids  us  rec- 
ognise the  eternal  necessity  of  'laws  of  nature/ 
we  pause  and  ask  why.  For  if  we  incautiously 
accept  the  statement  as  a  major  premiss,  we  may 
be  afterwards  presented  with  the  inference  that 
causal  initiative,  human  or  divine,  is  a  fiction. 
There  is  no  place,  it  is  urged,  for  such  effects  in 
the  strictly  determined  order  of  nature.  The  ex- 
pression c  law  of  nature '  is  of  course  anthropo- 
morphic. And  analogy  must  not  lead  us  to  regard 
such  laws  as  having  a  validity  beyond  the  partic- 
ular facts  in  which  they  are  realised.  No  natural 
law  can  be  deduced  a  priori  in  the  Kantian  sense. 
It  neither  of  itself  creates  the  facts  which  exemplify 
it,  nor  shows  why  they  come  to  be.  A  'law  of 
nature/  as  in  chemistry,  is  often  no  more  than  a 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     57 

quantitative  formula  which  states  the  proportions 
in  which  elements  unite  to  form  new  products. 
That  sixteen  parts  by  weight  of  oxygen  unite  with 
two  parts  of  hydrogen  to  form  water  is  true  as  a  fact 
but  meagre  as  an  explanation.  That  gravity  as  a 
force  varies  with  the  mass,  and  inversely,  as  the 
square  of  the  distance,  describes  how  bodies  act 
under  certain  conditions  and  no  more.  Laws  are 
generalised  expressions  of  the  behaviour  of  things, 
and  they  are  without  significance  apart  from  the 
things.  Their  ultimate  meaning  depends  on  the 
inner  nature  of  the  things  of  which  they  are 
the  expression.  In  fact,  the  idea  of  a  'law  of 
nature'  seems,  under  examination,  to  sink  back 
into  the  more  general  principle  that  nature  is 
uniform.  In  other  words,  the  things  and  elements 
in  nature  act  on  and  respond  to  one  another  in 
uniform  ways,  so  that  experience  is  continuous,  the 
present  harmonises  with  the  past,  and  the  logical 
movement  of  thought  is  in  correspondence  with  the 
outward  order  of  events.  The  scientific  notion  of 
necessity,  like  that  of  law  and  causality,  is  not  a 
principle  which  imposes  itself  on  facts  and  rules 
them  by  some  superior  right.  It  can  only  find 
what  warrant  it  has  in  the  inner  constitution  of  the 
facts  themselves.  And,  from  its  mechanical  stand- 
point, Natural  Science  is  obviously  unable  to  solve 
this  problem. 


58     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

The  jurisdiction  of  Natural  Science  is  thus  limited. 
Without  going  beyond  its  province  it  cannot  sit  in 
judgment  on  the  spiritual  side  of  experience.  On 
the  other  hand,  Ethics  and  Eeligion  are  alike  con- 
cerned to  maintain  that  the  mechanical  view  of 
nature  is  not  final,  that  it  can  and  ought  to  be 
supplemented.  For  both  presuppose  that  the  world 
of  outer  experience  subserves  moral  and  spiritual 
ends.  Does  nature  itself  lend  any  countenance  to 
the  contention  that  the  standpoint  of  mechanism 
must  be  transcended  ?  This  at  least  we  know,  that 
to  explain  mechanically  is  to  explain  inadequately. 
Do  the  facts,  then,  demand  a  teleological  interpre- 
tation? The  old  argument  which  demonstrated 
everywhere  the  hand  of  an  external  designer  is 
discredited,  and  it  is  seldom  urged  now.  And  one 
may  admit  that  Bacon's  protest  against  explanation 
by  final  causes,  on  the  part  of  science,  was  sound 
advice  against  confusing  two  different  standpoints.1 
Yet  nature  itself,  in  setting  before  us  the  varied 
phenomena  of  life,  puts  in  a  plea  for  teleology. 
The  relation  of  the  parts  in^  an  organic  body  visibly 
calls  for  a  way  of  regarding  them  which  is  higher 
than  mechanical.  For  we  find  here  a  grouping  and 
co-ordination  of  elements  into  a  whole,  which  we 

1  ("  Causoe  finales)  quse  stint  plane  ex  natura  hominis  potius  quam 
universi,  atque  ex  hoc  fonte  philosophiam  miris  modis  corruperunt." 
— 'Nov.  Org.,'49. 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     59 

make  intelligible  to  ourselves  through  the  notion  of 
means  and  end.  To  Aristotle  it  seemed  that  the 
idea  of  the  whole,  or  complete  organism,  was  the 
presupposition  and  final  cause  (TO  o5  l^e/ca)  of  the 
arrangement  and  growth  of  the  parts.  His  concep- 
tion of  an  immanent  teleology  has  been  a  fruitful 
one,  and  it  has  not  lost  its  value.  We  cannot 
ignore  the  fact  that  in  nature,  in  the  sphere  where 
mechanical  explanations  prevail,  complex  products 
appear  in  which  external  causality  has  been  con- 
verted into  a  systematic  connexion  of  parts,  so  that 
each  part  is  determined  in  meaning  and  function 
by  the  whole,  If,  then,  within  the  realm  of  nature, 
forms  of  unity  which  are  determined  by  an  end  are 
present  beyond  dispute,  can  we  draw  any  inference 
as  to  the  constitution  of  the  world  in  which  these 
forms  appear?  The  inorganic  elements  we  know 
are  made  subservient  to  the  life-process,  they  are 
converted  into  means  to  an  end.  This  would  be 
impossible,  were  these  elements  in  their  inner 
character  not  susceptible  of  a  connexion  which  is 
more  than  mechanical.  Tf  the  material  world  were 
only  a  vast  series  of  externally  related  things  with 
no  inward  unity,  the  continuous  process  of  life 
within  it  would  be  a  hopeless  puzzle.  The  nature 
which  constantly  ministers  to  that  which  is  clearly 
teleological  must,  in  some  sense,  be  a  whole  per- 
vaded by  the  principle  of  end. 


6o     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

The  mechanical  method  is  an  abstract  and,  for 
practical  purposes,  highly  convenient  way  of  inter- 
preting nature.  Mechanism  has  its  value  as  an 
aspect  of  a  more  concrete  point  of  view ;  and  that 
within  its  limits  it  is  valid  the  discoveries  of 
science  attest.  It  only  becomes  false  when  it 
asserts  its  own  sufficiency.  The  mechanism  of  the 
organ  is  implied  in  the  production  of  the  fugue 
which  is  played  upon  it.  But  it  would  be  ridicu- 
lous to  say  that  it  explains  the  musical  meaning 
of  the  piece  as  a  harmonious  whole. 

When  we  pass  from  the  domain  of  nature  to 
that  of  consciousness,  the  futility  of  a  merely 
mechanical  interpretation  is  transparent.  The  point 
has  been  so  often  and  so  effectively  insisted  on 
that  we  do  not  feel  called  upon  to  urge  it  here. 
Nor  does  the  notion  of  psycho-physical  parallelism, 
or  the  view  of  mind  as  an  epiphenomenon,  offer 
any  real  explanation  of  the  nature  and  origin  of 
consciousness.1  If  an  organic  world  supervenes  on 
a  mechanical  system,  and  if  life  in  turn  blossoms 
into  conscious  selves  which  think,  feel,  and  will, 
and  invest  experience  with  meaning  and  value,  we 
must  construe  the  beginning  in  the  light  of  the 
rich  result.  The  e^epyeta  interprets  the  SiW/xis, 
and  not  vice  versa.  The  deeper  and  more  com- 
plete interpretation  of  reality  will  be  spiritual,  and 

1  Vid.  Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  caps.  11  and  12.    t 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     6 1 

what  seems  lowest  must  have  some  affinity  with 
spirit.  The  procedure  of  natural  scientists  to  some 
extent  supports  this  contention,  for  they  find  it 
necessary  to  idealise  "matter"  to  fit  it  for  the 
rdle  it  has  to  play. 

"  Natura  non  facit  saltum  "  was  once  a  favourite 
motto  with  physicists,  and  Leibniz  gave  a  higher 
turn  to  the  principle  when  he  declared  experience 
to  be  continuous  through  all  its  grades.  It  is  of 
value  to  remember  that  no  phase  of  experience  is 
isolated,  but  each  derives  meaning  from  its  relation 
to  other  phases.  And  so  it  would  be  overstraining 
the  point  to  say  that  the  ethical  world  represents 
a  complete  break  in  the  chain  of  development.  In 
the  region  of  instinctive  behaviour,  in  the  uncon- 
scious but  purposive  selection  of  what  conserves  the 
life  of  the  individual  and  the  species,  it  may  be 
conceded  there  is  a  dim  forecast  of  the  higher 
realm  of  moral  conduct.  For  morality  is  also  action 
which  conduces  to  the  wellbeing  of  the  individual 
and  race,  and  the  customs  and  laws  of  primitive 
society  were  developments  which  ministered  to  the 
conservation  of  the  social  whole.  And  while  with 
the  deepening  of  self-consciousness,  and  the  growth 
of  personal  character,  these  laws  gradually  take  a 
higher  and  more  distinctly  ethical  character,  it  is 
still  true  that  we  cannot  fix  a  point  and  say  that 
there  is  here  a  break  in  the  continuity  of  the 


62     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

process.  The  danger  is  that  a  false  inference  may 
be  drawn  from  the  principle  of  continuity.  For 
if  you  assume  that  you  have  got  a  complete 
explanation  of  the  facts  on  a  lower  level,  and 
then  suppose  that  the  same  explanation  must 
hold  at  a  higher  level,  you  are  likely  enough 
to  go  astray.  The  abstract  principles  of  mechan- 
ism, for  instance,  give  a  useful  interpretation 
of  natural  phenomena:  apply  them  to  spiritual 
phenomena,  and  they  are  notoriously  insuffi- 
cient. In  the  same  way  the  self-regarding  in- 
stinct may  be  helpful  in  shedding  light  on  bio- 
logical facts ;  but  make  it  the  universal  law  of 
action,  and  by  it  explain  all  civic  virtue  and  moral 
heroism,  and  your  principle  breaks  down.  The 
truth  would  seem  to  be  that  such  generalisations, 
even  in  the  lower  sphere,  are  not  perfect  and  ex- 
haustive, but  their  inadequacy  becomes  palpable  in 
the  higher.  Hence  it  seems  to  me  that  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  ethical  and  spiritual  life  of  man 
with  lower  levels  of  being,  instead  of  suggesting 
an  interpretation  of  the  higher  by  the  lower, 
should  warn  us  that  the  explanations  which  will 
work  at  the  lower  level  are  really  incomplete. 

It  is  undoubted  that  man  as  a  personal  and 
ethical  being  stands  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
merely  natural  order  of  things.  Though  person- 
ality be  gradually  evolved,  it  none  the  less  marks 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     63 

a  distinctive  stage  of  world -development.  And 
first  and  foremost,  in  the  moral  world  the  differ- 
ence between  what  is  and  what  ought  to  be  has 
come  to  decisive  expression.  Man  does  not  con- 
fine his  judgment  to  mere  facts.  Over  against 
fact  he  sets  up  the  notion  of  value,  and  declares 
that  the  good  which  is  not  here  and  now,  ought 
to  be.  The  idea  of  moral  obligation  is  the  great 
obstacle  to  the  satisfactory  treatment  of  Ethics 
from  the  strictly  scientific  point  of  view.  Up  to 
a  point,  indeed,  such  a  line  of  treatment  may 
be  followed,  but  only  up  to  a  point ;  and  in  the 
end  we  cannot  get  quit  of  the  fact  that  Ethics 
is  a  normative  science.  It  is  not  merely  descrip- 
tive ;  it  prescribes  rules  of  conduct  and  sets  forth 
what  ought  to  be. 

All  conduct,  as  Aristotle  has  told  us,  is  directed 
to  some  end  or  good :  moral  conduct  is  so  directed 
consciously  and  of  choice.  It  is  necessary,  however, 
to  distinguish  the  immanent  teleology  which  exists 
in  nature  from  the  teleology  of  moral  action.  In 
the  former  we  have  the  whole  determining  the 
interaction  of  its  elements  and  developing  itself 
through  it.  The  final  end  is  thus  the  comple- 
mentary notion  to  that  of  causality.  In  the  one 
case  we  go  from  the  parts  to  the  whole,  in  the 
other  from  the  whole  to  the  parts.  And  so,  we 
may  remark  in  passing,  we  cannot  hold  with  Kant 


64     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

that  cause  is  constitutive,  but  the  end  only  regu- 
lative. For  the  end  is  the  more  complete  state- 
ment of  what  is  involved  in  the  cause.  But  here 
we  cannot  speak  of  the  end  being  a  motive  to 
the  parts,  nor  is  there  any  contrast  implied  be- 
tween a  higher  and  a  lower  end.  The  particular 
quality  which  attaches  to  the  word  ought  is  want- 
ing. Or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  moral  growth 
is  not  a  movement  determined  from  point  to 
point  by  the  completed  result.  An  end  which 
thus  dominates  the  process  of  development  is  not 
an  ethical  end,  and  though  you  might  speak  of  it 
as  that  which  has  to  be,  you  could  not  speak  of 
it  as  that  which  ought  to  be.  In  other  words 
man  selects  his  ends,  chooses  between  them,  and 
determines  himself.  Moral  obligation  rests  on  the 
freedom  of  the  subject ;  remove  this,  and  obli- 
gation sinks  to  non-moral  constraint.  I  suppose 
that  most  people  will  agree  that  moral  conduct 
presupposes  some  kind  of  freedom,  and  that  there 
is  a  sense  in  which  such  conduct  is  not  mechani- 
cally determined.  But  nevertheless  there  is  dis- 
agreement as  to  what  exactly  is  signified  by  free- 
dom. And  even  though  the  question  is  an  old 
one,  it  may  be  well  to  examine  it. 

The  Natural  Sciences,  we  may  take  it,  cannot 
disprove  freedom.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  they 
cannot  show  that  the  mechanical  point  of  view  is 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     65 

applicable  to  the  spiritual  world :  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  do  not  prove  that  nature  itself  is 
satisfactorily  explained  from  the  standpoint  of 
mechanism.  Hence  they  have  no  title  to  insist 
that  nature  is  a  strictly  determined  whole  which 
excludes  the  free  realisation  of  moral  ends  within 
it.  As  Science,  then,  is  not  in  a  position  to  op- 
pose a  non  possumus  to  the  claim  for  freedom,  the 
validity  of  the  claim  must  be  judged  on  other 
grounds.  And  to  begin  with,  it  is  highly  signifi- 
cant that  the  claim  should  be  made.  Those  who 
deny  freedom  ought  to  explain  why  we  act,  and 
cannot  help  acting,  under  the  idea  of  freedom. 
"  Paradoxical  as  it  may  appear,"  says  Prof.  Ward, 
"  even  the  illusion  of  activity  and  spontaneity  is 
certain  evidence  that  activity  and  spontaneity 
somehow  exist."  And  certainly  if  man  were  only 
a  conscious  automaton,  it  does  not  seem  possible 
to  offer  any  plausible  reason  why  he  should  even 
imagine  himself  free. 

The  most  ordinary  analysis  will  show  that  there 
is  that  in  moral  action  which  differentiates  it 
qualitatively  from  mechanical  process.  Between 
the  stimuli  A,  B,  C,  and  the  acts  which  correspond 
to  them — X,  Y,  Z — there  intervenes  the  conscious 
subject  S.  And  the  fact  that  A,  B,  and  C  can 
only  become  motives  by  losing  their  externality 
and  forming  part  of  the  living  content  of  S,  this 

E 


66     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

constitutes  the  difference  between  compulsion  and 
self-determination,  as  Aristotle  pointed  out.1  Man, 
as  has  often  been  said,  is  free,  because  he  is  not 
externally  determined  but  determines  himself. 

It  is,  however,  apparent  that  the  idea  of  self- 
determination  may  cover  two  distinct  conceptions 
of  personal  freedom.  In  the  one  case,  where 
there  are  alternatives  before  the  individual,  he 
chooses  between  them,  and  while  he  selects  one 
it  was  possible  for  him  to  select  the  other.  This 
we  may  call  the  freedom  of  the  real  alternative. 
In  the  other  case  he  chooses,  but  his  whole  char- 
acter is  expressed  in  the  choice,  and  of  acts  that 
seem  alternative  only  one  is  consistent  with  the 
self.  A  man's  character  determines  his  action, 
but  as  character  is  just  the  self  as  it  has  come  to 
be  qualified,  we  can  still  say  he  is  self-determined 
and  therefore  free.  It  is  of  importance  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  religious  consciousness  that 
we  should  decide,  if  possible,  which  of  these  views 
is  to  be  accepted.  For  the  way  we  regard  moral 
evil,  and  the  manner  in  which  we  construe  the 
act  of  faith,  will  depend  on  the  kind  of  freedom 
we  take  to  be  true. 

Now  it  must  be  frankly  admitted  that  some 
considerations  tell  in  favour  of  what  we  may  call 


1  Eth.  Nic.,  iii.  1.     Biaiov  Se  ov  17  a-PX*l  2£<t>#ev,  roiavrr]  ovcra  ev 
•$  fj,r)$€v  (rv/A/JaAAcTai  6  Trparrwv  r)  6 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     67 

spiritual  determinism,  and  it  has  commended  itself 
to  many  philosophical  thinkers.  If  choice  is 
absolutely  indifferent,  it  is  hardly  moral ;  and  in 
practical  life  we  do  not  suppose  S  to  be  just  as 
likely  to  choose  A  as  B.  Moral  valuation  goes  on 
the  assumption  that  acts  are  somehow  the  outcome 
of  character  expressed  in  desire.  And  experience 
of  men  serves  to  show  that  there  is  very  little 
which  is  arbitrary  in  human  conduct.  Moreover, 
against  those  who  maintain  a  real  contingency  of 
choice,  it  is  contended  that  this  means  the  intro- 
duction of  a  fictitious  pure  self  which  is  without 
content ;  and  so  the  vital  nerve  is  cut  which  binds 
the  character  to  the  act  of  the  agent,  and  makes 
him  responsible.  Still,  when  all  is  said,  spiritual 
determinism  raises  grave  difficulties,  although  those 
who  advocate  it  are  not  always  willing  to  allow 
this.  The  difficulties  come  out  in  the  facts  of 
remorse  and  repentance.  We  are  here  confronted 
with  the  dilemma  that,  if  the  acts  repented  of  are 
not  connected  with  the  character  of  the  agent,  they 
are  not  really  his  and  he  cannot  truly  regret  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  would  be  no  cause  for 
regret  if  the  individual  could  not  have  acted  other- 
wise. Eepentance,  to  the  determinist,  is  an  illusion 
engendered  by  a  discord  between  a  man's  present 
emotional  condition  and  his  condition  when  he  did 
the  deed.  The  interpretation,  it  must  be  said,  is 


68     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

not  credible.  A  similar  difficulty  confronts  the 
spiritual  determinist  in  dealing  with  the  fact  of  a 
moral  reformation  in  the  individual  history.  In 
his  view  the  self-conscious  principle  in  man  has 
transformed  the  natural  desires  and  dispositions 
into  a  moral  character.  Between  the  present  and 
past  of  this  character  there  is  a  necessary  connex- 
ion, and  each  new  act  is  an  outcome  of  the  past 
and  becomes  a  condition  of  the  future.  How,  then, 
does  man  draw  from  the  past  the  will  to  reform 
himself  in  the  present  ?  The  late  Prof.  Green  has 
suggested  as  an  explanation  that  a  man's  past 
conduct  may  have  been  determined  by  "a  concep- 
tion of  personal  good"  which  has  failed  to  bring 
satisfaction,  and  his  attitude  may  be  one  of  "  con- 
scious revulsion  from  it." 1  True ;  but  the  self 
which  thus  reacts  against  the  past  is  not  the  deter- 
minate outcome  of  the  past.  The  present  reaction 
of  the  self  is  not  intelligible  apart  from  the  past. 
Yet  the  self  which  the  past  has  failed  to  satisfy 
cannot  fairly  represent  the  whole  character  de- 
veloped in  the  past.  Else  why  the  revulsion  ? 

We  may  find  some  help  in  this  difficulty  by  con- 
sidering more  closely  the  relation  of  the  self  to 
character.  The  self  which  stands  for  the  person 
with  his  history,  his  interests,  ideals,  is  an  ideal 
construction,  not  a  fact  immediately  given.  Here 

1  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  115. 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     69 

the  self  includes  the  character  it  has  developed  in 
time.  But  behind  the  ideally  constructed  self  there 
is  the  self  which  is  the  basis  of  memory,  recognition, 
and  continuity  of  interest.  Ideal  construction  with- 
out an  active  centre  which  constructs  and  is  referred 
to  does  not  seem  possible.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
character  which  is  related  to  and  owned  by  the 
fundamental  self  is  not  a  perfectly  coherent  and 
organic  whole.  It  is  formed  gradually  out  of  un- 
harmonised  natural  tendencies,  dispositions,  and 
desires,  as  the  self  works  itself  free  from  mere 
impulse  and  comes  to  fuller  consciousness  of  itself. 
The  inner  life  is,  to  use  a  figure,  composed  of 
different  strata  at  different  levels,  and  some  of 
these  may  commonly  fall  within  the  focus  of  con- 
sciousness while  others  lie  more  usually  in  the 
subconscious  region.  The  self  in  its  development 
from  the  material  to  the  spiritual  has  to  construct 
from  these  a  consistent  whole  of  character.  A 
fallacy  seems  to  lurk  in  the  ordinary  assertion 
that  action  is  necessarily  determined  by  character, 
for,  in  point  of  fact,  man  in  his  temporal  history 
has  never  unified  his  character  so  completely  as  to 
exclude  the  possibility  of  a  real  alternative  in 
conduct.  Every  moral  act  is  related  to  an  aspect 
of  a  man's  character,  else  we  should  not  commend 
him  or  condemn  him  for  it,  and  he  himself  would 
not  be  conscious  of  self  -  approval  or  repentance. 


70     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

But  all  acts  are  not  equally  characteristic.  We  re- 
mark, for  instance,  of  an  act  which  springs  directly 
from  the  main  current  of  an  individual's  interest 
and  effort,  that  it  was  "So  like  him."  Of  another 
act  we  say  that  it  was  "  So  unlike  him,"  implying 
that  it  proceeds  from  a  more  obscure  and  less  active 
aspect  of  his  inner  life.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that 
the  self  as  will  which  determines  to  action  can  take 
up  into  the  content  of  its  will  different  conceptions 
of  the  self  as  object.  These  conceptions  may  not 
harmonise,  though  all  are  potentially  capable  of 
more  or  less  close  relation  to  the  self  which  wills, 
for  they  have  had  a  place  in  the  development  of 
the  inner  life.  And  a  true  liberty  to  choose  between 
them  is  not  inconsistent  with  a  constant  relation  of 
character  and  conduct,  arid  it  gives  a  real  meaning 
to  facts  like  repentance  and  moral  obligation. 

Freedom  of  moral  choice  has  limits  imposed  on  it 
by  the  inner  life  of  the  individual,  for  the  moral 
act  must  always  be  related  to  that  life.  Before 
self-consciousness  has  developed  the  rude  elements 
of  character  out  of  the  natural  desires,  there  is  no 
responsible  action.  On  the  other  hand,  the  charac- 
ter as  it  becomes  more  and  more  unified  and  con- 
solidated, as  it  is  drawn  into  more  close  organic 
relation  to  the  self  which  wills,  so  does  it  leave  less 
scope  for  the  alternative  in  action.  As  a  man  be- 
comes thoroughly  bad,  his  power  to  choose  the  good 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     7 1 

diminishes :  and  the  more  disciplined  we  are  in 
the  life  of  virtue,  the  less  does  evil  appeal  to  us. 
In  general,  the  more  fully  and  consistently  we  take 
up  a  conception  of  self  into  the  principles  of  our 
will,  the  more  we  lessen  the  possibility  of  develop- 
ing an  alternative  conception.  Hence  the  larger 
and  ideal  meaning  which  has  been  attached  to 
freedom.  In  this  sense  freedom  denotes  the  fullest 
and  most  harmonious  development  of  human  powers, 
— a  state  in  which  goodness  is  the  immanent  law  of 
life,  and  evil  has  ceased  altogether  to  be  a  motive. 
This  of  course  is  an  ideal  which  in  temporal  experi- 
ence is  not  attained;  all  that  the  individual  can 
hope  for  is  to  make  progress  towards  it.  The  im- 
portant point  is  that  man's  path  to  this  higher 
freedom  is  by  the  real  exercise  of  his  choice,  and 
the  journey  is  significant  and  testing  because  of  the 
alternatives  which  open  out  before  the  wayfarer. 
For  the  ideal  freedom  postulates  a  real  freedom 
to  realise  it. 

We  have  so  far  discussed  the  problem  of  freedom 
from  the  individual  point  of  view,  but  we  are  fully 
aware  that  the  question  has  a  social  aspect.  Behind 
the  inner  life  of  the  individual,  and  fostering  its 
growth,  is  the  larger  life  of  the  society  to  which  he 
belongs.  The  nature  of  the  alternatives  which  are 
possible  to  him  is  conditioned  by  the  stage  of  social 
progress  and  the  character  of  his  social  environment. 


72      The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

The  virtue  and  vice  of  the  savage  are  not  those  of 
the  civilised  man,  and  the  points  where  moral 
choice  was  most  urgently  necessary  were  not  the 
same  in  mediaeval  as  in  modern  times.  Again,  the 
full  fruition  of  human  capacities  is  not  possible  in 
isolation  :  man  only  finds  scope  and  exercise  for  his 
powers  in  interaction  with  others.  So  we  could  not 
conceive  that  an  individual  should  attain  to  perfect 
freedom  apart  from  a  perfected  society.  It  is  true, 
indeed,  that  some  men  have  been  remarkably  in 
advance  of  their  age  and  environment.  Still  there 
are  boundaries  which  even  genius  cannot  overpass. 
Shakespeare  could  not  have  appeared  in  the  age 
of  Dante,  nor  Isaiah  among  the  Athenian  contem- 
poraries of  Socrates.  The  highest  civic,  moral,  or 
artistic  powers  cannot  come  to  full  and  harmonious 
utterance  in  a  rude,  lawless,  or  decadent  society. 
For  though  these  capacities  be  latent  in  a  man, 
there  is  neither  a  sympathetic  medium  to  elicit 
them  nor  a  free  field  for  their  exercise.  The  inner 
development  of  the  individual,  therefore,  is  historic- 
ally and  socially  conditioned.  And  the  advance  to 
the  higher  freedom  is  a  historic  process,  in  which 
society  and  individuals  act  and  react  one  on  another. 
The  development  of  this  ideal  must,  then,  be  studied 
historically,  and  to  this  aspect  of  ethical  develop- 
ment we  now  turn. 

Man  is  by  nature  a  TroXmKoz/  tfiov  as  Aristotle 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     73 

said,  and  morality  is  social  in  its  origin.  Ethics 
coming  from  e#os  and  morals  from  mores,  point 
to  the  ancestry  of  moral  ideas  in  customs.  The 
study  of  the  subject  from  the  evolutionary  stand- 
point dispels  the  illusion  that,  from  the  first, 
morality  was  a  separate  province  of  life  presided 
over  by  a  special  '  faculty.'  If  we  go  back  to  the 
tribe, — and  we  cannot  go  further, — primitive  ethics 
are  there  represented  simply  by  tribal  customs. 
The  norm  of  conduct  is  the  traditional  usage  or 
unwritten  law  of  the  tribe,  and  conformity  with 
this  law  is  the  rudimentary  expression  of  what 
ought  to  be.  Fear  of  punishment  human  or  divine 
ensuing  on  breach  of  the  custom,  is  the  earliest 
phase  of  conscience.  At  this  level  of  culture  per- 
sonality is  undeveloped,  and  the  social  whole  is 
all-important.  Spiritual  life  is  hampered  by  material 
conditions,  and  there  is  no  independent  growth  of 
the  inner  nature.  Hence  we  find  a  lack  of  specific 
character  in  the  products  of  the  primitive  mind. 
There  is  a  certain  monotony  in  early  myth,  custom, 
and  religion,  and  the  same  circle  of  ideas  recurs 
among  many  races.  And  the  development  of  per- 
sonal character  is  restricted  by  the  narrow  range 
of  possible  motives.  Man's  gradual  triumph  over 
natural  impediments,  and  his  advance  from  savagery 
to  civilisation,  are  primarily  due  to  the  pressure  of 
spiritual  life  within  him.  In  the  course  of  develop- 


74     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

ment  the  inner  life  deepens  and  defines  itself  pari 
passu  with  the  growth  of  social  organisation.  A 
cardinal  point  in  that  history,  regarded  objectively, 
is  the  transition  from  the  tribe  to  the  nation  as 
social  whole.  To  the  outer  expansion  correspond 
an  inner  concentration  and  advance  in  self -con- 
sciousness which  make  possible  the  rdle  of  law- 
giver, prophet,  and  reformer.  The  inward  disposi- 
tion now  receives  a  value  over  against  external 
acts.  By  -  and  -  by  legal  enactments  and  ancient 
usages  are  supplemented  by  the  thought  of  "un- 
written laws,"  of  larger  scope  and  more  divine 
authority.  So  the  human  end  is  defined  in  terms 
of  law,  which  is  the  *  custom ;  of  the  olden  time 
idealised  and  made  universal.  To  the  Hebrew 
prophet  this  end  was  obedience  to  the  law  of  the 
Covenant  -  God,  written  on  "  fleshly  tables  of  the 
heart."  To  the  Greek  thinker  it  was  participation 
in  that  immanent  justice  which  is  the  "bond  of 
perfectness"  in  society. 

The  growing  consciousness  of  the  worth  of  the 
subjective  side  of  morality  paved  the  way  for  that 
distinction  between  ethics  and  politics  which  was 
made  after  Aristotle.  It  is  a  development  of  this 
tendency  which,  in  modern  times,  has  prompted  the 
effort  to  determine  morality  by  conscience  and  to- 
value  conduct  simply  by  motives.  Conscience,  said 
Bishop  Butler,  is  "  the  rule  of  right  within " ;  the 


The  Natural  Sciences  y  Ethics,  and  Religion.     75 

one  unconditional  moral  good,  said  Kant,  is  "  a 
good  will."  We  sympathise  with  these  views  as 
a  protest  against  an  external  utilitarianism,  but 
the  rigid  exclusion  of  results  from  the  valuation 
of  conduct  is  not  possible.  The  motive  and  the 
consequences  of  an  act  must  both  enter  into  a  full 
appreciation  of  it.  In  practice  we  should  dis- 
approve of  actions  done  with  the  best  intent,  but 
the  results  of  which  the  doer  had  ample  oppor- 
tunity of  seeing  to  be  socially  demoralising.  And 
our  disapproval  of  the  acts  would  mean  a  disap- 
proval of  the  character  from  which  they  proceeded. 
The  historic  and  evolutionary  methods  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  have  served  to  correct  a  one-sided 
stress  on  the  subjective  side  of  morality.  The 
essential  interdependence  of  society  and  individuals, 
revealed  in  their  common  growth,  has  been  insisted 
on.  The  good  for  the  individual  is  recognised  to 
be  a  common  good,  and  subjective  approval  must 
in  the  last  resort  be  based  on  this  good.  From 
the  school  of  scientific  evolution  we  have  the  chief 
good  described  as  " social  health,"  or  "general  in- 
crease of  life."  These  definitions  at  least  imply 
that  valuation  must  be  in  terms  of  the  ethical  end, 
and  that  this  end  is  social  as  well  as  individual. 
As  definitions,  however,  they  must  be  reckoned 
partial  and  one-sided.  In  fact,  the  ethical  end  must 
be  regarded  not  only  as  a  common  end  but  as  ideal, 


76     The  Natiiral  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

if  we  are  to  do  justice  to  the  inner  life  which  is 
the  source  of  moral  values.  In  other  words,  the 
perfection  which  is  the  ethical  end  is  an  ideal  which 
transcends  present  attainment,  and  implies  a  per- 
fected social  system  as  its  condition.  This  corre- 
sponds to  the  higher  freedom  already  referred  to, 
— the  actualisation  of  all  capacities  for  good  in  the 
individual  in  and  through  a  society  which  makes 
this  possible.  A  school  of  English  ethical  writers 
has  termed  this  ideal  self-realisation,  and  the  phrase 
can  be  commended  on  several  grounds.  For  it 
keeps  in  view  the  fact  that  the  highest  value  must 
be  something  personal.  If  a  social  system  is  good, 
it  is  because  the  good  has  its  living  centre  in  the 
personal  beings  who  make  up  the  system.  Ethical 
goodness  has  a  reference  in  the  last  resort  to  persons, 
and  the  fact  is  kept  in  mind  when  we  speak  of  it 
as  a  realisation  of  the  self.  Again  this  designation 
of  the  ideal  does  justice  to  the  truth  that  the  de- 
velopment is  in  and  through  a  historical  process.  It 
is  a  making  real  in  time  what  the  self  has  in  it  to 
become  through  interaction  with  other  selves.  We 
progress  to  the  ideal  by  the  way  of  the  better,  but 
we  cannot  now  give  full  content  to  it.  Only  through 
the  process  of  development  itself  could  we  know  how 
much  there  is  in  a  fully  realised  self.  The  definition 
has  the  terseness  and  the  general  applicability  which 
are  needed  in  a  definition  of  the  ethical  end. 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     77 

Still  there  is  an  ambiguity  in  the  phrase,  as  will 
be  seen  when  we  ask,  What  is  the  relation  of  the 
ideal  self  to  the  actual  self  ?  Plainly  the  self  which 
has  to  be  made  real  has  not  here  and  now  come  to 
the  fulness  of  its  utterance.  It  must  be  a  larger 
self  than  the  already  existing  self.  Is  this  ideal 
self  implicit  in  individual  selves  ?  the  flower  and 
fruit,  as  it  were,  while  they  are  the  germ  ?  And 
is  ethical  progress  a  progress  by  which  the  ideal 
self  works  itself  out  through  the  historically  given 
self  by  an  inward  course  of  development?  If  so, 
self-realisation  would  have  a  lower  counterpart  in 
organic  growth.  But  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  it  is  not  possible  by  this  construction  to  do 
justice  to  the  facts  of  the  moral  life.  For  the 
ideal  self  does  not  explain  the  real  moral  develop- 
ment of  the  individual  in  time,  which  is  not  con- 
tinuous and  consistent.  To  understand  this  we  are 
thrown  back  on  the  self  which  determines  itself  to 
act,  and  in  choice  identifies  itself  with  conceptions 
of  self  which  are  not  always  compatible.  If  we 
are  to  describe  the  moral  life  in  time  as  a  process 
of  self-realisation,  we  must  mean  that  the  self 
which  men  are  realising  is  a  projected  or  future 
self.  The  self  which  is  taken  into  the  content  of 
the  will  as  end  is  not  the  complete  and  ideal  self. 
It  may  be  an  idea  of  self  lower  than  what  we  are. 
But  if  the  act  is  morally  good,  it  is  a  self  better 


78     The  Natural  Sciences ',  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

than  the  existing  self,  and  represents  a  value  in 
excess  of  that  already  attained.  The  "ought"  is 
ever  reflected  against  the  background  of  the  pre- 
sent. Yet  it  is  not,  as  we  see  it,  an  eternally 
fixed  beacon -light  but  a  luminous  point  which 
moves  with  the  background  against  which  it  is 
projected.  The  better  self  which  ought  to  be  real- 
ised is  conditioned  by  the  self  which  is,  and  this 
in  turn  is  largely  influenced  by  the  historical  and 
racial  environment  in  which  it  appears.  Ideals, 
we  all  know,  vary  with  individuals  and  races  and 
epochs  in  history.  Accordingly  the  end  defined 
as  self  -  realisation  has  a  certain  vagueness.  We 
want,  if  possible,  to  know  more  about  the  kind  of 
self  which  should  be  realised,  that  we  may  have 
some  principle  of  appreciation  to  go  on. 

In  these  circumstances  we  are  forced  to  ask, 
whether  the  idea  of  a  supreme  good,  or  perfectly 
realised  self,  is  more  than  an  abstract  generalisa- 
tion from  the  partial  forms  of  good  which  have 
existed.  It  has  not  been  shown,  and  it  may  not 
be  possible  to  show  in  a  convincing  way,  by  a 
study  of  human  progress,  that  the  diverse  ideals 
of  various  races  and  ages  are  slowly  converging 
towards  a  central  good.  And  at  the  best  our 
survey  of  the  evolution  of  experience  is  limited. 
But  still  it  is  a  very  unsatisfactory  view  that  the 
supreme  ideal  is  only  a  useful  fiction,  and  has  no 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     79 

reality.  For  then  there  would  be  no  reason  why 
different  men  and  races  should  not  content  them- 
selves where  they  could  with  quite  different  con- 
ceptions of  human  good.  And  there  could  not 
be  any  sure  conviction  on  the  meaning  of  progress 
and  the  direction  in  which  it  lay.  For  there  would 
be  no  goal  by  which  to  judge  of  movement.  We 
seem  driven  to  conclude  that  a  Supreme  Ideal  must 
in  some  way  be  real,  if  the  ends  of  conduct  are  to 
be  co-ordinated,  if  partial  ideals  are  to  be  trans- 
cended, and  if  the  good  is  to  grow  from  less  to 
more.  In  what  sense  are  we  to  say,  then,  that 
the  ideal  of  a  perfectly  realised  self  is  real  ?  Here 
the  student  of  Ethics  is  forced,  whether  he  likes 
it  or  not,  to  enter  the  domain  of  metaphysics. 
Readers  of  Green's  '  Prolegomena  to  Ethics '  will 
remember  that  he  found  it  necessary  to  postulate 
that  the  fully  realised  self  was  actual  in  the  Eternal 
Consciousness  or  God.1  And  he  endeavours  to 
bring  the  ideal  into  an  operative  connexion  with 
the  historical  process  by  his  theory  that  the  in- 
dividual is  in  possibility  what  the  Eternal  Self 
is  in  actuality.  Of  God,  Green  remarks,  "He 
is  a  Being  in  whom  we  exist,"  and  "  He  is  all  we 
are  capable  of  becoming."  This  is  not  the  place 
to  discuss  the  speculative  difficulties  in  Green's 
doctrine  of  the  relation  of  the  Eternal  to  the  in- 

1  Op.  tit.,  p.  196  ff. 


8o     The  Natiiral  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

dividual  consciousness.  But  we  must  ask  if  it 
offers  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  ethical  problem 
involved.  The  difficulty  lies  in  the  connexion  of 
the  Eternal  and  Ideal  Self,  which  is  above  de- 
velopment, with  the  development  of  the  self  in 
time.  If  the  finite  self  knows  itself  in  God  to 
possess  eternally  the  complete  good  it  seeks  in 
piecemeal  fashion  in  time,  this  temporal  develop- 
ment partakes  of  the  nature  of  appearance  and 
loses  value  in  consequence.  And  if  the  eternally 
perfect  Self  is  so  intimately  bound  up  with  our 
self -consciousness,  it  does  not  seem  clear  what 
spiritual  gain  comes  of  the  temporal  efforts  after 
a  higher  good,  or  why  there  should  be  such  a 
circuitous  process.  But  we  may  cling  to  the  reality 
and  value  of  the  development  in  time.  We  may 
say  that  the  perfectly  realised  self  somehow  exists 
in  God,  and  is  the  final  form  of  goodness,  though 
it  is  differentiated  from  the  self  which  wills  the 
good  in  time.  Then,  if  we  hold  to  self-realisation 
as  an  absolute  principle,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the 
separation  of  the  two  selves  can  be  overcome. 
Between  the  temporal  becoming  of  the  self  and 
its  eternal  goal  inner  identity,  and  so  moral  con- 
tinuity, is  wanting.  For  development  presupposes 
incompleteness :  and  we  cannot  conceive  a  process 
of  self-realisation  issuing  in  a  timeless  and  perfect 
self,  which  is  bound  by  continuity  of  consciousness 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     8 1 

and  character  to  the  self  which  wills  the  good  in 
experience.  That  is  to  say,  the  self  as  active  will 
cannot  bridge  the  cleft  between  the  real  and  the 
ideal,  and  freedom  does  not  come  as  the  fruition 
of  moral  endeavour. 

The  course  of  the  argument  thus  seems  to  have 
brought  us  to  a  dilemma.  We  saw  that  if  a  final 
good  or  highest  value  did  not  exist,  there  was  no 
trustworthy  test  of  value  or  determination  of  pro- 
gress. And  yet,  when  we  try  to  give  an  ultimate 
expression  to  the  ethical  end,  we  find  ourselves 
entangled  in  contradictions.  It  seems  to  me  that 
the  only  solution  to  this  difficulty  lies  in  the 
recognition  that  the  ethical  consciousness  itself 
is  not  ultimate  and  must  be  transcended.  Self- 
realisation  as  an  ethical  principle  is  not  at  fault. 
It  is  a  good  working  idea  of  the  ethical  end,  and 
up  to  a  point  satisfies  the  needs  of  a  theory  on 
the  subject.  It  only  becomes  contradictory  when 
we  try  to  state  it  as  an  absolute  principle  of 
spiritual  life.  For  no  working  out  of  the  moral 
ideal  brings  man  to  the  fulfilment  of  his  destiny 
in  the  real  universe.  The  Eternal  and  Perfect 
Self  exists,  but  by  no  process  of  self-realisation 
can  the  individual  become  identical  with  it.  The 
endeavour  of  the  developing  moral  life  comes  to 
its  goal  not  in  the  sphere  of  morality  but  in  that 
of  religion,  and  here  spiritual  life  takes  a  new  and 

F 


82     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

higher  form.  In  communion  with  God,  the  Perfect 
Good,  man  finds,  in  principle  at  least,  that  comple- 
tion of  himself  which  by  no  effort  of  his  own  after 
the  good  has  he  been  able  to  gain.  The  deeper 
drift  of  the  moral  life  comes  to  light  in  religion, 
and  through  religion  receives  a  satisfying  meaning. 
God,  as  Plato  noted,  rather  than  man  is  the  true 
measure  of  value.1  And  the  religious  consciousness 
is  the  final  expression  of  a  man's  personal  attitude 
to  life. 

From  the  formal  point  of  view,  then,  Eeligion 
is  the  goal  and  completion  of  Ethics,  and  there  is 
no  antagonism  between  them.  On  the  level  of 
Ethics  man  seeks  the  satisfaction  of  the  self  by 
a  process  of  realising  the  good  in  time.  Eeligion 
does  not  nullify  this  process  but  transcends  it. 
The  satisfaction  man  seeks  under  the  form  of  the 
moral  life  it  gives,  not  in  the  way  of  personal 
achieved  gain,  but  in  the  form  of  an  inward  com- 
pletion and  harmony  wrought  by  union  with  God. 
It  is  true,  as  we  pointed  out  before,  that  in  the 
historical  evolution  of  Ethics  and  Eeligion  the 
content  of  the  moral  consciousness  has  sometimes 
been  at  discord  with  the  content  of  the  religious 
consciousness.  But  such  antagonism  is  temporary  : 
it  is  not  grounded  in  the  nature  of  things,  and  has 
been  useful  in  bringing  about  a  more  harmonious 

1  Laws,  716  c. 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     83 

relationship.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in 
the  course  of  development  the  moral  consciousness 
has  powerfully  influenced  religion.  For  while 
religion  fostered  the  ethical  virtues  by  acting  as 
a  social  bond,  the  ethical  spirit  in  turn  reacted 
on  religion,  and  purified  and  elevated  it.  The 
growing  perception  of  moral  values  on  earth  gave 
man  a  nobler  conception  of  the  things  in  heaven. 
The  object  of  faith  in  every  higher  religion  is 
qualified  by  ethical  predicates.  Yet  morality  is 
not  the  basis  of  religion,  since  it  really  presupposes 
it.  For  man  would  not  be  moral  if  he  had  it  not 
in  him  to  be  more  than  moral.  The  pursuit  of  ends 
entails  a  final  end,  and  appreciation  of  value  rests 
on  a  Supreme  Value.  But  in  the  region  of  moral 
endeavour  the  ideal  is  elusive  and  fades, 

"  For  ever  and  for  ever  when  we  move." 

The  fact  that  man  follows  and  follows  vainly  the 
fugitive  ideal,  is  a  token  that  he  is  somehow  cap- 
able of  the  satisfaction  for  which  he  yearns.  He 
condemns  the  good  he  has  realised  as  partial  be- 
cause he  feels  the  contact  and  appeal  of  the  Good 
which  is  complete.  And  if  he  is  conscious  of  failure 
to  gain  the  larger  freedom  by  his  own  endeavour, 
it  is  because  he  has  had  a  foretaste  of  the  freedom 
which  comes  through  obedience. 

The  transition  of  the  ethical  into  the  religious 


84     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

consciousness  is  a  movement  from  a  narrower  to 
a  larger  and  more  concrete  point  of  view.  Eeligion 
is  the  expression  of  a  practical  relation  to  experi- 
ence and  its  ground.  This  relation  is  established 
by  faith,  and  faith  is  the  utterance  of  the  free 
spirit  within.  Our  religious  faith  is  just  the 
personal  affirmation  of  the  ultimate  meaning  life 
has  for  us.  The  soul  which  temporal  experience 
cannot  satisfy  declares  that  there  is  a  Being  who 
can  satisfy  its  deepest  needs.  So  religion  is  the 
personal  expression  of  human  trust  in  a  Keality 
behind  the  changing  world  of  experience,  a  reality 
at  once  the  source  and  end  of  all  partial  good. 
Man  rises  in  faith  above  the  strife  and  limitation 
of  a  world  where  the  good  develops  painfully, 
and  here  and  now  realises  in  some  degree  that 
his  broken  and  fragmentary  life  is  being  har- 
monised and  completed  by  the  indwelling  Life  of 
God. 

The  psychological  motives  to  religion,  as  we  shall 
see  afterwards,  are  complex.  But  they  all  involve 
the  principle  that  man  is  a  limited  and  dependent 
being,  who  yet  seeks  more  than  he  can  find  within 
himself.  Were  men  "  Finished  and  finite  clods, 
untroubled  by  a  spark,"  they  would  never  be 
religious.  An  inner  need  impels  man  to  religion, 
and  faith  posits  the  object  to  supply  the  need. 
Here  we  have  not  intellectual  inference,  but  the 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     85 

more  insistent  logic  of  the  inner  life.  The  univer- 
sality of  religion  is  a  testimony  that  the  need  which 
is  expressed  by  faith  is  a  normal  outcome  of  human 
nature.  Still,  it  has  often  been  regarded  as  a  weak- 
ness that  the  attitude  of  the  religious  consciousness 
to  its  object  should  be  one  of  faith  rather  than 
reason.  In  this  respect  religion,  it  is  said,  is  at 
a  disadvantage  compared  with  the  Natural  Sciences 
and  Ethics  which  are  based  on  the  stable  foundation 
of  reason.  But  this  is  to  overstate  the  case  to  the 
disadvantage  of  religion ;  for  the  Natural  Sciences 
and  Ethics  also  involve  faith,  if  perhaps  not  so 
obviously.  The  man  of  science,  for  example,  trusts 
the  principles  on  which  he  works,  but  the  field  in 
which  he  can  apply  them,  and  the  test  to  which 
he  can  put  them,  are  restricted.  And  with  the 
ampler  evolution  of  experience  they  may  require 
modification  in  the  future,  just  as  the  modern  in- 
vestigator has  revised  the  principles  on  which 
primitive  man  interpreted  nature.  The  scientific 
man  believes  that  the  particular  connexion  he 
establishes  between  elements,  and  the  '  laws '  he 
finds  in  nature,  will  be  valid  of  experience  distant 
in  time  and  place  from  his  own.  Yet  he  could 
not  make  this  good  by  logical  proof.  A  perfect 
guarantee  of  his  generalisations  could  only  be 
attained  by  a  rational  insight  into  experience  as 
an  inclusive  and  systematic  whole,  which  determines 


86     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

the  development  of  its  parts.  Needless  to  say,  the 
man  of  science  has  no  such  insight.  And  though 
his  belief  in  his  explanations  may  have  excellent 
practical  justification,  this  only  helps  to  show  that 
it  contains  an  element  of  faith. 

In  the  region  of  Ethics  faith  even  more  plainly 
plays  a  part.  Those  moral  ideals  which  grow  out 
of  the  inner  life  of  men  are  no  purely  intellectual 
creations,  nor  do  we  believe  in  them  on  rational 
grounds  simply.  Indeed  we  could  not  think  them 
out  in  clear  and  detailed  form,  and  we  only  realise 
gradually  their  meaning  as  we  progress  towards 
them.  We  have  faith  in  their  reality  and  value, 
but  we  could  not  prove  these.  The  appeal  of  the 
'  ought '  to  the  will  of  man  as  embodying  a  value 
he  has  not  yet,  must  always  contain  a  demand  on 
his  faith.  The  truth  is  that  faith  and  reason  both 
issue  out  of  the  personal  life  of  man  and  develop 
with  personal  development,  and  neither  is  alto- 
gether separated  from  the  'other.  Faith  certainly 
cannot  be  held  to  exclude  thought.  When  it  is 
used  in  the  lower  sense  of  supposition,  the  mere 
opinion  (Sd£a)  of  Plato,  it  is  largely,  if  not  entirely, 
an  imperfectly  developed  intellectual  process.  And 
even  that  more  definitely  and  intimately  personal 
faith  which  is  the  expression  of  emotional  and 
practical  demands,  can  only  attain  clearness  and 
generality  by  connecting  itself  with  ideas  which 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     87 

are  given  through  the  intellect.  But  its  distin- 
guishing feature  is  that  it  is  personal  at  the  core, 
and  has  its  stronghold  in  the  emotions  and  the 
will ;  and  to  this  we  can  trace  that  characteristic 
of  faith  in  virtue  of  which  it  often  continues  to 
affirm  the  reality  of  its  postulate  even  against  the 
verdict  of  reason.  Thought,  again,  seeks  to  present 
a  larger  and  connected  view  of  things,  and  it  tries 
to  exclude  the  subjective  and  emotional  element 
from  its  working.  But  it  develops  on  a  personal 
basis,  and  it  never  succeeds  in  becoming  strictly 
impersonal.  The  operation  of  thought,  moreover, 
is  always  incomplete.  It  has  to  begin  somewhere 
and  to  assume  something,  but  it  can  never  come 
back  on  its  beginnings  and  take  them  up  into  an 
all-inclusive  whole.  Hence  reason  can  never  abso- 
lutely justify  its  conceptions  on  grounds  of  reason. 
Thought  is  supplemented  by  an  act  of  faith  which 
justifies  a  conception  on  grounds  of  value.  And  the 
value -judgment  springs  from  the  inner  personal 
life,  and  we  cannot  reduce  it  to  the  theoretical 
judgment,  though  there  cannot  ultimately  be  a 
dualism  between  them. 

If  this  view  be  correct,  the  prominence  of  faith 
in  religion  is  not  a  token  of  special  defect.  The 
range  of  faith  is  wide,  and  reason  cannot  take  over 
its  office.  And  it  belongs  to  the  psychological 
nature  of  religion  that  the  intellectual  element 


88     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

should   not   be   so  dominant  in  it  as   is  the  case 
with  philosophy. 

The  function  of  faith  in  religion  will  become 
plainer  to  us,  if  we  keep  in  mind  that  the  mere 
desire  for  explanation  could  not  of  itself  beget 
religion.  Piety  would  be  unmeaning  in  a  purely 
intellectual  being.  The  restless  endeavour  of  the 
will,  the  pressure  of  emotional  need  as  well  as  the 
thoughts  which  "  wander  through  eternity,"  are 
all  active  in  creating  the  demand  for  an  object 
which  can  satisfy  and  harmonise  the  inner  life. 
Hence  no  intellectual  conception  can  exhaust  the 
significance  of  the  object  of  religious  faith.  To  the 
piously  disposed  a  philosophic  notion  of  the  Infinite 
is  a  stone  rather  than  bread.  In  view  of  what  the 
object  of  faith  does  and  means  for  those  who  are 
religious,  we  must  also  conceive  it  in  terms  of 
value  —  as  a  highest  value  which  gives  order  and 
meaning  to  the  partial  values  realised  in  the  life 
of  the  individual  and  the  race.  That  the  spirit 
of  man,  which  seeks  support  and  satisfaction  in 
communion  with  an  unseen  object,  finds  what  it 
seeks,  is,  in  some  degree,  an  evidence  that  faith 
does  not  fall  down  before  a  phantom  of  its  own 
creation  but  establishes  contact  with  reality. 

Eeligion,  although  its  aim  is  not  theoretical,  yet 
as  it  postulates  a  highest  value  which  completes 
and  harmonises  the  personal  life,  involves  a  Welt- 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     89 

anschauung.  Like  philosophy  it  presents  us  with 
a  view  of  the  world  as  a  whole,  and  so  furnishes 
a  wider  outlook  than  either  Science  or  Ethics. 
That  outlook  is  primarily  an  appreciation,  a  judg- 
ment of  facts  in  terms  of  a  central  value.  To  the 
religious  man  as  such,  scientific  explanations  are  of 
minor  interest ;  he  rather  considers  whither  things 
tend  and  what  their  worth  is  in  relation  to  the 
perfect  good.  Life  unrolls  before  him  as  a  system 
of  ends,  which  have  meaning  and  coherence  by 
reference  to  a  supreme  End.  So  the  world  becomes 
a  graduated  order  seen  sub  specie  boni.  Yet  it  is 
not  true  to  say,  as  some  do,  that  the  religious 
consciousness  moves  entirely  on  the  lines  of  the 
value-judgment.  For  the  religious  man  must  think 
as  well  as  feel  and  will,  and  the  kingdom  of  the 
soul  cannot  be  at  peace  if  thought  is  in  rebellion. 
So  he  cannot  help  regarding  his  highest  value  as 
somehow  satisfying  thought  and  explaining  what 
exists.  He  derives  the  world  from  God,  the 
Supreme  Good.  But  the  religious  mind,  we  repeat, 
is  not  interested  in  finding  significance  in  things 
through  their  complex  relations  to  one  another. 
It  neglects  the  intermediate  links,  and  construes 
nature  and  life  by  the  final  purpose  which  is  being 
wrought  out  in  them.  But  inasmuch  as  it  does 
this,  religion  involves  a  synthesis  which  gives 
meaning  to  reality.  In  the  more  developed  re- 


QO     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

ligions,  which  have  expanded  into  systems  of 
theology,  considerable  emphasis  is  frequently  laid 
on  the  fact  that  they  explain  things,  and  up  to  a 
point  at  least  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  intellect. 
Nevertheless  religion  neither  does  nor  can  identify 
itself  fully  with  the  standpoint  of  intellectualism. 
It  will  not  embark  on  a  thorough  criticism  of  its 
own  postulates,  and  pleads  the  necessity  of  faith. 
It  refuses  to  admit  that  the  world  of  values  can  be 
reduced  to  categories  of  thought.  The  stronghold 
of  religion  is  personal  experience,  and  this  experi- 
ence is  richer  than  any  satisfaction  of  the  intellect. 
"  Our  hearts  are  restless  till  they  find  rest  in  Thee," 
cried  Augustine,  who  had  found  neither  the  pleas- 
ures of  life  nor  philosophy  satisfying.  "Pectus 
theologum  facit,"  said  a  school  of  later  divines,  thus 
giving  their  testimony  that  spiritual  life  is  the  true 
fountain  of  profitable  doctrine. 

Still  religion  does  not  utter  the  last  word  on 
things  human  and  divine.  Thought  with  its 
"  obstinate  questionings "  refuses  quietly  to  merge 
itself  in  faith.  For  problems  are  left  confronting  us 
which  do  not  admit  of  solution  from  the  purely 
religious  point  of  view.  The  world  of  facts  and  the 
world  of  values  remain  apart  from  one  another, 
and  an  inner  bond  between  them  has  not  been 
established.  That  they  fall  within  experience  we 
know,  and  we  judge  now  from  the  one  point  of 


The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     9 1 

view  and  again  from  the  other.  But  how  there  is 
continuity  of  development  between  fact  and  value, 
so  that  both  form  valid  and  consistent  aspects  of  the 
organised  whole  of  experience,  is  not  clear.  The 
question  thrusts  itself  upon  us,  and  religion  cannot 
answer  it.  And  further,  we  find  the  problem  of 
religious  value  complicated  by  the  fact  that  religions 
differ,  and  so  do  their  scales  of  value.  The  religious 
good,  for  example,  as  the  Hindu  conceives  it,  is 
curiously  unlike  that  of  a  European  Christian,  and 
so  the  goods  which  are  a  means  are  likewise  regarded 
differently.  With  varying  notions  of  value  before 
us,  we  have  to  ask  ourselves,  Is  there  any  common 
standard  of  appreciation  ?  Is  there  a  normal  human 
nature  whose  value-experiences  are  regulative  ?  Or 
can  we  by  reflecting  on  the  development  of  the 
religious  consciousness,  and  on  the  historic  forms  in 
which  it  is  embodied,  bring  to  light  an  ideal  of 
religion  by  which  we  can  determine  the  relative 
worth  of  different  religions  ?  Then  there  is  another 
and  related  problem  which  calls  for  discussion. 
Eeligion,  if  an  important  aspect  of  culture,  is  still 
only  one  aspect.  How  are  we  to  conceive  its  rela- 
tion to  the  other  aspects  ?  By  a  study  of  the 
respective  processes  we  can  try,  as  we  have  done, 
to  show  how  it  relates  itself  to,  and  contrasts  itself 
with,  Ethics  and  Science.  In  a  like  way  one  might 
•discuss  the  relation  of  religion  to  Art.  The  results 


92     The  Natiiral  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

of  such  discussions  cannot,  however,  be  final,  as  our 
point  of  view  has  been  partial.  While  the  study  of 
the  parts  should  precede  the  whole,  yet  the  full 
meaning  of  the  parts  can  only  be  determined  in  the 
light  of  the  whole.  So  it  would  seem  that  the 
ultimate  significance  of  religion  and  its  function  in 
culture  can  only  be  appreciated  by  the  mind  which 
sees  the  different  aspects  of  experience  together. 

To  deal  fully  with  the  problems  raised  by  religion 
we  must,  therefore,  go  beyond  the  purely  religious 
point  of  view.     They  can  only  be  properly  treated 
by  a  Philosophy  of  Keligion.     And  the  latter  again 
will  be  determined  in  its  method  and  point  of  view 
by  general  Philosophy.     At  present,  however,  it  will 
be  widely  admitted  that  Philosophy  is  not   in    a 
position   to   synthesise   and   explain  the   whole  of 
experience  by  a  universal  principle.     The  matter  to 
be   explained  has  become  vast  and   complex,  and 
between   the   general   principles   with  which   Phil- 
osophy works  and  the  world  of  particular  facts,  there 
is  for  us  a  breach  of  continuity.     Similarly,  between 
the  experience  we  designate  'mere  fact'  and  the 
higher  spiritual  experiences  of  the  individual,  a  line 
of  immanent  development  has  not  been  traced.     But 
Philosophy,  if  it  cannot  unify  all  experience,  at  least 
helps  us  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  problem 
and  the  conditions  under  which  a  solution  may  be 
attempted.     And  it  opens  out  general  points  of  view 


TJu  Natiiral  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion.     93 

by  which  we  can  correct  the  onesidedness  which 
clings  to  special  sciences  and  phases  of  culture.  It 
suggests,  tentatively  at  all  events,  the  standpoint 
from  which  the  universe  may  be  best  regarded  as  a 
coherent  whole.  Hence  the  concluding  word  on  the 
relations  of  Science,  Ethics,  and  Keligion  falls  to  be 
spoken  by  Philosophy.  Although  that  word  be  not 
ultimate,  it  represents  the  deepest  insight  of  a 
particular  stage  of  human  culture. 

The  Philosophy  of  Eeligion,  it  may  be  added,  dis- 
tinguishes itself  from  general  Philosophy  mainly  by 
its  starting-point  and  method.  The  one  begins  with 
the  part  and  tries  to  show  its  meaning  in  the  whole ; 
the  other  seeks  to  show  how  the  whole  includes  the 
part.  Philosophy  deals  with  religion  as  an  element 
falling  within  the  synthesis  of  experience.  Philos- 
ophy of  Keligion  begins  with  the  study  of  religious 
phenomena,  in  order  to  bring  to  light  the  essential 
principles.  Hence  it  proceeds  to  show  how  these 
find  a  meaning  and  a  place  in  the  larger  order  of 
things.  This  is  its  point  of  contact  with  general 
Philosophy.  But  even  though  the  latter  fails  to 
offer  any  adequate  interpretation  of  all  experience, 
the  Philosophy  of  Keligion  may  still  perform  an 
important  office.  It  will  discuss  the  origin  and 
development  of  the  religious  consciousness,  the 
psychological  factors  involved,  as  well  as  the  func- 
tion and  value  of  religion  in  culture.  And  as  the 


94     The  Natural  Sciences,  Ethics,  and  Religion. 

outcome  of  this  it  will  try  to  unfold  the  deeper 
meaning  of  religion.  But  the  success  of  a  Philos- 
ophy of  Eeligion  in  attacking  the  latter  problem 
must  finally  depend  on  the  sufficiency  of  the  point 
of  view  offered  by  Philosophy  in  the  larger  sense. 


ESSAY    III. 

RELIGIOUS  DEVELOPMENT: 
ITS  HISTOEY  AND  INTERPRETATION 


ESSAY    III. 


THE  present-day  student  who  devotes  himself  to 
the  History  of  Religion  is  oppressed  by  the  wealth 
of  material  which  lies  before  him.  The  investiga- 
tions of  the  last  century,  pursued  in  the  dis- 
passionate spirit  which  befits  science,  have  made  a 
multitude  of  fresh  facts  available.  Through  the 
intricate  and  varied  mass  of  phenomena  set  before 
him  the  student  finds  it  no  easy  thing  to  thread 
his  way,  and  reach  a  point  where  he  can  see 
general  principles  and  state  determinate  con- 
clusions. We  might  compare  him  to  a  man 
wandering  in  a  vast  forest,  now  overshadowed  by 
great  trees,  now  plunged  into  a  rank  undergrowth, 
and  doubtful  whether  he  will  ever  see  the  wood 
for  the  trees.  The  phenomena  are  so  complex,  and 
higher  and  lower  elements  are  so  often  inter- 
mingled, that  a  logical  arrangement  of  them  must 
to  some  extent  be  arbitrary.  Hence  to  accept 
Plato's  rule  and  follow  always  the  natural  joints 


98  Religious  Development : 

in  our  divisions  is,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  not 
practicable.1  Tiele,  one  of  the  most  competent 
workers  in  this  field,  finally  contents  himself  with 
a  broad  classification  of  religions  into  Natural  and 
Ethical.  And  even  here  there  may  be  difference 
of  opinion  as  to  where  the  line  should  fall. 

This  difficulty  then  faces  us  when  we  turn  to 
study  the  history  of  religion.  The  facts  cannot 
naturally  be  compressed  within  a  scheme  of  logical 
development.  There  is,  indeed,  a  continuity  in  the 
growth  of  a  religion,  and  no  phase  of  it  but  has  a 
meaning.  Thought,  however,  is  only  one  element  in 
the  religious  consciousness,  and  does  not  suffice  to 
control  the  evolution  of  religion  by  the  principle 
of  intellectual  consistency.  If  we  are  to  speak 
of  the  logic  of  religious  evolution,  it  must  be  that 
larger  logic  which  embraces  the  working  of  human 
needs,  emotions,  and  desires. 

The  worker,  then,  in  the  field  of  religious  pheno- 
mena has  a  complicated  material  to  deal  with,  and 
he  has  to  face  the  question  of  the  method  he  will 
follow.  He  may  decide  to  proceed  on  purely 
historic  lines.  He  therefore  endeavours  above  all 
to  ascertain  the  facts,  to  present  them  accurately 
and  group  them  as  far  as  possible,  but  he  avoids 
any  comprehensive  explanation  of  them.  Such  is 
the  method  adopted  by  Dr  Tylor  in  his  excellent 

1  Phsedrus,  265,  E. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  99 

book  on  '  Primitive  Culture/  and  it  has  given  it 
a  permanent  value  which  does  not  belong  to  bolder 
but  more  imaginative  works  in  the  same  field.  But 
the  careful  sifting,  arrangement,  and  presentation 
of  materials  only  lay  the  foundation  for  further 
inquiry,  and  in  themselves  cannot  satisfy  the  reason. 
To  know  the  facts  is  necessary,  but  we  also  want 
to  know  the  meaning  of  the  facts :  the  on,  in 
Aristotelian  phrase,  must  become  the  Sicm.  Most 
people  will  admit  that  it  is  only  when  we  go 
beyond  merely  empirical  results,  and  discern  law 
and  connexion  behind  things,  that  we  can  duly 
appreciate  their  significance.  The  scientific  spirit 
always  refuses  to  regard  phenomena,  whether 
natural  or  historical,  as  isolated  and  independent. 
And  the  scientific  historian,  if  he  knows  his 
business,  tries  to  show  how  events  and  movements 
connect  themselves  with  what  has  gone  before  and 
with  what  comes  after.  The  student  of  religious 
development  cannot  be  indifferent  to  the  pressure 
of  this  demand ;  for  even  the  domain  of  faith 
—  the  region  par  excellence  of  human  hopes 
and  fears — is  not,  after  all,  a  fairyland  where  any- 
thing may  be  the  result  of  anything.  Still  the 
elucidation  of  the  early  history  of  religion  offers 
peculiar  difficulties.  It  is  not  possible  for  the 
modern  inquirer  to  grasp  fully  the  condition  of 
mind  of  primitive  men.  If  it  is  difficult  for  the 


ioo  Religious  Development : 

mature  man  to  enter  into  the  mental  world  of 
childhood,  it  is  harder  for  him  to  appreciate  the 
psychical  condition  of  his  remotest  ancestors.  He 
is  apt  to  forget  this,  and  to  interpret  the  savage 
mind  too  much  through  his  own.  But  in  a  matter 
like  this  we  cannot  attain  to  more  than  probable, 
it  may  sometimes  be  highly  probable,  inference. 
And  yet  it  is  just  an  insight  into  the  psychology 
of  the  primitive  mind  which  is  most  important 
in  interpreting  the  origin  and  growth  of  religious 
belief. 

Again,  at  particular  points  we  find  ourselves 
hampered  by  evidence  which  lends  itself  to  diverse 
inferences.  Hence  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to 
prevent  subjective  presuppositions  from  influenc- 
ing the  treatment  of  our  materials.  The  cautious 
student  will  now  and  then  have  to  leave  points 
undecided  in  the  interests  of  objective  interpreta- 
tion. And  where  more  than  one  explanation  is 
possible  he  will  be  careful  not  to  press  a  particular 
theory  further  than  the  evidence  warrants.1 

What  is  the  proper  method  to  follow,  it  may  be 
asked,  in  trying  to  understand  the  evolution  of 
religion  ?  The  so-called  a  priori  method  does  not 

1  As  an  example  of  this  error  one  might  instance  the  excessive 
importance  attached  to  totemism  by  Mr  Jevons,  in  his  '  In- 
troduction to  the  History  of  Eeligion,'  or  the  ubiquitous  part 
played  by  the  spirit  of  vegetation  in  Mr  Frazer's  'Golden 
Bough.' 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  101 

find  much  favour  in  these  days  when  there  is  a 
reaction  against  the  bolder  flights  of  speculation. 
The  wealth  and  variety  of  material  discourage  the 
attempt  to  apply  transcendental  principles  of  ex- 
planation in  the  sphere  of  religious  history.  Such 
interpretations,  when  carried  out,  may  be  ingenious 
and  perhaps  at  points  suggestive,  but  they  are 
artificial,  and  do  not  arise  naturally  out  of  a  study 
of  the  phenomena.  Nor  is  there,  it  seems  to  me, 
any  gain  in  introducing  scientific  concepts,  drawn 
from  the  domain  of  biology,  into  the  history  of 
religion  for  the  purpose  of  interpretation.  Terms 
like  '  natural  selection '  and  the  '  survival  of  the 
fittest,'  when  applied  to  the  rise  and  fall  of  re- 
ligions, import  misleading  associations  from  a  lower 
sphere  into  a  higher.  And  they  are  useless  as 
explanations  of  the  transition  from  one  form  of 
religion  to  another. 

Neither  Metaphysics  nor  Science  can  help  us 
here.  Our  key  must  be  a  psychological  one  ;  it 
must  lie  in  the  inner  nature  of  man,  from  which 
religion  everywhere  proceeds.  The  mind  of  man, 
thinking,  feeling,  and  willing,  is  the  constant  factor 
in  religious  history;  and  the  stages  and  forms  of 
spiritual  development  must  in  their  characteristic 
features  reflect  the  nature  of  the  source  from  which 
they  issue.  So  it  seems  to  me  that  Hoffding  is 
entirely  in  the  right  when  he  insists  that  the  true 


IO2  Religious  Development : 

method  by  which  to  study  the  growth  of  religion 
is  the  psychological-genetic  method.1  We  shall  be 
strengthened  in  this  conviction  when  we  remember 
that,  while  thought  largely  predominates  in  the 
development  of  science  and  philosophy,  it  is  by  no 
means  so  in  religion.  In  the  latter  feeling  and  will 
play  as  large  a  part  as  the  intellect,  and  they  make 
their  presence  constantly  felt  in  the  evolution  of 
religious  belief.  For  example,  in  trying  to  under- 
stand the  phenomena  of  religious  progress  and 
reform,  survival  and  decadence,  we  must  connect 
them,  first  of  all,  with  the  psychological  elements 
which  are  at  work  in  human  nature.  In  this  way 
we  may  find  that  what  seems  obscure  and  incon- 
sistent in  the  evolution  of  religions  becomes  more 
intelligible  by  being  brought  into  relation  with  one 
or  other  of  the  factors  of  the  inner  life. 

Is  the  psychological  interpretation  of  the  religious 
development  a  final  one  ?  Some,  no  doubt,  in  these 
days  when  a  certain  distrust  of  metaphysical  specu- 
lation is  abroad,  will  be  disposed  to  reply  in  the 
affirmative.  Yet  it  is  plain  that,  if  we  cannot  go 
beyond  the  psychological  meaning  of  religious  ex- 
perience, the  whole  question  of  the  objective  truth 
and  validity  of  that  experience  is  left  in  abeyance. 
The  claim  which  every  religion  makes  to  be  true 
urges  us  beyond  the  limits  of  a  psychological 

1  Keligionsphilosophie,  pp.  123,  124. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  103 

inquiry.  The  final  interpretation  of  religious  evolu- 
tion presupposes  a  determination  of  the  idea  of 
religion  as  well  as  an  explanation  of  the  ultimate 
meaning  and  ground  of  religious  experience.  Only 
in  this  way,  and  not  from  a  purely  psychological 
study,  can  we  gain  an  objective  standard  of  appre- 
ciation in  dealing  with  religions.  This  task,  of 
course,  falls  to  a  Philosophy  of  Keligion,  and  it  may 
be  any  solution  we  can  give  will  be  tentative  and 
provisional.  Still,  a  Philosophy  of  Eeligion,  if  it 
is  to  be  true  to  its  function,  must  deal  with  the 
problem,  and  its  treatment  will  only  be  effective  if 
it  takes  into  consideration  the  psychological  facts. 
This  will  be  the  best  guarantee  that  the  theory  it 
offers  is  neither  fanciful  nor  one-sided.  Our  aim  in 
the  present  essay  is  a  limited  one,  and  does  not  go 
beyond  an  attempt  to  interpret  psychologically  the 
development  of  religion. 

Our  inquiry  may  begin  with  the  question  of  the 
origin  of  religion.  A  certain  ambiguity  lurks  in 
the  word  origin.  Like  the  Aristotelian  apx7?*  it  is 
susceptible  of  two  meanings  :  it  can  signify  the 
beginning  or  temporal  starting-point  of  a  series, 
and  likewise  the  cause  or  ground  of  the  series 
(OLLTLOV).  The  origin  of  religion  in  the  former  sense 
would  be  a  purely  historical  question.  When  and 
how  in  the  history  of  the  world  did  religion  first 
appear?  In  the  second  case  the  inquiry  turns  on 


IO4  Religious  Development  : 

the  psychological  causes  which  bring  religion  into 
being.  The  first  problem  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
cannot  be  solved  with  the  materials  at  our  disposal ; 
the  vast  prehistoric  period  is  veiled  in  darkness, 
and  the  conditions  and  character  of  the  earliest 
human  life  can  only  be  inferred  more  or  less 
uncertainly.  How  or  when  religion  first  appeared 
in  the  world  is,  therefore,  a  hopeless  inquiry.  This 
much  we  may  affirm,  anything  worthy  to  be  called 
religion  could  not  have  emerged  among  mankind 
prior  to  the  formation  of  some  kind  of  social  union, 
and  without  a  certain  development  of  language. 
The  second  problem  offers  a  more  fruitful  field  of 
inquiry.  It  signifies  that  we  investigate  the 
genetic  -  causal  ground  of  religious  development. 
The  question  may  be  put  thus,  What  elements  in 
the  inner  life  of  man,  interacting  with  his  outer 
environment,  beget  that  attitude  of  mind  which  is 
termed  religion  ?  The  sources  cannot  be  temporary 
or  accidental.  For  amid  ceaseless  change  in  out- 
ward circumstances  and  social  conditions  religion 
abides  as  an  element  in  culture.  Like  art  and 
morals,  it  is  a  permanent  expression  of  the  human 
spirit.  What,  then,  are  its  roots  in  man's  inner 
nature  ?  We  seek  a  psychological  explanation,  and 
the  ontological  ground  of  the  phenomenon  is  not  in 
question. 

Before  dealing  with  this  matter,  it  might  seem 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  105 

advisable  to  define  religion.  Such  a  definition, 
however,  to  have  any  value  would  require  to  be 
based  on  an  adequate  examination  of  the  pheno- 
mena. And  while  I  admit  we  need  some  principle 
of  distinction  between  what  is  religious  and  what  is 
not,  I  believe  the  importance  of  a  verbal  definition 
to  be  secondary.  In  point  of  fact  I  doubt  whether, 
in  a  case  where  the  phenomena  are  so  wide  in 
range  and  diverse  in  spiritual  significance,  any  one 
formula  will  perfectly  embrace  all  the  facts.1  Such 
a  definition,  for  example,  as  is  given  by  Menzies  in 
his  'Handbook  on  the  History  of  Keligion,'  "  Eeligion 
is  the  worship  of  unseen  powers  from  a  sense  of 
need,"  will  work  well  enough ;  but  it  is  not  always 
equally  applicable.  Still,  I  do  not  see  that  we 
should  gain  anything  by  going  over  the  historic 
types  of  religion  to  find,  if  possible,  a  common 
feature  which  will  serve  as  a  label.  And  there  is 
a  danger  that  if  we  proceed  by  eliminating  the 
specific  features  of  particular  religions  in  order  to 
come  to  some  common  quality  which  belongs 
equally  to  all,  the  result  may  be  a  superficial 
abstraction.2 

We  are  more  likely  to  grasp  the  essence  of  religion 
by  showing  the  constant  factors  which  generate  it. 

1  Cp.  Caird,  Evolution  of  Eeligion,  vol.  i.  p.  39  ff. 

2  It  seems  to  me  that  Hoffding  has  fallen  into  this  error  when  he 
finds  the  essence  of  religion  to  be  "  faith  in  the  persistence  of  value." 


1 06  Religious  Development : 

The  significance  of  these  factors  changes  with  the 
different  phases  and  stages  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness, but  they  maintain  an  identity  in  their  differ- 
ences. Stated  in  their  most  general  form  these 
factors  are  the  subject  and  object :  and  religion — 
from  religare,  to  bind  —  denotes  a  bond  between 
them.  Both  terms  of  the  relation  must,  however, 
be  qualified  in  a  particular  way  ere  we  have  that 
determinate  modification  of  consciousness  called 
piety,  or  religion.  The  object  always  comes  before 
the  mind  as  real,  as  possessing  power,  and  so  able 
to  affect  men  for  weal  or  woe.  A  powerless  god 
is  a  contradiction ;  and  so  the  fetish  which  is 
judged  to  be  impotent  is  discarded.  Further,  the 
subject  must  be  determined  in  a  special  way  by  the 
object.  The  purely  intellectual  apprehension  of  the 
object  may  be  the  attitude  of  mind  in  science  or 
philosophy,  but  it  is  not  so  in  religion.  Hence, 
to  say  that  religion  arises  from  the  Infinite  involved 
in  consciousness  is  not  enough.  Though  the  fact  be 
true,  there  would  not  be  religion  without  further 
predisposing  conditions  in  the  subject.  An  epis- 
temological  analysis  cannot  do  duty  for  the  present- 
ation of  psychological  motives.  For  religion  a  cer- 
tain emotional  tone  is  necessary — the  feeling  of  awe 
and  reverence.  But  religion  as  an  affection  of  the 
subject  is  not  merely  an  impression  received  from 
the  object.  The  subject  relates  itself  to  the  object, 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  107 

and  the  pressure  of  its  inwardly  felt  needs  prompts 
it  to  do  so.  These  needs  the  power  or  powers  wor- 
shipped are  believed  to  be  able  to  satisfy.  Hence 
the  sense  of  trust  and  dependence  which  is  involved 
in  the  religious  consciousness.1 

Moreover,  the  bond  between  worshipper  and  wor- 
shipped is  a  practical  one  :  it  appeals  to  the  will,  and 
is  realised  in  the  acts  which  constitute  the  cultus 
and  represent  religious  conduct.  For  "  religion 
means  that  action  is  bound,  obliged,  that  there  is 
no  choice  between  opposites,  but  supreme  decided- 
ness  for  the  right  without  option." 2 

The  primacy  of  feeling  in  originating  religion  has 
often  been  noted.  "Primus  in  orbe  fecit  deos 
timor."  The  frequently  quoted  saying  of  Statius, 
however,  unduly  limits  the  emotional  motives.  Not 
only  fear  but  awe  and  wonder,  gratitude  and  hope, 
assist  at  the  birth  of  faith.  Nevertheless  we  admit 
that  fear,  disappointment,  anxiety,  the  feelings  in 
short  which  are  most  closely  connected  with  the 
limitations  of  the  human  lot,  would  be  specially 
active  in  urging  man  to  find  a  more  assured  exist- 
ence, by  establishing  a  bond  of  union  with  higher 
powers.  Faith,  even  in  its  rudest  form,  implies  a 


1  Even  on  purely  psychological  grounds  M.  Arnold's  definition  of 
religion  as  '  morality  touched  by  emotion '  is  defective. 

2  Schelling,  quoted  by  Wallace,  'Lectures  on  Natural  Theology 
and  Ethics,'  p.  59. 


io8  Religious  Development : 

certain  discontent  with  what  is :  the  sober  present 
never  fully  corresponds  to  human  desire  and  long- 
ing. Eeligion  is  the  abiding  witness  to  the  truth 
that  the  human  self  can  never  find  a  full  satisfaction 
through  its  environment. 

But  though  great  stress  be  laid  on  the  urgency  of 
feeling  in  developing  the  religious  consciousness, 
feeling  cannot  stand  alone  as  an  explanation.  For 
religion  is  also  belief  and  demands  a  certain  activity 
of  mind.  Feeling  must  be  qualified  by  thought  if  it 
is  to  be  significant :  and  the  crudest  religious  rela- 
tionship must  have  an  element  of  universality  in  it. 
We  cannot,  as  already  remarked,  conceive  of  a  re- 
ligion prior  to  the  evolution  of  forms  of  speech  ;  and 
language  which  implies  some  sort  of  social  union 
also  implies  some  development  of  thought.  The 
worshipper  must  have  an  idea  of  the  powers  or 
spirits  which  he  worships,  and  this  means  at  least  a 
rudimentary  capacity  to  generalise  and  hold  before 
consciousness.  H.  Usener,  in  a  suggestive  investi- 
gation into  the  names  of  the  gods,  deals  with  the 
relation  of  language  to  primitive  religion.1  In  his 
view  the  earliest  objects  of  worship  are  gods  of  the 
moment  (AugenblicJcsg otter),  objects  whom  the  de- 
sire and  stress  of  the  instant  have  made  divine. 
By  repetition  a  deity  of  this  fugitive  kind  develops 
into  a  specific,  or  departmental  god,  and  is  desig- 

1  Die  Gotternamen. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  109 

nated  adjectivally  (the  bright,  the  strong).  Finally 
a  god  gets  a  name,  becomes  personal,  and  rises  from 
the  sensuous  to  the  ideal  sphere.  Classes  two  and 
three  in  Usener's  theory,  correspond  generally  to  the 
distinction  between  spiritism  and  polytheism.  As 
to  the  first  class,  I  doubt  whether  it  can  fairly  be 
regarded  as  the  primitive  and  original  stage  of  the 
religious  consciousness.1  To  invoke  a  thing  as  divine 
in  the  stress  of  the  moment  surely  implies  a  con- 
sciousness of  the  divine  which  is  wider  than  the 
particular  experience.  And  a  relation  which  is  of 
the  moment  merely  does  not  seem  to  be  in  the  full 
sense  religious.  So  far  as  Usener's  AugenblicJcsgotter 
represent  a  real  phase  in  the  evolution  of  religion, 
they  are  best  regarded  as  a  degenerate  outgrowth 
of  his  second  class :  we  shall  find  that  much  the  same 
relationship  exists  between  fetishism  and  spiritism. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  the  psychological  genesis 
of  religion  cannot  be  traced  back  to  the  emotional 
impulse  of  the  moment.  Feeling,  we  repeat,  to  be 
religious,  involves  some  activity  of  thought ;  and 
religion  presupposes  that  man  has  already  put  some 
sort  of  meaning  into  his  experience  of  things.  The 
crude  meaning  which  he  has  read  into  the  world 
about  him  serves  as  the  basis  on  which  he  builds  his 
religious  faith.  The  early  view  of  things  which  lies 

1  Usener  cites  as  an  illustration  of  an  AugenblicJcsgott,  ^Eschylusy 
'  Septem  contra  Thebas,'  529,  530. 


1 1  o  Religious  Development : 

behind  religion  is  animism.  In  its  origin  animism 
is  not  a  conscious  theory,  but  man's  instinctive 
projection  of  his  own  experience  into  the  objects 
around  him.  The  savage  reads  into  the  chang- 
ing phenomena  of  nature  the  same  life  and  power 
which  he  is  conscious  of  within  himself.  Only  thus 
are  growth,  movement,  change  in  nature,  intelligible 
to  him.  Winds  and  waters,  clouds  and  stars,  trees 
and  plants  were  instinctively  regarded  as  possessing 
a  life  like  his  own.  Though  we  find  it  hard  to 
realise,  in  the  lower  culture  the  idea  of  the  inani- 
mate and  the  unconscious  does  not  exist;  it  only 
appears  with  the  development  of  a  greater  capacity 
to  abstract  and  generalise.  Originating  in  an  in- 
stinctive act  of  mind  and  not  in  deliberate  reflexion, 
animism  came  to  represent  the  way  in  which  primi- 
tive man  habitually  thinks  of  the  world  around 
him.  It  is  explanation  in  its  primeval  form.  Anim- 
ism is  universal  as  a  stage  of  culture ;  we  see  evid- 
ence of  it  among  all  races,  from  the  Esquimaux  and 
Finns  in  the  north  to  the  Australian  aborigines  in 
the  south.  By  itself,  however,  it  is  not  religion, 
as  it  is  sometimes  loosely  termed.  For  in  religion 
there  must  be  a  distinctive  relation  of  the  subject 
to  an  object,  and  this  means  an  act  of  selection  on 
the  part  of  the  subject.  From  the  nature  of  the 
case  worship  must  be  directed  to  some  things  and 
not  to  everything,  and  what  determines  choice  ? 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  1 1 1 

The  answer  clearly  is  that  those  objects  which  are 
believed  to  stand  in  close  relation  to  individual 
desires  and  wants  will  be  chosen.  Primitive  man 
acted  on  the  rule  do  ut  des,  and  the  things  he  rever- 
enced were  always  those  he  supposed  could  affect 
him  for  good  or  ill.  It  is  the  supervention  of 
human  need  on  the  animistic  view  of  the  world 
which  begets  the  religious  bond :  the  determining 
factor  is  within,  not  without.1 

The  distinction  between  animism  and  spiritism 
is  not  hard  and  fast.  There  is  no  historic  evidence 
of  a  stage  of  culture  where  the  first  existed  but 
not  the  second.  The  difference  in  name  is  justified 
if  we  regard  spiritism  as  the  result  of  a  process 
which  gave  a  higher  form  to  the  animistic  con- 
sciousness. Worship,  we  saw,  implied  selection,  and 
the  attribution  of  a  special  power  to  the  object 
selected.  If  a  man  reverences  a  tree  or  a  stone  it 
must  be  more  than  other  trees  and  stones.  It 
possesses  power  for  good  or  ill,  but  why  ?  The 
answer  is  that  there  is  a  spirit  in  it.  This  inter- 
pretation is  psychologically  intelligible,  and  is  simply 
man's  inreading  into  things  of  a  development  in 
his  own  experience.  For  the  primitive  mind  the 

1  To  say  that  religion  is  "  the  solution  of  the  contradiction  between 
outer  determination  and  inner  freedom  "  is  no  more  than  an  abstract 
way  of  putting  the  psychological  facts.  In  reality  it  does  not  describe 
these  fully,  and  is  of  course  no  explanation  of  the  ultimate  meaning 
of  religion. 


1 1 2  Religious  Development : 

distinction  between  fact  and  fancy,  hallucination 
and  real  perception,  the  dream  and  the  waking 
consciousness,  does  not  exist.  All  experiences  are 
alike  objective.  But  the  savage  is  confronted  by 
the  fact  that  his  fleshly  body  has  not  really  fol- 
lowed the  course  of  his  dreams.  So  a  distinction 
develops  between  the  body  and  the  soul,  the  latter 
being  conceived  as  a  finer  self,  which  usually  dwells 
within  the  body  though  it  is  not  confined  to  it, 
and  sometimes  wanders  forth  to  strange  adven- 
tures.1 The  dream  is  true,  but  it  is  a  history  of 
what  happened  to  the  soul  in  its  absence  from  the 
body.  The  distinction  which  primitive  man  drew 
within  his  own  experience  he  transferred  to  things 
about  him.  Hence  arose  the  conception  of  spirits 
which  reside  in  things  but  yet  are  not  bound  to 
them.  The  saying  attributed  to  Thales,  rraivTa 
7T\rjp-rj  0ea>v,  is  a  reminiscence  of  the  ubiquity  of 
spirits  in  early  culture.  In  springs  and  rivers, 
trees  and  groves,  in  fire  and  earth,  they  were 
found,  all  possible  objects  of  reverence,  if  not  all 
actually  worshipped.  All  races  have  passed  through 
this  stage  of  belief,  though  they  have  differed  in 
the  degree  of  development  they  have  given  to  it. 

1  Cp.  the  remarks  on  the  same  point  in  the  essay  "  On  the  Distinc- 
tion between  Inner  and  Outer  Experience."  The  dream -soul  or 
shadow-self  plays  a  great  part  in  the  lower  culture.  For  the  Homeric 
view  vid.  Iliad,  23,  101-105.  The  Egyptian  Ka,  as  is  well  known, 
was  made  the  subject  of  elaborate  doctrines. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  1 1 3 

Spiritism  is  closely  interwoven  with  minor  nature- 
worship,  to  use  the  phrase  of  Keville.  Places 
frequented  by  spirits,  the  objects  in  which  they 
dwelt,  became  sacred.  Hence  there  were  holy  wells 
and  groves,  trees  and  mountains,  for  spirits  haunted 
them  who  could  help  or  hurt  men.  The  selection 
of  these  sites  was  sometimes  due  to  the  need  they 
supplied :  the  spring  quenched  man's  thirst,  the 
tree  gave  him  fruit.  At  other  times  choice  may 
have  been  due  to  some  fortuitous  circumstance 
which  convinced  the  savage  mind,  not  able  to  dis- 
tinguish between  conjunction  and  causality,  that 
spirits  were  present  there.1  When  once  selected, 
sentiment  gathered  round  a  spot  and  tradition 
handed  down  its  sanctity.  The  mystery  of  age 
by-and-by  cast  a  spell  on  men's  minds ;  and  holy 
places  have  enjoyed  a  local  reverence,  and  some- 
times more  than  this,  even  when  the  faith  which 
created  them  has  lost  its  power  to  move  mankind. 
The  tree  in  the  Arician  grove,  the  oak  of  Dodona, 
the  'green  tree'  which  overshadowed  the  Canaan- 
itish  altars,  and  the  sacred  wells  of  our  own  land, 
all  tell  the  tale  how  the  vestiges  of  an  older  cult 
may  linger  on  and  touch  the  imagination  of  an 
after-age.  The  careful  inquirer  who  looks  beneath 
the  surface  of  a  later  culture  will  always  find 

1  The  application  of  the  principle  post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc  is  the 
source  of  many  of  the  vagaries  of  early  belief. 

H 


H4  Religious  Development : 

traces  of  a  minor  nature-worship  which  once  was 
flourishing. 

The  question  suggests  itself,  What  is  the  relation 
of  the  minor  to  the  greater  n  ature- worship  ?  By 
the  latter  is  meant  the  worship,  for  example,  of 
heaven,  sun  and  moon,  dawn  and  thunder.  Keville 
has  suggested  that  the  latter  is  an  extension  or 
outgrowth  from  the  lesser  nature- worship.1  The 
hypothesis  is  tempting,  especially  to  those  who 
like  to  see  orderly  progress  everywhere.  For  minor 
nature-worship  is  circumscribed  in  its  appeal  and 
conservative  in  its  tendency.  But  the  greater 
nature-worship  cannot  be  locally  restricted  in  this 
way :  even  the  primitive  barbarian  would  find  it 
hard  to  claim  for  his  tribe  a  monopoly  of  the  sun 
or  the  heavens.  Man  in  all  his  wanderings  could 
not  pass  away  from  them,  and  so  the  worship  of 
the  larger  phenomena  of  nature  ultimately  became, 
as  we  shall  see,  a  means  of  transition  from  the 
tribal  to  a  wider  form  of  religious  union.  Never- 
theless one  cannot  see  why  the  one  form  of  wor- 
ship necessarily  precedes  the  other ;  and  the  savage 
who  is  capable  of  reverencing  an  animal  or  a  tree 
should  also  be  able  to  worship  the  sun  or  moon. 
It  would  be  hazardous  to  apply  the  maxim  of  Cicero 
in  this  case,  "  Quod  crebro  videt  non  miratur " ; 

1  Eeligiona  des  Penples  non  Civilians,  vol.  ii.  p.  225. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  115 

for  the  rolling  thunder,  the  howling  wind,  the 
changing  moon  must  have  forced  themselves  on 
the  notice  and  provoked  the  awe  and  wonder  of 
the  humblest  barbarian.  It  seems  safer  to  conclude 
that  the  greater  nature-worship,  if  it  did  not  develop 
so  rapidly,  in  its  beginnings  may  be  as  early  as  the 
minor  nature- worship.1  And  both  have  their  roots 
in  animism. 

But  the  individual  who  has  reached  a  satisfactory 
conclusion  about  the  facts  we  have  been  considering 
is  perplexed  by  a  fresh  group  of  religious  phenomena 
which,  to  appearance,  seems  rather  remotely  related 
to  the  other  group.  I  refer  to  Ancestor-worship,  the 
worship  of  the  souls  of  the  dead,  and  Totemism. 
Between  the  members  of  this  second  class  a  connex- 
ion may  be  shown,  but  the  relation  of  the  whole 
class  to  the  first  class  is  less  clear.  Is  the  one  group 
earlier  than  the  other,  and,  if  so,  which  is  the  earlier  ? 
Are  both  independent  growths,  and,  if  not,  is  it 
possible  to  show  how  the  one  developed  out  of  the 
other?  Mr  Herbert  Spencer,  it  is  well  known,  re- 
gards ancestor  -  worship  as  primitive  and  nature- 
worship  as  derivative — "  an  aberrant  form  of  ghost- 
worship."2  The  theory  has  found  few  supporters, 

1  This  seems  to  me  one  of  the  points  where  our  defective  knowledge 
of  primitive  psychical  conditions  makes  it  unsafe  to  dogmatise. 

2  Ecclesiastical  Institutions,  687. 


1 1 6  Religious  Development : 

and  in  itself  it  is  neither  natural  nor  probable.  Yet 
the  cult  of  the  Manes  is  undoubtedly  very  old,  older 
among  the  Aryans,  according  to  Fustel  de  Coulanges, 
than  the  cult  of  Indra  or  Zeus.1  But  though  it 
existed  prior  to  the  evolution  of  the  greater  gods, 
we  cannot  say  that  it  is  the  oldest  form  of  spiritism. 
The  spirits  man  found  in  nature  were  a  reflex  of  the 
soul  he  had  learned  to  recognise  in  himself;  and  it 
seems  at  least  likely  that  the  spirits  in  the  world 
about  him  first  provoked  his  worship,  because  they 
were  more  readily  associated  with  his  daily  wants 
and  fears.  The  psychological  causes  which  special- 
ised spiritism  in  the  cult  of  souls  are  fairly  clear. 
Early  man,  we  saw,  had  no  notion  of  the  inanimate, 
and  death  appeared  to  him  no  more  than  a  kind 
of  sleep  in  which  the  soul  was  still  active.  The 
reappearance  of  the  dead  in  dreams  was  a  sure 
token  that  they  still  haunted  the  earth  in  ghost- 
like form.  The  soul  was  thought  to  linger  near  the 
body  it  once  inhabited,  and  like  other  spirits  these 
souls  of  the  departed  could  powerfully  affect  the 
living  for  good  or  evil.  Of  the  doctrine  of  ghost- 
souls  Dr  Tylor  says,  that  "  it  extends  through 
barbarian  life  almost  without  a  break,  and  survives 
largely  and  deeply  in  the  midst  of  civilisation." 
The  student  of  Greek  and  Koman  religion,  for 
example,  will  find  abundant  evidence  for  it  in  the 

1  La  cit6  antique,  p.  19. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  1 1 7 

burial  customs  and  other  survivals  in  the  historic 
period.1 

It  is  to  be  inferred  that  the  organised  worship 
of  the  spirits  of  ancestors  is  later  than  the  primitive 
cult  of  ghosts  ;  for  it  implies  a  growth  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  value  of  family  and  social  ties. 
The  god  who  is  an  ancestor  in  claiming  the  worship 
of  his  descendants  rests  his  appeal  on  the  sense  of 
a  common  bond  and  'the  duty  of  a  common  loyalty. 
The  cult  of  ancestral  souls  depends  on  family  and 
tribal  solidarity.  At  this  point  emerges  the  link 
of  connexion  between  ancestor-worship  and  totem- 
ism.  In  the  lower  stages  of  culture  the  tribal  bond 
could  only  be  conceived  in  an  external  and  material 
way,  as  embodied  in  a  thing.  The  totem  is  the 
reflex  of  the  sense  of  unity  in  clan  or  tribe.  It  is 
true  that  totemism  is  not  a  purely  religious  phe- 
nomenon. It  is  connected  with  exogamy,  and  is 
associated  with  prohibitions  which  may  not  have 
had  a  religious  significance  at  first.  But  un- 
doubtedly the  totem — the  plant  or  animal  which 
was  the  ancestor  of  the  tribe  and  embodied  its  life 
— came  to  be  an  object  of  religious  reverence.  The 

1  Besides  the  work  of  F.  de  Coulanges,  we  may  refer  to  E.  Kohde's 
book,  'Psyche.'  The  reader  will  find  there  the  evidence  for  a 
primitive  cult  of  souls  in  Greece,  drawn  from  burial  customs  recorded 
in  Homer  and  elsewhere.  On  Greek  and  Eoman  tombs  the  inscrip- 
tions are  found — 0eots  \9ovio^  Dls  Manibus.  Cp.  Eurip.,  Alcestis, 
1003,  1004, — vvv  &'  €<JTI  /AttKcupa  Sat/xcov  x^P*  &  '""OTVI',  *v  &*  801175. 


1 1 8  Religious  Development : 

selection  of  an  ancestor  from  the  animal  or 
vegetable  kingdom  will  cease  to  surprise  us  when 
we  remember  how  vague  is  the  conception  of 
causality  in  the  savage,  and  how  constantly  he 
reads  his  own  consciousness  into  the  things  around 
him.  The  point  of  interest  is  that  the  thought 
of  religion  as  represented  in  a  physical  bond — 
one  of  blood — was  a  germ  which  in  a  favourable 
soil  might  rise  to  a  higher  form  and  bring  forth 
ethical  fruit.  Totemism  flourished  most  luxuriantly 
among  the  Indians  of  North  America,  and  we  find 
it  in  Australia  and  among  the  Arabs  and  other 
Semites.  That  it  was  a  widespread  phenomenon 
is  undeniable ;  that  it  was  a  phase  through  which 
all  religions  passed,  like  spiritism,  is  not  proved,  and 
can  well  be  doubted.  The  reverence  paid  to  animals, 
as  in  Egypt,  may  be  due  to  a  primitive  animal- 
worship  and  not  to  totemism.  And  some  religions, 
like  the  Greek  and  Koman,  show  no  clear  trace  of 
it  at  all.  Between  the  worship  of  the  totem-ancestor 
and  the  worship  of  the  soul  of  the  human  ancestor 
of  the  family  or  clan  there  is  no  clearly  marked  line 
of  separation.  But  the  latter  object  has  a  more 
ideal  significance,  and  is  better  fitted  to  be  a  means 
to  a  higher  development  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness. The  rude  fear  of  the  souls  of  the  dead,  out  of 
which  ancestor- worship  issues,  is  gradually  leavened 
by  sentiments  of  loyalty  and  devotion.  As  the 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  119 

sense  of  the  worth  of  social  union  deepens,  so  is  the 
religious  relation  elevated.  In  the  Koman  cult  of 
the  forefathers  of  the  family  who  in  spirit  watched 
over  its  fortunes,  representing  to  the  later  genera- 
tions its  best  traditions  and  linking  the  present  to 
the  remoter  past  by  the  bond  of  filial  piety  and 
common  interest,  we  realise  the  possibilities  of 
growth  in  this  form  of  worship.1  In  China,  the 
land  of  ancestor- worship,  piety  takes  as  its  main 
form  fidelity  to  the  tie  which  links  the  children  to 
divine  forefathers.  As  a  general  fact  we  note  that 
at  the  stage  of  ancestor- worship  man's  social  relations 
begin  to  play  a  part  in  colouring  his  religious  con- 
ceptions. The  tie  of  family  and  of  tribe  is  traced 
back  to  the  more  enduring  bond  which  links  man 
to  his  gods. 

At  this  point  it  will  be  convenient  to  discuss 
briefly  the  place  of  Fetishism  and  Magic  in  the 
development  of  religion.  Both  have  sometimes 
been  regarded  as  primitive,  although  the  majority 
of  writers  incline  to  treat  them  as  later  products — 
fetishism  especially  being  reckoned  a  degeneration 
from  something  higher.  The  only  useful  test  we 
can  apply  to  settle  the  question  is  that  of  psycho- 
logical consistency.  A  fetish  may  be  any  kind  of 
material  object,  a  stone,  shell,  claw,  or  root.  The 

1  For  the  higher  side  of  Roman  family  piety,  see  Pater's  chapter  on 
"  The  Religion  of  Numa  "  in  '  Marius  the  Epicurean.' 


1 20  Religious  Development  : 

point  is  that  it  is  conceived  to  be  the  abode  of  a 
spirit,  and  so  is  credited  with  superhuman  powers. 
Belief  in  spirits,  therefore,  is  a  psychological  condi- 
tion presupposed  by  the  selection  of  the  fetish,  and 
fetish -worship  is  thus  a  special  application  of  spirit- 
ism. In  harmony  with  this  fetishism  is  rife  where 
spiritism  is  rampant.  To  the  mind  of  the  West 
African  negro  the  world  teems  with  spirits,  and 
West  Africa  is  the  land  where  fetishism  abounds. 
Though  fetishism  is  not  primitive,  it  does  not  stand 
on  the  line  of  higher  religious  development.  For  it 
gives  a  form  to  the  religious  relationship  which  is 
crude  and  arbitrary  to  a  degree,  and  it  offers  no 
possibilities  of  progress.  Psychologically  fetishism 
is  explicable  by  the  natural  desire  of  man  to  estab- 
lish a  closer  connexion  with  the  spirits  by  physical 
means,  in  order  to  further  his  own  ends.  But  its 
tendency  is  to  set  up  a  kind  of  control  over,  instead 
of  dependence  on,  higher  powers,  which  is  not  in 
harmony  with  the  religious  idea.1 

A  similar  line  of  argument  applies  to  magic. 
Like  fetishism  it  has  its  root  in  spiritism,  and  it  has 
flourished  most  where  spiritism  has  prevailed  greatly. 
We  may  illustrate  this  from  the  Finns  and  the  early 
Sumerian  inhabitants  of  Babylonia;  and  Koman  and 

1  Fetishism,  it  should  be  noted,  is  closely  associated  with  idolatry, 
but  it  exists  in  some  of  the  lower  races  without  it — e.g.,  among  the 
Bushmen,  the  Esquimaux,  and  the  Andaman  Islanders. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  121 

Chinese  magic  had  their  roots  in  the  dominant 
animism  which  gave  a  character  even  to  the  later 
religious  development  of  both  peoples.  The  same 
psychological  motives  are  at  work  as  in  fetishism. 
The  magic  word,  rite,  or  formula  can  control  the 
spirits,  and  the  sorcerer  is  venerated  for  his  know- 
ledge and  power.  Hence  it  is  hard  to  believe  that 
Dr  J.  G.  Frazer's  view  of  magic,  as  set  forth  in  the 
second  edition  of  '  The  Golden  Bough,'  is  correct. 
He  thinks  that  religion  arose  out  of  the  failure  of 
magic,  and  in  despair  of  its  efficacy.1  Dr  Frazer,  I 
think,  fails  to  recognise  the  universal  character  of 
the  psychological  motives  which  led  to  religion. 
There  are  plenty  of  examples  to  show  that  magic 
and  religion  can  easily  exist  together  among  the 
same  people.  Nor  is  it  likely  that  primitive  peoples 
came  naturally  to  despair  of  magic.  Faith  in  its 
efficacy  has  often  survived  the  strongest  reasons 
for  disbelief.  And  even  granted  the  existence  of 
such  a  despair,  one  does  not  see  why  the  reaction 
against  magic  should  constantly  issue  in  religion  as 
a  kind  of  dernier  ressort.  Moreover,  there  is  no 
evidence  that  there  are  or  have  been  low  tribes  who 
practised  magic  but  had  not  a  religion ;  and  even 
were  it  so,  it  might  be  argued  that  it  was  religion 
which  had  died  out  while  magic  survived.2  It  is 

1  Vol.  i.  p.  62  ff. 

2  Vid.  A.  Lang,  Magic  and  Eeligion,  p.  47. 


1 2  2  Religious  Development  : 

altogether  much  more  intelligible  to  regard  magic  as 
a  lower  outgrowth  of  the  religious  consciousness. 

The  forms  of  religion  we  have  been  considering 
are  all  found  at  the  tribal  stage  of  culture.  Do 
these  forms  represent  the  full  development  of  tribal 
religion?  There  is  a  certain  amount  of  evidence 
that  even  on  this  low  level  of  culture  advances 
have  been  made  towards  the  conception  of  a 
Supreme  Being.  As  illustrating  this  we  may  point 
to  Torngarsuk,  or  Great  Spirit,  of  the  Greenlanders, 
Atahocan,  or  Creator,  of  the  Algonquin  Indians, 
Unkulunkulu,  the  Old  Old  One,  of  the  Zulus. 
Manitu,  the  Great  Spirit  of  the  North  American 
Indians  generally,  and  Baiame,  the  Creator,  of  the 
native  Australian  tribes,  may  also  be  noted.  In 
some  cases  we  can  see  that  ancestor-worship  led  to 
the  idea  of  a  Great  or  First  Ancestor,  as  among  the 
Zulus.  In  others  the  supremacy  of  the  greater  and 
stronger  over  the  smaller  and  weaker  perhaps 
suggested  a  highest  god.  This  may  have  been  so 
where  ancestors  were  not  worshipped.  And  some- 
times the  great  god  of  low  tribes  is  plausibly  ex- 
plained by  contact,  direct  or  indirect,  with  Christian 
ideas ;  but  it  is  not  always  so.  The  existence  of 
great  gods  amongst  savage  races  has,  curiously 
enough,  prompted  Mr  A.  Lang  to  rehabilitate  the 
old  hypothesis  of  a  primitive  theism.  "  Our  con- 
ception of  God  descends  not  from  ghosts  but  from 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  123 

the  Supreme  Being  of  non- ancestor -worshipping 
peoples."1  Animism  Mr  Lang  finds  to  be  "full 
of  the  seeds  of  degeneration " ;  and  it  appears  to 
have  ousted  a  purer  religion  by  the  attractions  it 
possessed  for  the  natural  man.2  So  in  Guiana,  we 
are  told,  the  ghost-cult  has  reduced  the  primitive 
Father  of  all  to  a  nominis  umbra ;  among  the 
Bantu  tribes  devotion  to  fetishes  and  ghosts  has 
brought  the  Supreme  Being  into  neglect ;  while 
among  the  Zulus  Unkulunkulu  is  a  vanishing 
greatness.  Mr  Lang's  contributions  to  our  know- 
ledge of  early  culture  and  mythology  have  secured 
a  hearing  for  this  venturesome  hypothesis.  But  if 
he  is  right  the  current  notions  of  religious  develop- 
ment must  be  entirely  revised ;  animism  and 
spiritism  cease  to  be  primitive,  and  must  be  re- 
garded as  lapses  from  a  higher  and  an  earlier 
religious  level.  On  this  theory  it  may  be  sufficient 
to  remark — (1)  The  evidence  that  some  low  tribes 
have  risen  to  the  idea  of  a  Supreme  Being,  where 
it  is  satisfactory,  still  only  refers  to  a  stage  of 
development  which  is  comparatively  recent,  and 
cannot  be  taken  as  a  proof  of  what  is  primitive. 
Though  some  modern  savages  have  formed  for 
themselves  an  idea  of  a  Supreme  Being,  this  is  no 
proof  that  prehistoric  man  could  have  done  so.  (2) 
Such  great  gods,  where  genuine  native  growths,  are 

1  Making  of  Religion,  p.  191.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  264,  257. 


1 24  Religious  Development : 

explicable  as  later  products  of  the  savage  mind. 
They  were  superadded  to  the  spirits,  but  were 
never  so  firmly  fixed  in  the  traditions  and  senti- 
ments of  the  people.  (3)  While  the  vestiges  of  a 
primitive  animism  are  to  be  found  everywhere  be- 
hind the  ]ater  stages  of  religious  development,  the 
same  is  by  no  means  true  of  a  primitive  theism. 
(4)  The  theory  attributes  too  great  psychical 
capacity  to  primitive  races,  and  ignores  the  force 
and  intelligibility  of  the  psychological  reasons 
which  produced  animism. 

We  may  now  attempt  to  state  briefly  the  general 
features  of  religion  at  the  tribal  stage  of  its  history. 
Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  character  of  religion  reflects 
the  inner  consciousness  of  man,  which  again  is  con- 
ditioned by  his  social  relations.  At  this  period  self- 
consciousness  is  relatively  undeveloped,  and  the 
spiritual  life  does  not  definitely  contrast  itself  with 
or  oppose  itself  to  the  natural  world.  Imagination 
is  fettered  to  the  domain  of  sense,  and  cannot 
rise  to  the  thought  of  an  ideal  bond  or  a  super- 
sensuous  world.  The  gods  belong  to  the  realm  of 
nature :  if  not  absolutely  identified  with  material 
objects,  they  are  more  or  less  closely  bound  up  with 
them.  Personality  is  dormant,  the  individual  is 
merged  in  the  tribe,  and  religious  growth  is  uncon- 
scious. The  day  of  the  prophet,  reformer,  and 
spiritual  teacher  has  not  dawned.  The  rude  pre- 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  125 

cursor  of  these  is  the  sorcerer  and  the  medicine-man. 
As  yet  religious  change  is  gradual  and  comes  with- 
out observation.  In  harmony  with  this,  the  private 
belief  of  the  individual,  if  he  has  any,  is  unim- 
portant :  each  member  of  the  tribe  shares  its  religion 
by  taking  part  in  the  cult.  His  religion  is  deter- 
mined for  him  by  his  membership  of  the  family  or 
clan,  and  is  part  of  his  birth  inheritance.  A  man 
can  only  change  his  religion  by  breaking  his  social 
bonds  and  undergoing  initiation  into  an  alien  tribe 
which  "  serves  other  gods."  The  spiritual  not  being 
properly  differentiated  at  this  stage  from  the 
natural,  human  needs  are  restricted  to  the  material, 
and  desires  do  not  rise  above  the  sensuous.  The 
stress  of  life  is  embodied  in  the  constant  endeavour 
to  supply  the  wants  of  the  body  and  to  gain  protec- 
tion or  deliverance  from  danger.  For  man  has  not 
yet  gained  that  material  basis  of  existence  which,  in 
giving  him  fuller  security,  also  gives  him  leisure  to 
reflect :  and  as  the  circle  of  his  needs  is  limited,  so 
is  the  scope  of  his  religious  interest.  The  colourless 
uniformity  which  is  manifest  in  tribal  religions 
is  a  consequence  of  the  poverty  of  social  life, 
which  cannot  nourish  a  complex  and  developed 
personality. 

At  first  we  are  astonished  at  the  recurrence  of  the 
same  beliefs  and  rites  among  the  most  distant  tribes. 
But  we  wonder  less  when  we  remember  that  men 


126  Religious  Development : 

everywhere  have  the  same  limited  group  of  material 
wants,  and  bring  the  same  mental  constitution  to 
bear  on  these  wants.  Monotony  —  the  lack  of 
distinctive  character — is  a  note  of  tribal  religions. 
Primitive  religion  certainly  made  for  loyalty  to  the 
tribal  bond,  yet  in  casting  the  shadow  of  a  religious 
sanction  over  tribal  divisions,  it  hindered  rather 
than  helped  the  advent  of  wider  forms  of  social 
union.  The  merging  of  tribes  in  the  nation  was  not 
due  to  the  pressure  of  religious  motives. 

In  correspondence  with  man's  slender  inner 
development  the  gods  of  tribal  religion  are  lacking 
in  content.  The  worshipper's  poverty  of  character 
is  mirrored  in  the  objects  which  he  worships.  The 
host  of  spirits  which  encircled  the  savage  were 
differentiated  one  from  another  only  in  an  external 
way — i.e.,  by  local  habitation  and  office.  One  dwells 
in  a  tree  and  another  in  a  spring,  one  is  invoked  that 
he  may  do  good,  another  is  propitiated  lest  he  work 
harm  :  but  otherwise  their  nature  remains  vague  and 
undefined.  The  god  is  not  personified  ;  he  does  not 
combine  and  body  forth  a  group  of  determinate 
qualities.  In  other  words,  the  gods  of  tribal 
religion  do  not  rise  to  the  level  of  personal 
character.1  Hence  their  relations  to  the  worshipper 

1  Usener  thinks  that  up  to  the  time  of  the  division  of  the  Indo- 
Germanic  peoples  the  Aryans  did  not  have  concrete  personal  gods. 
— '  Gotternamen,'  p.  279. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  1 27 

are  material  and  external.  To  this  the  religious 
rites  bear  witness.  Sacrifice,  for  example,  goes  far 
back  in  the  history  of  the  race.  Yet  in  primitive 
sacrifice  the  ethical  element  is  quite  undeveloped. 
As  is  now  generally  agreed,  sacrifice  was  originally 
a  common  meal  which  the  god  shared  with  his 
worshippers,  and  was  a  means  of  strengthening  the 
bond  of  union  between  them.1  That  bond  was  one 
of  life  or  blood.  So  with  prayer ;  it  was  only  the 
expression  of  personal  desire  for  some  tangible 
good.  A  higher  stage  of  religion  could  only  come 
with  the  development  of  a  deeper  personal  con- 
sciousness in  man.  For  with  the  deepening  of  the 
inner  life  there  goes  perforce  a  demand  for  more 
elevated  ideas  of  the  gods  and  a  recasting  of  the 
religious  relationship.  The  new  wine  must  have 
new  bottles.  We  shall  now  try  to  indicate  shortly 
the  significance  of  the  transition  from  tribal  to 
national  religion. 

The  process  by  which  various  clans  and  tribes  are 
fused  into  a  nation  is  not  one  which  we  can  actually 
observe.  In  some  cases,  however,  analysis  of  the 
composite  product  enables  us  to  form  a  fairly  clear 
idea  of  the  different  elements,  and  of  the  way 
in  which  they  were  gradually  combined  in  the 
national  whole.  It  may  be  confidently  asserted 

1  Vid.  W.  E.  Smith's  Religion  of  the  Semites,  p.  439.  Cp.  Iliad, 
i.  451. 


128  Religious  Development : 

that  no  nation  was  ever  formed  by  simple  and 
continuous  expansion  of  a  single  stock  or  clan. 
Tribal  history  is  full  of  warfare  and  conquest. 
The  victory  of  the  stronger  tribe,  the  subjuga- 
tion and  final  incorporation  of  the  weaker,  have 
been  the  means  by  which  the  formation  of  larger 
social  organisations  has  been  promoted.  The 
building  up  of  the  Roman  people  from  a  nucleus 
of  Italic  clans  is  a  case  in  point.  As  a  nation 
develops,  the  elements  which  have  entered  into 
it  consolidate ;  men  enjoy  a  larger  security  and 
have  less  anxiety  about  the  satisfaction  of  bodily 
wants.  Hence  the  way  is  opened  out  for  the  growth 
of  reflective  consciousness,  and  to  the  outward  ex- 
pansion of  the  social  system  there  corresponds  an 
inward  deepening  of  the  personal  life.  A  new  and 
higher  range  of  desires  emerges ;  and  along  with 
this  goes  the  demand  for  a  definite  advance  in  the 
form  of  religion.  The  local  aspects  of  the  older 
faiths  are  felt  to  be  out  of  harmony  with  a  wider 
outlook  and  higher  needs.  The  sacred  spring  and 
tree  and  the  spirit-haunted  holy  place  do  not  lend 
themselves  to  the  reverence  of  a  whole  nation.  Nor 
can  family  ancestors,  or  the  totem  of  the  clan,  both 
resting  on  ties  of  blood,  become  truly  national  gods 
without  losing  their  significance.  In  Eome,  for 
instance,  although  Vesta,  the  deity  of  the  domestic 
hearth,  became  a  state -goddess,  the  cult  of  the 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  129 

forefathers  of  the  family  was  shared  only  by  the 
family.1 

The  birth  of  a  nation  brings  with  it  a  new  sense 
of  the  value  of  order  and  uniformity  which,  in  the 
religious  sphere,  makes  for  a  new  organisation  of 
beliefs.  Moreover,  the  interaction  of  the  diverse 
religious  ideas  which  tribes  bring  with  them  into 
the  nation  is  favourable  to  religious  development. 
The  need  of  harmonising  discordant  elements  and 
establishing  some  form  of  unity  is  a  stimulus  to 
religious  reflexion.2  It  might  be  thought  that  a 
ruling  race  whose  influence  was  dominant  would 
simply  impose  its  religion  on  the  lower  peoples 
under  its  sway.  But  only  to  a  limited  extent  is 
this  possible.  The  conservative  force  of  sentiment 
and  tradition  always  prevents  one  religion  from 
completely  usurping  the  place  of  another.  The 
dominant  and  official  cult  never  wholly  ousts  the 
weaker  one  from  its  local  strongholds,  and  in  its 
own  development  is  modified  by  it.  Behind  Baby- 
lonian polytheism  lurk  the  magic  and  the  spirits 
of  the  old  Sumerian  inhabitants.  The  primitive 

1  Perhaps  in  the  general  idea  of  kinship  between  men  and  gods  we 
may  trace  the  survival,  at  a  higher  level  of  development,  of  tribal 
notions   of   blood- relationship.      But   the   important  thing  is  that 
tribal  religion,  in  any  of  its  forms,  is  not  adequate  to  the  national 
consciousness. 

2  It  is   worthy  of    note    that  races   which  have   suffered  from 
isolation — e.g.,  Finns  and  Lithuanians — have  remained  long  on  the 
lower  levels  of  religious  belief. 

I 


1 30  Religious  Development  : 

animal  worship  of  the  different  nomes  shows  itself 
beside  the  greater  gods  of  the  Egyptian  Empire. 
Hindu  idolatry  suggests  how  the  religion  of  the 
Aryan  conquerors  of  India  has  been  influenced 
by  the  fetishism  of  the  aborigines.  Keligions 
die  hard.  Indeed  the  tenacious  life  which  pre- 
serves a  lower  form  of  faith  beside  a  higher 
is  a  widespread  phenomenon,  well  known  to 
all  students  of  human  culture.  It  can  be  illus- 
trated from  Christian  as  well  as  from  pagan 
lands. 

Minor  nature-worship,  as  we  have  seen,  is  local 
and  tribal  in  its  character  and  tendency,  while  the 
worship  of  the  greater  powers  of  nature  lends 
itself  to  the  outlook  of  a  larger  religious  faith. 
The  heavens  and  the  sun,  the  thunder  and  the 
storm,  have  a  world  -  wide  range  and  sphere  of 
operation.  They  were  therefore  fitted  to  be  the 
objects  of  a  worship  that  transcended  the  local 
cults  of  clan  and  tribe.  We  can  understand,  then, 
how  the  national  consciousness,  reacting  against 
the  narrow  form  of  tribal  religion,  and  stirred  to 
advance  by  the  opposition  of  beliefs,  intuitively 
laid  hold  on  the  greater  nature -worship,  as  that 
side  of  older  faith  which  could  be  expanded  to 
meet  its  larger  wants.  A  personification  of  the 
greater  powers  of  nature  lies  behind  the  organised 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  131 

polytheism  of  the  national  religions.1  The  traces 
of  the  nature  -  origin  of  many  of  the  greater  gods 
have  almost  vanished,  but  sometimes  we  can  detect 
enough  to  suggest  to  us  what  the  basis  of  the 
later  development  has  been.  A  few  illustrations 
will  make  this  more  plain.  That  the  chief  gods 
of  the  Veda  are  personifications  of  natural  powers 
appears  fairly  certain.  The  drama  of  the  storm 
lies  at  the  root  of  Indra,  and  Agni  is  primarily 
fire.  Yaruna  is  possibly  the  all  -seeing  heaven. 
In  China,  Tian  is  the  personification  of  the  celestial 
firmament.  The  Baalim,  or  Lords,  of  the  Semites, 
Merodach,  god  of  Babylon,  and  the  Egyptian  Ka 
are  sun-gods.  The  Hellenic  Zeus  shows  vestiges  of 
his  connexion  with  the  phenomena  of  the  sky,  with 
rain,  wind,  and  thunder  —  5croi>,  w  </>iXe  Zet),  /caret 


The  Roman  Jupiter  has  likewise  a  primitive  con- 
nexion with  the  heaven  —  "Sub  frigido  Jove"  —  and 
a  philological  kinship  with  his  Hellenic  counterpart. 

These  examples  might  be  added  to.  But  enough 
has  been  said  to  justify  the  view  we  have  taken  of 
the  way  in  which  the  national  consciousness  raised 


1  It  is  not,  of  course,  meant  that  all  the  greater  gods  were 
originally  nature-powers.  Brahma  is  an  instance  of  a  god  origin- 
ating in  the  cult.  The  Eoman  religion  furnishes  examples  of  the 
apotheosis  of  purely  social  functions. 


132  Religious  Development : 

tribal  religion  to  a  form  adequate  to  its  needs. 
It  did  so  by  developing  the  greater  nature- worship 
into  a  polytheistic  system.  And  in  the  process  the 
material  basis  of  the  gods  was  gradually  outgrown. 
The  physical  root  of  a  deity  is  overlaid  with  higher 
attributes,  and  resembles  the  rudimentary  organs  of 
some  animal  type  by  which  the  biologist  is  able  to 
spell  out  its  remoter  lineage.  This  development 
consists  in  giving  content  and  personal  definiteness 
to  the  idea  of  a  god  ;  and  it  is  made  possible  by  the 
growth  of  higher  social  and  ethical  qualities  within 
the  nation.  The  evolution  of  personal  character 
on  earth  gives  a  higher  conception  of  the  things 

in  heaven. 

"  Und  wir  verehren 
Die  Unsterblichen 
Als  waren  sie  Menschen, 
Thaten  im  Grossen 
Was  der  Beste  im  Kleinen 
Thut  oder  mbchte." 

The  movement  of  the  mind  by  which  the  gods 
are  clothed  with  all  human  virtues  likewise  invests 
them  with  higher  social  meaning.  They  become 
the  ideal  representatives  and  protectors  of  special 
departments  of  the  national  life.  The  earthly  state 
has  a  counterpart  in  the  commonwealth  above.  So 
the  interests,  aspirations,  and  activities  of  a  race,  as 
well  as  the  different  aspects  of  its  social  life,  are 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  133 

represented  in  the  gods  of  the  State,  and  as  the 
moral  consciousness  grows  they  receive  a  corres- 
pondingly higher  moral  character.  To  illustrate 
this.  In  China,  Tian,  or  Heaven,  was  identified 
with  the  principle  of  order,  and  measure,  and  just 
custom,  and  became  the  pattern  of  right  for  those 
upon  the  earth.  The  Vedic  Varuna  was  exalted  to 
the  place  of  a  highest  ruler  who  saw  all  things,  who 
required  piety  in  his  worshippers,  and  to  whom 
confession  of  sins  was  made.  The  Greek  Apollo 
may  have  been  originally  a  light-god,  but  he  after- 
wards became  the  deity  who  presided  over  the  art 
of  healing,  and  wielded  the  gift  of  prophecy. 
Athene,  who  was  perhaps  at  first  the  lightning- 
flash,  became  the  goddess  who  was  the  pattern  of 
civic  valour  and  good  counsel,  and  whose  interests 
were  bound  up  with  the  city  which  was  called  by 
her  name.  Mars,  an  ancient  Italian  deity  of  spring 
and  fertility,  cast  his  preserving  care  over  agri- 
culture, and  became  the  god  of  war  as  well.  The 
Teutonic  Odin,  besides  war,  took  understanding  and 
culture  under  his  protection.  The  Egyptian  Osiris, 
who  appears  to  have  been  originally  the  Sun  after 
his  setting,  was  raised  to  be  ruler  of  the  realm 
of  departed  spirits,  the  moral  judge  who  weighs 
in  a  balance  the  good  and  evil  done  in  the  flesh. 
The  ascription  of  diverse  functions  to  the  one  god 
was  a  consequence  of  the  multiplication  of  human 


134  Religious  Development : 

interests  and  activities.  Yet  this  was  not  the  sole 
reason.  Sometimes  the  process  was  due  to  the 
desire  to  introduce  unity  and  coherence  into  the 
local  cults.  In  Egypt  the  sun-god  Ka  absorbed  the 
various  local  sun-gods,  who  became  aspects  of  Ra. 
In  Greece  we  find  a  like  movement  working  upon 
more  diverse  materials.  The  Zeus  e^SeVSptos  of 
Dodona  was  no  doubt  a  primeval  tree-spirit.  The 
Zeus  cDuos  was  a  god  of  the  sea.  The  Zeus  x#oi>ios 
worshipped  at  Mount  Ida  and  Crete — at  both  of 
which  the  grave  of  Zeus  was  shown — was  probably 
an  earth-spirit.  These  gods,  really  of  diverse  origin, 
were  harmonised  by  being  designated  as  aspects  of 
Zeus.  But  this  tendency  to  unify  is  not  strictly 
universal,  and  a  society  as  it  grows  more  complex 
sometimes  goes  on  adding  to  its  deities.  This  was 
markedly  the  case  among  the  Komans,  whose  crowd 
of  'little  gods,'  thinly  veiled  abstractions  as  they 
were,  was  constantly  being  augmented.1  But  the 
influences  which  make  for  unification  commonly  pre- 
dominate at  this  stage.  Political  and  social  reasons 
make  it  desirable  that  the  citizens  of  a  state  should 
not  be  divided  in  their  religion. 

The  organisation  of  society  suggests  a  supremacy 
and  headship  among  the  gods.  The  reflective  con- 
sciousness seeks  unity  behind  multiplicity,  and  looks 
for  a  greater  god  on  whom  the  lesser  gods  depend. 

1  Vid.  Aust,  Die  Eeligion  der  Komer,  19,  20. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  135 

Moreover,  this  tendency  of  thought  is  supported  by 
the  instinct  which  is  in  the  worshipper  to  adore  a 
particular  god  as  supreme  in  the  act  of  reverence. 
The  suppliant  craving  the  help  of  a  god  thinks 
of  that  god  for  the  time  being  as  greatest  and 
strongest.  The  existence  of  the  other  gods  is  of 
course  in  no  sense  denied.  This  attitude  of  the 
religious  mind  has  been  termed  Kathenotheism,  and 
Vedic  worship  is  usually  cited  as  an  illustration  of 
it.  Sayce  finds  the  same  movement  of  mind  in  the 
religion  of  Egypt.1 

A  further  advance  towards  unity  is  revealed  in 
Henotheism,  which  means  that  while  many  gods 
are  admitted  to  exist,  worship  is  reserved  for  one 
only.  The  dividing  line  between  these  two  phases 
of  belief  is  shadowy.  In  the  latter  case,  however, 
faith  in  the  supremacy  and  uniqueness  of  the  god 
worshipped  has  become  a  permanent,  not  a  passing, 
attitude  of  mind. 

The  Hebrew  Psalmist  has  been  quoted  as  speaking 
the  language  of  Henotheism.  "  Thou,  Lord,  art  high 
above  all  the  earth :  Thou  art  exalted  above  all 
gods"  (Ps.  xcvii.  9).  And  the  well-known  lines 
of  Xenophanes  are  henotheistic  in  spirit : — 

Efc  #609  %v  re  Qeolai  KOL  avdpcoTroicrt, 

Ol/T6  SeJLdS  QvYToi<JlV  OJLOUOS  OVT€ 


1  Religions  of  Ancient  Egypt  and  Babylonia,  p.  93. 


1 36  Religious  Development : 

But  there  is  another  and  a  more  developed  aspect 
of  the  tendency  to  unify.  The  reflective  conscious- 
ness discerns  a  divine  element  in  all  the  gods,  or 
recognises  some  higher  law  immanent  in  the  world 
of  gods.  Such  are  the  Greek  To  Belov  and  Motpa, 
and  the  Hindu  Rita.  The  further  progress  of  this 
movement  leads  to  pantheism  with  its  reduction  of 
the  manifold  world  of  divine  forms  to  appearances 
of  the  One.  Whether  this  path  is  followed  to  its 
logical  conclusion  or  not  depends  on  several  condi- 
tions. Capacity  for  speculative  thought  in  a  people 
counts  for  something.  Still  more  important  is  the 
degree  in  which  personality  has  been  developed  in 
the  social  system.  Where  a  high  sense  of  person- 
ality has  been  linked  with  imaginative  power  the 
forms  of  divine  beings  are  clearly  defined,  and  their 
character  is  concrete.  In  which  case  the  gods  resist 
the  process  of  fusion  into  a  pantheistic  whole.  It 
is  also  true  that  where  the  developed  consciousness 
of  personality  is  accompanied  by  a  keen  perception 
of  moral  values,  pantheism  does  not  find  a  favour- 
able soil  in  which  to  grow.  In  India  the  Aryan  con- 
querors seem  early  to  have  lost  the  vigour  and  self- 
assertion  of  their  race.  The  Hindu  was  oppressed 
by  the  burden  of  life  in  a  tropical  land  rather 
than  quickened  by  its  interests :  personality  was 
slenderly  developed,  and  the  forms  of  the  gods 
remained  vague  and  shadowy.  Already  in  the 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  137 

Veda  the  process  of  blending  has  begun.  "They 
have  styled  him  Indra,  Mithra,  Varuna,  Agni,  for 
the  poets  have  many  names  for  the  One."  The 
issue  of  this  movement  of  thought  is  contained  in 
the  words  of  the  Vedanta,  "  He  who  knows  the 
highest  Brahma  becomes  Brahma."  Nay,  such 
knowledge  is  only  the  intuition  of  what  always  has 
been,  the  Eternal  One  !  All  else  is  illusion.  In 
ancient  Egypt  the  official  religion  was  construed  by 
the  priesthood  into  a  subtle  pantheism,  which,  how- 
ever, was  more  an  esoteric  product  than  was  the 
case  in  India.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Greek  genius 
had  given  such  definite  and  artistic  form  to  the 
gods  that  the  process  of  fusion  could  not  be  carried 
out.  Greek  pantheism  is  a  late  philosophical  pro- 
duct which  did  not  concern  itself  with  the  tradi- 
tional religion. 

In  contrast  to  this  line  of  development  which 
ends  in  the  impasse  of  pantheism,  another  line  leads 
on  to  monotheism.  The  former  movement  is  mainly 
intellectual,  in  the  latter  moral  forces  play  a  part. 
And  if  it  be  granted  that  piety  and  reverence  are 
rooted  in  the  nature  of  man,  then  beyond  question 
monotheism  is  the  higher  and  truer  development : 
it  gives  the  more  complete  expression  to  the  religious 
principle.  Historically  the  advance  from  polytheism 
to  monotheism  has  been  by  way  of  monarchism. 
The  term  signifies  that  one  out  of  a  circle  of  gods  is 


138  Religious  Development : 

represented  as  supreme  and  having  sway  over  the 
rest :  the  favoured  god  may  have  been  the  deity  of 
a  conquering  race,  or  of  a  city  which  has  established 
a  rule  over  other  cities.  Such  were  Amon-Ea  of 
Thebes,  and  Merodach  of  Babylon.  Among  the 
Greeks  Zeus  was  raised  to  a  kind  of  sovereignty 
over  the  other  gods,  and  so  Homer  depicts  him.1 
He  has  a  shadowy  counterpart  in  the  Jupiter  Opti- 
mus  Maximus  of  the  Eoman  Capitol. 

Monotheism  is  distinguished  from  monarchism 
by  its  refusal  to  admit  the  existence  of  many  gods, 
and  its  affirmation  that  there  is  but  one  Glod.  The 
Psalmist  speaks  the  language  of  monotheism  when 
he  declares,  "All  the  gods  of  the  nations  are  idols, 
but  the  Lord  made  the  heavens  "  (Ps.  xcvi.  5).  On 
a  superficial  view  it  might  seem  that  the  transition 
from  monarchism  to  monotheism  was  simple  and 
easy.  But  it  is  not  so :  the  definite  rejection  of 
the  claim  to  existence  of  all  gods  save  the  One  is 
a  step  as  difficult  as  it  is  important.  Sentiment 
and  tradition  as  well  as  local  associations  do  battle 
for  polytheism,  and  the  conservative  instincts, 
which  are  so  powerful  in  religion,  protest  against 
the  thought  that  the  objects  of  a  long-lived  faith 
are  unreal.  Even  though  discredited  in  the  eyes  of 
those  who  know,  the  old  gods  find  a  refuge  in 
quiet  places  among  the  simple  and  unlearned.  The 

1   Vid.  Iliad,  viii.  1-35. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  139 

strenuous  warfare  the  Hebrew  prophets  had  to 
wage  against  the  local  Baalim  is  an  illustration  of 
the  tenacious  life  of  polytheism.  Indeed  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  pure  monotheism  means  a  self- 
conscious  reaction  against  the  religion  of  the  past 
which  is  more  the  outcome  of  moral  and  spiritual 
than  of  intellectual  forces.  It  argues  a  higher 
spiritual  development  in  individuals,  in  virtue  of 
which  they  realise  keenly  that  their  worship  cannot 
be  divided  among  several  but  must  be  reserved  for 
the  one  object.  When  men  are  fully  persuaded 
that  there  is  but  the  one  God  who  is  worthy  of 
their  reverence  and  service,  the  figures  of  other 
deities  perforce  grow  shadowy  and  unreal ;  and  the 
process  ends  in  the  explicit  denial  of  their  existence. 
Monotheism,  as  distinguished  from  pantheism  and 
polytheism,  rests  on  a  developed  sense  of  spiritual 
personality.  In  harmony  with  this  God  is  con- 
ceived as  a  Being  who  transcends  the  world  and 
His  worshippers,  but  enters  into  personal  relations 
with  men. 

On  the  higher  levels  of  ethical  religion  the  in- 
fluence of  individuals  on  the  course  of  religious 
development  becomes  very  important.  Even  at 
the  stage  of  the  nature-religions  it  must  have  been 
true  that  the  influence  of  some  individuals  on 
religious  development  was  greater  than  that  of 
others.  Yet  growth  was,  on  the  whole,  uncon- 


140  Religious  Development : 

scious ;  for  the  individual  had  not  come  to  the 
consciousness  of  an  inner  life  of  his  own,  in  virtue 
of  which  he  could  set  his  own  experience  in  contrast 
with  that  of  his  tribe,  and  initiate  changes  on  his 
own  responsibility.  Tribal  society  does  not  give 
scope  for  personal  centres  of  light  and  leading. 
The  development  of  self  -  consciousness  through  a 
higher  social  organisation  makes  it  possible  for  the 
individual  to  become  a  determining  factor  in  the 
advance  of  religion.  He  recognises  that  what  he 
feels  and  thinks  has  a  value.  In  virtue  of  their 
inner  experience  the  prophet  and  the  religious 
teacher  purify  religious  ideas  and  hand  them  on 
in  a  higher  form.  Seeing  further  than  other  men, 
they  give  articulate  voice  to  what  the  popular  mind 
is  only  dimly  groping  after.  They  become  them- 
selves personal  influences,  the  sources  of  far-reaching 
movements,  the  centres  round  which  thought  and 
sentiment  gather  and  from  which  they  continue  to 
be  inspired.  And  when  the  historic  form  has 
grown  faint,  seen  through  a  space  of  intervening 
years,  pious  imagination  adorns  it  with  myth  and 
legend. 

In  a  sense,  humanity ;  is  right  in  magnifying  the 
great  spiritual  personalities  of  the  past.  For  these 
men  are  only  explicable  up  to  a  point  through 
their  environment.  We  can,  for  instance,  always 
find  links  which  connect  them  and  their  message 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  141 

with  what  has  gone  before  :  so  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  principle  of  continuity  between  the  past 
and  present  is  wholly  set  aside.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  attempt  to  show  that  they  are  simply 
the  products  of  their  age  and  surroundings  is  never 
perfectly  convincing.1  The  spiritual  genius  is  usu- 
ally in  advance  of  his  time,  and  sometimes  in 
sharp  opposition  to  its  main  tendency ;  and  he 
gives  a  specific  direction  to  religious  progress 
which  is  not  explained  by  a  general  reference  to 
the  "  spirit  of  the  age."  The  depth  of  individual 
character  and  the  uniqueness  of  personal  experience 
contribute  a  distinctive  element  to  the  riper  stages 
of  religious  development, — an  element  which  we 
cannot  bring  entirely  within  the  scope  of  racial 
tendencies  and  social  forces.  The  prophet  of  one 
age  would  have  been  different  in  another,  but  this 
does  not  prove  that  the  age  is  the  exhaustive 
explanation  of  the  man.  Does  Judaism,  for 
example,  at  the  beginning  of  our  era  render 
perfectly  intelligible  the  life  and  teaching  of 
Christ?  One  cannot  resist  the  conviction  that 
explanations  of  this  kind  are  made  to  appear 
sufficient  by  unwarrantably  reading  into  the  past 
what  is  necessary  for  the  purpose  in  hand.  The 
adequate  discussion  of  the  question  would  lead  us, 
however,  beyond  the  domain  of  psychology.  So 

1  Vid.  Tiele,  Science  of  Religion,  vol.  i.  p.  244  ff. 


142  Religious  Development : 

we  simply  note  the  fact  that  the  deepening  of  the 
religious  self-consciousness  and  the  advent  of  great 
religious  personalities  render  the  development  of 
religion  more  complex,  and  so  more  difficult  to 
interpret  as  the  outcome  of  general  conditions. 
We  find  an  analogy  to  the  spiritual  genius  rather 
in  the  poet  or  creative  artist  than  in  the  speculative 
thinker.  And  it  is  easier  to  detect  rational  con- 
tinuity in  the  evolution  of  philosophy  than  of 
religion. 

The  stress  which  is  laid  on  the  inward  and 
spiritual  side  of  religion  is  fruitful  in  conse- 
quences. Worship  of  itself  tends  to  stiffen  into 
a  mechanical  and  external  cult,  where  the  opus 
operatum  counts  for  much  and  faith  for  very 
little.  The  dominance  of  the  ritual  element  makes 
religion  one-sided  and  provokes  reaction.  So  on 
the  upper  levels  of  Ethical  Eeligion,  with  the 
deepening  of  the  subjective  consciousness  there 
is  a  recoil  from  the  tyranny  of  outward  form ; 
and  the  result  is  to  bring  into  relief  the  religious 
value  of  inner  experience,  and  to  emphasise  the 
need  of  faith.  The  new  prominence  of  the  sub- 
jective factor  helps  to  liberate  religion  from  the 
local  and  racial  limitations  which  have  hitherto 
clung  to  it.  For  these  appear  alien  and  burden- 
some as  men  come  to  recognise  the  value  of  piety 
in  the  heart.  The  Hebrew  prophets  who  found 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  143 

the  law  of  God  within,  and  preached  the  cleansing 
of  the  heart  and  not  of  the  garments,  were  the 
pioneers  of  an  ampler  creed.  Already  the  weight 
of  national  exclusiveness  was  falling  from  them, 
and  with  the  images  at  their  disposal  they  pro- 
phesied the  day  of  universal  religion, — the  day 
when  all  nations  should  come  to  Zion.  The 
message  of  Buddha  is  strangely  unlike  that  of  the 
prophets  of  Israel.  But  he  resembled  them  in 
this,  that,  as  against  the  claims  of  a  legal  ritual 
and  a  material  sacrifice,  he  declared  the  way  of 
salvation  to  be  within.  And  the  inner  sanctuary 
is  a  refuge  for  every  man.  "My  redemption," 
he  said,  "is  a  redemption  for  all."  The  inner 
life  receives  a  more  positive  value  and  a  richer 
content  in  the  teaching  of  Christ.  The  worth 
of  a  soul,  he  tells  us,  is  greater  than  the  world, 
and  "the  pure  in  heart  see  God."  And  just 
because  faith  is  an  inward  possession,  and  the 
only  worship  which  avails  is  worship  in  "spirit 
and  in  truth,"  the  Christian  religion  rises  in 
principle  above  all  local  and  national  limitations 
and  becomes  universal.  That  which  is  deepest 
in  religion  is  likewise  that  which  is  free  to  every 
man — spiritual  life.  "  One  is  your  Father,"  said 
Christ  to  men,  "and  all  ye  are  brethren," — 
brethren  after  the  spirit  though  not  after  the 
flesh.  As  an  ethical  and  spiritual  religion  Christi- 


1 44  Religious  Development : 

anity  is  the  ripest  fruit  of  religious  development 
and  the  outcome  of  the  fulness  of  the  time.  And 
it  is  of  necessity  that  the  religion  which  lays  the 
deepest  stress  on  individual  faith  and  personal 
character  should  at  the  same  time  be  the  most 
universal.  For  faith  is  possible  to  all,  and  man 
is  "  saved "  by  faith,  not  by  the  "  works  of  the 
law."  In  its  historical  evolution  Christianity  has 
doubtless  not  always  been  true  to  its  principles. 
Alien  ideas  have  affected  its  creed,  and  the  religions 
which  it  superseded  have  reacted  upon  it.  Hence 
the  working  out  of  its  spiritual  ideal  has  been 
hampered  by  lower  elements.  But  the  fact  re- 
mains that  Christianity  has  best  enabled  us  to 
realise  the  thought  of  religion  as  a  universal  as- 
pect of  life  and  the  deepest  possession  of  the  soul. 
Beyond  doubt  it  is  the  maturest  product  of  the 
historic  development  of  the  religious  consciousness. 
We  must  now  try  to  gather  together  and  to 
state  more  directly  the  conclusions  which  our 
historic  discussion  suggests.  At  the  outset  some 
general  propositions  will  probably  be  agreed  on. 
It  will  be  granted  that  there  is  a  progress  in 
human  culture,  and  religion  as  an  element  in 
culture  shares  in  that  progress.  It  is  for  instance 
clear  that,  as  social  life  expands  and  grows  more 
highly  organised,  it  is  accompanied  by  a  refine- 
ment and  elevation  of  religious  conceptions.  We 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  145 

cannot  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  progress  of 
the  one  measures  that  of  the  other.  But  it  is  at 
least  true  that  religion  cannot  remain  apart  from 
and  unaffected  by  the  development  of  the  social 
whole  in  which  it  exists.  In  the  second  place,  it 
is  evident  that  the  general  trend  of  the  religious 
advance  is  from  the  material  to  the  spiritual. 
This  upward  movement  is  not  so  rapid  in  one 
religion  as  in  another,  nor  is  it  uniform  through 
different  stages  of  the  same  religion :  in  some 
cases  it  may  not  exist  at  all.  But  that  there  is, 
on  the  whole,  a  progress  of  the  kind  mentioned 
will  not  be  denied.  The  religious  bond,  for  ex- 
ample, in  early  races  one  of  blood,  is  gradually 
converted  into  one  of  inner  character.  And,  in 
the  third  place,  the  direction  which  religious  pro- 
gress takes  is  towards  universality.  The  history 
of  religion  discloses  a  movement  from  tribal 
through  national  to  universal  religion.  The  sub- 
jective factor  in  the  religious  consciousness,  un- 
important to  begin  with,  becomes  more  and  more 
important.  Universal  religion  demands  faith, 
which  means  an  act  of  personal  freedom,  and  it 
calls  for  piety,  which  is  the  expression  of  inward 
character.  And  there  are  no  barriers  to  '  salvation ' 
but  those  which  a  man  raises  within  himself. 

It   being   granted   that   there  is  a  development 
of  religion   such   as   we   have   indicated,  we  must 

K 


146  Religious  Development : 

now  deal  more  directly  with  its  interpretation. 
In  what  sense  can  we  regard  the  higher  and  more 
complete  form  of  religion  as  growing  out  of  the 
ruder  and  earlier?  That  the  later  stage  of  a 
religion  is  related  to  the  earlier,  and  cannot  be 
understood  apart  from  it,  is  of  course  clear.  But 
can  we  speak  of  the  religious  idea  as  a  germ  which 
develops  by  an  immanent  law  the  blossom  and 
fruit  which  were  somehow  in  it  from  the  begin- 
ning? The  analogy  of  an  organism  is  a  tempting 
if  not  always  a  safe  one,  and  it  has  been  much 
used  as  a  key  to  intellectual  and  spiritual  progress. 
In  the  case  of  organic  growth  we  may  try  to 
explain  the  process  to  ourselves  by  supposing  that 
the  typical  line  which  that  growth  follows  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  fully  developed  whole  is 
somehow  implicitly  present  in  the  beginning. 
How  we  are  to  think  of  this  presence  is  not  at 
all  clear,  and  the  explanation  does  not  amount  to 
much.1  At  the  same  time,  I  do  not  see  that  we 
can  deny  that  organic  growth  is  a  movement  to 
an  end ;  which  end,  or  developed  result,  appears 
to  determine  the  successive  phases  of  growth,  so 
that  the  development  follows  a  characteristic  order. 
Interaction  of  organism  with  environment  is,  of 

1  A  thoughtful  criticism  of  the  idea  of  development  will  be  found 
in  the  lectures  on  '  The  Development  of  Modern  Philosophy '  by  the 
late  Prof.  Adamson.  Vid.  vol.  ii.  p.  185  ff. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  1 47 

course,  necessary  as  a  means,  but  the  typical  form 
is  not  created  by  the  environment.  The  living 
germ  means  a  determinate  development  and  noth- 
ing else.  Now  I  doubt  if  we  can  speak  of  the 
evolution  of  religion  as  a  development  in  the  fore- 
going sense.  In  organic  growth  the  earlier  stages 
are  transmuted  and  taken  up  into  the  later.  They 
cease  to  exist  for  themselves,  and  are  only  repre- 
sented in  the  higher  product.  But  in  the  history 
of  religion  we  find  that  a  lower  stage  survives 
alongside  and  refuses  to  be  merged  in  the  higher. 
This  phenomenon  of  survival  is  too  frequent  to  be 
treated  as  sporadic.  And  so  we  have  religions 
in  which  the  growth  of  higher  beliefs  has  been 
hampered,  and  it  may  be  arrested,  by  the  pressure 
of  older  beliefs  and  practices.1 

The  analogy  is  defective  at  another  point.  I  do 
not  think  we  can  assign  a  distinct  germinal  basis 
to  religion  such  as  the  analogy  of  an  organism 
requires.  Eeligion  is  not  a  fact  by  itself:  it  is  a 
psychological  state,  and  it  only  exists  as  an  aspect 
of  the  greater  whole  of  self-conscious  life.  Hence, 
as  its  vitality  and  significance  depend  on  the  larger 
content  of  which  it  is  an  element,  we  cannot  regard 
it  as  possessing  a  principle  of  growth  in  abstraction 

1  An  example  of  this  is  the  Roman  religion,  which  never  fairly 
succeeded  in  transmuting  its  primitive  basis  in  animism  into  a  higher 
system  of  belief. 


148  Religious  Development : 

from  the  unity  to  which  it  belongs.  Eeligion  grows 
with  the  growth  of  the  mind.  The  other  aspects  of 
consciousness  are  essentially  involved  in  the  growth 
of  the  religious  consciousness.  We  cannot  correctly 
speak  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  itself  unfold- 
ing by  an  immanent  law  the  wealth  implicit  in  it 
from  the  beginning.  To  put  the  same  truth  from 
another  point  of  view,  the  social,  scientific,  and 
ethical  culture  of  a  race  all  help  to  determine  the 
character  of  its  religion. 

It  will  perhaps  be  said  that  the  other  aspects  of 
consciousness  play  the  part  of  a  spiritual  environ- 
ment to  the  religious  idea,  and  are  only  necessary  as 
a  means  to  its  unfolding.  We  cannot,  however, 
make  a  valid  distinction  of  active  and  passive  in 
consciousness  like  this.  And  the  facts  of  religious 
evolution  do  not  bear  out  the  view  that  these 
elements,  which  are  described  as  a  means,  have  no 
share  in  determining  the  characteristic  form  which 
religion  takes  at  a  given  stage. 

If  we  say,  then,  that  there  is  a  continuity  in  re- 
ligious development,  and  different  religions  have  a 
common  character,  in  what  sense  do  we  understand 
the  statement  ?  Eeligions  have  a  common  character 
inasmuch  as  they  are  the  expressions  of  the  one 
human  mind  seeking  satisfaction  for  needs  which, 
broadly  speaking,  are  the  same.  In  our  analysis  of 
the  religious  consciousness  we  saw  that  it  had  a  sub- 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  1 49 

jective  and  an  objective  aspect, — on  the  one  side  the 
sense  of  need,  incompleteness,  and  dependence,  and 
on  the  other  the  conception  of  an  object  which  can 
satisfy  the  subject.  This  is  the  generic  form  of  the 
religious  idea  and  the  bond  of  unity  between  the 
different  types  of  religion.  These  types  are  diverse, 
but  they  cannot  fall  outside  the  general  notion  and 
yet  remain  religions.  The  continuity  of  religious 
development  has,  as  its  primary  condition,  therefore, 
the  unity  of  principle  which  is  realised  in  all  the 
phases  of  that  development.  The  higher  religions 
embody  the  idea  in  a  larger  and  worthier  form  than 
the  lower :  they  are  the  same  spiritual  consciousness 
on  a  further  stage  of  its  upward  journey.  Between 
the  new  and  the  older  phase  of  religious  develop- 
ment there  is  no  absolute  break,  just  as  there  is 
none  in  the  individual  between  the  religion  of  child- 
hood, youth,  and  manhood.  As  the  content  of  the 
religious  consciousness  deepens,  it  reacts  on  the 
form  and  strives  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with 
itself.  But  the  new  is  ever  reached  by  modification 
of  the  old,  and  it  is  not  to  be  understood  apart 
from  it.  Even  where  the  principle  of  continuity  is 
most  threatened — viz.,  in  the  case  of  those  religions 
which  trace  their  distinctive  character  to  the  spiritual 
genius  of  great  teachers — seeds  of  the  new  faith  will 
be  found  in  the  past.  And  the  greatest  of  religious 
teachers  is  under  the  necessity  of  appealing  to  men 


1 50  Religious  Development  : 

through  the  ideas  and  forms  to  which  they  are 
accustomed.  He  can  never  inaugurate  a  new  faith 
which  is  devoid  of  relation  to  the  old,  although  at 
the  same  time  we  contend  that  personal  initiative, 
resting  on  freedom,  contributes  an  element  to  de- 
velopment which  is  more  than  the  past  can  explain.1 

Another  question  suggests  itself.  Have  all  specific 
religions  played  a  part  in  the  general  development 
of  religion  ?  Many  of  these  withered  and  died. 
Others,  after  a  period  of  development  appeared  to 
lose  vitality,  and  hardened  down  into  a  form  which 
resisted  further  progress.  Some  vanished  away  when 
the  culture  out  of  which  they  arose  broke  up,  and 
no  one  could  say  in  what  definite  respect  they 
have  influenced  the  religion  of  posterity.  As  we 
look  back  on  the  extinct  types  of  faith  they  seem 
futile  creations  of  the  human  spirit,  passing  products 
of  a  passing  age,  their  meaning  and  value  perishing 
with  them. 

Yet  it  is  possible  to  press  the  point  of  view  too 
far.  It  would  be  absurd,  for  example,  to  assume 
that  the  various  religions  are  isolated  growths  which 
run  their  course  in  mutual  independence.  Direct 
interaction  can  often  be  proved,  and  must  have 
existed  in  many  cases  where  clear  evidence  has  not 
been  discovered.  The  accumulation  of  fresh  historic 

1  This  takes  us  back  to  the  old  problem  of  the  reality  of  freedom, 
a  matter  which  has  been  referred  to  in  the  previous  essay. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  151 

materials  has  already  established  points  of  contact 
not  suspected  before.  We  shall  more  readily  admit 
the  possibility  of  one  religion  influencing  another 
when  we  keep  in  mind  that  religion  is  intimately 
related  to  the  culture  of  a  people,  and  is,  perhaps, 
its  most  characteristic  expression.  An  older  civilisa- 
tion breaks  up  and  is  followed  by  a  younger,  and  a 
weaker  is  dominated  by  a  stronger.  Yet  the  earlier 
never  vanishes  utterly :  surrounding  civilisations 
retain  traces  of  its  influence,  and  in  more  ways 
than  can  be  defined  and  measured  it  affects  and 
modifies  the  civilisations  which  succeed  it.  Now  it 
cannot  be  supposed  that  religion  is  excluded  from 
this  general  influence,  for  it  is  a  characteristic  ex- 
pression of  the  culture  to  which  it  belongs.  Never- 
theless, it  must  often  be  impossible  to  weigh  and 
appreciate  the  effect  of  an  element  which  is  so 
interwoven  with  the  whole. 

The  general  conclusion  that,  in  so  far  as  there 
is  a  continuity  in  culture,  there  must  also  be  a 
continuity  in  the  various  historic  manifestations  of 
religion,  may  seem  meagre  and  indefinite.  The 
speculative  thinker  will  try,  perhaps,  to  find  some 
indwelling  principle  in  religion,  which  realises  itself 
in  the  historic  religions  and  determines  their  place 
and  sequence.  But  there  are  great  obstacles  to  the 
working  out  of  this  conception.  The  solidarity  of 
humanity  is  still  imperfect,  and  it  was  far  more 


152  Religious  Development  : 

imperfect  in  primitive  times.  Consequently,  though 
certain  sections  of  the  race  have  developed,  others 
have  been  nearly  stationary.  The  latter  is  especially 
true  of  tribes  which  have  suffered  from  isolation  and 
hard  external  conditions.  Eeligious  development 
has  been  conspicuous  at  favoured  points  rather  than 
over  the  whole  area  of  the  race.  Then  while  there 
is  a  connexion  between  certain  centres  of  develop- 
ment, between  the  more  distant  points  it  becomes 
exceedingly  vague.  Thus  we  can  show  no  valid 
reason  for  asserting  that  the  development  of  religion, 
say  in  China,  had  a  relation  to  and  significance  for 
the  development  of  religion  in  Egypt.  Humanity 
is  not  an  organic  whole,  so  that  each  religion  must 
have  a  determinate  place  and  value  in  the  whole. 
Hence  I  think  we  must  abandon  the  attempt  to 
interpret  the  different  religions  by  assigning  them 
a  place  in  a  general  scheme  of  development. 

We  shall  be  confirmed  in  this  view  by  the 
examination  of  a  very  able  and  ingenious  effort  in 
this  direction.  I  refer  to  the  conception  set  forth 
by  Dr  Caird  in  his  lectures  on  'The  Evolution  of 
Eeligion.'  He  finds  the  key  to  the  problem  in  a 
general  analysis  of  consciousness.  This  yields  an 
objective  and  a  subjective  factor,  while  the  Absolute 
unites  and  harmonises  them.  Logically  the  Absolute 
is  presupposed  in  the  simplest  act  of  knowledge,  but 
as  a  temporal  process  mind  advances  by  a  movement 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  153 

from  objective  to  subjective  consciousness,  and  finds 
its  goal  in  the  Absolute  consciousness.  Here  we 
have  the  general  form  of  religious  development. 
We  need  not  pause  to  urge  the  objection  that  the 
specific  nature  of  religion  is  assumed,  not  explained, 
by  an  epistemological  analysis  of  this  kind.  Dr 
Caird  then  goes  on  to  show  that  in  the  earliest 
phase  of  religion  God  is  represented  under  the 
form  of  an  object  among  other  objects.  Against 
this  defective  form  the  mind  ultimately  reacts  and 
passes  over  into  the  second  stage,  that  of  subjective 
religion,  where  God  takes  the  higher  form  of  the 
subject,  and  is  conceived  as  mainly  dwelling  in  and 
speaking  to  the  soul  of  the  individual.  The  final 
stage  of  the  movement  attains  to  adequacy  of  form 
in  the  idea  of  God  as  Universal  Spirit,  immanent 
in  all  objects  and  persons.  The  proper  develop- 
ment of  the  final  stage  will,  we  are  told,  be  the 
work  of  the  future. 

That  primitive  religion  is  objective  in  the  sense 
indicated  will  be  admitted.  If  the  writer  meant 
no  more  by  the  second  stage  than  ethical  religion, 
as  Tiele  suggests,1  we  should  agree  that  the  trend 
of  development  is  in  this  direction.  It  seems  clear, 
however,  the  meaning  is  that  there  is  a  dialectic 
movement  which  by  way  of  reaction  posits  God, 
not  in  the  world  of  objects,  but  dwelling  in  and 

1  Elements  of  the  Science  of  Religion,  vol.  i.  p.  61. 


1 54  Religious  Development  : 

speaking  through  the  inner  life  of  the  subject. 
But  it  is  conceded  that  only  nations  which  have 
attained  a  certain  stage  of  civilisation  display  this 
phenomenon.1  We  would  like  to  know  more  pre- 
cisely what  the  stage  is,  and  whether  the  only 
test  of  its  being  reached  is  the  manifestation  of 
the  movement  in  question.  Civilisations  have 
lasted  long  and  still  have  not  entered  on  the  phase 
of  subjective  religion.  And  religions  which,  in  their 
later  stage  at  all  events,  contain  ethical  elements, 
such  as  the  Eoman,  Egyptian,  and  Chinese,  do  not 
reveal  this  kind  of  movement.  The  illustrations 
which  Dr  Caird  gives  of  his  principle  are  not  quite 
convincing.  Buddhism  may  be  called  a  subjective 
religion,  but  it  is  so  because  it  sacrifices  the  idea 
of  God  altogether  and  substitutes  for  it  an  inner 
principle  of  redemption.  The  Israelitish  prophets 
did  lay  stress  on  the  divine  ]aw  written  on  the 
heart  and  the  divine  voice  speaking  to  the  soul. 
But  it  is  an  exaggeration  to  call  their  religion 
subjective :  they  always  believed  in  God  as  an 
objective  and  righteous  Power.  The  prophets 
simply  purified  and  gave  new  ethical  content  to 
the  national  religion.2  Dr  Caird's  formula  is  a 

1  Evolution  of  Religion,  vol.  ii.  p.  4. 

2  Another  of  Dr  Caird's  examples  is  Stoicism.     But  Stoic  subject- 
ivity represents  a  philosophical  and  political  movement.     We  do  not 
construe  it  as  a  reaction  against  the  defective  form  of  earlier  Greek 
religion. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  155 

broad  and  flexible  one,  but  for  all  that  it  does 
not  find  a  simple  and  natural  verification  in  the 
history  of  religion.  Whether  the  Absolute  Eeligion, 
as  he  conceives  it,  will  complete  the  process  and 
satisfy  the  modern  consciousness  is  far  from  clear. 
If  the  practical  religion  of  mankind  depended  on 
metaphysics,  and  certain  metaphysical  principles 
were  generally  accepted,  it  might  be  so.  But 
these  are  not  conditions  likely  to  be  fulfilled.  Dr 
Caird  on  the  whole  fails  to  convince  us  that  he 
has  formulated  the  immanent  law  of  religious  de- 
velopment. There  seems  to  be  no  inherent  neces- 
sity that,  when  religious  evolution  takes  place,  it 
should  proceed  exactly  in  this  way.  There  is  not 
a  general  stage  of  subjective  religion  which  cor- 
responds to  the  nature  -  religions.  Nor  is  there 
warrant  for  the  view  that  any  particular  religion 
can  reach  a  higher  development  only  by  passing 
through  the  subjective  stage. 

The  effort  then  to  interpret  the  evolution  of 
religions  through  universal  categories  like  subject 
and  object  is  not,  I  think,  helpful.  But  though 
we  reject  this  method  as  inadequate  there  is 
another  way  open  to  us.  We  can  at  least  try  to 
set  forth  clearly  the  psychological  principles  in- 
volved. Indeed  this  seems  to  be  a  necessary 
preparation  for  any  valid  conclusions  on  the  sub- 
ject. The  study  of  religion  has  suffered  much 


156  Religious  Development : 

from  the  neglect  of  psychology,  and  the  defect  is 
only  beginning  to  be  remedied. 

As  we  have  remarked  more  than  once,  the  mind 
or  spirit  as  a  whole  is  active  in  deepening  the  con- 
tent of  the  religious  consciousness,  which  in  turn 
strives  to  give  a  more  adequate  form  to  the  religious 
principle.  And  the  law  which  seems  to  govern  the 
spirit's  operation  is  the  necessity  under  which  it 
lies  of  being  in  unity  or  harmony  with  itself.  This 
has  been  enunciated  by  Tiele  as  the  law  of  the  unity 
of  the  mind.1  So  stated  it  is  a  general,  not  a 
specifically  religious,  principle.  Still  this  is  not  a 
decisive  objection ;  for,  as  we  hold  proved,  the  self- 
conscious  mind  works  in  religious  development  and 
not  the  religious  consciousness  in  abstraction  from 
the  rest. 

In  all  consciousness,  and  so  in  the  religious  con- 
sciousness, three  factors — thought,  feeling,  and  will 
— are  present.  One  of  them  may  be  dominant  at 
a  given  time,  but  the  others  are  never  entirely 
absent.  In  the  degree  that  each  element  gets  its 
due,  and  is  in  concord  with  the  rest,  we  experience 
inner  harmony  and  satisfaction.  A  belief,  for 
example,  as  my  belief,  must  be  pervaded  by  a 
certain  emotional  tone ;  it  must  be  something  on 
which  I  can  act,  and  only  as  acted  on  is  it  vigorous ; 
and  finally,  it  must  fit  into  and  cohere  with  my 
1  Op.  tit.,  vol.  i.  p.  232. 


f    UN1VERS1T 

OF 

its  History  and  Interpretation.  157 

system  of  ideas.  Where  there  is  opposition  between 
the  elements,  where  thought,  for  instance,  is  at  dis- 
cord with  feeling,  the  mind  is  urged  to  gain  a 
content  in  which  they  will  be  harmonised.  The 
operation  of  this  law  of  unity  is  distinctly  to  be 
recognised  in  the  evolution  of  religion.  It  is  the 
pressure  of  this  immanent  need  which,  in  one  form 
or  another,  brings  about  transition  and  change  in 
the  religious  consciousness.  To  use  a  figure,  the 
emphasis  on  one  element  at  the  expense  of  another 
creates  an  instability  which  precipitates  movement. 
The  satisfaction  and  completion  which  the  religious 
spirit  seeks  through  the  divine  object  of  its  faith 
must  be  a  life  in  which  feeling,  intellect,  and 
practical  endeavour  are  at  one  with  each  other. 
And  while  this  is  an  ideal  which  in  finite  and 
temporal  experience  is  never  fully  realised,  yet 
man's  incapacity  to  be  satisfied  with  less  impels 
him  to  transcend  each  partial  satisfaction  and  seek 
a  spiritual  life  fuller  and  more  harmonious.  In  the 
interplay  of  these  three  elements,  in  the  reaction 
against  the  excessive  predominance  of  any  one  of 
them,  in  the  persistent  effort  towards  harmony,  I 
think  we  find  a  psychological  explanation  of  some 
of  the  characteristic  features  of  religious  evolution. 
At  the  risk  of  some  repetition  I  will  try  briefly  to 
justify  and  illustrate  this  statement  ere  I  bring  this 
essay  to  a  close. 


158  Religious  Development  : 

The  predominance  of  feeling  in  the  form  of 
emotion  at  the  origin  and  primitive  stage  of 
religion  has  been  noted.  Emotion  and  not  in- 
tellectual interest  engenders  religious  belief.  But 
belief,  however  crude,  exists  as  a  starting-point  for 
action,  and  can  only  maintain  itself  in  and  through 
the  exercise  of  will.  Hence  religious  belief  takes 
form  as  a  religious  bond  which  is  realised  in  con- 
duct, and  a  cultus  grows  up  with  a  ritual,  fixed 
observances,  and  definite  obligations.  These  be- 
come the  nucleus  around  which  religious  sentiment 
gathers  and  by  which  it  is  in  turn  fostered.  Thought 
is  too  slenderly  developed  to  play  an  aggressive 
part.  The  savage's  ideas  of  the  world  form  no 
coherent  system,  and  he  is  not  pressed  to  revise 
his  religious  creed  by  any  urgent  demand  of  reason. 
Beliefs  are  modified  simply  through  practical  needs 
and  interests,  and  the  only  test  of  religious  loyalty 
is  the  performance  of  the  prescribed  acts.  The 
emotional  feeling  which  associates  itself  with  ritual 
performance  grows  into  a  fixed  sentiment  which 
resists  change.  The  meagre  power  of  development 
revealed  by  tribal  religion  is  due  to  the  poverty  of 
social  and  intellectual  life  and  the  consequent  lack 
of  diversity  within  the  mind  calling  for  recon- 
ciliation by  progress.  The  cohesive  force  of  senti- 
ment giving  support  to  existing  religious  practice 
has  no  strong  disintegrating  influences  to  withstand. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  159 

The  importance  of  those  social  changes  by  which 
the  nation  takes  the  place  of  the  tribe,  and  the 
accompanying  expansion  and  deepening  of  self- 
consciousness,  have  been  referred  to.  The  content 
of  the  self  has  been  enriched  by  a  new  range  of 
practical  ends  and  interests,  and  now  finds  itself 
out  of  harmony  with  the  older  and  narrower  form 
of  the  religious  consciousness.  National  religion 
is  the  outcome  of  man's  endeavour  to  bring  the 
traditional  religion  into  concord  with  the  deepened 
and  enlarged  life  of  the  self.  At  this  stage  thought 
attains  a  greater  influence  in  the  evolution  of  reli- 
gion, and  coherency  of  ideas  is  recognised  to  be  an 
element  of  the  spirit's  inner  satisfaction.  In  the 
first  instance,  the  endeavour  of  thought  is  to  give 
a  kind  of  connexion  and  explanation  to  religious 
beliefs.  Myths  and  theogonies  indicate  the  rise  of 
this  tendency,  which  indeed  goes  back  to  the  stage 
of  tribal  religion.  Afterwards  the  gods  are  grouped 
and  arranged  according  to  eminence  and  function. 
When  a  religion  has  struck  deep  roots  in  the  social 
life,  and  an  influential  cultus  has  grown  up,  thought 
proceeds  to  elaborate  on  a  larger  scale  the  meaning 
or  reason  for  what  is  done  :  the  result  is  religious 
doctrine.  Theology  represents  the  effort  to  set 
forth  the  truths  implied  in  a  religion  in  a  connected 
body  of  propositions ;  it  will  give  a  rational  and 
systematic  form  to  belief,  and  so  satisfy  the  mind's 


1 60  Religious  Development : 

desire  for  an  intelligent  presentation  of  its  faith. 
Thought,  however,  as  it  grows  more  conscious  of 
its  power,  inclines  to  free  itself  from  bondage  to 
the  religious  interest  and  to  follow  its  own  course 
in  independence.  An  intellectual  movement  which 
thus  begins  within  the  sphere  of  religion,  but 
gradually  enters  on  an  independent  path,  becomes 
in  the  end  one-sided.  In  its  anxiety  to  minister 
to  the  intellect  it  neglects  the  other  religious  needs. 
The  outcome  may  be  Eationalism,  in  its  narrower 
sense,  or  Pantheism,  according  as  the  analytic  or 
synthetic  tendency  prevails.  In  either  case,  the 
Weltanschauung  which  has  been  reached  is  in- 
compatible with  the  adequate  satisfaction  of  the 
spiritual  self.  And  in  the  result  we  have  a  phase 
of  religious  belief,  which,  in  exercising  a  purely 
intellectual  appeal  to  men,  fails  to  minister  to  other 
vital  needs,  and  is  superseded  in  the  interests  of  a 
fuller  satisfaction  of  the  self. 

But  there  is  another  aspect  to  the  influence  of 
thought  on  religion.  In  the  foregoing  case  reason 
began  by  working  from  within  the  religious  sphere, 
in  this  case  it  approaches  it  critically  from  without. 
At  the  higher  stages  of  culture  thought,  in  its  own 
interest,  investigates  the  nature  of  the  world  and 
man,  and  the  outcome  of  this  is  science  and  phil- 
osophy. It  is  perhaps  inevitable  that  the  scientific 
and  religious  view  of  the  world,  developed  as  they 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  1 6 1 

have  been  by  different  interests  and  in  independ- 
ence, should  fail  to  coincide  with  one  another. 
This  discord  begets  controversy,  and  the  religious 
interpretation  of  things  is  subjected  to  the  criticism 
of  thought  at  various  points.  But  a  lasting  dualism 
between  the  two  interpretations  is  impossible.  For 
both  science  and  religion  fall  within  the  unity  of 
self-consciousness,  and  division  between  them  cannot 
be  accepted  as  permanent.  The  necessary  endeavour 
of  the  mind  to  establish  harmony  within  itself 
affects  religious  ideas  which  undergo  modification 
and  development.  The  resisting  forces  of  senti- 
ment and  habit  hamper  and  retard  the  process, 
and  changes  are  usually  slow ;  but  they  are  not  the 
less  real  though  they  come  gradually. 

The  conservative  function  of  feeling  in  religious 
evolution  is  not  its  only  one.  As  an  indispensable 
element  of  the  religious  consciousness  it  asserts 
itself  against  a  one-sided  intellectualism.  Thought 
never  coalesces  with  its  object :  the  element  of 
difference  is  essential  to  its  movement.  And  this 
movement  seems  to  have  no  end;  the  conclusion 
arrived  at  becomes  only  a  starting-point  for  fresh 
processes.  To  the  soul  hungering  for  union  with 
the  object  of  its  faith,  the  labour  of  thought  seems 
tedious  and  external  as  it  is  unsatisfying.  Theo- 
logical and  philosophical  constructions  of  God 
appear  by  their  method  to  cast  a  veil  over  the 

L 


1 62  Religious  Development : 

spiritual  substance  of  religion.  The  emotional 
nature  cries  for  bread  and  reason  offers  a  stone. 
Mysticism  is  the  outcome  of  this  craving ;  and  in 
exalted  or  ecstatic  emotion  the  sense  of  estrange- 
ment is  done  away  and  the  worshipper  feels  himself 
at  one  with  the  Being  he  adores.  But  the  goal  is 
not  really  reached  by  a  route  so  easy,  and  Mysticism 
in  turn  proves  no  abiding  refuge  to  the  spiritual 
seeker.  Its  neglect  of  practical  effort  and  its 
disparagement  of  thought  render  it  a  partial  satis- 
faction at  the  best.  The  spirit  asserts  its  claim  to 
a  harmony  of  all  its  elements ;  and  as  Mysticism 
cannot  respond  to  this  demand,  man  cannot  rest  in 
it,  and  moves  forward  in  quest  of  an  ampler  self- 
fulfilment.  Here  as  elsewhere  reaction  is  the  result 
of  one-sided  development,  and  leads  in  turn  to  new 
development. 

All  that  we  can  claim  for  the  psychological  in- 
terpretation of  religious  development  is  that  it 
casts  a  certain  amount  of  light  on  a  very  compli- 
cated process.  The  explanation  it  yields  is  partial, 
and  the  objective  validity  of  the  ideas  involved  is 
not  determined.  But  our  only  hope  of  keeping  in 
touch  with  the  facts  of  religious  evolution  and  of 
intelligently  grasping  them  is  to  interpret  them 
psychologically  in  the  first  instance — i.e.,  in  the 
light  of  the  working  of  the  human  mind.  We  are 
under  no  obligation  to  fit  the  facts  into  intellectual 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  163 

categories,  or  to  make  them  square  with  abstract 
principles,  when  we  follow  this  method.  For  the 
student  of  religion  like  other  people  is  tempted 
to  neglect  facts  which  are  inconvenient,  and  he 
is  likewise  inclined  to  use  terms  which  imply 
an  undue  simplification.  The  latter  fault,  I  fear, 
cannot  be  altogether  avoided.  We  have,  for  ex- 
ample, been  constrained  to  speak  of  the  "  religious 
consciousness  "  as  it  exists  at  a  particular  epoch  or 
stage  of  development.  Yet  how  hard  it  is,  among 
the  higher  races  at  all  events,  to  give  an  exact 
meaning  to  the  phrase !  Its  connotation  varies  as 
you  pass  from  one  stratum  of  society  to  another. 
The  Brahminism  of  the  cultured  Hindu  is  very 
different  from  that  of  the  lowly  ryot,  and  the 
Christianity  of  the  speculative  theologian  is  not 
the  same  as  that  of  the  day-labourer.  Accordingly, 
when  we  speak  of  the  "  religious  consciousness,"  at 
a  particular  stage  of  a  race's  history,  feeling  acutely 
the  need  of  religious  reform  and  development,  in 
strictness  the  judgment  applies  only  to  the  more 
enlightened  members  of  society.  The  dull  and 
ignorant  hardly  experience  the  need  at  all.  And 
so  development,  when  it  takes  place,  is  seldom  or 
never  a  simultaneous  movement  of  all  elements  in 
the  social  whole :  only  very  slowly  does  the  in- 
fluence of  new  ideas  filter  down  to  the  many.  The 
"religious  consciousness"  of  a  people,  if  we  are  to 


1 64  Religious  Development : 

use  the  phrase,  is  thus  a  composite  thing.  And 
when  we  speak  of  it  developing,  it  must  be  with 
the  proviso  that  development  is  always  partial  and 
elements  remain  which  are  not  fused  in  the  process. 
Even  when  a  high  form  of  religion  has  long  been 
the  official  creed  of  a  country,  here  and  there  frag- 
ments of  older  belief  and  practice  always  survive.1 
And  this  may  help  us  to  understand  better  how,  in 
certain  circumstances,  there  may  be  a  recrudescence 
of  an  elder  phase  of  faith  instead  of  advance  to  a 
higher.  Taking  a  broad  survey  of  history,  we  do 
not  hesitate  to  regard  religious  development  as  a 
fact.  But  we  would  compare  it  to  the  seaward 
movement  of  a  great  and  deep  river,  breaking  into 
eddies  in  its  course  and  containing  backward 
currents. 

The  history  of  religion  is  the  record  of  man's 
endeavour,  ever  and  again  renewed,  to  find,  through 
union  with  an  object  above  him,  the  harmony  and 
completion  for  which  his  soul  yearns.  This  object, 
from  the  first,  is  conceived  to  be  something  better 
than  the  common  objects  of  experience,  and  grows 
in  worth  and  dignity  with  the  growth  of  man's 
inner  life.  Did  faith  realise  all  it  seeks,  there 

1  The  Christianity  of  the  ignorant  peasantry  in  some  Roman 
Catholic  countries  is  really  a  blending  of  Christian  and  pagan  be- 
liefs, the  latter  never  having  completely  died  out. 


its  History  and  Interpretation.  165 

would  not  be  any  development  of  religion.  But 
man  suffers  disillusion,  his  gods  disappoint  him, 
and  he  must  fare  forth  in  quest  of  a  better  pattern 
of  the  things  in  heaven.  As  each  stage  of  religion 
is  found  to  yield  only  a  partial  satisfaction,  the 
inner  need  of  the  soul  urges  it  to  clothe  the 
religious  idea  in  some  higher  form.  And  the  very 
consciousness  that  a  time-honoured  faith  has  grown 
too  narrow  is  a  token  that  the  mind  has  already 
some  intuition  of  what  is  better.  The  term  "  dia- 
lectic movement "  has  misleading  associations,  and 
I  would  not  wish  to  apply  it  to  the  evolution  of 
religion :  but  religious  progress  may  fairly  be  de- 
scribed as  a  transcending  by  the  spirit  of  partial 
satisfactions  in  order  to  gain  one  which  is  full 
and  abiding.  Behind  the  varied  manifestations  of 
religion  is  the  spiritual  nature  of  man  from  which 
they  issue.  And  the  long  history  of  religious  faith 
and  hope,  of  spiritual  desire  that  never  finds  "an 
earthly  close,"  suggests  that  the  soul  is  inwardly 
related  to  the  Infinite,  the  true  source  of  its 
aspiration  and  the  goal  of  its  endeavour. 

"  Our  destiny,  our  being's  heart  and  home, 

Is  with  Infinitude  and  only  there ; 
With  hope  it  is,  hope  that  can  never  die, 
Effort  and  expectation  and  desire, 
And  something  evermore  to  be." 


1 66  Religious  Development. 

But  to  justify  this  belief,  if  it  can  be  jus- 
tified, we  must  quit  the  humbler  but  surer 
region  of  psychology  and  adventure  ourselves  in 
that  loftier  realm  where  Speculative  Philosophy 
holds  sway. 


ESSAY    IV. 

ON  THE  DISTINCTION  OF  INNER  AND 
OUTER  EXPERIENCE 


ESSAY    IV. 


WE  may  regard  this  problem  from  two  points  of 
view.  In  the  first  place,  we  may  treat  the  question 
simply  from  the  historical  standpoint,  and  try  to 
show  the  causes  which  led  to  the  gradual  separa- 
tion of  experience  into  two  different  spheres,  an 
outward  and  an  inward.  From  the  nature  of  the 
case  such  an  investigation  must  be  largely  psycho- 
logical. It  cannot  in  itself  be  taken  as  determin- 
ing the  ultimate  validity  of  the  distinction,  though 
it  may  furnish  facts  which  an  epistemological  theory 
must  take  into  consideration.  But,  in  the  second 
place,  we  can  try  to  determine  the  real  meaning 
and  value  of  the  distinction  in  the  ultimate  nature 
of  things ;  and  this  of  course  will  be  a  problem 
for  metaphysical  discussion.  A  larger  inquiry  of 
this  kind  may  furnish  the  conclusion  that  experi- 
ence is  fundamentally  one,  and  that  outer  and  inner 
are  only  different  phases  or  stages  in  its  develop- 
ment. Or  it  may  lead  us  to  conclude  that  the 


170  On  the  Distinction  of 

contrast  we  make  and  act  upon  in  our  ordinary 
conduct  is  based  upon  a  real  difference  which  is 
more  than  one  of  degree.  It  will  be  convenient 
for  us  to  consider  first  of  all  the  genesis  of  the 
distinction. 

For  ordinary  thought  nothing  seems  more  obvi- 
ous than  the  difference  between  outer  and  inner 
experience.  And  one  naturally  assumes  that  a 
distinction,  which  he  draws  himself  so  readily, 
was  always  drawn  with  the  same  facility.  But 
undoubtedly  this  cannot  have  been  the  case.  If 
we  distinguish  two  grades  of  experience,  the  former 
perceptual  and  therefore  concrete  and  individual, 
the  latter  conceptual  or  generalised,  it  will  only 
be  at  the  second  stage  that  the  distinction  is  con- 
sciously made.  The  separation  into  two  spheres, 
inner  and  outer,  and  the  apt  reference  of  experience 
to  one  or  other  of  them,  imply  some  development 
of  the  power  of  generalisation.  To  a  merely  per- 
ceptual consciousness  the  act  of  reflexion  which 
marks  off  the  percept  from  the  perceiving  mind 
would  not  be  possible.  Nevertheless  we  must 
guard  against  a  rigid  division  of  perceptual  from 
conceptual  experience.  For  the  process  of  develop- 
ment is  continuous,  and  in  perception  itself  un- 
conscious inference  is  present.  Even  in  the  higher 
animal  self- conservation  implies  a  rudimentary 
capacity  to  draw  conclusions.  Only,  however,  on 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  171 

the  level  of  conscious  generalisation  can  individual 
experience  receive  a  name  and  acquire  a  meaning. 
In  his  lectures  on  '  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism ' 
Prof.  Ward  has  justly  insisted  that  conceptual 
thought  is  developed  by  intersubjective  intercourse. 
In  other  words,  it  involves  language,  and  therefore 
a  social  system.  It  is  not  as  an  isolated  individual 
but  as  a  member  of  society  that  man  has  uni- 
versalised  his  experience.  On  the  other  hand, 
we  must  bear  in  mind  that  intersubjective  inter- 
course could  not  create  an  intellectual  realm  apart, 
but  has  only  developed  to  clear  consciousness 
elements  implicitly  present  at  the  perceptual 
stage. 

If,  then,  the  distinction  of  outer  and  inner  experi- 
ence only  becomes  possible  on  the  level  of  con- 
ceptual thought,  how  and  why  was  it  made  and 
elaborated  then  ?  Great  certainty  on  such  a  matter 
can  hardly  be  expected.  I  shall  first  examine  an 
ingenious  theory  on  this  point  which  is  originally 
due  to  K.  Avenarius.  It  is  termed  the  fallacy  of 
introjection.  The  theory  is  reproduced  by  Prof. 
Ward  in  his  lectures  on  '  Naturalism  and  Agnostic- 
ism/ and  for  convenience  I  shall  take  his  statements 
in  explanation.  Substantially  the  process  called 
introjection  rests  on  an  error  which  is  due  to 
common  thought  and  language.  Its  essence  "con- 
sists in  applying  to  the  experiences  of  my  fellow- 


172  On  the  Distinction  of 

creatures  conceptions  which  have  no  counterpart 
in  my  own.  ...  Of  another  common  thought 
and  language  lead  me  to  assume  not  merely  that 
his  experience  is  distinct  from  mine,  but  that  it 
is  in  him  in  the  form  of  sensations,  perceptions, 
and  other  *  internal  states.'  .  .  .  Thus  while  my 
environment  is  an  external  world  for  me,  his  ex- 
perience is  for  me  an  internal  world  in  him."1 
Consequently  as  we  apply  this  conception  to 
the  experience  of  others,  and  they  do  the  same 
for  us,  we  are  also  led  to  apply  it  to  our- 
selves, and  so  to  construe  our  own  experience 
in  the  light  "of  a  false  but  highly  plausible 
analogy." 

The  foregoing  solution  of  the  problem  is  plausible, 
but,  as  it  stands,  somewhat  artificial  and  not  quite 
convincing.  Beyond  doubt  intersubjective  inter- 
course has  been  necessary  to  develop  a  distinction 
which  implies  conceptual  thinking.  But  the  part 
in  introjection  assigned  to  an  "  involuntary  error," 
due  to  common  thought  and  language,  is  hardly 
intelligible,  and  appears  to  be  superfluous.  Evi- 
dently some  psychical  growth  is  presupposed  in  the 
act  of  interpretation  by  which  common  thought 
places  the  thoughts  and  perceptions  of  another 
within  him.  The  process  of  inreading  would  be 
meaningless  unless  each  individual  had  already 

1  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  vol.  ii.  p.  172. 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  173 

some  key  to  it  in  his  own  experience.1  General- 
ised experience  implies  a  society,  but  it  is  not 
credible  that  men  in  society  elaborated  a  distinction 
which  did  not  somehow  rest  upon  and  appeal  to 
the  life-history  of  individuals. 

What  facts,  then,  led  to  the  historical  genesis  of 
this  distinction  ?  One  of  the  earliest  would  be  the 
distinction  of  the  body  from  surrounding  objects. 
The  beginnings  of  this  separation  take  us  back  to 
the  animal  world.  An  animal  would  have  no 
chance  of  survival  in  the  struggle  for  existence 
if  it  did  not  note  the  difference  between  visual 
changes  due  to  movement  on  its  own  part  and 
those  due  to  movement  on  the  part  of  the  object.2 
But  man  might  have  consciously  differentiated  his 
body  from  surrounding  objects  without  recognising 
a  soul  or  life  within  the  body.  The  phenomena  of 
sleep  and  dreams  must  have  decisively  contributed 
to  this  further  result.  In  the  lower  culture  dreams 
are  regarded  as  real  occurrences,  and  are  attributed 
to  a  second  or  shadowy  self  within,  which  can  leave 
the  body  and  return  to  it.  In  giving  clearness  to, 
and  in  marking  off,  the  experiences  of  this  inner 
self,  no  doubt  the  utterances  and  testimony  of  other 


1  A  similar  objection  is  urged  against  Avenarius's  view  of  introjec- 
tion  by  W.  Jerusalem,  in  his  suggestive  book, '  Die  Urtheilsf unction/ 
vid.  p.  245. 

2  Stout,  Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  323. 


174  On  the  Distinction  of 

individuals  were  highly  important.  Then  the  voice 
and  the  breath  coming  from  within  seemed  a 
witness  of  the  reality  of  the  soul  in  the  eyes  of 
primitive  men.1  When  conceptual  thinking  had 
given  some  fixity  and  generality  to  the  notion  of  a 
soul,  we  may  conjecture  that  the  phenomena  of 
error  and  illusion — facts  which  must  have  been  soon 
noted  because  practically  so  important — were  treated 
in  the  same  way  as  dreams  and  attributed  to  the 
inner  self,  which  of  course  was  still  conceived  in  a 
material  way.  A  conscious  contrast  between  objects 
given  in  presentation  and  objects  reproduced  in 
memory  and  imagination  cannot  be  primitive,  but 
when  the  differentiation  was  made  the  latter  pro- 
cesses would  naturally  fall  to  be  regarded  as  inward. 
We  need  only  further  mention  the  activity  of  the 
will,  with  the  corresponding  sense  of  a  resisting 
environment,  which  would  give  force  and  vividness 
to  the  incipient  distinction  between  an  outward 
world  and  an  inward  self. 

If  our  view  be  right,  then,  the  distinction  of 
outer  and  inner  has  its  rude  beginning  in  the 
animistic  mode  of  thought :  and  animism,  as  Dr 

1  There  seem  to  be  reminiscences  of  ancient  beliefs  about  respira- 
tion in  the  Ionic  school.  Anaximenes,  for  example,  supposes  the 
soul  to  be  composed  of  air,  ^  fax*]*  ^caV,  -YJ  fjfjLerepa  aijp  ovcra 
o-vyKpartl  ^/xas  (Hitter  and  Preller,  20).  Heraclitus  speaks  of  it 
as  a  bright  exhalation,  di/adv/uaori?.  Cp.  also  the  use  of  the  Hebrew 
nV),  Gen.  ii.  7  ;  Job  xxvii.  3. 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  175 

Tylor  and  others  have  shown,  is  universal  in  the 
lower  culture.  Survivals  among  civilised  races 
prove  the  presence  among  them  long  before  of 
animistic  beliefs.  Avenarius  supposes  that  the 
wide-spread  phenomenon  of  animism  is  an  extension 
to  nature  of  the  principle  of  introjection  as  applied 
to  human  beings.  This  is  true  if  introjection  means 
nothing  more  than  the  attribution  of  a  soul.  But 
the  act  of  interpretation  by  which  we  place  the 
thoughts  and  perceptions  of  another  man  within 
him  as  "  internal  states "  is  a  somewhat  developed 
one.  It  is  not  natural  to  make  the  cruder  pheno- 
mena of  animism  depend  on  introjection  thus 
conceived.  We  do  better  justice  to  the  facts  when 
we  conclude  that  the  distinction  of  outer  and  inner 
has  its  germ  in  the  experience  of  individuals.  The 
distinction  was  then  developed  by  intersubjective 
intercourse,  and  the  notion  of  an  internal  soul 
came  to  be  applied  not  only  to  human  beings  but 
also  to  natural  objects.  The  idea  of  "internal  ex- 
perience "  is  later,  and  grows  out  of  the  theory  of  a 
soul  or  finer  second  self  within  the  body. 

We  find,  then,  this  theory  of  a  fallacy  of  primitive 
thought  does  not  solve  our  problem.  But  though 
we  trace  the  distinction  to  a  basis  in  the  actual 
experience  of  individuals,  the  larger  question  of  its 
final  validity  still  remains.  For  it  is  always  possible 
that  thought  may  misconstrue  experience.  And,  so 


176  On  the  Distinction  of 

far  as  we  have  gone,  the  division  of  our  world  into 
two  spheres  may  or  may  not  have  a  justification  in 
the  real  nature  of  things.  To  this  further  aspect  of 
the  problem  we  now  turn. 

The  expression  outer  and  inner,  when  applied  to 
experience,  is  to  some  extent  metaphorical.  For 
experience  is  not  a  process  carried  on  within  the 
head,  nor  are  objects  which  appear  external  to  us 
and  to  one  another  on  that  account  outside  con- 
sciousness. The  distinction  of  inner  and  outer  is 
one  which  falls  within  experience,  and  what  we  call 
an  outward  object  and  an  inward  idea  are  alike 
states  of  consciousness.  That  externality  in  space 
is  not  externality  to  mind  was  clearly  brought  out 
by  Kant.  It  lay  beyond  Kant's  mental  horizon  to 
discuss  the  distinction  of  outer  and  inner  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  historical  growth  of  experience. 
But  he  accepts  the  distinction  as  justifiable  and  in- 
corporates it  in  his  theory  of  knowledge.  That 
which  is  in  space  and  time  belongs  to  outer  sense, 
that  which  is  in  time  alone  belongs  to  inner  sense. 
And  there  is  a  necessary  connexion  between  the 
two  spheres,  for  that  which  is  determined  in  space 
is  determined  from  the  side  of  the  subject  in  terms 
of  inner  sense.  By  attending  to  the  mental  process 
by  'which  all  objects  become  possible  the  inward 
side  of  experience  would  be  differentiated  from  the 
outer.  But  Kant  afterwards  saw  that  in  putting 


Inner  and  Older  Experience.  177 

this  interpretation  on  the  common  distinction  he 
involved  himself  in  difficulties  which  affected  the 
consistency  of  his  theoretical  philosophy.  For  the 
inner  life  was  perpetually  changing,  and  we  could 
not,  as  he  thought,  apply  to  it  the  category  of 
substance  as  the  permanent  in  time.  Nor  could 
that  product  of  Kantian  abstraction,  the  spectral 
pure  ego,  which  was  without  content,  serve  as  a 
permanent  unity  to  which  inner  changes  were 
referred. 

Accordingly  in  the  second  edition  of  the  'Critique,' 
in  the  "  Remark  on  the  Principles  of  Judgment,"  we 
find  Kant  modifying  his  earlier  view,  and  asserting 
that  outer  sense  is  presupposed  in  the  conscious 
determination  of  ourselves  in  time.  "It  is  by 
means  of  external  perception  that  we  make  intel- 
ligible to  ourselves  the  various  successive  changes 
in  which  we  ourselves  exist.  .  .  .  No  change  can 
possibly  be  an  object  of  experience  apart  from  the 
consciousness  of  something  that  is  permanent,  and 
in  inner  sense  nothing  that  is  permanent  can  be 
found."  On  this  view  it  would  be  as  logically  sub- 
sequent to  and  contrasted  with  the  determination 
of  objects  in  space  that  the  consciousness  of  inner 
experience  is  possible.1  It  is  of  course  evident  that 

1  Dr  Caird  thinks  that  the  modifications  in  statement  made  by 
Kant,  in  dealing  with  this  point  in  the  second  edition  of  his  '  Critique,' 
indicate  a  movement  of  his  mind,  of  which  perhaps  he  was  not  him- 

M 


178  On  the  Distinction  of 

Kant  in  his  treatment  of  this  distinction  is  greatly 
influenced  by  the  general  theory  of  experience 
which  he  found  it  necessary  to  postulate.  He 
could  not  admit  that  the  self  was  real  in  the 
sense  of  maintaining  its  identity  amid  its  changing 
activities.  Hence  the  fact  of  external  perception 
was  judged  necessary  to  give  the  contrast  of  per- 
manence over  against  inner  changes.  Yet  in  Kant's 
theory  it  is  impossible  to  understand  how  a  pure 
form  of  perception  like  space,  when  somehow  super- 
induced on  an  affection  of  sense  which  is  mysteriously 
given,  could,  even  with  the  necessary  help  of  the 
schematised  categories,  produce  those  localised  ob- 
jects in  space  which  fill  the  field  of  outer  experience. 
It  is  conceivable  that  spatial  and  temporal  relations 
may  have  been  evolved  out  of  sense-affection  as  a 
form  which  is  implicitly  contained  in  it ;  but  it  is 
not  intelligible  how  pure  forms  of  intuition  could 

self  fully  conscious,  towards  a  larger  and  more  consistent  idealism 
(*  Phil,  of  Kant,'  i.  417, 614).  I  am  not  aware  how  far  he  is  supported 
in  this  view  by  competent  Kantian  scholars.  But  I  venture  to  think 
that  Kant  simply  desired  to  give  a  statement  of  his  critical  idealism 
less  open  to  objection  and  more  carefully  guarded  than  that  which 
he  had  given  in  the  first  edition  and  in  the  Prolegomena.  While  he 
shows  in  the  second  edition  that  inner  sense  depends  on  outer  sense, 
he  also  repeats  that  a  phenomenon  (Erscheinung)  must  be  a  pheno- 
menon of  Something  (ed.  '  Kehrbach,'  p.  23).  And  though  he  admits 
that  this  reference  of  perception  to  a  reality  beyond  it  might  not  be 
necessary  for  intellectual  perception  (op.  eit.t  p.  32),  yet  it  is  no  part 
of  his  theory  that  human  intelligence  is  implicitly  a  consciousness 
which  is  capable  of  exercising  an  intellectuelle  Anschauung. 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  179 

be  read  into  an  alien  matter.  We  refrain,  however, 
from  entering  on  a  detailed  criticism  of  Kant,  for 
it  will  generally  be  admitted  that  his  theory  of 
knowledge  is  too  unsystematic,  too  little  penetrated 
by  the  notion  of  development,  to  be  accepted  as  it 
stands.  The  motto  simplex  sigillum  veri  may  not 
always  be  true,  but  the  cumbersome  and  ill-adjusted 
machinery  of  the  *  Critique '  of  itself  provokes  doubt 
and  unbelief.  Let  us  rather  see  how  Kant's  view 
on  this  subject  is  amended  and  developed  by  Dr 
Caird  in  his  well-known  treatise  on  the  *  Philosophy 
of  Kant.' l 

Inner  and  outer  experience  we  are  there  told 
are  only  different  stages  in  the  development  of 
consciousness,  which  in  another  aspect  is  the  de- 
velopment of  the  object.  From  the  simplest 
determinations  of  the  object  in  space  and  time 
we  advance  organically  through  the  categories,  or 
forms  of  judgment,  to  the  world  as  completely 
determined  by  reason  or  self  -  consciousness,  which 
if  logically  posterior  is  the  real  presupposition  of 
the  whole  movement.  The  later  and  more  highly 
articulated  stage  of  this  development  is,  properly 
speaking,  inner  experience,  and  it  can  only  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  consciousness  of  the  world  in 
the  sense  that  it  is  that  consciousness  in  a  more 
completely  developed  form.  But  as  each  fact  of 

1  Phil,  of  Kant,  vol.  i.  p.  614  ff. 


180  On  the  Distinction  of 

experience  involves  a  reference  to  the  self,  so 
every  outer  experience  will  have  its  inner  side. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  inner  experience 
which  is  not  also  outer,  but  we  call  it  inner  be- 
cause the  inner  side  is  specially  reflected  on, — in 
other  words  we  definitely  recognise  it  as  belonging 
to  the  self. 

That  there  are  elements  of  truth  in  this  statement 
we  do  not  seek  to  deny.  Inner  experience  could 
not  consistently  develop  except  in  relation  to  and 
in  distinction  from  outer  experience.  And  what 
we  call  an  outer  experience  must  also  have  an 
inner  side.  Nor  can  there  be  doubt  that  in  the 
historical  growth  of  experience  its  two  aspects  have 
advanced  pari  passu.  None  the  less  it  is  difficult 
to  regard  inner  experience  as  merely  outer  experi- 
ence at  a  more  concrete  and  highly  articulated 
stage  of  growth.  If  we  set  aside  for  the  moment 
the  question  whether  the  distinction  between  them 
can  be  minimised  in  this  fashion,  we  might  still 
argue  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  psychological 
development,  it  is  inner  experience  which  is  primary 
and  outer  which  is  derivative.  A  developed  self- 
consciousness  is  mediated  by  the  consciousness  of 
objects,  but  in  the  last  resort  we  must  postulate 
a  direct  and  real  activity  of  the  self  as  the 
ground  and  beginning  of  all  progress  in  experience. 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  we  must  be  immediately 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  1 8 1 

conscious  of  the  operations  of  our  own  minds,  and 
it  is  only  as  the  result  of  inferential  thought  that 
we  mark  off  a  section  of  experience  as  outer.  On 
this  ground  we  should  be  disposed  to  modify  Dr 
Caird's  statement,  and  to  treat  inner  experience 
as  fundamentally  the  more  simple  and  elementary. 
From  this  standpoint  development  begins  from  an 
active  self  in  relation  to  an  environment,  which 
gradually  distinguishes  that  environment  from  itself, 
and  by  the  aid  of  conceptual  thought  defines  a 
portion  of  its  whole  experience  as  external. 

But  the  further  question  remains  whether  a  dis- 
tinction of  degree  between  outer  and  inner  experi- 
ence covers  all  the  facts.  Dr  Caird  does  not  find 
anything  in  the  object  as  determined  in  space 
which  is  not  taken  up  into  self-consciousness.  The 
advance  from  outer  to  inner  experience  is  just  a 
process  in  which  thought  goes  on  to  a  more  and 
more  complete  determination  of  things,  till  "it 
finds  its  own  unity  in  the  object."1  It  is  hard 
to  see  how  on  this  view  the  individuality  and 
uniqueness  which  we  discover  in  experience  are 
explained  at  all.  And  in  reference  to  the  matter 
on  hand  this  theory  does  not  afford  room  for  certain 
obvious  facts.  Inner  and  outer  experience  refuse 
to  melt  into  one  another  in  the  way  suggested. 
Mere  reflexion  on  the  inner  side  of  an  outer 

1  Phil,  of  Kant.,  vol.  i.  p.  470. 


1 82  On  the  Distinction  of 

experience  does  not  lead  us  to  regard  it  as  inner. 
A  man,  for  instance,  examining  a  statue  critically 
in  order  to  give  his  opinion  of  it,  reflects  on  the 
impressions  he  receives  and  recognises  them  as  his 
own.  Yet  he  would  not  call  his  experience  an 
inward  one.  Even  more  decisively  would  the  same 
individual  refuse  to  term  outward  his  experience 
when,  leaning  back  on  his  chair  and  closing  his 
eyes,  he  thought  out  carefully  the  merits  of  several 
possible  lines  of  action  in  order  to  select  the  best. 
And  between  the  one  experience  and  the  other 
there  would  appear  to  him  to  be  a  qualitative 
difference.  If  every  inner  experience  is  outer  as 
well,  why  do  we  habitually  distinguish  what  we 
call  subjective  mental  processes  from  the  percep- 
tion of  outward  objects,  and  contrast  the  one  with 
the  other?  No  doubt  each  outer  experience  has 
an  inward  side,  and  in  virtue  of  this  we  some- 
times wrongly  interpret  an  inner  state  to  signify 
facts  in  the  external  world.  But  we  never  mistake 
our  perception  of  objects  in  space  for  a  purely 
inward  mental  process.  We  find,  therefore,  a  diffi- 
culty in  accepting  the  view  that  the  contrast  of 
inner  and  outer  experience  rests  entirely  on  a 
difference  of  degree  in  the  development  of  con- 
sciousness. From  this  standpoint  distinctions 
which  are  universally  noted  and  acted  upon  are 
not  adequately  explained. 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience,  183 

Against  this  it  may  be  urged  that  inner  and 
outer  experience  cannot  be  two  diverse  kinds  of 
experience,  for  both  are  experiences  of  the  one 
subject  and  are  distinctions  within  the  one  con- 
sciousness. We  have  already  admitted  this.  For 
the  purely  perceptual  consciousness  experience 
would  be  one,  and  the  generalised  distinction  of 
outward  and  inward  we  know  is  made  possible  by 
conceptual  thinking.  But  on  the  level  of  mediate 
thought,  or  rational  inference,  a  new  question 
presses  itself  upon  us.  We  ask,  Does  the  ulti- 
mate raison  d'etre  of  the  distinction  lie  in  the 
conscious  selves  who  make  it?  Or  is  the  inference 
reasonable  that  the  experience  which  we  name  ex- 
ternal gets  its  character  from  the  implication  of 
realities,  which  are  not  those  of  self  -  conscious 
subjects?  In  other  words,  Is  outer  experience 
the  interpretation  by  self-conscious  subjects  of  the 
action  of  reals  which  thought  itself  does  not  create  ? 
This  we  believe  to  be  the  true  solution  of  the 
problem,  and  the  explanation  of  the  refusal  of 
outer  experience  to  be  taken  up  into  and  merged 
in  inner  experience. 

But  before  going  further  let  us  deal  with  an 
objection  which  is  certain  to  be  raised.  The  as- 
sumption that  a  trans  -  subjective  real  is  implied 
in  presented  objects  will  be  termed  gratuitous. 
The  apparent  independence  of  the  object,  it  will 


1 84  On  the  Distinction  of 

be  contended,  is  entirely  the  outcome  of  conceptual 
thought.  For  the  application  of  the  concept 
generalises  the  particular  experience  of  perception, 
and  treats  it  as  an  instance  of  a  general  relation  : 
and  this  just  means  that  "  we  are  conscious  we 
have  before  us  an  object  which  exists  independ- 
ently of  its  presentation  in  the  particular  case." 
On  this  view  the  seemingly  independent  outer 
object  would  be,  if  not  relative  to  the  individual 
thinker,  yet  relative  to  "  consciousness  in  general/' 
— the  rational  self-consciousness  which  is  the  same 
in  all  human  subjects. 

In  reply  we  may  point  out  that  conceptual 
thought  depends  for  its  individual  reference  upon 
perceptive  experience,  which  is  altogether  special 
and  concrete.  As  Kant  himself  granted,  particular 
connexion  in  experience  can  only  be  learned  from 
experience ;  laws  of  nature  like  gravitation  cannot 
be  deduced  a  priori.  The  ground,  then,  of  the 
particular  character  of  individual  objects  and  the 
special  relations  in  which  they  stand  to  one  another 
can  only  be  found  in  perceptual  experience.  It  is 
indeed  only  by  an  act  of  abstraction  that  we  can 
picture  a  purely  percipient  ego.  But  none  the  less 
this  percipient  consciousness  must  take  note  of,  and 
be  affected  by,  realities  other  than  itself,  in  order 
that  universal  experience  may  have  its  specific  side. 
For  conceptual  thought  can  only  evolve  out  of  per- 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  185 

ception  what  is  implicitly  contained  in  it.  That 
the  perceptive  consciousness  is  not  aware  of  this 
reference  of  the  percept  to  something  beyond  itself 
is  no  disproof  of  the  fact  that  there  is  such  a 
reference.  If  inferential  thought  compels  us  to 
postulate  this  reference,  we  must  accept  its  verdict. 
For  we  open  the  door  to  a  hopeless  scepticism,  if 
we  refuse  to  admit  that  the  real  must  conform  to 
what  is  rational.  I  shall  now  give  one  or  two 
illustrations  to  show  that  experience  is  not  explic- 
able unless  we  posit  such  a  trans- subjective  reality. 

What  we  term  external  experience  impresses  us 
as  containing  an  element  of  inevitableness.  We 
are  conscious  that  we  have  a  share  in  directing  the 
process  of  our  thoughts  or  the  movement  of  our 
limbs,  but  if  we  look  to  the  heaven  above  or  the 
earth  around,  the  things  we  see  we  cannot  help 
seeing.1  The  process  of  consciousness  in  the  in- 
dividual persons  A,  B,  C,  and  D,  may  be  very 
different  at  a  particular  time,  but  at  a  certain 
moment  they  all,  without  choice  on  their  part, 
register  an  experience  X, — say  the  appearance  of 
the  sun.  Let  us  call  the  percepts  of  A,  B,  C,  and 
D,  a,  6,  c,  d;  then  a,  6,  c,  d  contain  an  implicit 
reference  to  x,  which  becomes  for  universal  thinking 
X.  But  suppose  they  do  not,  and  that  X  is  an 

1  Berkeley,  in  his  *  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,'  distinguishes 
in  this  way  perception  from  imagination. 


1 86  On  the  Distinction  of 

abstraction  elaborated  out  of  a,  6,  c,  d.  Then  there 
must  be  some  reason  in  the  series  a,  b,  c,  d  why 
the  abstract  X  should  be  evolved  and  not  Y  or  Z. 
That  is  to  say  a,  6,  c,  and  d  must  each  be  so 
qualified  that  it  accepts  the  interpretation  X  but 
excludes  Y  or  Z.  Ex  hypothesi  the  cause  of  the 
specially  qualified  percepts  a,  6,  c,  d  cannot  be 
found  in  the  previous  condition  of  A,  B,  C,  D. 
Nor  can  the  abstract  X  give  any  common  qualifica- 
tion to  these  percepts.  Consequently  the  sudden 
manifestation  to  different  minds,  the  consistency, 
the  inevitableness  of  the  experience  we  call  X 
becomes  quite  unintelligible.  And  the  facts  remain 
inexplicable  unless  we  admit  that  X  is  more  than 
an  abstraction,  and  is  significant  of  something  (x) 
which  has  a  reality  for  itself. 

We  put  the  same  point  in  a  somewhat  different 
light  when  we  direct  attention  to  the  fact  that  a 
person  refers  various  experiences  which  he  has  had 
at  different  times  to  one  object  A.  He  has  seen 
A  frequently,  and  believes  that  if  he  complies  with 
the  conditions  he  will  see  it  again.  For  popular 
thought  this  is  the  common,  if  fallacious,  argument 
for  the  independent  existence  of  A  as  it  stands. 
Plainly,  however,  A  in  its  unique  setting  cannot 
be  deduced  from  the  universal  side  of  experience : 
nor  is  there  any  constraining  reason  in  the  in- 
dividual himself  why  he  should  refer  various 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  187 

percepts  to  one  and  the  same  object  A.  That 
necessity  comes  from  the  side  of  the  object,  and 
A  must  stand  for  something  which  has  had  a 
determining  influence  on  perception  while  it 
persists  beyond  it.  Again,  however  inadequate 
the  "laws  of  nature"  may  be  as  an  explanation 
of  concrete  reality,  yet  they  have  validity  in 
nature.  They  enable  us  to  anticipate  experience. 
An  eclipse  is  predicted  years  before  it  happens, 
and  it  takes  place  exactly  as  predicted.  Here  we 
have  a  perceptual  experience  A  furnishing  the 
basis  for  a  mathematical  construction  on  which 
the  forecast  was  made  which  was  verified  in  per- 
ceptual experience  B.  Between  A  and  B  there 
is  a  process  which  need  not  come  into  consciousness 
at  all,  but  must  be  real  if  B  is  to  take  place.  The 
facts  require  us  here  to  assume  that  the  rational 
process  by  which  B  is  deduced  from  A  has  for 
its  counterpart  an  activity  in  things  which  thought 
interprets  but  does  not  create. 

These  are  somewhat  obvious  instances,  but  we 
must  not  ignore  their  significance  on  that  account. 
They  all  unite  in  enforcing  the  one  lesson.  We 
admit  that  the  objects  of  outer  experience  are  ideal 
constructions,  but  the  facts  compel  us  to  add  that 
these  constructions  can  only  be  valid  interpreta- 
tions of  a  reality  beyond.  And  in  regard  to  the 
distinction  between  inner  and  outer  experience,  we 


1 88  On  the  Distinction  of 

conclude  that  outer  experience  has  the  special  char- 
acter which  attaches  to  it,  because  it  directly 
implies  that  the  subject  is  influenced  by  realities 
other  than  itself.  The  subject  creates  the  dis- 
tinction, but  it  does  so  as  its  interpretation  of 
a  real  difference  within  the  whole  of  its  ex- 
perience. 

We  must  now  try  to  form  a  more  definite  concep- 
tion of  this  trans-subjective  reality  which  we  find  it 
necessary  to  postulate.  But  we  require  to  state  our 
position  in  this  reference  with  some  care.  It  will  not 
do  to  argue  that  in  "physical  events,"  as  distinguished 
from  the  subjective  sequence  of  ideas,  we  have  the 
fundamental  notion  of  externality.1  For  a  '  physical 
event'  is  by  no  means  a  primitive  datum  of  con- 
sciousness, but  implies  ideal  construction ;  and  it  is 
absurd  to  suppose  that  the  object  as  it  exists  for 
developed  consciousness  has  the  same  significance 
apart  from  consciousness.  Influenced  by  these  con- 
siderations, J.  S.  Mill,  as  is  well  known,  defined 
matter  as  "  a  permanent  possibility  of  sensations  "  ; 
and  he  explains  that  these  "  permanent  possibilities" 
are  "  not  constructed  by  the  mind  itself  but  merely 
recognised  by  it."2  That  which  persists  through 
changes  and  has  capacities  must  in  some  sense  be 
real ;  but  Mill  gives  us  no  light  as  to  how  we  are  to 

1  Vid.  Mind,  N.S.,  No.  22,  p.  222. 

2  Exam,  of  Hamilton,  6th  edition,  p.  239. 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  189 

think  of  this  reality.  Nor,  on  the  whole,  has  Kant's 
treatment  of  the  subject  been  helpful.  His  "thing 
in  itself"  is  at  one  point  regarded  as  the  positive 
source  of  sensations,  but  afterwards  it  is  fined  down 
to  a  mere  limiting  notion.1  On  neither  view  is  the 
process  of  experience  intelligible ;  and  the  conclu- 
sion seemed  inevitable  that  philosophy  must  either 
return  to  the  realism  of  Locke  or  advance  to  the 
absolute  idealism  of  the  post  -  Kantian  thinkers. 
Without  committing  ourselves  to  this  inference,  we 
may  frankly  allow  that  the  notion  of  "  things  in 
themselves  "  is  inconsistent  as  well  as  useless.  That 
which  ex  hypothesi  possesses  no  knowable  qualities 
can  never  be  coerced  into  active  relations  with 
elements  within  conscious  experience.  If  this  were 
possible  the  original  assumption  must  have  been 
wrong,  and  the  'thing  in  itself '  instead  of  being  an 
impenetrable  mystery  has  some  affinity  to  conscious- 
ness. It  might  seem,  then,  that  in  trying  to  do 
justice  to  the  facts  of  outer  experience  we  have 
reached  an  impasse.  On  the  one  side  it  appears 
impossible  to  explain  the  facts  of  sense-perception  if 
the  object  only  exists  as  experienced.  On  the  other 
side,  if  we  postulate  an  unknowable  reality  behind 


1  With  this  we  may  compare  the  Aristotelian  v\rj  which  is  some- 
times spoken  of  as  mere  privation — o-rep^cris,  and  at  other  times  is 
regarded  as  a  positive  means  through  which  individuals  are  differen- 
tiated. 


190  On  the  Distinction  of 

the  things  of  sense,  the  unity  of  experience  becomes 
inexplicable. 

There  is  one  sense  in  which  no  sober  idealist 
refuses  to  admit  that  the  object  of  experience  has 
a  reality  of  its  own.  Among  the  objects  of  our 
experience  are  other  human  subjects  who,  we  inevit- 
ably infer,  have  a  reality  for  themselves.  Entering 
into  our  experience  they  can  never  be  dissolved  into 
it,  but  persist  beyond  it.  This  is  an  admission  of 
some  significance.  For  it  means  that  we  recognise 
individual  centres  of  thought,  feeling,  and  will, 
which  decisively  influence  our  consciousness,  while 
they  are  independent  of  it.  Here  we  have  a  prin- 
ciple of  individuality  as  object,  whose  qualities,  as 
recognised  and  interpreted  by  us,  are  represented  in 
it  by  modes  of  its  own  activity.  And  when  we  have 
admitted  this  we  are  bound  in  consistency  to  go 
further.  The  law  of  continuity,  as  justly  insisted 
on  by  Leibniz,  forces  us  to  regard  the  principle  of 
individuality  as  having  many  stages  and  degrees  of 
development.  There  is  no  break  in  the  process  by 
which  life  advances  to  consciousness  and  to  self- 
consciousness  ;  and  the  line  of  separation  between 
organic  and  what  we  call  inorganic  matter  is  a  vanish- 
ing one.  Moreover,  the  psychologist  is  compelled  to 
postulate  the  reality  of  a  subconscious  mental  world, 
in  order  to  explain  phenomena  which  are  manifest 
above  the  threshold  of  consciousness.  And  it  is 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  191 

reasonable  to  suppose  that  what  is  substantial  in 
lower  forms  of  life  is  one  in  kind  (though  very  dif- 
ferent in  degree)  with  the  conscious  self  in  man.  The 
latter  would  be  the  e^epyeia  of  which  the  former  was 
the  Swapis.  The  real  on  which  the  ideational  activity 
of  the  subject  works  in  constructing  the  phenomenal 
world  is,  on  this  view,  manifold  spiritual  substances 
or  causalities  ;  and  the  diverse  qualities  of  the  world, 
as  given  in  experience,  would  be  grounded  in  the 
various  activities  of  these  substances.  The  basis  of 
the  phenomenon  termed  matter  is,  on  this  theory,  an 
inner  life  which  is  allied  to  our  own  consciousness.1 
The  point  we  wish  to  urge,  then,  is  that  if  you 
accept  the  world  of  intersubjective  intercourse  as  a 
fact,  you  cannot  restrict  the  principle  to  the  rela- 
tions of  human  individuals  with  one  another.  The 
interaction  of  individuals  not  existing  merely  for 
each  other,  but  each  for  itself,  must  also  be  possible 
at  lower  stages  of  development,  and  there  is  no 
break  in  the  process  of  advance  from  the  lower  to 
the  higher.  Hence  there  seems  to  be  no  valid 
reason  why  one  should  not  admit  that  our  so-called 
external  experience  involves  the  presence  to  our 
consciousness  of  manifold  spiritual  substances  which 
are  subjects  at  lower  planes  of  development.  A 
trans-subjective  real  is  inferentially  necessary  to 

1  Cf.  Paulsen,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  p.  387 ;  Stout,  Manual 
of  Psychology,  p.  54. 


192  On  the  Distinction  of 

explain  external  experience  ;  and  as  we  construe  this 
real  in  terms  of  spirit  and  not  of  matter,  we  cannot 
be  accused  of  setting  up  a  dualism  which  makes 
knowledge  inexplicable.  The  constructive  work  of 
thought  has  been  already  referred  to.  But  thought 
cannot  weave  out  of  itself  the  content  of  experience. 
Something  must  be  given,  and  the  requisite  funda- 
menta  relationis  are  supplied  by  individual  reals, 
by  everything  which  possesses  a  degree  of  inner  life 
and  is  for  itself  as  well  as  for  others.  On  this 
hypothesis  we  do  justice  to  the  primacy  and  cen- 
trality  of  the  inner  life,  while  we  avoid  the  absurdity 
of  reducing  external  experience  to  thought-relations, 
or  of  positing  unknowable  "things  in  themselves" 
behind  the  phenomena  of  sense. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  deal  with  a  point 
of  some  importance  which  bears  on  the  distinction 
of  inner  and  outer.  We  mean  the  spatial  reference 
which  the  distinction  suggests.  It  may  be  assumed 
here  that  neither  space  nor  time  can  be  an  empty 
form  having  a  real  existence,  which  is  somehow 
applied  to  things.1  They  must,  therefore,  be  in 
some  way  developed  out  of  the  content  of  experience 
itself :  though  not  real  in  themselves,  they  must  be 
evolved  from  some  basis  in  reality,  or  to  use  a  phrase 
employed  by  Leibniz,  they  must  be  phenomena  bene 
fundata.  This  point  of  reference  to  reality  can  only 

1  Vid.  Lotze,  Metaphysics,  bk.  ii.  chaps,  i.,  iii. 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  193 

be  found  in  the  interaction  of  those  individual  reals 
which  are  the  ground  of  experience.  The  mutual 
determination  of  different  spiritual  substances  would 
be  represented  from  the  standpoint  of  the  perceiving 
subject  under  the  form  of  space.  And  inasmuch  as 
all  experience  must  be  construed  in  terms  of  the 
states  of  a  subject  for  which  both  itself  and  other 
selves  exist,  we  have  time  as  the  universal  form 
in  which  the  subject  represents  everything  that 
happens.  The  long  history  of  experience,  and  the 
generalisation  which  is  its  outcome,  have  served  to 
invest  space  and  time  with  a  seeming  reality  and 
independence  of  their  own.  Only  the  unworkable 
nature  of  this  conclusion  and  the  contradictions  in 
which  it  involves  him,  shake  a  man's  natural  faith 
in  an  opinion  which  seems  so  well  founded.  It 
would  be  too  much  to  say  that  the  theory  we  accept 
satisfactorily  solves  every  difficulty,  but  it  avoids  a 
twofold  error.  For  it  treats  neither  space  nor  time 
as  an  independent  real,  nor  does  it  reduce  them  to 
subjective  mental  fictions  which  cut' us  off  from 
reality.  They  are  representations  in  the  subject, 
but  they  are  also  valid  forms  under  which  he  in- 
terprets what  is  real. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  historic  development 
of  experience  the  universal  point  of  view  is  late.  To 
the  merely  perceptual  consciousness  space  and  time 
would  not  be  distinguished.  The  "  selective  in- 

N 


194  On  the  Distinction  of 

terest "  or  the  practical  need  which  turns  the  atten- 
tion of  the  animal  to  space  and  time  is  concerned 
with  the  fact  of  movement  which  involves  both.  I 
refer  to  the  temporal  and  spatial  adjustments  which 
are  necessary  to  secure  food,  to  seize  prey,  and  to 
escape  a  foe.  And  it  is  from  the  association  in  man 
of  active  movement  with  the  capacity  of  generalising 
that  the  differentiation  and  development  of  the  ideas 
of  space  and  time  are  due.  The  stages  of  this 
progress  are  however  matter  for  psychological  dis- 
cussion. The  final  result  is  that  space  is  hypos- 
tatised  as  a  comprehensive  whole  which  exists  for 
itself,  and  which  contains  within  it  all  that  general- 
ised experience  treats  as  an  independent  reality. 
And  language  has  given  universal  currency  to  the 
habit  of  speaking  of  what  is  believed  to  belong  to 
the  mind  as  in  it  and  of  what  does  not  belong  to  it  as 
outside  it.  Philosophic  reflexion  forces  us  to  correct 
this  abstraction.  Both  the  spatial  image  and  the 
object  it  contains  are  shown  to  belong  to  the  mind 
as  ideal  constructions.  Yet  the  common-sense  point 
of  view  has  a  certain  justification.  For  ideal  con- 
struction is  at  root  interpretation  ;  and  in  the  exist- 
ence and  activity  of  trans-subjective  realities  lies  the 
possibility  of  our  representing  to  ourselves  the  world 
of  objects  extended  in  space. 

In   the   remainder   of  this   paper   I  will   try  to 
answer  certain  objections  which  may  be  made  to 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  195 

the  theory  of  reality  we  have  accepted.  You  have 
admitted,  it  will  be  said,  the  presence  of  ideal  con- 
struction in  experience,  why  should  you  infer  that 
so-called  things  are  anything  more  than  such  con- 
structions? A  thing,  however  seemingly  solid,  is 
only  the  meeting-point  of  universal  qualities  or  rela- 
tions. In  reply  it  may  be  asked,  What  is  meant  by 
a  meeting-point  ?  Evidently  something  which  serves 
as  a  ground  of  identity  and  a  bond  of  connexion 
between  the  qualities.  These  cannot  fly  loose  and 
unclaimed  in  the  world  of  experience.  For  if  in  a 
sense  they  belong  to  reality  as  a  whole,  yet  they 
definitely  pertain  to  particular  determinations  of 
reality  and  not  to  others.  No  doubt  if  we  suppose 
that  qualities  are  somehow  attached  as  adjectives  to 
isolated  fragments  of  reality,  we  shall  be  proved 
inconsistent :  the  substance  does  not  exist  outside 
its  attributes.  But  this  objection  does  not  apply 
when  we  conceive  the  'support  of  qualities'  after 
the  analogy  of  the  self,  and  construe  the  qualities 
themselves  as  representations  in  consciousness  of 
the  interaction  between  spiritual  substances.1  In 
a  similar  spirit  it  is  said  that  to  advocate  the  reality 
of  things  is  to  champion  a  mere  fiction  of  the  mind. 


1  It  will  be  said  that  this  is  tacitly  to  admit  that  the  individual 
is  only  qualified  in  virtue  of  its  relations.  I  do  not  think  so,  for  the 
qualities  which  become  explicit  through  interaction  point  to  positive 
differences  in  the  monads  themselves. 


196  On  the  Distinction  of 

For  the  so-called  thing  is  "  ruined  by  thought "  :  it 
goes  to  pieces  under  the  touch  of  the  speculative 
inquirer.  Popular  thought  is  certainly  arbitrary  in 
the  way  in  which  it  applies  the  name ;  and  we  do 
not  deny  that  things  are  sometimes  mental  fictions. 
A  bag  of  grain  might  be  called  a  £  thing/  while  the 
name  would  not  be  given  to  the  contents  spread  out 
upon  the  floor.  But  popular  terminology  does  not 
concern  us  here ;  and  we  prefer  to  speak  of  indi- 
vidual reals  which  have  a  being  for  themselves. 
These  are  not  due  to  ideal  construction,  but  are 
presupposed  by  it,  for  without  them  thought  would 
not  have  data  on  which  to  work.  Obviously  it  will 
not  be  possible  for  us,  with  our  present  knowledge, 
to  distinguish  what  is  individual  at  levels  of  develop- 
ment far  distant  from  our  own. 

But  even  in  this  sense,  it  is  contended,  the  exist- 
ence of  individual  reals  cannot  be  maintained.  The 
more  we  reflect  the  better  we  shall  see  that  the 
significance  of  every  predicate  involves  relations 
which  force  us  to  go  beyond  the  individual  itself; 
and  the  further  we  carry  the  process,  the  more  un- 
real becomes  the  abstraction  which  remains.  The 
fact  is,  as  we  learn,  that  an  individual,  or  monad,  is 
a  fiction ;  it  is  reducible  to  a  mere  adjective  which 
falls  within  the  only  true  individual,  the  universe  as 
a  whole — the  one  ultimate  reality. 

As  a  result  of  this  drastic  argument,  not  only 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  197 

'  things '  but  conscious  selves  are  *  ruined/  or  at 
least  they  should  be.  For  the  reasoning  employed, 
if  valid,  ought  also  to  undermine  the  individuality 
and  identity  of  the  human  self  by  dissolving  it  into 
a  changing  tissue  of  relations.  The  logical  conse- 
quence of  this  argument  must  be  to  discredit  any 
theory  of  reality  which  the  human  ego  can  form. 
Experience,  on  the  contrary,  testifies  to  a  self  which 
distinguishes  itself  from  its  states  and  maintains  its 
unity  in  them.  And  it  is  after  the  analogy  of  the 
self  that  we  conceive  the  individual  reals  which  are 
the  ground  of  the  external  world  as  perceived. 

It  will  still  be  urged  that  the  test  of  the  truth  of 
any  theory  is  its  coherency ;  in  other  words,  if  we 
can  "  think  it  out "  consistently  in  all  its  bearings, 
we  establish  its  claim  to  truth.  And  individual 
reals  cannot  be  "thought  out"  without  yielding  up 
their  reality  to  the  absolute.  That  there  is  an  ele- 
ment of  truth  in  this  contention  we  do  not  deny, 
and  we  will  return  to  the  point  presently.  But  if 
you  reduce  individuals  to  mere  appearance,  and  turn 
their  identity  into  a  fiction,  in  the  ostensible  in- 
terests of  rational  explanation  you  are  ignoring 
facts  which  require  to  be  explained.  If,  like  Par- 
menides,  you  say  that  the  one  only  is  and  the  many 
are  not,  you  have  still  to  account  for  the  illusion  of 
*  not-being.' 

Suppose  for  the  moment  that  thought  did  compel 


198  On  the  Distinction  of 

us  to  merge  all  individuals  in  the  one  perfect  in- 
dividual or  absolute,  I  do  not  see  how,  on  this 
supposition,  we  are  to  explain  the  appearance  of  in- 
dividuality within  the  whole.  For  it  can  hardly  be 
maintained  that  the  illusion  is  due  to  the  abstract 
method  of  ordinary  thought  which  concentrates 
attention  on  one  aspect  of  reality  and  neglects 
the  rest.  On  this  assumption  the  term  might  be 
applied  or  rejected  according  as  the  point  of  view 
changed.  Yet  there  are  centres  of  experience  which 
claim  to  have  a  reality  of  their  owij  from  whatever 
standpoint  they  are  regarded.  And  one  cannot 
understand  how,  if  the  theory  of  reality  we  are 
considering  be  true,  such  a  claim  could  ever  come 
to  be  made.  But,  it  may  be  urged,  the  rights  of 
logical  thought  are  supreme,  and  to  deny  these 
rights  is  to  pave  the  way  to  a  scepticism  of  the 
worst  kind.  And  certainly,  if  thought  and  reality 
are  not  ultimately  consistent,  philosophical  discus- 
sion must  be  fruitless.  Still  it  does  not  seem  to  me 
that  the  demands  of  coherent  thinking  forbid  us  to 
attribute  reality  to  individuals  which  are  not  them- 
selves absolute.  If  you  assume  that  the  individual 
is  simply  its  relations,  then  it  may  consistently  be 
deprived  of  any  being  for  itself  in  the  ultimate 
system  :  but  the  validity  of  the  conclusion  is  spoiled 
by  the  inadequacy  of  the  premises.  The  self  which 
thinks,  and  so  relates  itself  to  other  objects  and 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  199 

objects  to  one  another  in  the  relational  form  of  con- 
sciousness, is  not  the  whole  self.  And  though  we 
are  bound  to  accept  the  relational  system  as  a  valid 
interpretation  by  thought  of  what  is  given  in  ex- 
perience, we  are  not  entitled  to  say  that  the  whole 
self  of  experience  is  exhausted  by  this  interpreta- 
tion. Thought  presupposes  experience,  and  in  some 
form  experience  must  have  preceded  the  genesis  in 
time  of  intellectual  activity.  It  is  just  because 
experience  is  richer  than  thought  that  a  self,  or 
individual  centre  of  experience,  is,  in  Prof.  Ward's 
phrase,  a  fundamentum  relationis. 

A  few  further  observations  on  this  point  may  be 
made.  Mr  Bradley  has  justly  remarked  that  the 
subject  in  a  judgment  must  always  have  a  reality 
beyond  the  predicate.  To  reduce  the  two  sides  to 
a  fundamental  identity  as  aspects  of  one  thought- 
content  is  to  destroy  the  possibility  of  predication.1 
And  this  must  apply  to  the  judgment  of  self-con- 
sciousness as  well  as  to  that  of  perception.  Thus, 
when  we  predicate  thought  of  the  self,  the  judg- 
ment is  made  possible  by  the  fact  that  the  self  is 
also  a  centre  of  feeling  and  will,  and  cannot  be 
dissolved  in  the  pure  unity  of  thought.  This  dis- 
tinction makes  the  judgment  significant ;  and  self- 
consciousness  is  an  illustration  of  the  principle  that 
the  object  of  thought  is  more  than  thought.  On  the 

1  Appearance  and  Eeality,  p.  170. 


20O  On  the  Distinction  of 

other  hand,  all  three  elements  are  embraced  in  the 
self  as  subject  of  experience,  and  so  the  self  is  not 
a  reality  beyond  experience  in  this  wider  sense. 
We  are  not,  therefore,  entitled  to  argue  that  the 
subject  of  experience  is  equivalent  to  thinking- 
subject,  and  on  this  ground  to  claim  that  the  object 
is  thought  and  nothing  more.  The  reality  to  which 
I  refer  my  states  of  consciousness  must  always  be 
more  than  these  states.  We  have  already  tried  to 
show  in  what  way  we  think  this  reality  is  to  be 
conceived. 

It  would  be  futile,  however,  to  deny  that  those 
who  believe  the  hypothesis  of  individual  reals  to 
be  justifiable,  and  even  necessary,  are  in  a  posi- 
tion of  great  difficulty  when  they  try  to  explain 
their  place  and  meaning  in  the  ultimate  system  of 
things.  Prof.  Ward,  for  example,  in  his  lectures  on 
'  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism '  accepts  the  principle 
of  individual  selves  or  centres  of  experience,  but  it 
is  somewhat  difficult  to  understand  the  relations  in 
which  he  conceives  these  centres  to  stand  to  the 
Absolute.  God,  we  are  told,  is  "  the  living  Unity 
of  all,"  and  behind  the  development  of  experience 
there  can  only  be  "  the  connecting  conserving 
acts  of  the  one  Supreme."  x  Moreover,  Prof.  Ward 
admits  real  contingency  in  the  divine  working,  but  it 
is  the  contingency  "  not  of  chance  but  of  freedom." 

1  Op.  tit.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  280,  281. 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  201 

In  his  view  the  divine  Unity  which  comprehends 
all  is  evidently  not  that  of  a  system  where  all  the 
elements  are  determined  in  relation  to  one  another 
and  to  the  whole.  A  view  like  the  foregoing 
requires  a  good  deal  of  explanation,  and  if  it 
obviates  certain  difficulties,  it  also  exposes  itself  to 
certain  criticisms.  In  any  case,  it  would  have  been 
interesting  and  valuable  to  have  had  a  more  explicit 
statement  on  this  point  from  so  able  a  thinker. 
For  it  is  just  on  this  question  of  the  relation  of 
individuals  which  are  real  to  the  Absolute,  that 
opponents  press  home  their  arguments  most 
strongly.  Thus  it  is  urged,  "Those  who  cling  to 
the  idea  that  there  is  an  absolute  principle  of 
individuality  in  man  and  in  other  finite  substances, 
seem  necessarily  to  be  led  to  a  denial  of  all  real 
connexion  or  relation  between  such  substances." l 
It  must  be  granted,  of  course,  that  there  can  be 
only  one  absolute  Being,  and  a  plurality  of  res 
completce  is  impossible.  To  claim  such  absolute 
reality  for  individuals  would  be  suicidal,  seeing 
that  each  is  only  an  element  in  the  universe,  and 
all  must  find  a  place  and  receive  a  meaning  in  a 
coherent  system.  For  this  we  require  a  supreme 
connecting  and  organising  activity  which  is  present 
in  all  individuals.  Lotze  tries  to  satisfy  this  need 
by  saying  that  all  substances  "  are  parts  of  a  single 

1  Caird,  Evolution  of  Eeligion,  vol.  ii.  p.  83. 


2O2  On  the  Distinction  of 

real  Being." l  Yet  if  this  statement  be  accepted 
as  it  stands,  it  does  not  appear  possible  to  resist 
the  inference  that  the  Pluralism,  which  philosophy 
found  it  necessary  to  postulate  at  an  earlier  stage, 
is  only  a  temporary  hypothesis,  and  is  superseded 
when  thought  rises  to  the  final  synthesis.  The  use 
of  the  term  '  substance '  in  this  connexion  has  been 
objected  to.  Wundt,  for  example,  criticises  it,  and 
would  substitute  for  it  causality  or  activity.2  But 
it  is  not  clear  that  the  material  associations  which, 
as  he  points  out,  cling  to  the  one  word  are  absent 
from  the  other.  Moreover,  if  we  are  to  think  of 
activity  at  all,  it  must  be  as  the  activity  of  some- 
thing real ;  and  we  do  not  mean  more  when  we  use 
the  word  substance  to  denote  a  centre  of  experience. 
In  his  c  Microcosmus ;  Lotze  has  stated  somewhat 
differently  his  attitude  to  the  ultimate  Unity  which 
philosophy  strives  after.  "  It  seems  to  me  that  philo- 
sophy is  the  endeavour  of  the  human  mind,  after  this 
wonderful  world  has  come  into  existence  and  we  in 
it,  to  work  its  way  back  in  thought  and  bring  the 
facts  of  outer  and  inner  experience  into  connexion 
so  far  as  our  present  position  in  the  world  allows." 3 

1  Metaphysics  (Eng.  trans.),  vol.  i.  p.  165. 

2  System  der  Philosophic,  p.  427.    Paulsen's  position  on  this  point 
is,  I  think,  just.     He  advocates  the  use  of  the  term  substance  here, 
only  demanding  that  we  first  make  clear  what  we  mean  by  it. 
Atomistic  associations  are,  of  course,  out  of  place. 

3  Microcosmus  (Eng.  trans.),  vol.  ii.  p.  718. 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  203 

The  note  of  caution  here  is  justifiable.  For  our 
thought  is  necessarily  infected  by  spatial  and  tem- 
poral metaphors.  And  space  and  time  on  any 
view  cannot  adequately  express  the  nature  of  the 
Absolute.  We  are  inclined  to  forget  that  cate- 
gories which  are  valid  within  experience  cannot 
be  employed  in  the  same  way  to  the  ultimate 
conditions  of  experience.  And  it  is  evident  that 
no  category  at  our  disposal  is  entirely  adequate 
to  explain  the  relation  of  the  Absolute  to  the 
individual. 

The  result  of  our  discussion  then  is,  that  the  facts 
of  outer  experience  lead  us  to  infer  that  the  in- 
dividual subject  is  here  in  direct  relation  with  a 
system  of  other-selves.  In  inner  experience,  again, 
the  subject's  own  activity  is  primary,  and  relation 
to  other -selves  is  only  indirectly  implied.  But 
though  we  claim  that  the  monads  are  real,  the 
reality  which  pertains  to  each  individual  can  only 
be  secondary  or  derivative.  For  the  individual  has 
its  determinate  character  elicited  through  interaction 
with  other  monads,  and  the  whole  system  pre- 
supposes an  organising  ground  and  principle  of 
unity.  If  we  desire  a  figurative  expression  of  this 
unity  in  difference,  perhaps  we  might  find  it  in  the 
connexion  of  soul  and  body.  In  an  organism  the 
separate  parts,  or  members,  are  essentially  related  to 
one  another,  while  each  has  its  specific  function  in 


2O4  On  the  Distinction  of 


the  whole.  The  soul,  again,  or  the  e^reXe^cta,  to  use 
Aristotle's  word,  is  the  presupposition  of  the  organ- 
ism and  the  ideal  principle  which  gives  it  meaning 
and  truth.  By  some  such  analogy  we  may  conceive 
of  the  Absolute  as  immanent  in  all  individuals,  yet 
allowing  to  each  a  definite  function  and  degree  of 
reality  in  the  whole,  while  its  own  being  is  not  lost 
in  the  process  of  finite  experience.  For  that  the 
universe  is  a  coherent  whole  is  a  presupposition 
both  of  thought  and  of  ethical  action. 

A  final  observation  may  be  added. 

In  any  view  we  take  of  the  ultimate  Unity,  we 
must  not  ignore  the  world  of  ethical  and  spiritual 
values.  For  the  facts  of  moral  and  religious  experi- 
ence have  as  good  a  claim  to  be  taken  into  account 
as  the  facts  of  science.  The  tendency  to  "  excessive 
unification,"  which  Aristotle  objected  to  in  Plato, 
has  always  been  a  danger  to  which  philosophy  is 
peculiarly  liable.  And  a  philosophy  which,  in  the 
interests  of  system,  undermines  the  moral-respon- 
sibility of  the  individual  and  treats  religion  as  an 
illusion,  lays  itself  open  to  the  charge  of  explaining 
away  what  it  cannot  explain.  The  intellectual 
necessity  we  are  under  of  striving  after  unity  in 
all  experience  must  be  conditioned  by  the  ethical 
necessity  by  which  we  postulate  that  the  Supreme 
Reality  satisfies  our  spiritual  nature.  There  can  be  no 
final  dualism  between  the  two  spheres  any  more  than 


Inner  and  Outer  Experience.  205 

there  can  be  between  inner  and  outer  experience. 
But  the  Absolute,  be  it  remembered,  does  not  merely 
explain  an  aspect  of  the  world,  but  the  world  as  a 
whole.  And  a  thinker  whose  outlook  is  catholic  will 
try  neither  to  ignore  nor  to  misconstrue  any  phase 
of  experience  in  order  to  secure  unity  of  system. 


ESSAY    V. 

THE  ULTIMATE  BASIS  AND  MEANING 
OF  RELIGION 


ESSAY   V. 


To  determine  the  ultimate  basis  of  religion,  the 
ground  in  reality  which  conditions  its  manifestation, 
is  at  once  the  most  difficult  as  it  is  the  most  im- 
portant part  of  our  subject.  At  present  the  tend- 
ency of  those  who  know'  is  to  say  little,  and 
that  not  dogmatically,  on  this  matter.  Nevertheless 
it  is  clear  that,  if  we  refuse  to  face  the  enterprise, 
we  surrender  at  the  outset  any  claim  to  put  a  final 
interpretation  on  the  religious  consciousness  and  its 
development  in  time.  One  reason  which  no  doubt 
deters  students  of  religion  from  embarking  on  onto- 
logical  speculations  is  the  difficulty  of  verifying 
them.  For  here  we  have  not  simply  a  definite 
group  of  religious  phenomena,  psychological  or  his- 
torical, which  we  have  to  connect  together  and  inter- 
pret. In  this  case  it  is  more  easy  to  test  a  theory 
from  point  to  point  by  bringing  it  into  contact  with 
facts  of  experience.  But  when  we  pass  to  consider 
the  ultimate  ground  and  meaning  of  religious  ex- 


2io  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

perience  as  a  whole,  the  process  of  verification  is 
much  more  difficult.  For,  needless  to  say,  the 
thinker  cannot  rise  to  an  absolute  principle,  and 
then  descend  again  to  the  region  of  temporal  ex- 
perience, and  exhibit  this  experience  in  its  diverse 
phases  as  necessary  stages  or  moments  in  the  un- 
folding of  that  principle.  The  only  feasible  test 
of  our  speculations  must  be  a  less  rigorous  one. 
We  can  but  ask  that  they  give  a  coherent  view 
of  the  facts  in  their  broad  features,  and  that,  to 
some  extent  at  least,  they  impart  a  satisfying 
meaning  to  them. 

The  word  experience  is  general,  and  the  thing  itself 
has  manifold  forms.  And  the  phenomena  of  religion, 
though  regarded  in  their  entirety,  only  make  part 
of  a  larger  whole.  In  other  words,  they  constitute 
a  special  phase  of  general  experience.  The  task  of 
interpreting  the  latter  falls  to  philosophy  in  the 
wider  sense  of  the  word.  Metaphysics  has  to  in- 
vestigate the  meaning  of  experience :  it  has  to 
bring  out  its  implications  and  to  show  the  ulti- 
mate grounds  and  presuppositions  on  which  it  rests. 
Philosophy  endeavours  to  carry  out  the  principles 
thus  reached,  so  as  to  make  it  clear  that  the 
universe,  or  experience  in  all  its  aspects,  is  a 
coherent  and  continuous  whole.  Even  though  there 
be  irreducible  elements  in  experience  which  refuse 
to  be  fused  by  the  thought-process,  philosophy  cer- 


Meaning  of  Religion.  211 

tainly  cannot  assume  this  to  begin  with,  and  can 
only  follow  persistently  the  plan  of  trying  to 
think  things  out.  The  test  we  apply  to  the 
Weltanschauung  which  it  offers  us  will  be  the 
internal  consistency  of  its  principles  as  well  as 
their  consistency  with  the  world  as  experienced. 
Do  things  both  in  their  individuality  and  their 
connexions  receive  their  due  in  the  interpretation 
which  is  put  upon  them? 

As  we  pointed  out  in  an  earlier  essay,  the 
Philosophy  of  Keligion,  which  is  engaged  with  a 
special  phase  of  experience,  must  always  be  de- 
pendent on  general  Philosophy,  which  deals  with 
the  larger  problem.  On  the  other  hand,  owing 
to  the  limitation  of  its  outlook,  it  has  the  pheno- 
mena of  the  religious  consciousness  more  fully  and 
directly  in  view.  This  concentration  of  interest 
makes  it  less  likely  to  sacrifice  the  claims  of  the 
part  to  those  of  the  whole.  Hence  the  Philosophy 
of  Religion,  alive  to  the  large  and  systematic  aims 
of  Philosophy,  but  also  cognisant  of  the  needs  of 
its  own  special  subject-matter,  seeks  to  mediate 
between  the  demands  of  the  speculative  and  the 
spiritual  mind.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the 
Philosophy  of  Eeligion  is  inspired  by  no  apologetic 
interest :  its  exclusive  interest  is  the  truth.  But 
it  recognises  that  religion  is  a  normal  aspect  of 
human  life,  and  has  to  be  interpreted  by  the 


212  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

philosopher.  With  perfect  fairness  it  seeks  to  bring 
the  point  of  view  of  reason  into  comparison  with 
that  of  faith,  and  dispassionately  asks  how  far  they 
can  be  reconciled.  And  even  though  he  believes 
that  the  result  of  the  inquiry  can  only  be  pro- 
visional and  not  final,  the  thinker  who  cares  for 
the  interests  of  reason,  and  likewise  appreciates  the 
claims  of  religion,  will  not  wish  to  evade  the 
problem  which  a  Philosophy  of  Religion  presents. 
In  entering  on  the  task  he  is  in  a  sense  only 
honestly  trying  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
himself. 

The  need  of  an  inquiry  of  the  kind  is  both  real 
and  urgent,  and  the  modern  world  has  in  the  main 
recognised  this.  Both  Philosophy  and  Religion  set 
before  us  a  view  of  the  universe,  and  as  a  rule 
their  views  are  in  somewhat  sharp  contrast.  Phil- 
osophy introduces  us  to  a  reasoned  theory  of  reality, 
and  tries  to  unfold  in  logical  sequence  the  steps 
which  lead  to  its  conclusions.  Religion,  again,  is 
not  interested  in  rigid  deduction,  and  it  encourages 
its  votaries  to  believe  where  they  cannot  prove. 
Nor  does  it  hesitate  to  follow  the  less  rigorous 
method  of  analogy  in  its  interpretation  of  the 
ground  of  experience,  and  it  upholds  the  claim  of 
faith  that  the  supreme  Reality  must  satisfy  the 
needs  of  man's  spiritual  nature.  Religion  centres 
in  spiritual  experience,  and  the  religious  man  finds 


Meaning  of  Religion.  213 

the  root  of  this  experience  in  a  personal  relation 
between  himself  and  God.     He  indeed  thinks  and 
speaks  of  God  as  the  first  Cause  of  all  things,  but 
yet  for  him  God  is  not  merged  in  that  which  He 
produces.     He  can  fitly  be  addressed  in  prayer  as 
'Thou1;   and  while  His  will  is  manifested  in  the 
world,  He  is  not  identified  with  the  world.     For 
Pantheism,   though   it   frequently   appears    in    the 
history  of  religious  development,  is  not  a  normal 
expression  of  the  religious  consciousness.     But  when 
we   pass  from  Eeligion   to   Metaphysics   a  change 
in  the  atmosphere  is   apparent.      The  philosopher 
is  chary   of   using   human    analogies    in  reference 
to  the  ultimate  ground  of  things,  and  sometimes 
deliberately   rejects   them   altogether.      Instead   of 
God  we   hear  rather  of  Substance,  the  Absolute, 
the  Idea :  and  even  when  the  time-honoured  name 
is  used,  the  connotation  is  commonly  very  different. 
The  God,  for  example,  of  Spinoza  and  the  God  of 
the  average  worshipper  stand  for  conceptions  which 
hardly  have  any  common  content.     The  source  of 
this   diversity   of  meaning    and    tendency   is    the 
difference  of  the  interest  which  engrosses  the  specu- 
lative and  the  religious  mind.     The  philosopher  aims 
at  unification  of  experience ;  a  final  dualism  in  his 
eyes  spells  defeat ;  and  he  is  anxious  to  show  that 
the   differences   in   experience,   which   prompt  the 
ordinary  man  to  rest  in   dualism,   can  ultimatelv 


214  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

be  resolved  into  a  monism.  So  for  him  the 
Supreme  Keality  is  to  be  found  within  the  world- 
process  rather  than  without  it.  The  religious  in- 
terest, in  contrast,  centres  in  a  personal  relation- 
ship between  the  human  and  the  divine.  The 
existence  of  this  relationship  seems  incompatible 
with  a  Deity  who  has  no  reality  apart  from  the 
process  of  experience  in  which  He  is  manifested. 
Accordingly,  the  religious  spirit  clings  to  the  be- 
lief that  God  somehow  transcends  the  world.1 

It  is  natural,  then,  that  the  view  of  the  world 
presented  by  philosophy  should  distinguish  itself 
somewhat  sharply  from  that  of  religion.  And  as 
religion  lays  claim  to  be  true  as  well  as  philosophy, 
it  is  not  surprising  that  the  attitude  of  the  one  to 
the  other  should  often  be  hostile.  On  the  one  side, 
religion  objects  that  philosophy  does  not  give  due 
heed  to  the  demands  of  the  spiritual  consciousness, 
that  it  is  dominated  by  an  interest  too  prevailingly 
intellectual,  and  that,  in  consequence,  it  sets  up 
pale  abstractions  in  the  place  of  living  reality.  On 
the  other  side,  philosophy  retorts  that  religion  un- 
fairly exalts  one  aspect  of  experience,  that  it  evades 
the  duty  of  examining  its  presuppositions  and  test- 
ing their  consistency  with  the  larger  whole  of 
things,  and  that  it  uses  analogies  without  consider- 

1  We  are,  of  course,  speaking  here  of  religion  in  its  highly  devel- 
oped forms. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  2 1 5 

ing  whether  they  are  really  applicable  or  not.  So 
we  often  find  philosophical  thinkers  speaking  of 
religious  beliefs  with  a  certain  tone  of  superiority 
and  condescension.  For  these  beliefs,  they  hold, 
are  at  best  only  figurative  thoughts  which  must 
be  criticised  and  transformed  ere  they  can  seriously 
claim  to  be  true.  And  it'  is  one  of  the  blessings 
of  a  philosophical  culture,  that  it  delivers  the  mind 
from  bondage  to  those  idols  which  the  common 
people  take  for  truth.  Eeligious  persons,  again, 
are  prone  to  regard  philosophy  and  its  obstinate 
questioning  with  suspicion  and  dislike.  Even  when 
it  approaches,  extending  the  olive  branch,  they  mis- 
trust it,  and  doubt  the  wisdom  of  an  alliance.  For 
some  of  them  complain,  and  not  without  some  show 
of  justice,  that  although  philosophy  uses  the  same 
words  it  does  not  mean  the  same  thing  as  they 
do.  Others  are  bold  to  declare  that  the  truths  of 
faith  are  of  a  different  order  from  those  of  reason, 
and  do  not  require  to  be  buttressed  by  thought 
even  if  that  were  possible.  Hence  a  Philosophy 
of  Keligion,  in  so  far  as  it  seeks  to  bring  about  a 
rapprochement  between  the  two,  is  not  likely  to 
win  the  unqualified  approval  of  either.  On  the 
side  of  religion,  at  all  events,  there  are  reasons 
why  one  should  not  expect  too  much.  For  the 
latter  has,  without  due  criticism,  as  the  philosopher 
is  inclined  to  think,  taken  religious  experience  and 


2 1 6  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

historic  facts  as  a  basis  on  which  to  build  its  own 
interpretation  of  the  world,  which  it  terms  theology. 
Yet  whatever  elements  of  value  theology  may  con- 
tain— and  that  it  does  contain  them  we  do  not 
in  the  least  deny  —  it  is  too  much  to  expect  the 
philosopher  to  accept  its  conclusions  as  they 
stand.  Theology  sets  out  from  authoritative  pre- 
suppositions, while  philosophy  requires  that  they  be 
reasoned.  And  the  speculative  thinker  does  not 
find  in  the  theologian's  results  either  the  internal 
consistency,  or  the  harmony  with  the  larger  whole 
of  experience,  which  he  sets  before  him  as  a  standard. 
It  is  therefore  inevitable  that  the  view  he  develops 
should  call  for  some  concessions  on  the  part  of 
those  who  hold  the  traditional  doctrines  which 
have  become  associated  with  religion.  To  the 
theologically  -  minded  person  this  criticism  will 
commonly  appear  too  drastic,  and  the  critic's  rever- 
ence for  the  past  too  slender.  Ignoring  that  pro- 
cess of  change  which  is  *  without  observation,'  and 
which  makes  a  'form  of  sound  words'  mean  one 
thing  to  an  earlier  and  another  to  a  later  age,  he 
sees  in  the  philosopher  only  the  representative  of 
an  ephemeral  fashion  of  speculation  who  sets  him- 
self to  judge  venerable  and  time-tried  doctrines. 
Such  an  objection  is  to  be  expected,  and  the 
religious  philosopher  must  be  prepared  to  hear  it 
urged  against  his  results.  At  the  same  time,  he 


Meaning  of  Religion.  217 

does  well  to  remember  that  his  own  gospel  is  not 
likely  to  be  the  end  of  all  wisdom.  New  thoughts 
grow  out  of  the  growing  experience  of  the  world ; 
and  the  speculations  which  represent  the  mind  of 
one  generation  have  to  be  remoulded  to  satisfy 
another.  If  a  theology  becomes  old  and  needs  to 
be  reconstructed,  a  philosophy  is  not  exempt  from 
the  same  law  of  progress. 

With  these  preliminary  remarks  we  go  on  to 
indicate  the  method  we  propose  to  follow  in  this 
important  part  of  our  investigation. 

To  interpret  religion  speculatively  signifies  that 
we  try  to  show  its  ultimate  basis,  and  to  explain 
its  meaning  and  function  in  the  real  universe. 
The  question  is  not  simply  how  religion  works, 
how  it  is  related  to  other  activities,  and  what 
its  value  is  in  the  life  of  individual  and  people. 
However  profitable  such  an  inquiry  might  be,  at 
the  end  of  it  we  should  still  be  ignorant  of  the 
final  truth  about  religion,  and  whether  it  had  any 
ultimate  justification.  We  have  to  go  deeper  than 
this,  and  must  try  to  show,  if  we  can,  what  is 
the  reality  which  lies  behind  and  gives  meaning 
to  the  phenomena  of  religion.  The  problem  in 
technical  language  is  ontological :  and  plainly  the 
reality  which  belongs  to  religion  can  only  be 
reached  through  the  determination  of  the  nature 
of  reality  in  general.  Now  it  seems  to  me  that 


2 1 8  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

the  most  fruitful  line  we  can  follow  in  an  investi- 
gation of  this  kind  is  to  argue  back  inferentially 
from  experience  to  its  ground.  By  ground  is  not 
meant  cause  in  the  purely  scientific  sense,  but 
those  fundamental  and  real  conditions  which  lie 
behind  the  realm  in  which  cause  and  effect  operate. 
But  experience  is  a  large  word,  and  it  has  two 
generally  recognised  aspects,  the  subjective  and 
the  objective.  To  these  correspond  the  spheres 
of  Psychology  and  Cosmology.  Our  regressive 
movement  towards  a  common  ground  must  have 
regard  to  both  aspects  of  experience.  We  must 
keep  in  view  alike  the  facts  of  nature  and  of 
mind  in  attempting  to  define  the  character  of 
their  ultimate  basis. 

It  will  be  said  that  we  are  here  making  an 
assumption  —  the  assumption  that  the  ordinary 
distinction  between  subject  and  object  has  some 
warrant  in  the  nature  of  things.  This  is  true, 
but  we  base  our  right  to  do  so  >on  the  epistemo- 
logical  discussion  in  the  preceding  essay.  It  was 
there  argued  that  outer  experience  implied  realities 
which  were  not  created  by  the  perceptive  subject. 
The  point  now  before  us  is  the  nature  of  the 
ground  which  these  substances  presuppose.  But 
to  whatever  result  the  discussion  of  this  problem 
may  lead  us,  it  will  not  be  a  final  and  complete 
determination  of  the  World  -  Ground.  We  must 


Meaning  of  Religion.  219 

bring  our  result  into  relation  with  the  implica- 
tions of  inner  experience,  with  the  realm  of  self- 
consciousness  and  those  personal  aspirations  and 
ethical  values  which  form  an  essential  aspect  of 
the  self-conscious  life.  The  result  will  show  how 
far  we  can  hope  to  determine  the  final  ground  of 
all  experience,  alike  from  the  point  of  view  of  form 
and  of  content.  We  shall  then  have  to  consider 
the  ground  in  the  definite  aspect  in  which  it  is 
the  basis  of  the  religious  consciousness.  The  last 
step  will  be  to  suggest  a  view  of  the  meaning  of 
religion  and  its  development,  founded  on  the  con- 
clusions we  have  come  to  on  the  nature  of  the 
finite  spirit  and  its  relation  to  God,  the  ultimate 
ground  of  all  things. 

Our  first  task,  then,  is  to  examine  the  implications 
of  outer  experience,  and  try  to  determine  the  nature 
of  the  reality  which  it  presupposes  as  its  ground 
and  condition.  The  argument  in  the  preceding 
paper  led  us  to  the  view  that  experience  is  a  historic 
development,  in  which  we  can  distinguish  sensitive, 
perceptual,  and  conceptual  stages.  Only  at  the 
latter  level,  and  as  the  result  of  the  generalised 
thinking  which  intersubjective  intercourse  makes 
possible,  is  the  universal  distinction  of  inner  and 
outer  elaborated  and  fixed.  But  the  distinction 
drawn  by  subjective  thinking  is  the  interpretation 
of  a  real  difference.  The  objective  world  must  be 


220  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

more  than  a  generalised  notion  which  takes  form  as 
the  result  of  the  interplay  of  many  minds.  If  not, 
obvious  facts  of  experience  remain  unexplained. 
The  question  then  arises,  What  are  the  realities 
which  we  must  presuppose  are  involved  in  the  pre- 
sentation in  experience  of  that  which  we  call  nature  ? 
As  we  saw  already,  we  cannot  accept  the  scientific 
conception  of  atoms  —  or  for  that  part  the  more 
recent  analysis  of  the  atom  into  electrons — as  the 
answer.  For  that  which  implies  the  process  of 
ideal  construction  cannot  at  the  same  time  be  that 
which  lies  beyond  it.  And  everything  which  has 
dimensions  and  sensible  qualities  involves  the  work 
of  mind.  The  fact  of  an  external  world  seemed 
best  explained  on  the  theory  that  it  meant  the 
existence  of  spiritual  centres  of  experience,  con- 
tinuous in  character  with  the  human  ego,  but 
standing  at  lower  levels  of  development.  A  system 
of  monads  acting  and  reacting  on  each  other,  and 
giving  rise  in  self-conscious  minds  to  the  interpre- 
tation of  reality  as  a  variously  qualified  world  of 
things,  we  took  to  be  the  basis  both  of  perceptual 
and  conceptual  experience. 

We  shall  not  repeat  the  arguments  by  which  we 
sought  to  defend  this  pluralism  against  objections 
more  or  less  serious.  Our  aim  now  is  to  find  out 
how  far  we  can  determine  the  ultimate  ground  of 
such  a  system  of  spiritual  substances.  The  phrase 


Meaning  of  Religion.  221 

"  spiritual  substance  "  is  used  here,  it  will  be  recol- 
lected, for  that  which  is  a  centre  of  experience,  and 
which  in  some  way  has  a  being-for-self.  To  call 
these  centres  causalities  or  activities,  as  Wundt  does, 
is  rather  a  matter  of  terminology  than  of  real  differ- 
ence in  meaning.  For  we  cannot  think  of  activity 
without  thinking  of  that  which  maintains  itself  and 
has  a  being  for  itself.  A  formless  and  indeterminate 
activity  could  not  explain  anything.  If  represented 
relations  and  qualities  imply  the  interaction  of  reals, 
these  reals  must  be  something  for  themselves  ere 
they  can  be  something  to  one  another.  Kelations 
without  a  basis  of  relation  melt  away  in  the  unsub- 
stantial void.  But  while  the  monad  is  not  con- 
stituted by  its  connexion  with  other  monads,  its 
character  can  only  become  explicit  by  its  interaction 
with  them.  Development  of  reality  as  experience 
is  not  of  the  abstract  unit,  but  is  always  by  a  syn- 
thesis, and  the  reference  to  self  becomes  explicit 
and  fully  defined  through  reference  to  another. 
But  while  interaction  thus  gives  articulation  to 
the  self,  it  cannot  create  those  centres  of  experi- 
ence which  are  necessary  to  the  development  of 
experience. 

When  we  speak  of  the  relations  of  the  reals  to 
one  another,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  term 
implies  ideational  activity,  and  this  has  its  root  in 
the  action  and  reaction  of  substances.  In  other 


222  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

words,  the  growth  of  experience  is  based  on  the 
activity  which  exists  between  its  real  elements. 
To  call  this  process  an  interaction  of  wills,  as  has 
been  done,  is  no  doubt,  from  one  point  of  view, 
open  to  objection :  for  the  term  will  has  a  special- 
ised psychological  meaning,  and  implies  a  process  of 
mental  construction.  But  we  must  speak  of  the 
centres  of  experience  as  active,  and  the  right  to 
employ  the  notion  of  activity  in  this  connexion  has 
been  called  in  question.  The  point  is  important, 
for  in  the  long-run  our  title  to  speak  of  God  as 
active  is  involved  in  it.  The  gist  of  the  objection 
to  the  use  of  the  term  in  Metaphysics  is,  that  it  is 
only  a  working  conception  in  the  domain  of  psy- 
chology. It  contains,  we  are  told,  assumptions  and 
involves  contradictions ;  and  while  it  may  be  con- 
veniently used  to  describe  psychological  phenomena, 
there  is  no  ground  for  treating  it  as  ultimately  real. 
Now  it  is  true  that  the  word  activity,  as  we  use  it 
in  reference  to  ourselves,  stands  for  something  more 
than  we  are  immediately  conscious  of.  The  feeling 
of  inner vation,  the  sense  of  power  going  from  us 
into  act,  is  not  simple,  but  implies  experience,  and  so 
expectation  of  the  result.  That  is  to  say,  it  involves 
generalisation.  But  all  this  may  be  true  and  yet  the 
idea  of  activity  need  not  rest  on  an  illusion.  Indeed 
the  fact  that  we  use,  and  cannot  help  using,  the 
idea,  is  so  far  evidence  that  it  stands  for  something 


Meaning  of  Religion.  223 

real.  Deny  it  of  the  self,  and  you  are  compelled 
to  attribute  it  to  the  ideas  which  belong  to  the  self. 
Suppose  for  the  moment  that  activity  is  no  more 
than  a  mental  fiction  which  we  find  it  convenient 
to  employ,  then  our  experience  is  reduced  to  a 
series  of  presentations  without  purposive  connexion, 
and  we  ourselves  are  only  the  ineffectual  spectators 
of  a  drama  in  which  we  fondly  dream  that  we  play 
a  part.  It  is  certainly  in  point  to  urge  that  our 
whole  practical  life  becomes  unintelligible  on  this 
assumption.  If  there  could  be  such  a  thing  as  a 
self  purely  passive,  the  development  of  experience 
in  it  would  be  impossible.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
may  well  be  that  the  reason  why  we  are  not  able  to 
know  ourselves  immediately  as  active,  just  lies  in 
the  fact  that  we  are  dealing  with  something  primi- 
tive and  inseparable  from  experience  in  any  form. 
We  cannot  instinctively  distinguish  the  feeling  of 
activity  from  that  of  pure  passivity,  for  the  latter 
is  not  a  possible  experience ;  and  when  we  try  to 
analyse  the  notion,  the  thing  itself  is  presupposed 
by  the  process  of  analysis.  I  cannot  see  that 
because  the  concept  activity  implies  mental  con- 
struction, it  is  therefore  not  based  upon  what  is 
real :  this  would  only  be  a  valid  inference  if  such 
construction  could  be  shown  to  involve  what  is 
fundamentally  false.  It  will,  I  suppose,  be  agreed 
that  the  self,  as  we  habitually  use  the  term,  is  an 


224  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

ideal  construction  :  if  for  that  reason  you  say  it  is  a 
fiction,  then  your  very  assertion  cannot  ultimately 
be  valid.  The  pressure  of  practical  life  always 
corrects  such  vagaries  of  thought.  And  as  regards 
activity,  we  cannot  banish  it  from  the  real  universe 
without  inconsistency. 

It  would  no  doubt  be  inconsistent  to  transfer  the 
notion  of  activity  from  the  region  of  experience  to 
a  system  of  dead  elements ;  for  there  is  no  inner 
connexion  between  personal  experience  and  that 
which  has  no  being  for  itself.  The  objection  does 
not  hold  in  the  case  of  a  system  of  monads  conceived 
as  centres  of  experience,  though  on  a  lower  level 
than  that  of  thinking  subjects.  In  such  a  system 
action  and  passion  express  the  nature  of  beings 
which  are  for  themselves.  For  even  passivity  is 
not  intelligible  apart  from  reaction  and  self- 
maintenance. 

If,  then,  we  have  so  far  vindicated  our  right  to 
speak  of  active  spiritual  substances,  we  must  now 
ask,  What  is  the  ground  of  their  interaction  ?  What 
makes  it  possible  ?  For  the  argument  has  been 
that  the  centres  of  experience  have  a  being  of 
their  own :  they  are  not  abstract  qualities,  or  mere 
appearances,  which  are  really  merged  in  a  whole. 
How,  then,  do  individuals  come  to  be  manifested 
as  an  interconnected  system?  As  is  well  known, 
Leibniz  refused  to  conceive  the  problem  in  this 


Meaning  of  Religion.  225 

way.  Following  the  lead  of  a  logic  according  to 
which  in  every  true  proposition  all  predicates  were 
analytically  contained  in  the  subject,  he  affirmed 
that  each  monad  contained  within  itself  the  source 
or  ground  of  all  its  changes.  No  monad  interacts 
with  another,  but  each  ideally  represents  the  uni- 
verse. And  though  Leibniz  extends  his  principle 
of  Sufficient  Eeason  in  order  to  find  a  ground  for 
the  monads  in  God,  the  inference  under  these  cir- 
cumstances lacks  cogency,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see 
what  essential  office  Deity  fills  in  a  universe  so 
constituted.  But  the  Leibnizian  conception  of  the 
monad  is  an  impossible  one.  How  a  simple  sub- 
stance can  evolve  from  itself  the  countless  differences 
of  experience  we  are  not  told.  And  the  whole  work 
of  intersubjective  intercourse  in  building  up  ex- 
perience must  be  interpreted,  on  this  theory,  in  so 
artificial  a  way  as  to  be  quite  unconvincing,  not  to 
say  incredible. 

If  it  be  agreed  that  we  cannot  eliminate  the 
idea  of  interaction  between  the  spiritual  substances 
which  are  the  basis  of  the  material  world  as  ex- 
perienced, we  may  now  go  on  to  ask,  What  are  the 
implications  of  the  process  ?  In  this  way  we  shall 
try  to  carry  out  our  regressive  movement  towards 
the  ultimate  ground  of  things.  It  will  be  obvious 
that  we  are  following  the  line  laid  down  by  Lotze, 
whose  carefully  reasoned  statement  has  had  an 

p 


226  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

important  influence  on  subsequent  thought.  The 
view  which  commends  itself  to  us  may  be  made 
clearer  by  considering  the  adequacy  of  the  solution 
offered  by  Lotze.  In  his  {  Metaphysics '  he  examines 
the  idea  of  a  transeunt  operation — the  passage  of  an 
influence  from  one  independent  real  to  another — 
and  finds  it  unintelligible  and  contradictory.1  It  will 
not  be  denied  that  the  transference  of  some  inexplic- 
able force  or  energy  from  one  thing  to  another  is  a 
fiction  of  the  mind.  Every  effort  we  make  to  think 
out  what  the  action  of  one  thing  on  another  means, 
ends  with  the  confession  that  the  reals  between 
which  the  operation  takes  place  cannot  be  absolutely 
independent  of  each  other  to  begin  with.  Therefore, 
argues  Lotze,  we  must  abandon  the  notion  of  in- 
dependent substances.  Take  the  two  substances 
A  and  B,  the  change  of  A  into  Aa  is  accompanied 
by  a  change  of  B  into  Bb.  And  this  is  only  explic- 
able if  the  real  being  of  both  A  and  B  is  M,  and 
if  the  change  in  M  called  a  evokes  as  compensa- 
tion that  modification  of  M  we  call  b.  What  popular 
thought  regards  as  an  external  process  between  A 
and  B  is  reduced  on  examination  to  an  immanent 
operation  in  M.  As  Lotze  himself  says,  "  The 
Pluralism  with  which  our  view  of  the  universe 
began  has  to  give  place  to  a  Monism."2  It  is  thus 

1  Metaphysics  (Eng.  trans,),  bk.  i.  chap.  vi. 

2  Ibid.,  i.  165. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  227 

difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  in  the  last 
resort  the  monads  are  virtually  reduced  to  qualifica- 
tions of  the  one  real  Being.1  Lotze  certainly  says 
that,  if  interaction  is  to  be  possible,  all  elements 
"must  be  regarded  as  parts  of  a  single  and  real 
being."  At  the  same  time,  his  persistent  endeavour 
is  to  maintain  the  uniqueness  and  individuality  of 
everything  that  can  be  called  a  self.  But  if  we 
are  to  hold  to  the  latter  principle,  then  the  interac- 
tion between  A  and  B  must  be  something  for  both 
A  and  B.  Yet  the  nerve  of  the  foregoing  argument 
is  that  the  interaction  takes  place  because  A  and  B 
are  parts  of  the  same  Being  M,  in  which  alone 
the  process  has  meaning.  It  is  conceivable  that 
some  one  might  urge  that  the  difference  exists 
within  the  unity,  but  that  conceptual  thinking 
cannot  explain  how  it  does  so.  But  though  this 
plea  is  not  always  to  be  made  light  of,  in  the 
present  case  it  is  not  satisfactory.  For  the  difficulty 
is  due  to  the  exclusive  claim  of  the  hypothetical  M, 
put  forward  in  explanation  of  the  fact  of  interaction. 
If  we  are  to  believe  a  recent  writer,2  this  impasse 
is  the  natural  doom  which  overtakes  realism  in 
^very  form.  Either  all  is  unity,  or  else  there  are 

1  Cp.  the  remark  of  Mr  F.  H.  Bradley  in  his  '  Appearance  and 
Reality,'  1st  edition,  p.  118,  "the  attentive  reader  of  Lotze  must,  I 
think,  have  found  it  hard  to  discover  why  individual  selves  with  him 
are  more  than  phenomenal  adjectives." 

2  Eoyce,  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  i.  p.  112. 


228  7"he  ultimate  Basis  and 

"  no  linkages."  Here  the  most  wary  voyager  can 
steer  no  middle  course  between  Scylla  and  Charyb- 
dis.  The  only  choice  is  an  all-inclusive  unity  or 
eternally  isolated  individuals.  To  this  one  might 
reply  that  it  is  no  doubt  possible  so  to  state  the 
case  for  realism,  that  there  would  seem  to  be  no 
escape  from  one  horn  or  the  other  of  the  dilemma 
which  is  here  thrust  before  us.  But  many  realists 
will  fail  to  recognise  their  own  likeness  in  the 
picture  which  Prof.  Eoyce  has  drawn  for  them. 
In  point  of  fact,  few  would  seriously  contend  that 
individual  reals,  on  whatever  level  of  development, 
are  eternally  complete  and  self-sufficing.  The  self- 
sufficing  individual  in  any  form  is  a  fiction  :  the 
connexion  of  individuals  with  one  another  shows 
that  they  all  depend  on  a  common  ground,  and 
this  makes  possible  that  lively  interaction  by  which 
they  evolve  their  distinctive  character.  The  special 
point  we  have  to  consider  is,  whether  what  Prof. 
Koyce  terms  linkage ,  or  as  we  put  it,  interaction, 
is  not  possible  save  on  the  assumption  that  the 
ground  is  a  unity  in  which  all  individuality  is 
really  absorbed.  For,  as  a  consequence,  this  in 
its  turn  renders  unintelligible  the  distinctive  dif- 
ference which  separates  the  experience  of  one 
self  from  that  of  another.  To  put  the  matter 
more  definitely.  We  postulate  individual  reals  or 
spiritual  substances  to  avoid  the  inevitable  con- 


Meaning  of  Religion.  229 

tradiction   of   supposing    that    nature    is    only  an 
ideal  construction.     The  action  and  passion  out  of 
which  experience  grows  must  be  viewed  in  terms 
of  the  inner  life  of  these  substances,  otherwise  we 
remain  outside  the  region  of  individual  experience 
altogether.      And   on   the  other   hand,  interaction 
between  centres  of  experience  would  be  impossible, 
if  there  were  not  some  inner  bond  of  connexion 
between  them.     A  ground  which  is  merely  external 
does  not  explain  anything.     For  then  in  postulating 
M  to  explain   the   interaction  of  A  with  B,  you 
leave  unexplained  the  interaction  of  both  A  and  B 
with  M.     The  conclusion  appears  unavoidable  that 
the  World -ground  must  in  one  aspect  be  an  im- 
manent  one,  and   is   somehow  present   in   all  the 
individuals  which   it  connects.      But   again,  if  in 
the  interests  of  unity  you  merge  the  differences  in 
an  identity,  you  reduce  them  to  an  illusion,  or  at 
all  events  to  an  appearance  ;  and  you  leave  yourself 
unable  to  give  any  valid  reason  why  there  should 
be   even    the    semblance   of    individuality   in    the 
universe.     This  objection  may  be  pertinently  urged 
against  a  system  like  that  of  Spinoza,  and  against 
the  views  of  Mr   Bradley  in  our  own   day.      An 
Absolute  such  as  Mr  Bradley  presents  to  us  may 
fulfil  the  office  of  a  cid  de  sac  into  which  intract- 
able matter   is  flung ;   it   certainly  does   not  offer 
any    consistent    explanation    of    the    evolution    of 


230  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

experience.  After  all,  we  live  and  act  sufficiently 
well  in  the  world ;  and  if  thought  finds  the  simplest 
processes  of  experience  riddled  with  contradictions, 
the  presumption  is  that  there  is  something  wrong 
with  the  thought.  Nor  is  it  more  than  a  tour  de 
force  to  tell  us  that  the  shreds  and  tatters  left  by 
dialectic  are,  in  a  way  we  can  never  understand, 
woven  into  a  harmony  in  the  Absolute.  In  the 
interests  of  experience  itself  we  must  therefore 
refuse  to  follow  this  course. 

The  problem  which  the  facts  set  before  us  is 
this.  Can  we  think  of  a  ground  which  is  at  once 
immanent  in  all  individual  centres  of  experience, 
and  at  the  same  time  does  not  reduce  these  centres 
to  mere  appearance?  Is  it  possible  to  conceive  a 
connecting  activity  which  explains  the  inter- 
dependence of  spiritual  substances  and  still  leaves 
to  them  a  being  of  their  own  ?  This  condition  can 
only  be  fulfilled  by  a  ground  which  is  both  im- 
manent and  transcendent,  a  ground  which,  while 
it  unites  individuals,  has  also  a  being  for  itself, 
and  so  always  distinguishes  itself  from  the  elements 
it  connects.  And  if  there  be  evidence  of  such  a 
type  of  connexion,  we  need  not  hesitate  to  refer 
to  it  in  the  solution  of  our  problem,  even  though 
we  cannot  think  out  in  detail  its  mode  of  operation. 
But  at  the  same  time  I  grant  that  a  type  of  unity, 
illustrated  in  experience,  cannot  adequately  describe 


Meaning  of  Religion.  231 

that  which  is  the  ground  of  experience.  With  this 
proviso  I  go  on  to  suggest  that  in  the  idea  of  soul 
there  is  a  helpful  notion  for  the  purpose  we  have 
in  hand.  To  some,  perhaps,  the  conception  will 
seem  threadbare,  calling  to  mind  the  superficial 
philosophy  of  Pope  : — 

"  All  are  but  parts  of  one  stupendous  whole, 
Whose  body  nature  is  and  God  the  soul." 

We  shall,  however,  only  be  antiquated  and  super- 
ficial if  we  take  up  the  idea  blindly  and  use  it 
without  examining  it  to  discern  its  true  import. 
We  have  nothing  to  do  here,  it  may  be  well  to  say, 
with  any  theories  about  the  nature  of  soul  in  the 
narrower  sense.  For  we  are  now  using  the  word  in 
its  broader  meaning,  in  its  biological  and  not  in  its 
theological  significance.  What  we  are  mainly  con- 
cerned with  is  the  kind  of  unity,  the  sort  of  inter- 
connexion disclosed  in  living  things.  In  its  simplest 
forms  life  involves  a  central  activity,  which  is 
revealed  in  the  process  of  assimilation  and  the 
capacity  to  react  on  stimulus.  There  is  a  sense  in 
which  all  life  -  activity  is  purposive,  for  it  means 
selection  and  subordination  of  elements  in  the  fulfil- 
ment of  function,  and  it  implies  the  power  to  reject 
what  is  alien  to  the  unity  which  it  maintains.  The 
question  of  consciously  willed  ends  does  not  of  course 
arise  here  :  and  if  we  term  the  central  activity  will, 


232  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

because  it  is  purposive,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that 
we  are  dealing  with  something  on  a  lower  level  than 
human  volition.  The  fact  remains  that,  from  the 
humblest  unicellular  organism  to  the  most  complex 
and  highly  differentiated  animal  body,  a  central  will 
or  soul  connects  and  dominates  all  the  elements. 
If  you  assert  there  is  no  such  principle,  then  you 
have  the  hopeless  task  of  explaining  how,  by 
mechanical  action  and  reaction,  the  highly  special- 
ised organs  of  the  body  have  become  reciprocally 
means  and  end  to  one  another,  and  subserve  the 
interest  of  the  whole.  The  attempt  to  solve  the 
problem  of  organic  growth  in  this  way  fails,  because 
it  has  to  assume  what  it  ought  to  explain.  In  the 
simplest  form  of  life  an  immanent  activity  is  in- 
volved, and  it  is  this  central  will  which  builds  up 
the  organism.  This  active  principle  brings  all  the 
elements  into  closest  interaction,  and  yet  allows  to 
each  organ  its  own  peculiar  function  and  meaning 
in  the  whole.  It  at  once  gives  the  parts  their 
systematic  arrangement,  and  operates  as  the  inward 
bond  between  them.  We  cannot  indeed  make  clear 
to  ourselves  in  thought  the  precise  way  in  which 
this  interconnexion  is  realised :  we  are  not  able  to 
lay  bare  the  modus  operandi  of  the  inner  activity. 
Certainly  we  do  not  do  so  by  generalising  and  call- 
ing the  whole  process  a  category.  Nevertheless,  it 
is  important  to  know  that  experience  contains  this 


Meaning  of  Religion.  233 

type  of  unity,  and  we  are  justified  in  considering 
how  far  it  may  offer  us  suggestions  in  dealing  with 
the  problem  we  have  before  us.  For  we  are  seeking 
a  principle  which  will  connect  the  various  individual 
centres  of  experience  without  at  the  same  time  sup- 
pressing their  individuality.  And  in  life  the  central 
will,  which  has  a  reality  of  its  own,  so  correlates  the 
changing  elements  on  which  it  works  that  a  rela- 
tively stable  system  emerges,  in  which  each  organ 
has  an  individual  office  and  is  likewise  intimately 
linked  to  all  the  rest.  In  other  words,  the  soul  is 
not  an  expression  simply  for  the  interior  harmony 
of  the  living  being,  but  the  formative  ground  which 
brings  about  the  harmony.  It  is  the  dominant 
power  which  builds  up  the  organism  and  manifests 
itself  in  it. 

Is  it  not  possible,  then,  that  the  principle  which 
obtains  in  the  microcosm  has  its  counterpart  in  the 
macrocosm  ?  May  not  a  supreme  Will  be  the  ground 
of  all  interactions  between  spiritual  substances  ? 
May  we  not  say  that  all  centres  of  experience  act 
and  react  on  each  other  in  uniform  ways  through  an 
ever-present  connecting  agency,  of  which  we  see 
a  reflexion  in  the  organic  world  ?  In  suggesting 
this  supreme  activity  we  can  at  least  say  that  such 
a  mode  of  action  is  not  purely  hypothetical,  but  is 
really  found  within  experience.  It  may  be  urged 
that  we  are  here  transferring  by  analogy  a  principle 


234  The  ultimate  Basis  ana 

which  works  within  experience  to  the  ground  of 
experience  as  a  whole.  This  is  true.  But  no  philos- 
ophy can  condemn  the  use  of  analogy  altogether  if 
it  is  not  to  sink  into  scepticism,  and  the  only 
question  is  one  of  justification  in  the  particular  case. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  disputed  that  the  primal  Will 
cannot  be  simply  a  magnified  copy  of  the  will  in 
the  physical  organism.  The  represented  world  in 
space  and  time  grows  out  of  the  interactions  of 
individual  substances,  and  we  are  here  dealing  with 
the  ground  of  that  interaction.  Hence  it  is  neces- 
sary to  think  of  a  fundamental  Activity  which  is 
neither  temporal  nor  spatial.  It  will  be  said  that 
activity  is  inconceivable  apart  from  time  :  and  it 
may  be  admitted  that  our  ideally  constructed  notion 
of  activity  seems  to  imply  succession.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  must  be,  as  we  tried  to  show,  a  reality 
behind  the  psychologically  formed  idea,  and  time, 
from  its  very  nature,  cannot  constitute  activity  but 
presupposes  it.  Plainly  the  fundamental  Will  must 
be  distinguished  from  the  will  which  is  a  mental 
construction  based  on  personal  experience.  For  it 
cannot  depend  for  its  exercise  on  an  external  occa- 
sion, nor  are  we  entitled  to  speak  of  it  as  an  inter- 
mittent agency,  now  operative  and  now  quiescent. 
We  must  not  use  language  which  would  mean  that 
the  centres  of  experience  are  scattered  over  space 
and  require  a  bridge  to  establish  intercommunica- 


Meaning  of  Religion.  235 

tion.  One  easily  drops  into  the  use  of  such 
figurative  speech,  and  to  some  extent  it  may  be 
unavoidable.  Yet  when  the  spatial  element  is 
discarded,  we  are  justified  in  thinking  of  the  funda- 
mental Will  as  present  and  operative  in  all  monads 
without  having  to  overcome  an  external  separation 
of  individuals.  The  purposive  activity  of  the  one 
ever-present  Ground  makes  possible  the  conative 
synthesis  by  which  each  centre  of  experience 
develops  its  meaning,  and  it  also  is  the  condition  of 
that  systematic  connexion  of  elements  in  virtue  of 
which  an  individual  can  have  a  function  in  the 
whole.  Kant  spoke  of  thought  through  its  cate- 
gories building  up  the  fair  fabric  of  nature  out  of  a 
chaotic  material  somehow  supplied  to  it.  The  con- 
ception is  unworkable,  for  thought  cannot  impose 
its  own  laws  upon  an  alien  element.  Nature  could 
not  become  an  ordered  whole  for  thought  if  an 
invisible  order  did  not  lie  behind  it.  The  individual 
reals  which  nature  presupposes  form,  as  we  believe, 
a  spiritual  system  of  which  the  active  soul  is  an 
omnipresent  Will.  The  characterless  and  unrelated 
"thing  in  itself"  is  a  fiction  which  explains 
nothing. 

An  ever-present,  eternally  operative  Will,  then, 
we  conclude  to  be  the  ground  of  the  external 
world  as  experienced.  But  this  determination  is 
largely  formal.  Whether  this  Will  is  the  will  of 


236  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

a  self-conscious,  personal,  and  ethical  being,  we  do 
not  know  as  yet.  If  there  be  justification  for  this 
view,  it  must  be  found  in  the  inner  or  subjective 
development  of  experience.  And  to  this  aspect  of 
the  question  we  must  now  turn. 

In  one  sense  all  experience  is  subjective.  It  is 
in  a  subject :  every  thing  which  is  individual  or 
real  has  an  inner  life,  and  its  qualities  are  repre- 
sented in  it  by  its  own  states.  But  in  the  narrower 
sense  that  is  subjective  which  not  only  is  for  itself 
but  is  also  conscious  of  itself.  The  stages  of  de- 
velopment toward  the  latter  are  tolerably  familiar. 
From  the  dim  self-feeling  which  reveals  itself  in 
the  instinctive  assimilation  of  one  element  and  the 
rejection  of  another,  there  is  an  advance  to  the 
level  of  sensation.  When  the  inner  development 
makes  selection  and  association  of  sense  impressions 
possible,  we  have  the  stage  of  perception.  And 
when  the  level  of  intellection  and  conceptual  think- 
ing is  attained,  the  subject,  now  fully  self-conscious, 
finds  himself  confronted  by  an  objective  world. 
From  the  lowest  phase  of  "  conative  synthesis"  to 
the  most  fully  developed  conceptual  thinking,  the 
objective  world  grows  pari  passu  with  the  sub- 
jective :  with  increasing  differentiation  between  the 
worlds  there  goes  at  the  same  time  increasing  con- 
nexion. Hence  the  world  of  conceptual  thought 
is  not  to  be  treated  as  a  secondary  and  less  real 


Meaning  of  Religion.  237 

world,  which  is  somehow  superimposed  on  a  solid 
reality.  Thinking  is  experience  in  its  most  de- 
veloped form,  and  is  not  the  mere  excrescence  of 
will,  its  tool  in  the  endless  struggle  with  fact. 
Accordingly  we  may  say  that  the  world  which  takes 
form  as  the  outcome  of  intersubjective  thinking  is 
the  way  in  which  reality  reveals  itself  in  us.1  On 
the  other  hand,  thought  and  reality  are  not  simply 
to  be  identified.  For  thought,  if  the  highest  aspect 
of  experience,  is  not  the  whole  of  it,  and  develops 
temporally  out  of  experience  which  is  not  con- 
ceptual. And  experience  in  its  widest  sense  is  a 
process  which  is  not  complete.  The  growth  of 
mind  through  intersubjective  intercourse  shows  the 
never-ceasing  endeavour  of  thought  to  give  more 
adequate  and  perfect  expression  to  experience. 
The  fact  that  the  historic  evolution  of  thought 
is  an  endeavour,  by  a  constant  process  of  criticism 
and  reconstruction,  to  give  a  more  perfect  state- 

1  Mr  F.  H.  Bradley,  laying  stress  on  the  negative  and  distinguish- 
ing element  in  thought  to  the  disadvantage  of  its  positive  and  con- 
necting aspect,  finds  it  inherently  inadequate  to  reality,  and  only 
saves  himself  from  complete  scepticism  by  his  doctrine  of  degrees  of 
reality.  No  one  has  more  extravagantly  depreciated  thought  than 
Nietzsche  in  his  latest  writings.  Vid.  Orestano,  'Le  Idee  Fonda- 
mentali  di  F.  Nietzsche/  p.  305.  "  Parmenide  ha  detto  :  non  si  puo 
pensare  ci6  che  non  esiste.  Nietzsche  6  pervenuto  all  altra  estrem- 
ita :  ci6  che  puo  venir  pensato  dev'essere  necessariamente  una 
finzione." 

One  is  tempted  to  add  that,  if  all  thought  be  fiction,  Nietzsche's 
view  of  thought  is  itself  fiction. 


238  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

ment  of  reality  is  a  warning  against  any  thorough- 
going identification  of  the  one  with  the  other.  A 
connexion  in  thought  will  represent  a  real  con- 
nexion, if  the  material  premises  have  been  ade- 
quately stated  as  logical  premises  to  begin  with.1 
Strict  proof,  as  the  establishment  of  necessary  con- 
nexion, is  between  given  elements  within  experi- 
ence, and  does  not  reach  to  the  ground  of  all 
experience. 

Hence  the  well-known  attempts  to  prove  the 
existence  of  God  by  logical  inference  have  no 
proper  cogency.  To  begin  with,  it  is  plain  that 
even  were  the  reasoning  valid,  it  would  prove 
very  much  less  than  those  who  used  it  hoped  to 
do.  That  which  is  commonly  connoted  by  the 
word  God  contains  much  more  than  the  so-called 
theistic  proofs  can  yield  in  any  case.  There  need 
be  no  spiritual  content  in  the  idea  of  an  External 
Designer,  a  First  Cause,  or  a  most  Keal  Being. 
Again,  the  Cosmological  and  Teleological  arguments 
assume  that,  from  one  element  or  aspect  of  ex- 
perience, you  can  pass  by  a  necessity  of  thought 
to  a  reality  which  is  the  ground  of  all  experience. 
Yet  here  the  necessity  of  thought,  supposing  that 
it  did  exist,  could  not  give  as  a  conclusion  a 
Being  who  was  not  finite  and  limited.  In  the 

1  "  If  the  essential  conditions  of  error  are  absent,  what  is  taken 
for  real  must  be  real."— G.  F.  Stout,  in  '  Personal  Idealism,'  p.  35. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  239 

Ontological  proof,  as  Kant  showed,  the  assumption 
common  to  the  different  arguments,  that  necessity 
of  thought  gives  necessity  of  fact,  is  explicitly  pre- 
sented. But  the  important  point  is,  that  the  argu- 
ment becomes  absolutely  futile  for  the  purpose  on 
hand  at  the  point  where  it  has  any  semblance  of 
validity.  We  contradict  ourselves  if  we  affirm  that 
being  does  not  exist,  and  that  there  is  a  sum-total 
of  being  it  is  meaningless  to  deny.  But  when  we 
go  on  to  qualify  this  indeterminate  Being  to  fit  it 
for  the  rdle  of  Deity,  we  have  no  guarantee  that 
the  reality  must  conform  to  our  idea,  and  to  speak 
of  proof  is  absurd. 

The  Ontological  proof,  in  its  scholastic  form,  has 
now  become  a  matter  of  purely  historical  interest. 
It  may  be  well,  however,  to  refer  to  a  sugges- 
tive if  radical  reconstruction  of  the  argument  by 
Pfleiderer.  Things,  so  Pfleiderer  puts  it,  conform 
to  our  ideas :  the  laws  of  nature  are  in  harmony 
with  the  laws  of  mind.  The  being  of  mind  is  not 
identical  with  the  being  of  nature,  but  the  outer 
and  inner  worlds  are  in  correspondence.  And  how 
is  this  ?  The  teleological  inference  is  unavoidable  ; 
they  have  been  adapted  to  one  another.  This 
adaptation  is  due  to  God,  the  Supreme  Keason, 
who  is  the  ground  both  of  nature  and  mind.  But 
though  we  accepted  this  argument,  it  would  not 
prove  that  the  common  ground  of  both  worlds  was 


240  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

a  self-conscious  Person : *  it  would  require  to  be 
supplemented  by  the  argument  drawn  from  the 
practical  reason,  as  Pfleiderer  would  admit.  But 
the  real  difficulty  is  to  suppose  that  the  world  of 
thought  and  the  world  of  things  are  divided  in 
the  way  suggested,  so  that  the  former  is  a  kind 
of  duplicate  of  the  latter.  If  the  theory  we  have 
already  advanced  is  correct,  there  is  no  such 
separation.  Experience  is  continuous  through  all 
its  stages,  and  the  laws  of  thought  are  only  its 
fullest  development.  There  is  no  reality  which  is 
not  experience  in  some  form.  But  others  who 
cannot  accept  this  view  will  still  find  transcendental 
realism  unsatisfactory.  And  because  it  makes  this 
assumption,  that  nature  and  mind  are  two  diverse 
worlds  which  somehow  correspond,  Pfleiderer 7s  ver- 
sion of  the  Ontological  argument,  it  seems  to  me, 
will  not  be  generally  convincing.  You  divide 
reality  as  'with  a  hatchet/  and  then  require  a 
bridge  between  the  severed  parts.  Of  the  theistic 
proofs  as  a  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  just 
in  giving  proofs  that  they  fail. 

At  this  point  it  will  be  best  to  state  the  result 
to  which  our  own  course  of  thought  has  brought 
us.  We  found  it  necessary  to  postulate  a  ground 

1  E.  Von  Hartmann,  who  also  accepts  the  principles  of  transcen- 
dental realism,  argues,  as  is  well  known,  from  the  correspondence  of 
thought  and  being  only  to  an  unconscious  World-ground. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  241 

for  the  interaction  of  spiritual  substances.  An 
active  Soul  or  Will  seemed  the  most  satisfactory 
conception  of  a  ground  which  would  make  possible 
the  connexion  of  individual  substances  without 
suppressing  their  individuality.  But  though  we 
postulate  this  we  cannot  turn  the  postulate  into 
a  proof,  for  we  are  not  able  to  show  that  the 
ground  on  its  part  must  issue  or  manifest  itself 
in  a  world  of  individual  realities.  We  have  now 
to  ask  how  far  the  developments  of  experience 
through  self-conscious  subjects  will  warrant  us 
in  giving  further  determination  to  the  ground 
postulated. 

The  cardinal  fact  in  the  subjective  process  of 
experience  is  the  fact  of  self-consciousness  itself. 
The  whole  realm  of  science,  art,  and  religion  has 
unfolded  itself  in  man  because  he  is  an  active, 
self-conscious  being.  The  intellectual  and  spiritual 
creations  which  make  up  the  world  in  which  man 
lives  and  moves,  are  only  possible  for  beings  who 
reflect  upon  themselves,  who  both  relate  themselves 
to  the  object  and  distinguish  themselves  from  it. 
The  importance  of  the  fact  of  self  -  consciousness 
has  justified  the  stress  which  modern  philosophy 
has  laid  upon  it.  Nor  should  the  fact  that  the 
consciousness  of  self  has  been  historically  evolved 
lead  us  to  minimise  its  significance,  or  to  dethrone 
it  from  its  central  place  in  human  experience.  The 

Q 


242  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

unfolding  of  individuality  in  its  lower  forms  is 
mediated,  as  we  saw,  by  interaction  between  in- 
dividuals. And  the  same  law  obtains  at  the  stage 
when  individuality  assumes  a  higher  and  more 
complex  shape.  The  friction  of  suitable  materials 
begets  the  spark.  So  the  contact  between  selves, 
the  endless  give  and  take  between  members  of  a 
society  of  which  language  is  the  outcome,  the 
sharpening  effect  of  social  intercourse  upon  the 
mind,  have  generated  the  light  of  self-knowledge. 
The  phrase  sometimes  used,  "the  socialised  self," 
at  least  reminds  us  how  much  the  human  ego 
depends  for  its  contents  on  the  social  system  in 
which  it  lives  and  moves.  None  the  less  an 
account  of  the  historical  genesis  of  self-conscious- 
ness does  not  solve  the  problem  of  its  origin. 
Social  conditions  are  the  means  which  develop  it, 
but  they  do  not  create  it. 

If  we  rule  the  purely  materialistic  explanation 
out  of  court,  we  may  still  be  told  that  self-con- 
sciousness is  the  product  of  unconscious  will.  The 
will  creates  the  intelligence  as  its  instrument,  the 
means  to  its  ends.  Yet  is  this  really  possible  ?  If 
D  an  unconscious  will  becomes  S  a  thinking  will, 
and  we  exclude  the  supposition  that  D  is  potentially 
S,  then  the  reason  for  the  development  must  be 
sought  in  the  factual  experiences  by  which  D  is 
qualified.  Let  D  then  interact  with  A,  B,  and  C : 


Meaning  of  Religion.  243 

it  will  respond  to  these  changes  in  its  environment 
by  becoming  D  S,  D  S',  D  S".  The  question  is,  How 
can  8,  S',  S",  which  represent  the  reactions  of  D,  in 
turn  so  modify  D  that  it  becomes  S,  a  self-conscious 
subject  ?  Stated  thus,  we  can  see  that  the  supposi- 
tion involves  a  false  abstraction.  For  the  states 
symbolised  as  S,  S',  S"  have  no  meaning  in  them- 
selves but  only  as  expressions  of  D.  And  no 
repetition  or  variation  of  these  states  could  modify 
D  in  any  way  that  was  not  the  utterance  of  its 
own  character.  We  can  only  make  intelligible  to 
ourselves  the  transformation  of  D  into  S  by  sup- 
posing that  it  really  represents  the  inner  develop- 
ment of  D,  of  which  8,  S',  S"  may  be  the  occasion 
but  cannot  be  the  cause.  Stated  generally,  while 
self-consciousness  can  be  conceived  as  the  fullest 
development  of  an  individual  substance,  it  can 
never  be  consistently  thought  as  superimposed  upon 
it  by  conditions  acting  from  without.  If  uncon- 
scious will  in  the  process  of  experience  becomes 
thinking  will,  then  it  must  have  possessed  the 
character  which  could  be  quickened  to  this  high 
issue.  If  you  deny  this,  you  must  take  up  the 
untenable  position,  as  it  seems  to  us,  that  the 
outcome  of  development  has  no  necessary  relation 
to  its  beginning,  and  then  you  abandon  any  prin- 
ciple of  explanation,  and  your  assertion  ceases  to 
be  more  than  an  ex  cathedra  statement.  It  may 


244  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

be  true,  as  we  see  in  cases  of  degeneration,  that 
the  Aristotelian  principle  that  what  is  vo-repov 
yeVeo-ei  is  TrpoTtpov  <f)V(T€L  is  not  always  applicable. 
But  in  normal  development  there  must  be  con- 
tinuity between  the  germ  and  the  fruit,  and  we 
read  the  meaning  of  the  beginning  in  the  light  of 
the  end.  In  the  general  evolution  of  experience 
sub- conscious  preceded  self-conscious  life,  and  in  the 
history  of  the  individual  person  the  same  order  is 
repeated.  And  it  seems  clear  that  the  only  way 
we  can  put  a  meaning  into  sub-conscious  mental 
activity  is  by  regarding  it  in  connexion  with  its 
developed  result  in  self-consciousness. 

We  ought  to  keep  these  facts  in  view  when  we 
consider  what  must  be  the  character  of  the  ultimate 
Ground  which  has  made  possible  the  development 
in  time  of  self-conscious  beings.  For  the  supreme 
Will,  which  conditions  the  interactions  of  all  in- 
dividuals, also  makes  possible  the  far  more  com- 
plex and  highly  organised  system  of  intercourse 
termed  social  life,  the  medium  out  of  which  self- 
consciousness  emerges  in  time.  To  the  same  im- 
manent activity  we  must  trace  that  character  in 
the  individual  real  which  makes  the  fullest  ex- 
pression of  its  nature  to  be  self-consciousness.  And 
the  point  is  whether  a  ground  which  is  Will  and 
nothing  more  can  be  the  source  of  a  character 
which  has  a  development  so  momentous.  The 


Meaning  of  Religion.  245 

answer  must  be  the  same  as  that  already  given. 
If  individual  centres  of  experience  were  will  and 
nothing  more,  they  could  not  evolve  self-conscious- 
ness :  and  just  as  little  can  we  suppose  that  a 
universal  and  unconscious  Will  created  by  its 
activity  self-conscious  subjects.  No  doubt  some 
have  asserted  this  to  be  true,  but  the  assertion 
in  this  case  raises  grave  practical  as  well  as 
theoretical  difficulties.  We  live  and  act  on  the 
assumption  that  the  self-conscious  world,  which  is 
likewise  the  world  of  values,  is  the  fullest  develop- 
ment of  reality.  Yet  if  naked  Will  is  the  ground 
and  creator  of  this  world,  then  an  unconscious 
principle  is  the  source  of  all  value,  and  is  itself 
the  highest  value.  It  is  only  consistent  that  those 
who  hold  this  speculative  theory  should  treat  the 
kingdom  of  self-conscious  spirits  as  a  lapse  from  the 
unconscious,  and  advocate  a  revaluation  in  the  inter- 
ests of  pessimism.  The  radical  contradiction  between 
this  Weltanschauung  and  our  most  deep-rooted  per- 
sonal instincts  is  a  strong  argument  against  it. 

No  doubt,  although  the  fundamental  Will  be 
self-conscious,  it  is  not  possible  for  us  to  define 
the  way  in  which  it  is  the  active  ground  of  self- 
consciousness  in  individual  centres  of  experience.1 

1  "When  Leibniz,  for  example  (' Monadologie,'  47),  speaks  of  his 
monads  as  "  des  figurations  continuelles  de  la  divinite","  the  language 
can  only  be  taken  as  metaphorical. 


246  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

On  the  other  hand,  if  our  regressive  movement  only 
brings  us  to  an  unconscious  ground  of  experience, 
the  ground  is  plainly  insufficient,  for  it  cannot 
impart  that  which  is  alien  to  itself.  The  nature 
of  developed  experiences  therefore  justifies  the 
postulate,  that  the  Will,  which  is  the  ground  of 
all  centres  of  experience,  is  the  Will  of  a  conscious 
Self. 

At  this  point  I  will  notice  an  objection  that  may 
be  directed  against  the  argument.  We  shall  be 
told,  perhaps,  that  if  the  World -Ground  is  self- 
conscious,  it  may  be  conceived  as  purely  immanent 
without  being  open  to  the  objections  previously 
urged  against  a  purely  immanent  Ground.  The 
difficulties  we  raised  before,  it  will  be  contended, 
were  plausible  just  owing  to  the  fact  that  we  were 
taking  experience  at  too  low  a  level.  Follow  it  out 
to  its  fullest  expression  in  self-consciousness,  and 
you  will  find  you  have  a  principle  which  duly 
differentiates  subject  and  object,  universal  and  par- 
ticular, and  still  contains  them  in  an  inclusive 
unity.  We  can  only  say  again  that  the  generalised 
experience  which  gives  us  an  objective  world  is 
only  intelligible  on  the  assumption  that  it  pre- 
supposes reals  which  are  not  adjectives.  To  put 
it  generally,  all  experience  does  not  fall  within  the 
aelf-conscious  subject.  It  may  be  said  that  this  is 
true  of  the  finite  self-consciousness,  but  it  does  not 


Meaning  of  Religion.  247 

hold  of  the  Absolute,  which,  while  giving  full  scope 
to  differences,  maintains  itself  in  them.  If  this  be 
so,  then,  as  the  individual  self -consciousness  falls 
within  the  whole  of  reality,  the  Absolute  self  must 
contain  all  such  selves  within  itself.  Can  the 
Universal  Self  and  individual  selves  be  so  related 
and  continue  to  possess  what  is  claimed  for  them  ? 
In  other  words,  can  the  Absolute  Self  and  the 
finite  self,  so  conceived,  be  each  for  itself  as  well 
as  for  the  other?  It  is  easy  to  speak  vaguely  of 
a  Universal  Self  which  is  the  unity  of  all  particular 
selves,  but  those  who  use  this  language  are  not 
always  careful  to  explain  exactly  what  they  mean. 
I  believe  those  who  adopt  this  standpoint  must  be 
driven  in  the  end  to  accept  one  of  two  alternatives : 
either  the  Universal  Self  alone  is  real  and  finite 
selves  are  an  illusion,  or  the  finite  selves  only  are 
real  and  the  Universal  Self  is  a  fiction.  For  if  the 
Absolute  Self  S  exists  in  the  individual  selves 
a,  fe,  c,  it  must  be  in  each  of  them.  Yet  it  cannot 
be  in  a,  or  6,  or  c,  taken  in  isolation,  but  only  as 
entering  into  the  whole,  or  it  would  not  unify 
them.  The  fact  that  a,  b,  and  c  are  for  S,  which 
is  a  supreme  and  inclusive  self,  because  it  unites 
all  finite  selves  in  a  totality  outside  of  which  it 
does  not  itself  exist,  forbids  us  to  suppose  that 
the  claim  of  a,  6,  and  c  to  be  for  themselves  over 
against  S,  is  anything  but  an  illusion.  For  in  the 


248  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

very  assertion  of  themselves  they  refuse  to  merge 
wholly  in  S.  I  cannot  see  that  under  these  con- 
ditions a,  6,  and  c  could  be  anything  more  than 
the  states  of  consciousness  in  which  the  Supreme 
Subject  expresses  its  activity.1  Again,  if  you  persist 
under  these  conditions  in  maintaining  the  personal- 
ity of  individuals,  the  unreality  of  the  Absolute 
Self  becomes  just  as  inevitable.  This  is  well 
brought  out  in  a  very  clear  and  candid  discussion 
by  Mr  J.  E.  M'Taggart.2  He  holds  that  personal 
selves  are  the  fundamental  differentiations  of  the 
Absolute,  and  fall  of  course  entirely  within  its 
unity.  The  Absolute  is  in  each  individual  self,  but 
also  outside  it,  and  therefore  is  for  it.  But  we 
cannot  say  that  individual  selves  are  also  for  the 
Absolute,  since  there  is  nothing  outside  the  Ab- 
solute. Hence  Mr  M'Taggart  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  Absolute  cannot  be  a  person  (unless 
in  some  utterly  incomprehensible  way).  It  is  really 
a  system  of  selves,  a  society  of  eternally  existing 
spirits.  This  bold  discussion  of  the  problem  will 
probably  do  good,  because  it  sets  forth  in  a  vivid 
light  the  inherent  difficulties  of  the  view  that  an 

1  It  is  noteworthy  that  Paulsen,  in  his  endeavour  to  round  off 
his  pluralism  in  a  monism,  uses  this  notion.     We  may  conceive,  he 
tells  us,  the  relation  of  the  Absolute  to  individual  spirits  after  the 
analogy  of    the    thinking  subject  to  its  states  ('Einleitung  in  die 
Philosophic,'  p.  250). 

2  Studies  in  the  Hegelian  Cosmology,  chap.  iii. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  249 

Absolute  Self  is  the  immanent  unity  of  all  finite 
selves.  But  the  objections  to  Mr  M'Taggart's  own 
theory  are,  to  say  the  least,  very  serious.  If,  as  he 
seems  to  say,  the  only  reality  is  the  fundamental 
differentiations  of  the  Absolute,  self-conscious  sub- 
jects, what  are  those  centres  of  experience  which 
are  not  self-conscious?  How  are  we  to  interpret 
nature?  Fundamental  differentiations  of  the  Ab- 
solute can  neither  begin  nor  pass  away.  Has  every 
person,  then,  existed  from  all  eternity  ?  The  Ab- 
solute, it  must  be  supposed,  is  perfect ;  yet  how 
can  this  be  reconciled  with  the  fact  that  error, 
weakness,  and  sin  attach  to  its  constituent  dif- 
ferentiations ?  That  kind  of  apotheosis  of  the 
individual  spirit  which  Mr  M'Taggart's  theory 
seems  to  imply  has  no  warrant  in  facts.  And  it 
is  in  conflict  with  an  essential  aspect  of  religious 
experience.  We  conclude  on  the  general  question 
that  the  idea  of  a  Supreme  Self -consciousness, 
which  is  the  purely  immanent  unity  of  all  indi- 
vidual selves,  is  inconsistent  with  what  is  involved 
in  the  nature  of  the  self. 

But  there  is  one  other  theory  which  I  should  like 
to  consider  in  this  connexion  before  going  further. 
It  is  that  of  Lotze.  He  holds,  as  we  know,  that 
the  Absolute  is  the  one  real  Being,  but  he  also  tries 
to  show  that  it  is  personal,  or  something  more  and 
better  than  personal.  No  competent  thinker  will 


250  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

suppose  that  the  divine  Personality  is  nothing 
more  than  a  magnified  copy  of  the  human.  There 
are  limitations  involved  in  the  latter  which  cannot 
be  transferred  to  the  former;  and  popular  religion 
very  commonly  forgets  this.  On  any  view,  how- 
ever, that  is  not  personal  which  cannot  use  the 
pronoun  'I,'  which  is  not  self-conscious.  If,  then, 
it  can  be  shown  that  the  Absolute  is  self-conscious, 
we  are  justified  in  calling  it  personal.  Now,  a 
constant  feature  of  self- consciousness,  as  we  know 
it,  is  the  contrast  of  ego  and  non-ego.  I  affirm 
myself  and  know  myself  as  over  against  a  not-self. 
Lotze's  problem,  therefore,  is  to  show  how  the 
Absolute,  which  is  the  supreme  and  sole  reality, 
can  be  a  self-conscious  Being.  His  argument,  put 
briefly,  runs  thus.1  Self -consciousness  is  not  de- 
veloped by  forming  an  image,  which  is  identified 
as  an  image  of  the  ego.  For  this  operation  pre- 
supposes an  already  existing  self-feeling.  In  this 
feeling  lies  the  principle  which  differentiates  one 
self  from  another.  The  self  is  not  gradually 
defined  over  against  an  outward  reality  but  by 
contrast  with  its  own  inward  and  changing  states. 
No  doubt  in  the  case  of  finite  persons  there  is  an 
ultimate  reference  to  something  without  implied 
in  sensation :  but  Lotze  urges  that  this  is  not  an 

1   Vid.   Religionsphilosophie,   p.   39  ff.,   and   Microcosmus  (Eng. 
trans.),  vol.  ii.  680  ff. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  251 

essential  feature  of  personality,  but  a  defect  which 
attaches  to  its  finite  form.  In  an  infinite  personal- 
ity no  such  external  reference  is  necessary. 

This  ingenious  argument  has  been  accepted  by 
several  thinkers,  and  it  is  undoubtedly  suggestive. 
At  the  same  time,  supposing  it  to  be  valid,  I  think 
it  still  leaves  the  old  difficulty  unexplained  how 
there  can  be  individual  personalities  within  the  one 
real  personal  Being.  And  it  is  at  least  doubtful  if 
any  distinction  between  a  self  and  its  inner  states 
does  not  ultimately  involve  a  reference  to  a  not- 
self  or  other.  It  must  indeed  be  granted  that  an 
original  self- feeling  is  presupposed  in  forming  the 
distinction  of  ego  and  non-ego,  as  well  as  in  the 
process  by  which  the  ego  is  able  to  recognise  itself 
as  an  identity  which  maintains  itself  through  its 
own  states.  Yet  all  our  experience  goes  to  show 
that  the  feeling  only  becomes  an  explicit  conscious- 
ness, because  we  find  it  practically  necessary  to 
mark  off  gradually  a  section  of  our  ideas  as  repre- 
sentative of  the  not-self.  And  on  this  contrast 
appears  to  depend  the  generalisation  by  which  we 
designate  a  part  of  our  experience  as  inner.  The 
interior  world  of  human  memory  and  reflection,  in 
which  we  are  invited  to  see  a  faint  adumbration  of 
the  closed  inner  life  of  the  Absolute,  is  a  highly 
complex  construction  which  could  not  be  developed 
apart  from  the  not-self.  Is  there  any  proof  that 


252  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

this  reference  to  another  than  the  self,  which  is 
implied  in  our  developed  self-consciousness,  is  a 
feature  which  is  restricted  to  the  finite  ?  If  there 
is,  Lotze  does  not  supply  it.  And  it  remains  a 
puzzle  how  the  Absolute  could  refer  its  states  to 
itself,  if  there  were  nothing  with  which  it  could 
contrast  itself.  If  an  Absolute  Self-consciousness 
were  possible  under  these  conditions, — and  on  this 
we  will  not  dogmatise, — the  analogy  between  it  and 
our  own  self -consciousness  must  be  very  slender 
indeed. 

While  the  necessary  reference  to  the  not-self  in 
finite  self-consciousness  is  not,  I  think,  in  itself  a 
defect,  yet  there  can  be  no  doubt  that,  in  the 
particular  form  in  which  it  manifests  itself  in  our 
experience,  it  does  carry  with  it  a  limitation.  As 
Lotze  says,  we  do  not  contain  within  ourselves 
the  conditions  of  our  own  existence,  and  external 
stimuli  come  to  us  from  an  object  which  does  not 
depend  upon  us.  The  work  of  ideal  construction 
by  which  we  interpret  experience  we  are  compelled 
to  envisage  in  forms  of  space  and  time,  and  cogni- 
tion is  a  process  which  goes  from  part  to  part, 
and  is  never  complete  and  adequate  to  its  object. 
Memory,  the  instrument  by  which  we  link  the 
present  to  the  past,  is  only  fragmentary  in  its 
achievement,  and  severely  restricts  the  contents  of 
individual  knowledge.  Hence  to  some  extent  the 


Meaning  of  Religion.  253 

wide  fields  of  experience  always  appear  to  the 
individual  knower  a  foreign  territory,  which  shuts 
in  his  own  slender  property.  Again,  the  act  of 
will,  by  which  we  seek  to  modify  reality  in  accord- 
ance with  our  idea,  is  the  expression  of  a  desire  in 
us.  And  this  desire  is  born  of  an  incomplete  har- 
mony of  inner  and  outer,  and  is  a  demand  for  fuller 
correspondence  between  the  self  and  its  object. 
But  the  process  of  will  in  time  never  gives  the 
completeness  which  is  its  ideal,  and  endeavour 
never  closes  in  a  full  satisfaction.  Nor  is  it  other- 
wise when  a  man  makes  himself  his  object,  and 
reflects  upon  his  own  life.  If  self-knowledge  is  desir- 
able, it  is  proverbially  difficult.  We  do  not  succeed 
in  gathering  up  into  a  whole,  and  illuminating  with 
a  clear  light,  the  inner  history.  Here  and  there 
spaces  of  our  life  remain  brightly  lighted,  but 
greater  interspaces  have  faded  into  darkness  and 
are  forgotten ;  and  these  have  been  important 
elements  in  making  us  what  we  are.  And  phases 
of  our  inner  experience  which  we  do  remember, 
with  the  lapse  of  years  we  sometimes  find  ourselves 
unable  fully  to  understand  and  appreciate.  Indeed 
many  considerations  go  to  show  that  man  is  not  a 
complete  self  -  consciousness,  he  is  not  a  perfect 
personality.  For  this  can  only  be  said  of  a  subject 
for  whom  the  object  contains  no  alien  element,  and 
is  fully  comprehended ;  where  will  is  activity  which 


254  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

is  no  token  of  defect ;  and  where  the  self  in  all  its 
meaning  is  ever  present  to  consciousness,  and  the 
whole  is  a  full  harmony. 

After  these  criticisms  and  discussions  we  come  to 
the  important  question  whether,  and  if  so,  how  far, 
we  can  offer  any  theory  of  the  nature  of  God  as 
personal,  which  would  serve  to  justify  the  use  of 
the  term  in  this  reference.  There  are  some,  who 
have  the  interests  of  religion  at  heart,  who  hold 
that  any  speculative  construction  of  the  nature  of 
God  is  valueless.  The  theologian,  K.  A.  Lipsius,  for 
instance,  has  declared  that  God  is  personal  in  the 
faith  relation,  but  we  cannot  translate  what  is  real 
to  faith  into  an  independent  metaphysical  deter- 
mination.1 If  we  take  this  to  mean  that  we  cannot 
give  an  adequate  speculative  construction  of  the 
divine  nature,  the  statement  need  not  be  disputed. 
But  if  we  take  it  to  mean  that  the  personality  of 
God  is  a  pure  matter  of  faith,  which  reason  is 
powerless  to  justify,  then  the  case  is  surely  put  too 
strongly.  If  reason  were  entirely  dumb  on  the 
subject,  the  verdict  of  faith,  standing  quite  unsup- 
ported, would  be  felt  in  the  long-run  to  be  unsatis- 
factory. A  Philosophy  of  Religion,  though  it  does 
not  pretend  to  give  a  full  solution  of  this  question, 
may  properly  be  expected  to  show  reason  for  one 

1  Dogmatik,  1879,  pp.  175,  176.  Cp.  also  the  remarks  a  little 
further  on  in  this  essay. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  255 

view  or  the  other.  And  if  it  argues  that  God  is 
personal,  it  should  try  to  show  that  this  deter- 
mination is  so  far  consistent  with  the  ground  of 
experience. 

The  result  which  our  discussion  up  to  this  point 
seems  to  have  yielded  may  be  stated  thus.  If  God, 
conceived  as  Absolute,  be  the  whole  of  reality,  one 
of  two  results  follows.  Either  individual  selves  are 
real,  but  God  the  system  in  which  they  are  con- 
nected is  not  a  person  ;  or  the  Absolute  as  the  sum 
of  experience  is  a  self,  but  the  selves  which  fall 
within  it  are  mere  appearance.  Neither  view  is 
satisfactory.  In  the  one  case  we  cannot  understand 
how  self-conscious  persons  should  issue  out  of  the 
unconscious  world-process,  in  the  other  we  virtually 
explain  them  away.  If,  then,  we  are  to  maintain 
the  reality  both  of  the  divine  and  the  human  self, 
we  cannot  speak  of  God  as  the  Absolute  in  the 
common  philosophic  use  of  the  term.  For  if  God 
be  the  all-inclusive  whole  of  reality,  a  personal  rela- 
tion between  Him  and  individuals  is  not  possible, 
and  there  is  no  real  place  for  religion.  If  we  do 
use  the  term  Absolute  of  God,  it  must  be  in  a  more 
restricted  sense.  We  may  speak  of  God  as  the 
absolute  ground  or  condition  of  experience,  not  as 
the  all-inclusive  whole  of  experience.  It  will  be  a 
gain  if  recent  discussions  have  made  it  clear  that 
the  philosophic  Absolute  and  the  religious  idea  of 


256  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

God  cannot,  as  they  stand,  be  made  to  coincide.  If 
the  notion  of  the  Absolute  is  right,  our  view  of 
religion  cannot  hold  good :  if  the  claim  of  religion 
is  valid,  the  idea  of  the  Absolute  must  be  revised.1 

The  World-Ground,  we  already  concluded,  must 
be  self-conscious,  and  we  now  add  that,  though  all 
finite  experience  depends  on  it,  it  is  not  the  whole 
of  experience.  The  question  will  perhaps  be  put 
to  us,  How  is  it  possible  to  think  of  a  Supreme  Self 
who  is  the  ground  of  all  human  selves,  while  both 
are  for  themselves  as  well  as  for  one  another? 
Plainly  our  view  involves  the  inference  that  the 
activity  of  the  divine  Will  by  which  He  is  ground 
of  all  human  experience  is  not  a  stage  or  step  by 
which  He  becomes  self-conscious.  For  this  takes 
us  back  to  the  unworkable  notion  of  a  purely  im- 
manent divine  consciousness.  Hence  the  Supreme 
Being  must  contain  eternally  within  Himself  the 
actualised  conditions  of  self -consciousness.  These 
conditions,  we  found  reason  to  believe,  were  that 

1  Philosophy  and  Religion  frequently  agree  in  regarding  God  as 
the  Supreme  Spirit.  But  when  a  distinguished  exponent  of  the 
all-inclusive  notion  of  the  Absolute,  like  Prof.  Jones,  tells  us  ('Hib- 
bert  Journal,'  Oct.  1903,  p.  31)  that  reality  is  a  coherent  system  all 
of  whose  parts  and  elements  exist  in  and  through  a  supreme  principle 
which  manifests  and  embodies  itself  in  them,  and  adds  that  religion  as 
well  as  philosophy  calls  this  principle  God,  we  must  take  leave  to 
doubt  the  statement.  The  weight  of  historic  evidence  is  that  the 
religious  mind  means  by  God  a  reality  which  differs  in  essential  points 
from  such  a  principle. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  257 

there  should  be  a  not-self  contrasted  with  and  yet 
related  to  the  self.  This  appears  to  be  a  feature  in 
all  gradations  in  the  development  of  self  in  finite 
experience.  No  doubt  in  the  region  of  our  experi- 
ence we  never  find  a  perfect  harmony  and  corres- 
pondence between  the  self  and  its  object,  as  the 
existence  of  evil  and  error  testify :  and  the  historic 
process  seems  to  be  an  endeavour  towards  fuller 
concord.  The  Divine  Being,  it  may  be  suggested, 
is  the  eternally  perfect  and  complete  type,  of  which 
human  self-consciousness  is  the  partial  and  imperfect 
reflexion.  This  would  mean  that  God  is  not  to  be 
conceived  as  pure  unity.  The  element  of  difference 
must  enter  into  His  nature,  but  here  it  does  not 
carry  with  it  external  limitation  or  defect  of  any 
kind.  Rather  we  must  think  of  a  unity  which  is 
differentiated  but  is  at  the  same  time  a  perfect 
harmony ;  of  a  not-self  which  in  no  way  impedes 
the  activity  of  the  self,  and  of  a  subject  which  fully 
realises  itself  in  the  object ;  of  a  Being,  in  short,  in 
whom  subject  and  object  completely  and  harmoni- 
ously interpenetrate.  It  is  important  to  remember 
here  that  the  Divine  Nature  is  not  under  the  con- 
ditions of  time  and  space,  and  that  the  defects 
which  pertain  to  perceptual  and  cognitive  process 
in  our  experience  do  not  exist  in  it.  The  piece- 
meal character  which  attaches  to  our  thought  and 
will  cannot  belong  to  the  divine  thought  and 


258  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

will.  And  the  fact  that  we  are  under  these  limi- 
tations debars  us  from  comprehending  adequately 
the  Supreme  Consciousness  in  our  discursive 
thought. 

The  same  difficulty  besets  us  when  we  try  to 
understand  the  divine  world  -  grounding  activity. 
We  ca,n  hardly  avoid  using  words  which  contain 
spatial  and  temporal  images,  and  yet  these  must 
be  more  or  less  misleading.  The  phrase  '  act  of 
will/  for  instance,  suggests  a  passing  into  activity 
due  to  some  occasion  at  a  particular  point  of  time. 
And  an  idea  like  this  applied  to  God  is  full  of  diffi- 
culties and  contradictions.  It  is  perhaps  less  open 
to  objection  to  say  that  God's  will  is  eternally 
ground  of  all  individual  experience,  in  the  sense 
that  we  cannot  consistently  represent  to  ourselves 
His  bringing  it  into  being  at  any  particular  point 
in  time.  On  the  other  hand,  we  do  not  know  enough 
of  the  divine  nature  to  warrant  us  in  saying  that 
the  manifestation  of  the  Divine  Will,  as  ground  of 
a  connected  world  of  individual  selves,  is  necessarily 
involved  in  that  nature.  The  divine  self-conscious- 
ness is  not  made  possible  by  the  existence  of  a  world 
in  space  and  time.  Nevertheless  if  we  say  that  God 
might  equally  have  manifested,  or  refrained  from 
manifesting,  His  Will  in  a  world  of  individual 
spirits,  this  would  mean  that  self-revelation  is  not 
essential  to  His  nature.  And  the  notion  that  the 


Meaning  of  Religion.  259 

present  world  has  been  preferentially  chosen  by 
God,  out  of  various  possible  worlds,  implies  an 
anthropomorphic  conception  of  Deity  which  it  is 
hard  to  justify  :  both  from  a  metaphysical  and  ethi- 
cal point  of  view  it  is  open  to  serious  objections. 
Nor  can  we  give  any  satisfying  explanation  how 
'spiritual  substances  come  to  exist  for  themselves, 
while  they  form  a  coherent  whole  only  through  the 
immanent  connecting  activity  of  the  Divine  Will. 
Explanation  is  the  fruit  of  the  endeavour  to  find 
and  state  in  general  terms  the  continuity  which 
exists  between  elements  within  experience,  and  it 
always  carries  with  it  the  impress  of  its  origin. 
Indeed  the  explanation  how  anything  takes  place, 
if  sufficient  for  the  purpose  in  hand,  is  never  theo- 
retically complete.  So  we  cannot  be  expected  to 
establish  the  exact  connexion  between  centres  of 
experience  and  their  ultimate  ground,  for  the  con- 
nexion would  have  to  be  stated  in  a  form  of  thought 
properly  applicable  to  elements  which  fall  within  our 
experience.  But  though  we  cannot  explain  how 
spiritual  Beings  proceed  from  the  Divine  Will,  this 
does  not  invalidate  the  postulate,  if  it  can  be  justi- 
fied on  other  grounds. 

According  to  the  view  here  suggested,  God  is  the 
actual  and  perfect  form  of  personality,  and,  as  time- 
less ground  of  the  world,  He  is  the  condition  of  the 
development  of  personal  experience  in  time.  We 


260  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

cannot  conceive  Him  as  an  individual  spirit  in  a 
society,  for  then  His  meaning  must  be  found  in 
the  system  of  which  He  was  a  member,  and  He 
would  be  conditioned  as  well  as  conditioning.  And 
He  would  thus  share  the  limitations  of  finite  spirits, 
and  could  not  contain  in  Himself  the  reason  of  His 
activity.  God  must  ever  be  differentiated  from 
finite  persons,  in  that  He  is  the  active  ground  on 
which  they  all  depend.  He  is  the  supreme  Self- 
consciousness  who  transcends  the  divisions  of  space 
and  time,  and  makes  possible  that  partial  reflexion 
of  Himself  which  is  the  developing  self-conscious- 
ness of  man. 

The  foregoing  argument  has  led  us  by  successive 
stages  to  the  determination  of  the  World-Ground  as 
Supreme  Will,  as  Self-conscious  Will,  and  finally  as 
the  Will  of  a  complete  or  perfect  Personality.  We 
must  now  ask  how  far  the  nature  of  personal  ex- 
perience warrants  us  in  giving  more  definite  content 
to  the  idea  of  God.  The  speculative  thinker  cannot 
follow  in  the  track  of  the  older  theologians  and, 
selecting  certain  ethical  predicates,  simply  declare 
that  they  must  belong  in  perfection  (via  eminentice) 
to  the  divine  character.  It  has  been  said  that  all 
such  analogical  attribution  of  content  is  here  in- 
valid.1 The  statement  is  too  sweeping.  But  no 
doubt  we  cannot  postulate  ethical  qualifications  of 

1  E.g.,  by  Wundt.     Vid.  System  der  Philosophie,  p.  438. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  261 

the  Divine  Nature  in  the  way  that  we  postulate  a 
personal  ground  of  the  world.  Obviously  many 
qualities  we  judge  good  in  men  cease  to  have  a 
meaning  in  an  eternal  and  perfect  Being.  And  if 
the  mere  fact  that  certain  virtues  have  come  to  exist 
in  men  be  a  pledge  that  they  have  a  counterpart 
in  God,  we  ought  to  say  the  same  of  human  vices. 
The  truth  is  that  experience,  viewed  as  existing 
fact,  gives  no  valid  ground  for  inferring  that  God 
is  a  spiritual  personality,  such  as  He  appears  to  the 
developed  religious  consciousness.  Pure  thought 
can  never  show  us  that  ethical  content  must  be 
predicated  of  the  Deity :  speculative  thinkers  who 
ostensibly  deduce  such  content  really  assume  it.  If 
we  are  to  justify  ourselves  in  giving  this  further 
qualification  to  the  idea  of  God,  it  must  be  on 
other  grounds  than  those  which  are  purely  intel- 
lectual. The  claim  so  to  interpret  the  character 
of  God  must  rest  on  the  demand  of  our  inner 
nature,  that  the  Being  who  is  the  ground  of  all 
reality  satisfy  our  moral  and  spiritual  needs  and 
aspirations.  Is  the  claim  a  valid  one? 

If  the  demand  in  question  were  simply  a  subjec- 
tive desire  that  ultimate  Eeality  should  be  qualified 
in  particular  ways,  it  would  be  hard  to  defend  its 
validity ;  and  we  are  not  in  the  habit  of  assuming 
that  what  we  wish  to  be  must  be.  The  case  would 
be  different  if  it  should  appear  that  the  claim  is  the 


262  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

normal  outcome  of  the  practical  life  of  men.  Now 
in  the  forefront  of  the  practical  life  the  distinction 
has  been  set  between  what  is  and  what  ought  to  be. 
Man  in  the  exercise  of  his  will  ever  places  a  better 
before  him,  and  moves  in  a  world  of  values.  A 
being  "  of  large  discourse,"  he  looks  before  and 
after;  and  with  the  possible  satisfaction  of  the 
moment  he  contrasts  a  greater  good,  which  may  be 
inconsistent  with  it  and  should  be  preferred  before 
it.  By  allegiance  to  some  central  end  or  chief  good, 
to  which  other  values  are  related  as  a  means,  he 
seeks  more  or  less  consciously  to  organise  his  con- 
duct as  a  consistent  whole.  The  affirmation  that 
something  ought  to  be,  the  demand  that  value 
should  be  realised,  this  has  been  the  constant  wit- 
ness of  the  human  spirit  throughout  its  history. 
The  content  of  the  idea  of  value  has  changed  with 
the  changing  life  of  societies,  but  the  historic  process 
has  been,  on  the  whole,  from  material  to  ethical  and 
spiritual  conceptions  of  good.  No  doubt  man,  speak- 
ing at  a  particular  point  and  time  in  the  evolution 
of  experience,  cannot  give  final  and  determinate 
content  to  the  idea  of  what  ought  to  be.  He  sees 
'  as  through  a  glass  darkly/  but  he  has  faith  that 
the  good  dimly  discerned  is  no  abstraction  and 
works  as  a  living  influence  on  human  souls.  In 
his  endeavour  to  fill  his  personal  life  with  a  good 
which  he  has  not  yet,  man  finds  a  meaning  for  his 


Meaning  of  Religion.  263 

existence  and  a  scope  for  his  freedom.  Not  the 
world  of  mere  fact  but  that  which  ought  to  be  has 
the  best  title  to  exist.  So  humanity,  clinging  in 
faith  to  the  thought  of  a  good  which  transcends  all 
other  goods,  moves  forward  to  its  goal  by  the  way 
of  the  better.  Faith,  it  must  be  said,  will  not  accept 
the  view  that  its  ideal  good  is  a  purely  relative 
notion  which,  Proteus-like,  takes  many  forms,  and 
is  only  consistent  in  refusing  to  be  fixed  to  any  one 
of  them.  Nor  can  it  agree  that  a  Supreme  Value  is 
a  mere  abstraction,  although  when  pressed  for  a 
reason  it  cannot  point  and  say,  Lo  here,  or  lo  there  ! 
The  kingdom  of  faith  is  within,  and  its  members  are 
convinced  that  they  experience  the  presence  and 
appeal  of  the  good  which  ought  to  be.  This  faith  is 
the  utterance  of  the  free  spirit,  and  is  its  personal 
affirmation  that  that  is  real  which  is  demanded  by 
its  own  deepest  needs.  The  judgment  of  faith  is 
certainly  not  a  logical  inference  which  follows 
analytically  from  premises  which  are  given ;  yet  it 
would,  not  be  fair  to  say  that  it  is  only  a  psycho- 
logical statement  of  what  occurs  in  a  particular 
person.  The  judgment  which  faith  makes  is  not  an 
isolated  one.  It  is  rather  the  normal  utterance  of 
the  spiritual  nature,  the  affirmation  of  what  men 
recognise  to  be  the  demand  of  their  moral  and 
spiritual  life.  Directly  or  indirectly  you  must 
attest  its  practical  validity.  The  Buddhist,  for 


264  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

example,  while  radically  differing  in  his  valuations 
from  Western  races,  is  still  impelled  to  assert  the 
claim  of  a  higher  good  to  be :  Nirvana  is  what 
ought  to  be,  and  it  is  better  than  any  existence  in 
sense  and  time.  We  conclude  that  it  is  a  normal 
characteristic  of  man  as  an  active  spiritual  being  to 
assert  over  against  mere  fact  the  claim  of  a  higher 
good  ;  and  this  involves  the  faith  that  all  values 
stand  in  organic  relation  to  a  Supreme  value. 
The  existence  of  a  highest  value,  though  not  a 
logical  inference,  might  be  named  with  Kant  a 
postulate  of  the  practical  reason,  for  it  is  a 
demand  which  grows  out  of  the  organisation  of 
practical  life. 

That  in  the  historical  development  of  the  race  the 
step  of  personifying  the  highest  value  should  have 
been  taken  is  significant.  It  is  intelligible,  too,  for 
goodness  has  always  a  personal  reference,  and  in 
the  last  resort  is  something  personally  realised. 
Hence  the  value-judgment  finds  its  goal  in  a  God 
who  is  perfectly  good,  the  source  of  all  the  value  that 
is,  and  the  pledge  of  its  completion.  We  do  not 
underrate  this  movement  as  a  historical  testimony  to 
man's  need  of  God.  At  the  same  time,  if  the  ground 
of  our  theistic  belief  is  only  a  judgment  of  value,  I 
cannot  but  think  the  foundation  is  not  sufficiently 
stable.  Let  me  state  shortly  some  objections  to  the 
view,  held  by  not  a  few  at  present,  which  throws 


Meaning  of  Religion.  265 

the  whole  stress  of  the  theistic  inference  on  the 
value-j  udgment . 

Although  in  practical  life  we  must  affirm  our  faith 
in  value,  and  even  in  a  highest  value,  the  need  of 
finding  this  value  personified  in  a  Supreme  Being 
has  not  been  universally  experienced.  There  are 
always  some  in  every  age  who  do  not  feel  that  their 
inward  needs  call  for  the  existence  of  a  God.  Nor 
does  it  seem  inconsistent  with  our  faith  in  value, 
that  the  highest  good  should  be,  not  a  single 
Supreme  Person  but  a  celestial  oligarchy,  or  even 
a  society  of  souls  who  find  a  perfect  satisfaction  in 
one  another.  Such  a  conception  may  be  contradic- 
tory, but  from  the  value  standpoint  it  need  not  be 
so ;  and  if  we  reject  it,  it  must  be  for  other  reasons. 
Again,  it  is  decidedly  unsatisfactory  that  on  grounds 
of  faith  alone  we  should  predicate  a  highly  developed 
notion  like  personality  of  the  supreme  good  :  at 
the  very  least  we  ought  to  discuss  how  far  it  is 
applicable  in  such  a  case.  If  it  were  argued  that 
personality  is  a  form  of  the  finite  only,  it  would  not 
be  enough  for  the  theologian  to  say,  "  Faith  assures 
us  that  the  Infinite  is  personal,  and  therefore  it  must 
be  so  in  fact."  He  would  require  to  show  that  the 
concept  of  the  Infinite,  or  the  World-Ground,  was  at 
least  not  inconsistent  with  personality.  We  have, 
however,  already  touched  on  the  point,  and  will  only 
add  here  that  a  theism  which  rests  entirely  on  a 


266  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

reading  of  the  value-judgment  must  be  perilously 
weak. 

We  have  tried  to  show  that  there  are  other 
grounds  why  God  should  be  conceived  as  personal. 
And  if  the  conclusion  be  accepted,  then  the  service 
the  value- judgment  can  render  in  this  connexion 
becomes  clear.  Faith  completes  the  more  formal 
determinations  of  reason,  and  the  practical  postulate 
of  a  highest  good  gives  content  to  our  conception 
of  the  self-conscious  ground  of  things.  The  Supreme- 
value  which  faith  affirms  to  be  real  must  belong  to 
the  inner  nature  of  the  Supreme  Self.  In  the 
Divine  Consciousness  the  highest  good  eternally 
has  that  reality  which  the  finite  self,  from  its 
standpoint  in  time,  affirms  it  ought  to  have. 
Hence  to  the  eye  of  faith  the  process  of  experience 
is  neither  a  mechanical  movement  nor  a  dialectic 
evolution  but  stages  in  the  development  of  the 
good  which  is  the  content  of  the  Divine  Will. 
From  this  point  of  view  the  demands  of  the 
ethical  consciousness  represent  the  inner  meaning 
of  the  historic  process,  and  witness  to  the  char- 
acter of  its  ground.  But  it  must  be  confessed 
that  we  cannot  give  adequate  specification  to  the 
highest  value  conceived  as  the  world-end.  Man 
must  be  content  to  gather  glimpses  of  his  goal 
with  the  progressive  development  of  the  good  in 
the  growing  riches  of  personal  life.  The  spirit  of 


Meaning  of  Religion.  267 

the  age,  "  dreaming  of  things  to  come,"  can  never 
give  a  clear  form  and  body  to  the  ideal  it  aspires 
after,  and  the  prophets  who  would  "describe  it  speak 
in  doubtful  oracles.  When  we  turn  the  eye  from 
the  illuminated  space  called  the  present,  the  forms 
of  distant  things  are  dim.  Man,  however,  sees 
enough  for  the  conduct  of  life  when  he  can 
advance  on  the  line  of  the  goal,  and  pass  from 
the  lesser  to  the  greater  good.  Moreover,  the 
highest  good,  as  it  would  be  for  our  thought,  would 
still  fall  far  short  of  that  living  fulness  of  personal 
experience  in  which  alone  it  could  be  adequately 
known  and  appreciated.  The  experience  we  have 
to  go  on  is  incomplete.  For  aught  that  we  know, 
terrestrial  experience  may  be  only  a  fragmentary 
portion  of  a  vaster  experience.  So  the  faith  which 
speaks  confidently  of  a  final  good  is  also  con- 
strained to  confess  that  "it  doth  not  yet  appear 
what  we  shall  be."  But  it  is  at  least  clear  that 
the  ultimate  good  must  be  a  personally  realised 
experience,  and  it  cannot  be  apart  from  God,  who 
is  the  source  and  consummation  of  all  goodness. 
Let  me  add  that,  as  it  is  by  an  act  of  faith  we 
affirm  the  reality  of  the  Absolute  Value,  so  it  is 
likewise  an  act  of  faith  by  which  we  affirm  that 
it  coincides  with  the  Self-Conscious  ground  of  all 
experience.  Not  reason,  then,  but  faith  gives 
ethical  content  to  the  idea  of  God.  Nevertheless 


268  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

there  is  a  justification  for  the  conviction  that  the 
theoretical  and  the  value-judgment  must  converge 
towards,  and  find  their  goal  in,  one  Supreme 
Being.  For  though  we  cannot  unify  the  two 
in  thought,  yet  both  proceed  from  one  and  the 
same  personal  life  in  man,  which  cannot  finally 
be  divided  against  itself.  And  this  life  every- 
where has  its  roots  in  the  activity  of  the  personal 
World- Ground. 

We  now  turn  to  the  concluding  part  of  our 
task  in  the  present  essay.  We  proceed  to  con- 
sider the  final  interpretation  of  religion  in  the 
light  of  its  ultimate  basis.  The  discussion  in  an 
earlier  essay  was  concerned  with  the  psychological 
interpretation  of  religious  development ;  it  remains 
for  us  to  try  to  complete  this  statement  by  re- 
considering our  results  from  the  speculative  stand- 
point, which  we  have  sought  to  make  good  in  the 
foregoing  pages. 

The  objective  basis  of  religion  is  God,  and  more 
definitely  God  as  the  supreme  and  perfect  Spiritual 
Personality.  All  experience  has  its  ground  in  the 
Divine  Will ;  but  it  is  only  with  the  development 
of  personal  centres  of  experience  that  the  divine 
activity  within  experience  can  be  the  ground  for 
conscious  acts  which  have  a  religious  significance. 
Very  important  is  it  in  the  interpretation  of  religion 
to  remember  that  the  Divine  Being,  while  immanent 


Meaning  of  Religion.  269 

in  all  centres  of  experience,  also  transcends  them, 
and  does  not  derive  the  fulness  of  His  personal 
life  from  them.  For  religion,  it  cannot  be  dis- 
guised, means  a  personal  relationship,  and  the 
object  of  reverence  must  at  least  be  invested  with 
some  personal  qualities.  Within  a  strictly  pan- 
theistic whole  there  is  scope  neither  for  judgments 
of  value  nor  for  religious  faith.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  we  so  differentiate  the  divine  and  the 
human  that  the  immanence  of  the  divine  in  the 
human  is  lost  sight  of,  the  facts  of  the  religious 
consciousness  again  become  inexplicable.  The 
universal  character  of  religion  shows  that  it  is  a 
native  expression  of  the  human  soul,  and  its  root 
must  lie  in  that  immanent  activity  of  God  by 
which  He  is  the  ground  of  personal  and  self- 
conscious  beings.  This  seems  to  us  the  ontological 
explanation  of  the  psychological  fact  that  religion 
is  the  expression  of  certain  common  elements  in 
the  personal  life  of  men.  With  a  merely  external 
relation  of  God  to  man,  religion  likewise  becomes 
external,  and  ceases  to  be  a  vital  utterance  of 
human  needs  and  energies.  The  old  words  which 
speak  of  the  divine  as  the  "life  and  light  of  men" 
find  ample  justification  in  the  witness  of  the  religi- 
ous consciousness. 

The  psychological  study  of  religious  development 
has  shown  us  that  religion  is  the  utterance  of  man's 


2  ye  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

nature  as  a  whole,  yet  certain  feelings  are  specially 
active  in  promoting  it.  I  refer  to  the  feeling  of 
incompleteness  and  need,  to  the  sense  of  depend- 
ence. From  the  first  this  attitude  of  spirit  had  a 
practical  justification  in  the  circumstances  of  the 
human  lot  on  earth.  The  Philosophy  of  Religion 
gives  a  deeper  and  a  broader  basis  to  the  psycho- 
logical facts.  The  feeling  of  need  and  dependence 
ultimately  springs  from  the  nature  of  human  per- 
sonality. The  finite  spirit  has  not  the  ground  of 
its  being  in  itself  but  in  God,  who  makes  possible 
its  activity.  Historically  it  was  the  physical  facts 
of  his  limitation  which  first  pressed  themselves  on 
primitive  man,  but  the  process  of  inner  develop- 
ment led  to  the  recognition  that  incompleteness  is 
a  note  of  the  personal  life  itself.  All  individual 
being  is  derivative,  it  has  its  ground  in  the  Divine 
Will;  and  this  fundamental  fact  lies  behind  that 
experience  of  incompleteness  and  dependence  which 
marks  the  religious  consciousness.  The  growth  in 
the  religious  consciousness  has  been  in  the  direction 
of  converting  this  material  and  external  idea  of 
dependence  into  an  inward  and  spiritual  idea,  or, 
what  is  the  same  thing,  the  desire  for  freedom 
has  passed  from  a  negative  to  a  positive  form. 
That  primitive  piety  which  is  concerned  with  the 
deliverance  from  brute  wants  and  fears  is  slowly 
transmuted  into  the  spiritual  mind,  which  yearns 


Meaning  of  Religion.  271 

for  the  inward  completion  of  its  own  life  through 
the  indwelling  life  of  God.  And  the  process  by 
which  man  rises  to  this  lofty  thought  is  the  pro- 
cess by  which  he  comes  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
immanent  ground  of  his  own  being. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  the  right  interpretation 
of  religion  to  keep  in  view  the  special  character 
of  the  Divine  Ground  on  which  personal  life 
depends.  We  must  remember  that  the  Divine 
Being  who  stands  in  intimate  relation  to  the 
lives  of  men  is  a  perfect  and  complete  Personality. 
The  defects  which  are  involved  in  human  know- 
ledge and  volition  have  no  counterpart  in  God, 
who  is  eternally  in  harmony  with  Himself.  And 
it  is  the  immanent  working  of  the  divine  in  the 
human,  the  contact  and  pressure  of  the  larger 
Self,  which  gives  the  impulse  to  development  and 
is  the  living  source  of  religious  aspiration.  It  is 
because  our  life  is  grounded  in  a  perfect  Being 
that  we  strive  after  a  perfect  satisfaction  of  the 
self,  and  can  finally  be  content  with  no  temporal 
good.  The  history  of  religion  is  the  record  how 
man  transcends  each  partial  satisfaction  of  his 
spiritual  nature,  and  seeks  a  satisfaction  final  and 
complete ;  and  the  explanation  of  the  process  is 
the  inner  relation  of  the  soul  to  God. 

The  significance  of  religion,  however,  will  not  be 
grasped  if  we  do  not  recognise  a  special  character  in 


272  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

the  imperfection  which  attaches  to  human  person- 
ality. This  is  not  simply  that  of  an  undeveloped 
being,  who  has  not  yet  realised  the  latent  richness 
of  his  nature.  If  this  were  all,  then  the  sense  of 
discord  and  division  in  the  self,  which  in  the 
developed  religious  consciousness  utters  itself  in  the 
longing  for  redemption  and  spiritual  deliverance, 
would  not  be  intelligible.  The  truth  is  that,  over 
and  above  what  may  be  called  natural  imperfection, 
there  is  that  particular  quality  of  evil  in  the  human 
self  which  we  designate  sin.  Sin  is  a  contradiction 
of  the  divine  law  of  man's  nature,  and  is  made 
possible  by  the  fact  that  the  human  self  is  so 
differentiated  from  its  divine  ground  that  it  calls 
its  will  its  own  and  can  oppose  the  Divine  Will. 
There  is  an  irrational  element  in  sin,  and  it  is  not 
fully  explicable;  but  it  is  a  fact  which  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Keligion  cannot  ignore,  though  it  is  not 
able  to  offer  a  speculative  theory  of  its  origin  and 
meaning.  Any  attempt  to  rationalise  moral  evil, 
by  showing  that  it  is  somehow  involved  in  the 
evolution  of  the  good  as  its  necessary  contrast,  can 
only  be  partially  successful.  For  in  the  last  resort 
we  are  confronted  with  the  verdict  of  the  moral 
consciousness  that  sin  is  just  what  ought  not  to  be. 
And  one  must  distrust  the  power  of  the  most 
synoptic  mind  to  rise  to  a  standpoint,  where  that 
which  the  moral  judgment  says  ought  not  to  be  is 


Mean  ing  of  Religion.  273 

seen  as  possessing  a  proper  title  to  exist.1  The  fact 
of  sin,  however  you  interpret  it,  gives  emphasis  to 
the  reality  of  human  freedom, — a  point  of  great 
importance  to  the  right  understanding  of  religion. 
For  apart  from  this  freedom  the  discord  which  is 
in  our  nature  is  not  intelligible — a  discord  which 
makes  the  burden  of  the  higher  Ethical  Keligions 
a  longing  for  inward  reconciliation.  And  then  the 
act  of  faith  by  which  the  individual  finds  deliver- 
ance in  communion  with  a  Divine  Being  is  also 
an  exercise  of  freedom :  you  cannot  construe  it  as 
the  necessary  outcome  of  inward  development.  If 
you  eliminate  this  element  of  personal  freedom,  I  do 
not  see  how  a  man's  religion  should  be  to  him  an 
inward  and  personal  expression  of  himself.  It  could 
not  be  so  any  more  than  the  language  he  habitually 

1  In  a  system  like  Hegel's  sin  must  somehow  find  a  place  in  the 
dialectical  evolution  of  spirit.  Mr  M'Taggart,  in  his  *  Studies  in 
the  Hegelian  Cosmology,'  chap,  vi.,  advances  some  considerations  in 
favour  of  the  view  that  it  is  the  negative  moment  in  the  transition 
from  innocence  to  virtue.  But  his  remarks  are  not  convincing.  Say 
what  you  will,  when  sin  becomes  a  necessary  stage  in  personal 
development,  it  ceases  to  be  sin  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word.  In 
individual  experience  it  is  not  necessary  to  participate  in  sin  in  order 
that  there  be  that  reaction  against  it  which  promotes  the  formation 
of  disciplined  virtue.  Moreover  it  does  not  seem  correct  to  say  that 
virtue  reached  after  personal  experience  of  sin  is  thereby  more  com- 
plete. It  would  be  nearer  the  mark  to  affirm  that,  though  a  man's 
conscious  antagonism  to  sin  may  be  sharpened  by  experience  of  the 
misery  it  entails,  yet'his  bygone  indulgence  in  evil  habit  leaves  an 
element  of  weakness  in  his  character  which  may  reveal  itself  in  time 
of  stress. 

S 


274  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

speaks  is  the  expression  of  his  character  and  indi- 
viduality.1 

Behind  this  exercise  of  freedom  on  man's  part, 
and  never  destroyed  by  it,  is  the  fundamental 
relation  in  which  he  stands  to  God,  the  perfect 
Personality.  On  this  depends  the  fact  that  in  the 
use  of  his  freedom  he  has  brought  discord  into  his 
nature.  For  discord  takes  us  back  to  a  harmony  of 
which  it  is  a  disturbance,  and  just  because  the  har- 
mony strives  to  assert  itself  are  there  division  and 
pain.  That  discontent  with  itself  which  impels  the 
soul  to  look  above  itself,  if  a  token  of  imperfection, 
is  also  a  witness  to  the  enduring  bond  which  links  it 
to  a  harmonious  and  perfect  Life.  The  development 
of  religion  in  the  individual  and  the  race  is  an 
endeavour  to  gain  a  harmonious  personal  existence, 
and  the  common  need  and  demand  for  this  arise  out 
of  the  immanent  relation  of  the  human  self  to  a 
Divine  Self.  "  Be  ye  therefore  perfect,  even  as 
your  Father  in  heaven  is  perfect."  The  pressure  of 
the  Divine  ideal  from  within  is  man's  warrant  and 
encouragement  to  embark  on  this  high  enterprise. 
Nor  is  it  alien  work  at  which  he  is  invited  to 
labour :  he  is  only  bidden  strive  to  enter  into  the 


1  These  remarks  no  doubt  apply  chiefly  to  the  higher  religions. 
At  the  stage  of  nature -religion  personal  freedom  is  undeveloped. 
To  the  savage  freedom  means  no  more  than  deliverance  from  the 
oppression  of  physical  evils. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  275 

full  enjoyment  of  that  heritage  which  is  his  spiritual 
birthright. 

But  religion,  as  an  endeavour  after  personal  har- 
mony, though  in  its  development  it  presents  features 
of  its  own,  is  of  course  subject  to  the  general  condi- 
tions of  human  development.  Even  on  the  lower 
levels  of  individual  being,  the  nature  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  only  unfolded  through  interaction  with 
other  individuals.  And  at  a  higher  stage  we  have 
recognised  that  self  -  consciousness  is  mediated  by 
the  interplay  of  mind  with  mind  in  a  social  system. 
Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  the  development  of  the 
personal  capacity  for  religion.  The  growth  in  self- 
consciousness  which  society  makes  possible  is  also 
accompanied  by  a  growth  in  the  religious  conscious- 
ness :  and  at  all  its  stages  religion  reflects  the 
character  of  the  society  to  which  it  belongs.  When, 
for  instance,  the  social  medium  becomes  rich  enough 
to  nourish  a  highly  developed  personality,  then  this 
is  reflected  in  the  inner  religion  of  the  prophet  and 
spiritual  teacher.  And,  as  it  is  a  general  law  that 
self-consciousness  unfolds  by  interaction  with  other 
selves,  the  same  is  true  in  the  case  of  the  spiritual 
consciousness.  The  latter  finds  expression  and  wins 
strength  for  progress  in  the  mutual  affections,  duties, 
and  services  of  persons  within  a  social  whole.  In 
and  through  their  relations  to  others  men  give  prac- 
tical form  to  their  religious  faith.  At  whatever 


276  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

level  you  take  religion,  you  always  see  that  it  con- 
tains the  idea  of  a  bond  linking  men  to  their  God 
and  to  one  another.  The  idea  may  be  crude  and 
external,  or  it  may  be  refined  and  spiritual,  yet  it  is 
ever  present.  A  religion  for  the  single  soul  and  for 
no  other  is  instinctively  felt  to  be  a  contradiction. 
Plainly  this  feature  is  not  arbitrary  or  accidental, 
but  belongs  to  the  nature  of  religion  itself;  and 
it  seems  possible  to  suggest  a  speculative  interpreta- 
tion of  it.  It  must  have  its  basis  in  the  fundamental 
character  of  the  divine  activity — that  activity  by 
which  individuals  are  placed  in  a  position  of 
common  dependence,  while  at  the  same  time  they 
are  made  interdependent.  God  is  the  immanent 
Ground  of  each  personal  life,  and  connects  all 
personal  centres  of  experience.  It  is  the  harmony 
of  the  divine  Self  in  inner  contact  with  the  human 
self  which  urges  man  to  seek  satisfaction  in  religion. 
Hence  the  religious  impulse,  proceeding  from  a  com- 
mon source  and  tending  to  the  like  expression, 
was  felt  as  a  bond  of  union  in  tribe  or  people : 
and  this  bond  had  its  visible  form  in  the  God  of 
their  worship.  Under  existing  psychological  and 
social  conditions  man  has  given  what  utterance  he 
could  to  the  truth,  that  what  is  central  in  each  man 
is  common  to  all,  and  that  the  religious  bond  is 
rooted  in  the  inner  nature  of  men.  He  has  had  to 
use  the  symbols  which  lay  to  his  hand  in  his 


Meaning  of  Religion.  277 

endeavour  to  express  the  tie  which  bound  him  and 
his  fellows  to  divine  powers.  He  conceives  the 
bond  to  be  one  of  blood,  or  he  thinks  of  it  less 
crudely  as  a  kinship  which  goes  back  to  a  common 
divine  ancestor ;  or,  finally,  he  regards  it  as  the 
spiritual  brotherhood  which  proceeds  from  the  one 
spiritual  Father  in  heaven.  But  though  they  may 
have  expressed  the  principle  inadequately  in  symbol 
or  in  creed,  men  have  always  believed,  and  acted  on 
the  belief,  that  the  tie  which  bound  them  to  their 
God  also  bound  them  intimately  to  one  another. 
The  persistence  of  this  feature  shows  that  it  belongs 
to  the  essence  of  religion.  We  suggest  that  its 
ultimate  explanation  lies  in  the  fact  that  God,  the 
source  of  the  religious  consciousness,  is  the  ground 
on  which  all  spirits  depend,  and  by  which  they  are 
linked  to  one  another.  And  the  religious  conscious- 
ness in  its  temporal  development  gives  expression 
to  the  nature  of  the  Power  which  works  in  its 
working. 

The  thinker  who  tries  to  read  a  philosophic 
meaning  into  the  history  of  religious  development 
has  a  hard  task,  for  the  facts  are  often  stubborn 
and  refractory.  But  any  attempt  to  deal  with 
the  problem  must  keep,  as  it  seems  to  us,  two 
things  in  view.  These  are  (1)  the  common  Divine 
Ground  from  which  the  religious  consciousness  pro- 
ceeds, and  (2)  the  temporal  conditions  and  limita- 


278  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

tions   under   which   that   consciousness   can  reveal 
itself.     By  the  former  we  explain  the  universality 
of  religion  and  the  continuity  of  its  manifestation 
through  all  the  stages  of  human  culture.     And  by 
the  second  we  must  explain  the  diverse  and  often 
conflicting  utterances  of  that  consciousness  in  its 
temporal  unfolding.     The  changing  social  medium 
reflects  the  spiritual  light  in  manifold  ways.     But 
when  we  take  into  account  the  difference  in  the 
character  of  the  medium,  the  phenomena  need  not 
be  inconsistent  with  unity  of  source.     For  the  self 
is    socially   evolved,    and    the    god    in   whom    the 
self  seeks  satisfaction  corresponds  to  the  self  which 
has   to   be  satisfied.     But  it  is  just  the   presence 
of  the  Divine  in  man  throughout  the  long  evolu- 
tion of  personal  life  which  makes  him  realise  the 
partial  nature  of  the  satisfaction  he  has  attained. 
It  impels  him  to  pass  beyond  the  one-sided  forms 
in   which   he   has   given   expression    to    his   faith, 
and  urges  him  to  seek  a  satisfaction  deeper  and 
more  complete.      This  is  the  principle  which  lies 
behind   the   rise   and   fall  of  religions  in  history. 
And  the  fact  that  the  religious  spirit  is  in  move- 
ment, that  it   transcends   the   incomplete  and,   as 
it   may   seem,    conflicting   forms   in  which  it  em- 
bodies itself,  should  make  us  willing  to  admit  that 
there  may  be  unity  of  meaning  and  purpose  in  a 
process  which  we  can  only  survey  in  part. 


Meaning  of  Religion.  279 

But  we  must  also  remember  that  the  divine 
immanence  does  not  work  so  as  to  submerge  the 
individual  personality  and  supersede  its  freedom. 
The  form  which  the  religious  consciousness  takes 
is  not  wrought  in  man  independently  of  his  own 
will.  An  act  of  choice  and  personal  appropriation 
are  implied.  And  it  is  possible  for  him  to  give  it  an 
expression  which  neither  corresponds  to  his  deeper 
nature  nor  ministers  directly  to  progress.  Fetish- 
ism and,  at  a  higher  stage,  pantheism  are  such 
forms ;  for  neither  lends  itself  to  that  inner  per- 
sonal development  which  is  essential  to  religious 
progress.  Still,  though  such  phases  of  religion 
stand  for  a  retrograde  movement,  they  may  have 
a  function  in  religious  development,  if  only  a 
negative  one.  Their  incapacity  to  satisfy  the  need 
of  the  personal  life  may  promote  a  reaction  of 
the  religious  spirit  towards  a  fruitful  line  of  ad- 
vance. The  spiritual  nature,  in  sympathetic  re- 
sponse to  its  divine  ground,  asserts  itself  against 
the  claims  of  a  one-sided  development. 

That  there  is  on  the  whole  a  progress  in  religious 
history  we  have  already  concluded.  But  standing 
as  we  do  in  the  midst  of  this  great  movement, 
we  can  hardly  expect  to  perceive  its  full  and 
final  significance.  Nevertheless  the  prospect  is  not 
wholly  dark.  The  movement  has  its  ground  in  the 
working  of  a  supreme  and  perfect  Personality. 


280  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

Finite  personality  has  its  preliminary  basis  in  in- 
dividuality, and  develops  out  of  it.  Individual 
centres  of  experience  lie  behind  the  ideally  con- 
structed world.  The  individual  real  becomes  the 
self-conscious  individual,  and  the  self-conscious 
individual  in  interaction  with  others  acquires  con- 
tinuity of  interest  and  determinate  character.  He 
becomes  personal  in  the  larger  sense.  So  ex- 
perience comes  to  ripe  blossom  and  fruit  in  per- 
sonality. And  if  experience  has  its  highest  issue 
in  personal  life,  it  is  in  religion  that  personal  life 
gains  its  fullest  development.  The  evolution  of 
religion  itself  is  a  deepening  and  enrichment  of 
self-consciousness.  In  this  process  in  time,  as  we 
venture  to  interpret  it,  the  Divine  Spirit,  working 
through  human  aspiration  and  endeavour,  seeks  to 
bring  human  souls  to  their  amplest  self-fulfilment 
in  living  harmony  and  fellowship  with  Himself. 

The  general  trend  of  religious  evolution  we  have 
already  described  as  a  movement  from  the  sensuous 
to  the  spiritual.  And  in  the  course  of  this  history 
personality  plays  an  increasingly  important  part. 
This  fact  has  perhaps  been  sufficiently  brought 
out  in  an  earlier  essay.  There  are  two  special 
points,  however,  connected  with  the  development 
of  this  conception  which  have  an  interest  for  the 
Philosophy  of  Eeligion.  The  first  of  these  is  the 
force  and  definiteness  given  to  the  personal  idea 


Meaning  of  Religion.  281 

through  the  life  and  work  of  the  great  spiritual 
teachers  and  founders  of  religion.  They  impressed 
on  men  the  truth  that  religion  was  a  personal 
attitude,  a  matter  of  faith  and  conduct :  and  they 
on  their  part  seemed  to  men  to  set  before  them 
a  true  knowledge  of  what  God  was  and  man 
ought  to  be.  They  revealed  God  to  human  faith ; 
in  their  words  and  works  they  gave  forth  the 
divine  spirit  which  filled  them.  And  to  the  pious 
imagination  of  later  generations  they  became  ideal 
figures  who  represented  the  perfection  of  a  religious 
personality.  They  gave  concrete  shape  to  the  ideal, 
they  brought  the  divine  near  to  men,  and  they 
stood  forth  on  the  historic  stage  the  spiritual 
helpers  of  those  who  struggled  towards  the  heavenly 
goal.  The  Philosophy  of  Eeligion  cannot  prove  that 
these  personalities  have  been  the  special  organs  of 
higher  revelation  to  humanity,  though  their  influ- 
ence on  religious  development  has  been  very  great. 
But,  as  we  have  argued  before,  they  are  not  fully 
explained  by  their  age  and  circumstances.  And 
while  there  is  a  sense  in  which  all  religion  has 
its  root  in  the  divine,  there  is  no  valid  reason 
for  denying  that  the  Supreme  Spirit  may  be  more 
directly  operative  at  one  point  than  another.  In- 
deed if  we  are  clear,  as  we  ought  to  be,  that  the 
World-Ground  is  not  mere  substance  but  an  active 
personal  Spirit,  we  shall  regard  such  action  as  prob- 


282  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

able.  The  verdict  of  historical  criticism  in  any 
given  case  is  of  value,  but  in  the  region  of 
spiritual  causality  it  cannot  give  a  final  decision. 
Where  faith  finds  a  quickening  and  renewing  influ- 
ence flowing  from  a  personality,  the  way  is  open 
to  recognise  there  a  revelation  from  a  divine  source. 
There  are  two  aspects  of  the  divine  nature,  as 
our  speculative  discussion  showed,  the  immanent 
and  transcendent.  And  our  second  point  is,  that 
in  the  higher  development  of  religion  the  trans- 
cendent aspect  comes  to  clear  consciousness.  The 
statement  may  be  controverted.  It  will  be  said 
that  an  immanent  God  is  the  only  one  which  the 
modern  mind  can  entertain.  There  is  a  tendency 
in  recent  thought  to  lay  stress  on  the  immanence 
of  God  to  the  exclusion  of  His  transcendence. 
But  it  seems  to  me  the  tendency  is  speculative  in 
its  motive  rather  than  religious.  The  religious  con- 
sciousness has  always  recognised  a  presence  of  God 
in  the  world,  but  as  the  spiritual  mind  developed 
it  came  to  realise  the  complementary  side  of  the 
divine  nature.  And  this  has  been  the  fruit  of 
the  growing  perception  in  spiritual  experience  of 
the  demands  of  personality.  The  higher  religious 
consciousness  finds  that  the  things  of  sense  and 
time  cannot  satisfy  it.  Likewise  it  sees  that  the 
most  potent  obstacles  to  its  development  are  within, 
the  selfish  desires  and  evil  passions.  And  the  soul 


£RS!TY 


Meaning  of  Religion.  283 

which  can  gain  the  harmony  it  craves  neither  with- 
out nor  within  is  urged  towards  a  power  above  it. 
Hence  the  part  redemption  plays  in  the  higher 
ethical  religions.  And  the  God  who  redeems  is 
always  thought  to  be  elevated  above  the  evils 
and  defects  of  temporal  existence,  and  so  able  to 
impart  that  spiritual  harmony  to  the  soul  which 
the  world  cannot  give.  This  negative  relation  to 
the  world  has  indeed  sometimes  been  emphasised 
overmuch.  The  way  to  God  has  been  conceived, 
as  Plato  at  one  time  conceived  it,  to  be  a  retreat 
from  the  things  of  sense,  <j)vy7j  Se  O/JUHOXJIS  ®c<£ 
Kara  TO  Swaroi/.1  The  exaggerations  of  this  idea 
in  Neo-Platonic  thought  and  Christian  practice  are 
well  known,  and  naturally  brought  about  a  reaction. 
For  the  world  after  all  is  God's  world,  and  He 
must  be  in  it  as  well  as  above  it.  None  the  less 
the  enlightened  worshipper  does  not  address  him- 
self to  a  Deity  who  has  no  being  outside  the 
world-process.  For  he  feels  that  a  God  who  is 
thus  interwoven  with  this  unsatisfying  experience 
in  sense  and  time  cannot  ensure  the  fulfilment  of 
his  deep  desire  for  spiritual  deliverance  and  personal 
completion.  It  would  thus  appear  that  religious 
experience  and  speculative  thought  converge  towards 
a  common  conception  of  God.  The  metaphysical 
problem,  as  we  tried  to  show,  was  how  to  think 

1  Thesetetus,  176  B. 


284  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

the  World-Ground,  so  that,  while  all  things  depend 
upon  it,  the  individuality  which  is  at  the  core  of 
experience  may  not  be  reduced  to  unreal  appear- 
ance. The  ripest  outcome  of  religious  experience, 
which  is  expressed  in  faith  in  a  God  who  is  in 
the  world  but  also  above  it,  agrees  with  the 
speculative  conclusion,  though  the  line  of  ap- 
proach has  been  different.  That  is  to  say,  the 
demands  of  consistent  theory  and  the  needs  of 
the  spiritual  life  lead  toward  the  same  result. 

Any  speculative  interpretation  of  religion  must 
ultimately  be  determined  by  the  idea  of  God.  If, 
for  instance,  God  is  concluded  to  be  impersonal,  it 
would  not  be  possible  to  regard  the  end  of  religion 
as  the  completion  and  harmony  of  human  personal- 
ity. It  is  reasonable,  therefore,  to  expect  that  the 
basis  from  which  a  Philosophy  of  Eeligion  is  de- 
veloped will  be  carefully  and  critically  examined. 
I  do  not  doubt  that  some  will  find  the  speculative 
idea  of  God,  suggested  in  the  present  paper,  to  be 
inconsistent,  or  at  least  defective.  In  any  case  it 
will  be  said  that  it  raises  perplexing  questions  which 
it  does  not  answer.  The  latter  complaint,  it  must 
be  granted,  has  justification.  Difficulties,  for  ex- 
ample, are  connected  with  the  interpretation  of  the 
nature  of  space  and  time,  and  with  the  manner  of 
the  divine  immanence  in  the  world.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  may  be  replied  that  there  is  no  meta- 


Meaning  of  Religion.  285 

physical  theory  of  reality  which  does  not  lay  itself 
open  to  objections  more  or  less  important.  The 
test  applied  to  a  theory  of  the  kind  must  be  a 
modified  one — viz.,  how  far  it  does  justice  to  the 
essential  aspects  of  experience.  And  I  will  say 
this,  the  conception  of  God  as  personal  World- 
Ground  offers  fewer  and  less  serious  difficulties  than 
that  which  regards  Him  as  an  impersonal  Absolute. 
Thus,  if  the  non  -  personal  nature  of  God  be 
maintained,  not  only  does  the  evolution  of  the 
human  self  become  an  enigma,  but  the  historic 
development  of  the  religious  consciousness  can  only 
mean  the  fictitious  projection  into  the  sphere  of 
real  being  of  purely  subjective  needs  and  desires. 
It  has  been  truly  said,  "  If  it  be  denied  that  the 
concept  of  personality  is  applicable  to  the  nature 
of  God,  the  whole  historical  development  of  the 
religious  consciousness  must  be  termed  the  de- 
velopment of  an  illusion."  x  And  while  some  are 
prepared  frankly  to  accept  this  consequence,  they 
must  do  so  at  the  cost  of  declaring  the  fundamental 
and  persistent  need  in  human  nature,  which  en- 
gendered the  illusion,  to  be  false  and  misleading. 
This  would  mean  that  there  is  an  abiding  discord 
between  the  claims  of  the  spiritual  and  intellectual 
nature.  As  against  this  we  cherish  the  conviction, 
that  a  world  in  which  spiritual  life  can  realise  itself, 

1  Siebeck,  Lehrbuch  der  Eeligionsphilosophie,  p.  364. 


286  The  ultimate  Basis  and 

and  advance  progressively  to  higher  forms,  must  be 
a  world,  on  the  whole  at  least,  in  accord  with  spirit- 
ual ends.  From  this  we  would  infer  that  it  has  a 
spiritual  ground.  And  if  the  theistic  inference  be 
wrong,  we  can  have  no  confidence  in  the  continued 
growth  and  dominance  of  spiritual  life  in  the  world. 
It  has  blossomed  forth  in  the  process  of  experience, 
and  it  may  fade  and  die,  for  there  is  nothing  in  the 
nature  of  things  which  can  secure  its  persistence. 
This  can  only  be  assured  by  an  ethical  and  personal 
World- Ground. 

The  individual  who  strives  to  know  the  reasons  of 
things  is  driven  to  confess  that  there  are  heights 
and  depths  in  experience  which  baffle  the  philo- 
sophic mind.  Even  in  the  matter  of  our  personal 
history,  the  inner  fulness  of  experience  and  its 
subtle  transitions  are  more  than  we  can  adequately 
express  in  the  general  ideas  with  which  thought 
works.  Still  more  inadequate  must  be  our  in- 
tellectual conception  of  that  ideal  experience, — the 
experience  complete  and  harmonious  in  which  per- 
sonal beings  come  to  spiritual  fruition  in  union  with 
God  and  one  another, — which  is  the  goal  of  religious 
endeavour.  Dante,  when  at  the  close  of  his  arduous 
journey  he  approached  the  sphere  of  the  Eternal 
Light,  found  his  speech  brief  and  stammering,  and 
strength  failed  him  to  pursue  the  lofty  vision  : — 
"  All'  alta  fantasia  qui  manc6  possa." 


Meaning  of  Religion.  287 

And  of  God  as  He  is  for  Himself,  of  the  depths 
of  His  inner  nature,  human  thought  could  only 
speak  surely  if  it  had  ceased  to  be  human,  and  if 
it  had  become  God's  own  thought.  It  is  faith 
which  completes  the  work  which  reason  has  to 
leave  unfinished,  and  sets  before  men  the  Deity 
who  can  be  an  object  of  reverence,  loyalty,  and 
love.  Faith  gives  that  fulness  of  spiritual  content 
to  the  idea  of  God  without  which  the  religion  of 
personal  experience  and  communion  would  be  im- 
possible. The  office  of  faith  thought  cannot  take 
upon  itself,  and  a  speculative  theory  of  religion 
can  lay  no  claim  to  exhaust  the  meaning  of  the 
object  of  faith.  But  it  should  not  be  deemed  to 
have  failed  if  it  opens  out  deeper  points  of  view 
on  the  subject,  suggests  the  larger  meaning  of  re- 
ligious development,  and  throws  a  light  on  the 
place  religion  fills  in  experience  as  a  whole. 

The  philosopher,  according  to  the  splendid  idea 
of  Plato,  is  a  c  spectator  of  all  time  and  existence ' : 
in  truth,  he  is  the  son  of  his  age,  and  utters  his 
oracles  on  the  deep  things  of  eternity  in  the 
language  and  tones  of  his  time.  The  activity  of 
thought  arises  out  of  the  wider  movement  of  life, 
and  has  its  roots  therein.  Behind  it  work  the 
practical  interests  of  a  social  era,  and  the  verdicts 
of  reason  are  not  absolutely  impartial  and  im- 
personal. The  later  speculator  has  the  ampler  ex- 


288      Ultimate  Basis  and  Meaning  of  Religion. 

perience  to  draw  upon,  if  he  has  the  wisdom  to 
read  its  lesson ;  and  he  commonly  finds  it  necessary 
to  preface  his  own  message  by  a  statement  of  the 
shortcomings  of  those  who  have  gone  before  him. 
Human  experience  is  incomplete,  and  while  it  con- 
tinues to  widen  and  deepen,  the  task  of  philosophy 
will  not  be  ended.  Moreover,  he  would  be  a  rash 
man  who  ventured  to  declare  that  the  universe 
contains  no  other  evolution  of  experience  than  the 
terrestrial.  Religion  in  these  days  has  been  re- 
proached for  failing  to  take  to  heart  the  teaching 
of  Copernicus,  but  philosophy  has  often  laid  itself 
open  to  the  same  censure.  And  if  Philosophy, 
depending  as  it  does  on  the  larger  movement  of 
experience,  can  advance  no  claim  to  finality,  the 
Philosophy  of  Religion  is  of  necessity  in  the  same 
case.  To  some  extent  its  conclusions  must  be 
tentative,  and  there  are  things  which  it  has  to 
leave  unexplained.  But  if  we  reject  the  gospel 
which  some  at  present  preach,  that  reason  is  only 
the  slave  of  feeling  or  the  hired  servant  of  will ;  if 
we  are  satisfied  that  thought  is  an  essential  aspect 
of  a  developed  personal  life; — we  shall  recognise 
that  man  must  take  on  him  the  task  of  searching 
out  the  deeper  meaning  of  religious  experience. 


ESSAY    VI. 

PHILOSOPHY  AND  THEOLOGY:   THE 
EITSCHLIAN  STANDPOINT 


ESSAY   VI. 


THE  word  theology  (OeoXoyiKij)  was  used  by  Aristotle 
as  a  designation  of  First  Philosophy.  For  his  ex- 
position of  principles  led  up  to  a  Supreme  Principle, 
to  a  Being  who  is  the  ground  of  all  being.  Follow- 
ing this  lead,  and  keeping  to  the  meaning  of  the 
term,  we  should  regard  theology  as  dealing  only 
with  the  nature  and  attributes  of  God.  In  practice, 
however,  the  word  theology  has  come  to  have  a 
wider  meaning.  It  is  used  to  denote  the  connected 
presentation  of  a  system  of  religious  doctrine.  And 
such  a  system  is  based  on  a  concrete  historic 
religion. 

The  formation  of  doctrine  belongs  to  the  later 
period  of  religious  growth,  for  in  the  early  stages  of 
religion  the  intellectual  element  is  little  developed. 
Custom,  worship,  and  ritual  precede  the  evolution 
of  doctrine.  Among  the  nature-religions  doctrine, 
in  the  ordinary  sense,  is  not  explicit,  and  remains 
unseparated  from  myth,  ritual,  and  tradition.  Nor 


29 2  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

is  this  further  development  possible  before  the 
appearance  of  ethical  religion,  and  the  advent  of 
reflective  self -consciousness.  But  when  this  poico 
is  reached,  thought  asserts  for  itself  a  distinct 
function  in  interpreting  and  directing  the  express- 
ion of  the  religious  spirit.  The  beliefs  which  have 
silently  grown  up  are  now  defined  and  organised, 
and  appeal  is  made  to  the  understanding  as  well  as 
to  the  feelings  and  will.  Man  desires  to  find  a 
general  meaning  for  the  acts  which  are  the  practical 
expression  of  religion,  and  this  meaning  he  seeks  to 
formulate  in  doctrine.  Illustrations  of  this  tend- 
ency will  be  readily  found  in  the  religions  of  India 
and  of  ancient  Egypt.  But  beyond  all  doubt  the 
Christian  Eeligion  furnishes  the  best  example  of  the 
growth  of  an  elaborate  doctrinal  system.  And  it 
is  the  only  system  which  has  a  direct  and  living 
interest  for  Western  peoples.  In  the  present 
paper  theology  is  used  exclusively  in  its  Christian 
reference. 

Like  every  other  religion,  Christianity  did  not 
establish  itself,  in  the  first  instance,  on  a  doctrinal 
foundation.  Beliefs  there  were,  of  course,  but  they 
were  relatively  few  and  simple,  and  faith  was 
intimately  united  to  life.  But  as  the  spiritual 
movement  grew  and  gathered  strength,  as  it  passed 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  Jewish  people  and  appealed 
to  Gentiles  reared  under  alien  traditions  and  ideas, 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  293 

it  became  necessary  for  the  Church  consciously  to 
realise  and  to  put  in  intelligible  form  the  outlines 
of  her  teaching.  And  the  task  was  the  more  urgent 
from  the  fact  that  Christianity  from  a  very  early 
period  had  to  meet  distortions  and  perversions  of 
what  was  felt  to  be  true  belief.  The  presence  and 
the  oppositions  of  heresies  forced  the  Church  to 
draw  out  with  increasing  fulness  the  details  of  the 
orthodox  creed.  And  by  the  end  of  the  second 
century  the  phrase  TO  8o'y//,a  became  current  as  the 
sign  of  a  doctrine  accepted  by  the  Church.  The 
dogma  was  regarded  as  the  intelligible  formula- 
tion of  a  truth  implied  in  the  common  Christian 
consciousness.  And  with  the  multiplication  of 
doctrinal  principles,  it  became  necessary  to  connect 
and  organise  them  in  a  systematic  way. 

The  important  part  played  by  Hellenism  in  the 
development  of  the  Church's  theology  has  been 
widely  recognised.  The  formal  terms  in  which  the 
early  theologians  expressed  their  doctrines  were 
borrowed  from  Greek  thought,  through  the  medium 
of  Hellenism,  and  the  form  could  not  but  react 
upon  the  matter.  And  in  the  Greek  language  the 
thinkers  of  the  Church  had  an  instrument  to  express 
the  subtle  distinctions  they  desired  to  draw.  But 
over  and  above  this,  we  find  philosophy  affecting 
theology  in  a  more  direct  way  in  the  work  of 
the  Alexandrine  School.  In  the  first  and  second 


294  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

centuries  the  pseudo-philosophy  of  the  Gnostics  had 
offered  itself  as  a  larger  and  more  profound  inter- 
pretation of  Christianity.  But  though  the  fantastic 
constructions  of  Gnosticism  were  rejected,  some  at 
least  were  disposed  to  admit  that  its  general  prin- 
ciple was  right.  There  was  a  higher  wisdom  to 
which  the  philosopher  could  attain.  This  yvaxris 
was  a  moris  enrior^fAoi/ucq — faith  elevated  by  know- 
ledge— so  said  Clement  of  Alexandria.  The  philo- 
sopher, in  this  view,  was  able  to  grasp  by  thought 
the  meaning  of  the  dogma  which  the  common 
Christian  consciousness  held  by  faith.  Between 
knowledge  and  faith  there  was  no  antagonism. 
The  influence  of  speculative  thought  on  the 
Church's  theology  is  still  more  apparent  in 
Clement's  great  pupil  Origen.  Some  of  Origen's 
theories,  like  that  of  the  eternal  generation  of  the 
Son,  the  Church  accepted  as  true ;  others,  like  that 
of  the  eternal  creation  of  the  world,  she  rejected 
as  false.  But  it  is  clear  that  while  the  Church, 
through  her  councils,  claimed  to  be  the  judge  of 
what  was  Catholic  truth,  she  was  not  disposed  to 
refuse  the  aid  of  the  philosopher  in  helping  her 
to  a  more  profound  interpretation  of  Christian 
doctrine. 

When  we  pass  to  mediaeval  times,  we  find 
the  religious  atmosphere  and  outlook  changed. 
The  formative  period  has  passed,  dogma  has 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  295 

hardened  down  into  fixed  form,  and  the  work  of 
the  theologian  is  to  systematise.  The  fundamental 
assumption  of  Scholasticism  is  the  truth  of  the 
dogma :  reason  may  support  the  dogma,  but  can- 
not alter  it.  One  thinker  in  the  ninth  century, 
Scotus  Erigena,  had  shown  a  speculative  boldness 
which  recalls  Origen,  but  it  was  at  the  expense 
of  being  considered  heretical.1  And  in  the  eleventh 
century  Anselm's  words,  "  credo  ut  intelligam,"  set 
forth  the  spirit  of  the  movement.  Keason  is  to 
be  valued  as  the  ancilla  fidei,  but  it  must  not 
alter  or  criticise  the  faith.  Nevertheless,  if  the 
Church's  theology  could  be  buttressed  and  con- 
firmed by  the  Aristotelian  Philosophy,  this  was 
tacitly  to  admit  the  independent  authority,  and 
in  a  sense  the  superiority,  of  the  philosophic 
reason  to  the  dogma.  Philosophy,  ostensibly  the 
handmaid  of  theology,  was  in  a  way  to  become 
the  mistress.  And  though  this  drastic  change 
was  not  accomplished  by  Scholasticism,  yet  reason 
became  a  disintegrating  influence  on  the  structure 
of  mediaeval  theology.  This  appears  in  the 
theory  of  the  "double  truth"  held  by  Occam  and 
the  later  schoolmen.  What  was  true  in  philosophy 
might  be  false  in  theology,  and  what  was  true 

1  In  one  place,  speaking  of  God,  Erigena  says,  "  Deus  propter  emi- 
nentiam  non  immerito  nihil  vocatur."  One  does  not  wonder  that  his 
orthodoxy  was  doubted. 


296  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

in  theology  might  be  false  in  philosophy.  Such 
a  position,  from  the  intellectual  point  of  view, 
was  virtually  suicidal :  and  if  those  who  adopted 
it  found  it  convenient,  it  is  not  likely  that  many 
of  them  took  it  seriously.  The  inevitable  result 
was  the  abandonment  of  the  assumption  on  which 
Scholastic  theology  rested ;  and  the  birth  of  the 
Eeformation  signalised  the  open  revolt  of  reason 
against  the  dogmatic  system  of  the  mediaeval 
Church. 

The  theology  of  the  Eeformed  Churches  was 
not  reared  by  the  help  of  speculative  thought. 
It  represented  in  the  main  an  endeavour  to  cut 
away  what  was  judged  to  be  false  in  Komish 
doctrine,  and  to  build  up  a  system  of  theology 
on  biblical  lines.  Nor  was  philosophy  itself  in  a 
condition  to  aid  in  the  work  of  reconstruction. 
Condemned  for  centuries  to  a  merely  formal 
activity,  it  had  to  come  in  contact  with  reality, 
to  find  content  in  the  fresh  movements  of  science 
and  social  life,  ere  it  could  rise  to  an  effective 
development  and  make  its  voice  heard  in  matters 
of  faith. 

There  is  one  episode,  however,  in  the  space 
between  the  Eeformation  and  the  beginning  of 
last  century  to  which  it  may  be  instructive  to 
refer.  I  mean  the  Deistic  controversy  and  the 
discussions  on  "  natural  religion,"  which  extended 


tfie  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  297 

from  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  well  into  the 
eighteenth  century.  Here  rational  thought  takes 
up  a  distinctive  attitude  to  "revealed  religion" 
as  represented  in  the  theology  of  the  Church. 
That  attitude  was  both  positive  and  negative. 
Positive,  in  so  far  as  the  English  rationalistic 
thinkers  held  that  there  was  a  core  of  truth 
beneath  the  doctrines  of  the  Church ;  negative, 
in  so  far  as  they  held  that  this  truth  was  to 
be  reached  by  an  external  process  of  cutting  away 
the  overgrown  branches  of  the  theological  tree, 
and  reducing  it  to  the  bare  stem  of  rational  re- 
ligion— the  religion  endorsed  by  the  natural  light 
of  reason  in  man.  The  idea  of  a  simple,  clear- 
cut,  and  universally  intelligible  '  religion  of  nature,' 
which  is  the  norm  of  religious  appreciation,  is  a 
curious  evidence  of  the  limitations  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  mind.  That  mind,  as  we  all  know, 
was  not  historical.  Eeason  to  it  meant  the  logical 
understanding,  a  ready-made  instrument,  not  a 
developing  capacity.  It  construed  history  by  the 
light  of  fictions  of  its  own  creation.  '  Natural 
religion'  was  an  artificial  product,  just  as  were 
the  'state  of  nature'  and  'natural  rights.'  Hence 
a  sympathetic  view  of  religious  development,  and 
of  the  growth  of  dogma  as  an  aspect  of  that 
development,  lay  beyond  the  mental  horizon  of 
the  eighteenth  century  thinkers.  No  fruitful 


298  Philosophy  and  Theology  : 

application  of  speculative  ideas  to  the  content  of 
religion  was  possible.  Even  Kant,  in  so  many 
ways  the  herald  of  a  new  age,  was  still  largely 
influenced  by  the  ideas  of  the  past.  His  reflexions 
on  the  subject  of  religion  were  entitled  "  Eeligion 
within  the  Limits  of  Mere  Beason,"  and  in  his 
general  treatment  of  religion  the  influence  of  the 
eighteenth  century  is  unmistakable. 

This  sober  rationalism  melted  away  in  that 
wonderful  spring-time  of  speculative  ardour  and 
religious  interest  which  marked  the  early  decades 
of  the  nineteenth  century  in  Germany.  The 
Eomantic  movement,  headed  by  Schleiermacher, 
and  the  far-reaching  systems  of  the  Post-Kantian 
thinkers,  were  in  different  ways  instrumental  in 
bringing  philosophic  ideas  into  living  contact  with 
theological  doctrines.  The  speculative  keenness  and 
confidence  which  were  inspired  by  the  *  kings  of 
thought'  bore  fruit  in  numerous  attempts  to  give 
a  philosophical  interpretation  of  the  main  dogmas 
of  Christianity.  Between  1830  and  1850  the 
German  mind  was  extraordinarily  active  in  the 
department  of  speculative  theology,  as  any  reader 
may  satisfy  himself  who  consults  a  good  history 
of  the  movement.1 

In  the  first  essay  I  have  indicated  the  general 
standpoint  of  those  who  sought  to  recast  and  re- 

1  Vid.  Pfleiderer,  The  Development  of  Theology. 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  299 

interpret  religious  doctrine  on  Hegelian  principles. 
The  old  contrast  of  TTLCTTLS  and  y^oio-is  had  a 
counterpart  in  the  distinction  of  Vorstellung  and 
Begriff.  But  the  speculative  theologian  claimed 
the  right  to  criticise,  reject,  or  transform  religious 
dogma  by  reference  to  the  philosophical  idea  of 
religion.  That  there  was,  after  all,  a  certain  in- 
definiteness  in  this  idea,  was  apparent  from  the 
very  different  valuations  put  on  the  doctrines  of 
the  Church  by  those  who  professed  to  share  the 
same  philosophic  principles.  The  doctrine  which 
one  thinker  reduced  to  a  myth  another  thought 
worthy  of  a  speculative  interpretation1.  With  the 
decadence  of  faith  in  the  principles  which  the 
speculative  theologians  sought  to  apply  to  religious 
doctrines  their  work  gradually  fell  into  disrepute. 
The  mind  of  the  theologian,  it  was  urged,  must 
not  be  warped  by  preconceived  ideas.  He  must 
bring  an  open  mind  to  the  study  of  Christian 
development,  and  he  must  recognise  that  feeling 
and  will  play  a  larger  part  than  thought  in 
religious  evolution.  The  growth  of  Christian 
doctrine,  for  example,  is  not  to  be  reduced  to  a 
progress  through  antagonism  of  ideas  as  it  seemed 
to  the  Tubingen  School,  but  should  be  connected 
with  the  practical  needs,  interests,  and  aspirations 

1  Daub,  for  instance,  speculatively  constructs  the   person  of  the 
Devil.    To  theologians  of  the  type  of  Strauss  this  was  folly. 


300  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

which  entered  into  the  life  of  the  Church.  We 
ought  to  stand  close  to  the  historic  facts  in  the 
fulness  of  their  meaning.  And  a  doctrine  has 
meant  more  for  the  religious  mind  than  can  be 
represented  in  general  notions. 

It  will  not  now  be  denied  that  there  is  truth  in 
these  contentions.  To  some  this  truth  has  seemed 
so  all-important  that  they  declare  that,  in  its  basis 
and  methods,  theology  must  be  purely  historical. 
In  Germany,  once  its  home,  speculative  theology 
to-day  receives  no  courteous  treatment  at  the  hands 
of  theologians ;  and  for  a  generation  their  attitude 
to  it  has  been  in  the  main  hostile.  I  have  already 
referred  to  the  leading  part  played  in  the  reaction- 
ary movement  by  the  large  and  influential  Bitschlian 
School.1  A  year  or  two  ago  Harnack,  in  the  intro- 
duction to  those  eloquent  and  illuminating  lectures 
which  he  delivered  to  the  Berlin  students  on  "  What 
is  Christianity?"  remarked,  "  Had  we  held  these  lec- 
tures sixty  years  ago,  we  should  have  occupied  our- 
selves in  trying  to  find  a  general  idea  of  religion  by 
speculation,  and  in  determining  the  Christian  (idea) 
in  accordance  with  it.  Only  we  have  justly  grown 
sceptical  about  this  procedure.  Latet  dolus  in 
generalibus.  We  know  to-day  that  life  does  not 
admit  of  being  compassed  by  universal  notions."2 
And  these  words  of  the  distinguished  historian  of 

1  See  Essay  I.  2  Das  Wesen  des  Christenthums,  pp.  5,  6. 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  301 

dogma  express  the  mind  of  that  numerous  group  of 
theologians  who  treat  religious  problems  after  the 
method  and  in  the  spirit  of  Eitschl.  The  followers 
of  Eitschl  differ  among  themselves  in  their  epis- 
temology,  and  in  the  value  they  attach  to  particular 
dogmas  and  religious  movements,  but  they  are  all 
at  one  with  the  master  in  maintaining  that  meta- 
physics cannot  help  theology,  and  must  be  sternly 
excluded  from  it.  Non  tali  auxilio,  nee  defens- 
oribus  istis ! 

Some  fifteen  or  twenty  years  ago  the  Ritschlian 
theology  was  little  known  in  this  country.  And 
such  verdicts  as  were  passed  on  it  were,  in  the 
main,  unfavourable.  But  now  signs  of  a  change 
of  attitude  are  not  wanting.  The  monistic  idealism 
which  traced  its  inspiration  to  Kant  and  Hegel  does 
not  command  the  same  assent :  and  a  philosophic 
movement  which  tends  to  subordinate  thought  to 
will,  the  theoretical  to  the  personal  and  practical 
aspect  of  life,  has  made  its  appearance.  As  yet  the 
partisans  of  the  movement  are  chiefly  engaged  in 
clearing  the  ground  for  themselves  by  a  vigorous 
assault  on  the  philosophic  powers  that  be.  The 
elements  of  value  in  their  gospel  will  be  better 
judged  when  they  have  constructively  developed 
their  principles.  Meanwhile  the  sympathetic  hear- 
ing accorded  to  the  new  views  is  a  sign  that  older 
forms  of  speculation  are  ceasing  to  satisfy.  And  it 


302  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

may  be  supposed  that  this  change  in  the  philosophic 
temper  of  our  time  will  help  in  disposing  the  theo- 
logically-minded to  give  a  favourable  reception  to 
the  Eitschlian  system.  Indeed  there  are  signs  that 
this  is  already  the  case.  Where  not  so  long  ago 
Kitsehlianism  would  have  been  condemned  for  its 
lack  of  philosophic  basis,  it  now  receives  attentive 
and  appreciative  study.  That  this  theology,  laying 
stress  as  it  does  exactly  on  those  points  where 
speculative  idealism  was  weak,  has  a  function  to 
fulfil  in  the  development  of  religious  thought  I  do 
not  doubt.  But  there  are  good  reasons  why  the 
Bitschlian  standpoint  should  not  be  accepted  as  a 
whole.  I  must,  however,  limit  as  far  as  possible 
the  discussion  to  a  single,  if  prominent,  aspect  of 
the  system.  We  are  at  present  concerned  with  the 
question,  whether  Eitschl  and  his  followers  success- 
fully justify  the  exclusion  of  philosophy  from  theo- 
logy. When  we  have  sufficiently  considered  this 
point,  we  will  state  our  own  view  on  the  relation  of 
the  one  to  the  other. 

According  to  Kitschl  the  fundamental  fact  for 
Christian  theology  is  the  revelation  of  God  in 
Christ.1  This  is  the  basis  of  the  Kingdom  of  God, 

1  In  this  examination  of  Eitschlianism  I  have  used  at  one  or  two 
points  an  article  of  my  own,  published  a  good  many  years  ago  in 
the  American  'Presbyterian  Eeview.'  English  readers  will  find  a 
clear  and  fair-minded  statement  of  KitschFs  system  in  Dr  Garvie's 
book,  *  The  Kitschlian  Theology.'  Instructive  criticisms  are  con- 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  303 

the  spiritual  society  founded  by  Christ,  in  which 
man  realises  his  freedom  and  works  out  his  religious 
vocation.  The  idea  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  as  the 
highest  good  of  Christian  men,  is  the  central  idea 
in  the  light  of  which  Ritschl  constructs  his  doctrinal 
system.  Hence  for  him  a  particular  historical  mani- 
festation guides  and  controls  the  working  out  of 
Christian  Dogmatics.  The  Christian  consciousness, 
which  expresses  itself  in  value -judgments,  affirms 
the  Kingdom  of  God  to  be  the  supreme  good.  And 
it  is  by  judgments  of  value  in  relation  to  the  King- 
dom that  the  attributes  of  God,  the  person  and 
work  of  Christ,  and  the  practical  religious  life  are 
determined  for  the  Christian  consciousness.  Putting 
it  generally,  we  may  say  that  the  Christian  conscious- 
ness, from  the  content  of  which  Christian  doctrine 
is  evolved,  has  an  objective  and  a  subjective  side. 
The  former  is  the  fact  of  revelation,  the  latter  is 
the  judgment  by  which  faith  affirms  the  value  of 
that  revelation  for  the  inner  life.  Through  these 
two  factors,  then,  we  are  supplied  with  the  materials 
for  constructing  a  theology  positive  and  historical, 
which  is  without  any  admixture  of  the  baser  ele- 

tained  in  the  English  translation  of  Prof.  Pfleiderer's  *  Philosophy  of 
Eeligion '  and  in  his  '  Development  of  Theology.5  In  his  '  Unterricht 
in  der  christlichen  Eeligion,3  Ritschl  has  given  a  clear  and  useful 
outline  of  his  theology.  The  full  exposition  of  his  system  is  contained 
in  his  great  work  in  three  volumes,  *  Die  christliche  Lehre  der  Eecht- 
fertiguug  und  Versohnung.' 


304  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

ment  of  metaphysics.  And  so  to  theologians,  to 
quote  the  words  of  Herrmann,  "  Whether  philosophy 
be  deistic,  pantheistic,  theistic,  or  whatever  it  is,  is 
a  matter  of  indifference.1 

It  is  of  course  inevitable  that  a  theology,  which 
is  built  up  by  personal  value-judgments  operating 
on  the  historic  fact  of  the  Christian  Eevelation, 
should  at  many  points  be  antagonistic  to  ecclesias- 
tical dogma.  Eitschl  and  his  followers  are  at  no 
pains  to  conceal  this  antagonism.  For  the  dog- 
matic system  of  the  Churches  has  been  leavened 
by  metaphysical  thought,  due  largely  to  Greek 
influence,  and  is  therefore  no  satisfactory  state- 
ment of  objective  Christian  Revelation.  Hence, 
in  their  reconstruction  of  Christian  doctrine,  the 
Ritschlians  eliminate  the  metaphysical  element  and 
replace  it  by  the  practical  aspect.  Instead  of  the 
ecclesiastical  doctrines  of  the  Trinity,  the  meta- 
physical attributes  of  God,  the  transcendent  nature 
of  Christ,  they  substitute  such  practical  interpre- 
tations of  these  as  are  made  possible  by  bringing 
them  into  organic  relation  with  Christ's  Kingdom 
as  the  supreme  end.  The  eternal  and  divine  nature 
of  Christ,  for  instance,  simply  means  that  He  had 
an  eternal  place  in  the  divine  world-plan  which 
embraced  the  kingdom,  and  that  his  person  has  the 
religious  value  of  God  for  the  Christian  community. 

1  Quoted  by  Pfleiderer,  Phil,  of  Keligion  (Eng.  trans.),  vol.  ii.  p.  100. 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  305 

An  exposition  or  a  criticism  of  the  Kitschlian 
theology  is  not  our  task  at  present.  But  one  may 
express  appreciation  of  its  boldness  and  decision 
of  purpose.  Kitschl  was  always  resolved  to  call 
his  soul  his  own;  and  antagonism  to  movements 
he  disliked  exercised  a  considerable  influence  in 
fixing  his  own  standpoint.  One  can  also  admire 
the  persistency  with  which  certain  fundamental 
principles  are  kept  in  sight  in  the  system,  and 
the  unity  of  spirit  and  method  which  characterises 
it.  Nor  is  it  a  slight  merit  that  the  School  should 
lift  up  its  voice  with  courage  and  conviction  against 
the  dead  weight  of  ecclesiastical  dogma,  and  demand 
a  return  to  what  is  practical  and  historical.  For 
those  at  all  events  who  are  unfettered  by  tradition, 
and  can  read  the  signs  of  the  times,  recognise  that 
reconstruction  is  inevitable,  if  the  study  of  theology 
is  to  be  pursued  with  more  than  an  antiquarian 
interest.  Last,  but  not  least,  Eitschlians  have  done 
a  real  service  in  insisting  on  the  indispensable  office 
of  the  value-judgment  in  the  religious  consciousness. 
The  tendency  of  speculative  theologians  had  been 
to  ignore  this,  and  to  the  disadvantage  of  their 
work. 

We  have  still  to  ask,  however,  if  Kitschl  and  his 
followers  are  really  successful  in  eliminating  meta- 
physics from  theology,  and  in  showing  that  the 
latter  can  be  quite  independent  of  the  former. 

u 


306  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

The  reply  to  this  question  must  be  in  the  nega- 
tive. Indeed  Eitschl's  contemporary,  Lipsius,  said 
no  more  than  the  truth  when  he  declared  that 
Eitschl's  rejection  of  philosophical  principles  was 
ostensible  rather  than  real.1  It  may  conduce  to 
clearness  if  I  state,  under  separate  heads,  what 
seem  to  me  the  main  objections  to  the  Eitschlian 
position  on  this  point. 

I.  The  rejection  of  metaphysics  by  the  Eitschlian 
school  is  not  thorough,  although  it  claims  to  be  so. 
Even  those  who  deeply  distrust  metaphysics  have 
usually  some  metaphysical  presuppositions  on  which 
they  take  stand  in  delivering  their  attack  upon  it. 
Eitschl  himself  develops  an  epistemological  theory 
with  the  aid  of  Kant  and  Lotze,  which  forms  the 
introduction  to  his  theology.  As  the  result  of  this 
he  is  able  to  define  the  sphere  and  function  of  the 
theoretical  and  of  the  value-judgment,  and  to  de- 
termine the  limitations  of  the  former.  By  its  own 
means,  he  tells  us,  theoretical  knowledge  cannot 
at  all  attain  to  a  highest  universal  law  of  existence. 
The  idea  of  the  world  as  a  totality  is  not  due  to 
philosophy  but  to  the  religious  consciousness.  Yet 
finally  Eitschl  is  led  to  conclude  that,  if  we  set 
out  from  the  Christian  idea  of  God,  a  theoretical 
knowledge  of  the  world  as  a  totality  is  still 
possible.  "If  theoretical  knowledge  will  not  re- 

1  Glauben  und  Wissen,  p.  324. 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  307 

nounce  the  attempt  to  comprehend  the  co-ordina- 
tion of  nature  and  spiritual  life,  it  must  accept 
the  Christian  idea  of  God  as  scientifically  valid 
truth."  One  might  argue  against  this  statement 
that  the  idea  of  the  world-unity  is  implied  in  the 
exercise  of  reason,  and  is  not  a  pure  gift  of  revealed 
religion.  But  apart  from  this  the  passage  quoted 
shows  that  Ritschl  was  in  the  end  disposed  to 
grant,  albeit  in  a  half-hearted  way,  a  liberty  of 
philosophising  under  certain  conditions.  The  in- 
complete exclusion  of  philosophy  from  theology  is 
further  shown  in  the  Ritschlian  treatment  of  the 
idea  of  God.  The  idea  is  supposed  to  be  entirely 
given  through  the  value- judgment  in  which  the 
religious  consciousness  expresses  itself.  If  so,  it 
cannot  contain  elements  which  fall  outside  per- 
sonal experience.  That  Ritschl  really  includes 
such  elements  in  his  exposition  of  the  divine 
Idea  can  hardly  be  doubted.  In  point  of  fact,  he 
tries  to  formulate  in  general  terms  the  conditions 
which  produce  in  man  the  conception  of  God.  His 
theory  is  related  to  the  Kantian.  "  The  idea  of 
God  in  religious  knowledge  is  attached  to  the 
condition  that  man  sets  himself  over  against  the 
world,  and  makes  his  position  in  it,  or  over  it, 
sure  through  trust  in  God."1  That  is  to  say,  the 

1  Lehre  der  Eechtfertigung  und  Versohnung,  iii.  204.    The  theory 
of  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  God  as  a  Hilfsvorstellung,  or  helping-con- 


308  Philosophy  and  Theology  : 

idea  of  God  helps  man  over  the  opposition  between 
his  spiritual  consciousness  and  his  natural  limita- 
tions, and  assures  to  him  his  freedom.  Now  the 
value -judgment  which  gives  us  the  idea  of  God 
cannot  also  give  us  the  universal  conditions  which 
make  itself  possible.  These  can  only  be  stated  as 
the  result  of  theoretical  reflexion  which  goes  beyond 
what  is  given  in  particular  experience.  Kitschl's 
epistemology  of  the  religious  consciousness,  what- 
ever we  may  think  of  it,  is  a  theory  elaborated 
by  reflective  thought,  which  states  in  general  terms 
the  meaning  of  the  object  of  faith.  It  cannot  be 
said  that  this  is  presented  or  directly  involved  in 
Christian  experience.  Again,  in  exhibiting  the 
Christian  idea  of  God,  as  given  in  revelation  and 
verified  by  the  value  -  judgment,  it  is  hard  to 
maintain  that  Eitschl  keeps  within  the  limits  laid 
down.  The  thought  of  the  time  at  least  exerts  a 
regulative  influence  upon  him.  And  his  views  of 
the  eternity,  unity,  and  the  omnipresence  of  God 
can  scarcely  be  traced  to  the  value-judgments  of 
Christian  experience. 

II.  Ritschl's  theology  claims  to  be  non-speculative 
because  it  pretends  to  be  purely  historical.  It  rests 
on  a  historic  revelation.  And  I  would  urge  that 

ception,  is  a  weak  point  in  the  Kitschlian  system,  and  stands  in  the 
way  of  the  full  recognition  of  the  truth,  that  God  is  directly  related 
to  the  spiritual  life  of  the  individual  and  completes  it. 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  309 

the  narrow  Kitschlian  conception  of  revelation  is 
not  tenable.  For,  be  it  remembered,  it  is  denied 
that  philosophic  thought,  by  the  examination  of 
general  experience,  can  show  that  such  a  revelation 
is  even  possible.  Christianity,  according  to  Eitschl, 
stands  in  no  vital  relation  to  other  religions,  nor 
will  he  allow  that  there  is  any  universal  conscious- 
ness of  God.  Hence  there  is  no  proper  sphere  for 
a  philosophy  of  religion,  which  seeks  to  arrive  at 
the  essential  meaning  of  religion,  through  the  re- 
flective study  of  its  history.  But  this  emphasis  on 
an  objective  revelation,  single  and  unique,  carries 
with  it  serious  difficulties.  By  divorcing  Chris- 
tianity from  the  general  development  of  religion 
its  appearance  becomes  a  mystery,  which  is  in  no 
way  lessened  by  insisting  that  it  is  a  fact.  For  a 
fact  loses  meaning  in  isolation.  And  if  revelation, 
as  Kitschl  conceives  it,  did  take  place  and  diffused 
itself  among  men,  it  would  still  imply  a  capacity 
to  receive  it :  this  argues  a  common  relation  to 
God,  not  created  by  revelation,  but  involved  in  the 
nature  of  the  human  spirit  itself.  If  there  were 
not  a  common  though  undeveloped  consciousness  of 
God  involved  in  the  nature  of  mind,  what  could 
revelation  appeal  to  ?  The  inherent  difficulty  of 
a  pure  religious  empiricism,  which  will  not  allow 
even  a  regulative  function  to  philosophic  thought, 
becomes  clearer  when  we  ask  how  the  definite 


3 1  o  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

content  of  revelation  is  to  be  determined.  No  one 
will  contend  that  the  content  of  revealed  truth  will 
be  immediately  certain  to  any  one  who  examines  the 
Christian  canonical  writings.  Kitschl  himself  used 
considerable  freedom  in  dealing  with  them.  This 
is  still  more  marked  in  the  case  of  his  distinguished 
follower  Harnack,  who  frankly  admits  that  there 
is  a  good  deal  in  New-Testament  literature  which 
will  not  satisfy  the  demands  of  modern  criticism. 
In  his  lecture  on  "  Christianity  and  History,"  he 
labours  to  show  that,  behind  these  accretions, 
there  is  a  core  which  constitutes  the  objective 
fact  of  revelation.1  And  he  says  that  this  fact  is 
certified  by  the  effect  it  produces.  Yet  if  the 
essence  of  Christianity  were  generally  apparent 
through  its  effects,  would  there  have  been  so  much 
dispute  about  what  the  essence  was  ?  Mere  ex- 
perience will  not  define  the  content  of  revelation, 
if  the  experience  of  one  man  does  not  coincide  with 
that  of  another.  Nor  is  it  possible  to  separate 
out  of  the  historic  development  of  Christian  ex- 
perience certain  elements  which  have  remained 
fixed  and  constant  in  their  significance  throughout. 
Indeed,  Eitschlians  bring  with  them  to  the  selection 
and  valuation  of  historic  materials  an  idea  of  true 
religion  which  is  not  impressed  on  them  from 

1  The  lecture  is  now  included  in  the  2nd  volume  of  his  '  Eeden 
und  Aufsatze.' 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  311 

without.  It  really,  as  we  think,  presupposes  theo- 
retical reflexion  on  their  part,  and  it  involves  them 
in  the  rejection  of  not  a  little  which  others  claim 
to  belong  to  the  content  of  revealed  religion.  In 
the  light  of  the  ideal  of  what  constitutes  revelation 
— an  ideal  which  is  no  pure  deduction  from  history 
— the  theologians  of  the  School  regard  the  later 
dogmatic  developments  of  the  Church  very  un- 
favourably. They  see  there  an  object-lesson  of  the 
fatal  results  which  follow  the  union  of  metaphysics 
with  theology.  Yet  the  germs  of  these  metaphysi- 
cal developments  may  be  found  in  the  Pauline  and 
Johannine  literature.  And  those  whose  standpoint 
is  severely  historical  can  hardly  prove  that  these 
germs  represent  the  intrusion  of  an  alien  element 
into  the  body  of  the  Christian  faith.  Put  briefly, 
our  point  is  that  Ritschlians,  who  are  constantly 
able  to  distinguish  pure  Christianity  from  its 
false  accretions,  are  going  on  a  standard  of  valua- 
tion which  has  been  elaborated  by  thought  out  of 
experience,  and  is  not  immediately  given  in  ex- 
perience. In  short,  though  the  claim  to  build  a 
theology  on  a  purely  historic  basis  is  plausible, 
and  appeals  to  those  who  desire  to  have  done  with 
subjective  opinion  and  prejudice  and  to  rest  on  the 
firm  ground  of  fact,  the  principle  cannot  be  con- 
sistently worked  out  in  practice.  Eeason,  we  are 
told,  must  bow  in  silence  before  fact.  But  we  are 


312  Philosophy  and  Theology  : 

not  so  much  impressed  by  the  dictum,  when  we 
find  that  reason  has  asserted  itself  in  determining 
what  is  fact. 

III.  The  conviction  that  thought  exercises  no  con- 
stitutive function  in  religion  led  Kitschl  to  maintain 
that  this  constitutive  office  is  entirely  fulfilled  by 
the  value -judgments.  In  this  he  has  been  gen- 
erally, if  not  universally,  followed  by  the  theo- 
logians of  the  School.1  This  exaltation  of  the 
value-judgment  is  the  outcome  of  a  psychology 
which  acknowledges  the  primacy  and  dominance 
of  will  in  the  personal  life.  In  the  case  of  the 
Eitschlian  movement  this  feature  has  a  connexion 
with  the  stress  laid  on  the  practical  reason  by 
Kant.  Now,  that  judgments  of  value  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  religion  has  been  fully  admitted. 
But  the  point  is  whether  theology,  as  a  science, 
can  be  reared  on  this  basis.  For  the  characteristic 
of  the  value-judgment  is,  that  it  only  defines  the 
object  in  so  far  as  it  affects  the  subject.  And 
theology  must  therefore  be  restricted  to  dealing 
with  the  objects  of  faith  only  as  they  reveal  them- 

1  Kaftan,  I  understand,  holds  that  the  theoretical  judgment  may 
play  a  part  in  religion  on  the  basis  given  by  the  value- judgment.  It 
would  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  Eitschlians  believe  that  what 
is  true  for  the  one  form  of  judgment  may  be  false  for  the  other. 
But  the  dualism  between  them  is  left  standing,  and  no  effort  after 
unification  is  made.  One  would  at  least  desire  the  recognition  of 
unity  as  an  ideal  we  must  strive  after. 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  3 1 3 

selves,  or  enter  into  the  experience  of  persons. 
That  Kitschl  succeeded  in  keeping  his  theology 
within  the  limits  thus  laid  down,  we  have  already 
seen  reason  to  doubt.  A  still  more  serious  difficulty 
is  the  element  of  subjectivity  which  will  cling  to 
theological  propositions,  whose  only  guarantee  is 
judgments  of  value.  For  there  is  nothing  in  the 
mere  experience  of  value  which  invests  the  ex- 
perience with  any  element  of  necessity,  or  lays  us 
under  the  obligation  of  believing  that  our  ex- 
perience must  be  that  of  other  people.  Nor  does 
revelation,  conceived  as  an  objective  fact,  offer  a 
means  by  which  we  can  free  ourselves  from  this 
difficulty.  For  the  only  mode  of  determining  and 
appreciating  revelation  is  subjective — i.e.,  the  way 
it  affects  us. 

No  doubt  it  would  be  unfair  to  suggest  that  the 
value- judgments  of  religion  are  merely  the  isolated, 
and  it  may  be  inconsistent,  utterances  of  individuals. 
They  have  a  certain  unity  of  ground.  Christian 
experience  expresses  itself  through  individuals,  who 
are  spiritually  what  they  are  in  and  through  their 
membership  in  a  living  Christian  community.  In 
this  way  it  might  seem  we  have  a  normative  body 
of  value-judgments,  on  which  a  theological  system 
may  be  developed.  This  argument  is  not  without 
weight.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  those  who  are 
living  the  life  together  know  the  truth  of  the 


314  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

doctrine.  But  none  the  less  an  empirical  generalisa- 
tion will  not  guarantee  its  own  objective  validity. 
And  it  seems  to  me  we  can  only  find  security  for 
the  objective  reference  of  the  value -judgments  of 
Christian  experience  if  we  take  them  in  connexion 
with,  and  make  them  supplement  and  complete,  the 
objective  determinations  of  reason.  For  then  our 
judgments  of  value,  which  represent  the  demands  of 
the  inner  life,  give  spiritual  content  to  the  more 
formal  but  objective  determination  of  the  Divine 
Being  by  thought.  If  we  follow  Eitschl,  however, 
and  deny  that  thought  is  a  constitutive  element 
of  religion,  even  the  appeal  to  that  general  Christian 
experience  which  is  based  on  revelation  will  not 
help  us  beyond  the  subjective  standpoint  to  the 
firm  ground  of  the  objective  and  universal.  For  all 
we  have  to  go  on  is  the  fact  of  this  experience :  we 
cannot  say  why  this  experience  should  be,  and  that 
it  is  the  expression  of  universal  principles.  Accord- 
ingly the  experience  of  the  Christian  Church  can 
only  be  authoritative  to  the  individual,  in  so  far  as 
he  shares  it,  and  can  verify  it  in  his  own  personal 
judgments  of  value.  And  at  the  most  he  can  only 
have  a  limited  empirical  assurance  that  his  own 
valuations  hold  good  for  other  persons.  We  have 
certainly  no  right  to  say  that  they  must  do  so,  if 
we  are  true  to  Eitschlian  principles. 

Indeed,  I  believe  Eitschlians  regard  the  valua- 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  315 

tions  of  the  Christian  consciousness  as  more  con- 
sistent and  coherent  than  they  really  are.  It  would 
not  be  difficult  to  show  that  the  values  on  which 
the  Christian  mind  of  one  age  laid  stress  did  not  fill 
the  same  place  in  another  age.  Christians  of  the 
fourth  century  were  no  doubt  persuaded  that  a 
metaphysical  theology  was  involved  in  the  needs  of 
a  spiritual  life.  Many  of  their  descendants  in  these 
days  do  not  find  that  this  theology  stands  in  a  vital 
relation  to  practical  religion.  Again,  the  Catholic 
of  the  middle  age  judged  an  authoritative  Church 
to  be  of  high  value  in  supplying  his  spiritual  wants : 
the  Protestant,  on  the  other  hand,  accentuated  the 
worth  of  personal  faith.  In  truth,  the  broad  ethical 
conceptions  of  value  developed  by  Christian  experi- 
ence may  be  used  as  indicating  what  the  spiritual 
consciousness  postulates  in  the  object  of  its  faith. 
But  it  is  a  very  different  thing  to  make  them  the 
exclusive  basis  of  theological  construction.  Value- 
judgments  do  not  fulfil  the  conditions  of  the  old 
canon  of  Catholicity,  "  Quod  semper,  quod  ubique, 
quod  ab  omnibus."  And  the  theologian  has  to  go 
beyond  the  narrow  and  uncertain  basis  they  supply. 
This  is  still  more  evident  if  we  consider,  as  I  think 
we  must  do,  the  Christian  consciousness  in  relation 
to  the  general  religious  consciousness  of  mankind. 
For  then  the  differences  in  valuation  are  much 
greater.  Yet  if  we  refuse  to  do  this  how  can  we 


3 1 6  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

justify  the  claim  of  Christianity  to  be  a  universal 
religion  ?  How  can  we  assert  that  in  principle  it 
is  the  highest  and  fullest  expression  of  that  rela- 
tion of  sonship  in  which  all  men  stand  to  God  ? 

If  the  foregoing  arguments  are  well-founded, 
Ritschlianism  has  not  proved  that  theology  can 
successfully  dispense  with  metaphysics.  But  though 
this  be  granted,  it  may  still  be  contended  that 
theology  cannot  afford  to  be  allied  with,  or  to  be 
dependent  on,  secular  philosophy.  Christian  revela- 
tion, it  is  urged,  is  a  fact  of  supreme  importance, 
and  it  must  decisively  determine  our  views  of  the 
world  and  man.  Therefore  theology  must  develop 
its  own  metaphysics,  for  metaphysics  in  independ- 
ence cannot  by  any  means  yield  results  of  the  same 
value.1 

This  standpoint  is  of  the  nature  of  a  compromise. 
It  commends  itself  to  those  who  recognise  the  diffi- 
culty of  banishing  all  speculative  reflexion  from 
theology,  and  who  nevertheless  distrust  the  capacity 
of  any  philosophy  to  deal  with  religious  problems 
if  it  does  not  rest  on  certain  Christian  presupposi- 
tions. That  the  advocates  of  this  view  have  some- 
thing to  say  on  their  side  is  probably  true.  Christian 
experience  is  an  important  fact,  and  philosophy 

1  This  view,  for  instance,  is  put  forward  by  Dr  Garvie,  vid.  '  The 
Ritschlian  Theology,'  pp.  68,  69,  392,  393.  And  it  was  at  least  sug- 
gested by  Kitschl  himself,  if  never  definitely  set  forth. 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  317 

must  take  it  into  account  in  forming  its  conception 
of  the  world  as  a  whole.  The  demands  of  the 
higher  spiritual  nature  enter  into  the  meaning  of 
the  world  which  thought  seeks  to  explain.  For  the 
rest,  the  idea  of  a  separate  and  independent 
Christian  metaphysics  seems  to  us  wrong  in  con- 
ception and  unworkable  in  practice.  It  cannot,  of 
course,  be  contended  that  there  is  any  dualism  in 
reason  :  the  thinking  process  of  the  Christian  meta- 
physician is  the  same  as  that  of  the  ordinary 
metaphysician.  The  difference  between  them  is, 
that  the  latter  reaches  his  principles  from  the  study 
of  general  experience,  the  former  evolves  them  from 
a  particular  experience.  And  in  the  second  place, 
Christian  metaphysics  so  conceived  takes  certain 
historic  facts  as  normative  in  forming  its  theory. 

Such  a  Christian  philosophy  would  claim  to  be 
generally  valid.  In  which  case  its  postulates  would 
require  to  commend  themselves  to  reason  as  worthy 
of  general  acceptance.  Now  in  a  case  where  postu- 
lates imply  an  interpretation  of  history — an  inter- 
pretation presenting  peculiar  difficulties  and  involv- 
ing in  the  end  a  demand  on  faith — it  would  be  too 
much  to  expect  agreement.  Even  those  who  speak 
from  within  the  Church  would  not  be  at  one  about 
the  basis,  which  the  Christian  faith  offers  to  specu- 
lative thought  for  development.  But  suppose  we 
waive  this  objection.  Grant  that  Christian  meta- 


3 1 8  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

physics  is  in  a  position  to  develop  its  theory.  Then 
it  may  either  create  or  borrow  the  general  notions 
which  it  employs.  If  the  former,  it  could  only 
justify  their  extension  to  the  wider  realm  of  ex- 
perience by  examining  and  criticising  them  in  rela- 
tion to  experience,  and  this  in  the  spirit  of  meta- 
physics in  its  wider  sense.  And  the  process  could 
not  be  carried  out  unless  the  original  postulates 
were  reconsidered  and  tested  in  the  light  of  general 
experience.  If  the  latter,  then  in  accepting  from 
philosophy  conceptions  such  as  cause,  substance,  and 
end,  as  valid  in  experience,  it  has  ceased  in  any 
strict  sense  to  be  independent. 

Moreover,  in  regard  to  its  method  we  must  criti- 
cise adversely  this  idea  of  a  Christian  metaphysics. 
It  takes  the  Christian  consciousness  by  itself,  and 
on  this  basis  proposes  to  develop  its  speculative 
theory.  But  Christianity  would  have  been  histori- 
cally unintelligible,  if  it  had  been  without  organic 
relation  to  the  prior1  development  of  the  religious 
consciousness.  And  no  theory  which  treats  it  in 
isolation  can  do  justice  to  its  contents.  A  Christian 
metaphysics,  from  the  nature  of  its  object-matter, 
must  begin  by  broadening  out  into  a  philosophy  of 
religion.  Finally,  I  would  urge  that  no  metaphysics 
can  give  a  satisfactory  theory  of  reality  by  inter- 
preting all  experience  through  one  of  its  phases. 
Keligion  itself  is  only  one  aspect  of  experience. 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  3 1 9 

And   however  philosophy  may  come   short   in  its 
task,  it  has  to  think  things  together  and  as  ele- 
ments in  a  whole.     For  it  is  catholic  in  its  outlook, 
and  tries  to  do  justice  to  all  the  aspects  of  the 
complex  experience  with  which  it  deals.     This  im- 
partial and  objective  treatment  is  a  condition  of  its 
success,  because  our  insight  into  the  meaning  of  the 
whole  depends  on  the  degree  in  which  we  have  been 
able  to  perceive  the  connexion  of  the  parts  and 
their  mutual  interdependence.     It  might  be  argued 
that  a  Christian  metaphysics  is  also  in  a  position 
to  think  things  together.     This  is  true  to  the  extent 
that  it  tries  to  show  how  the  whole  is  related  to  one 
of  the  parts.     But  it  interprets  the  significance  of 
the  part  in  isolation  to  begin  with,  and  so  cannot 
guarantee  the  validity  of  its  principles  for  experi- 
ence as  a  whole.     I  fear,  too,  that  the  record  of 
history  does  not  encourage  us  to  expect  that  this 
kind  of  religious  metaphysics  would  be  convincing 
in  its  treatment  of  speculative  problems.     And  it- 
would   only  gain   in   strength   and   in   breadth  of 
appeal  by  ceasing  to  be,  what  it  set  out  by  claim- 
ing to  be,  independent  of  the  general  speculative 
thought  of  the  age. 

If,  then,  theology  is  not  able  to  create  its  own 
metaphysics,  and  if  we  cannot  keep  theology  rigidly 
apart  from  philosophy,  we  must  ask  finally  if  the 
two  may  not  fruitfully  and  helpfully  be  connected 


320  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

with  one  another.  I  venture  to  offer  a  few  remarks 
on  the  point,  which,  to  some  extent  perhaps,  may 
suggest  an  answer  to  the  question. 

Theology  on  any  view  is  not  a  purely  speculative 
science.  It  has  practical  ends  to  serve  —  the  in- 
struction of  a  Christian  community — and  these  it 
must  keep  before  it.  It  builds  on  the  basis  of 
Christian  experience,  as  contained  in  biblical  litera- 
ture and  the  tradition  of  the  Church,  and  it  has  to 
formulate  doctrines  from  this  experience,  and  to 
present  them  in  forms  which  will  edify  the  existing 
Christian  consciousness.  Therefore  theology  is,  in 
the  first  instance,  a  historical  science,  for  it  develops 
its  doctrines  out  of  what  has  been  historically  ex- 
perienced. The  theologian  makes  certain  presup- 
positions on  historical  grounds,  and  he  does  not 
arrive  at  his  first  principles  by  purely  critical  re- 
flexion. Nor  is  this  to  be  objected  to  in  the  cir- 
cumstances. Theology  is  not  philosophy,  and  does 
not  pretend  to  be  so.  But  the  articulation  and 
development  of  a  system  of  doctrine  is  the  work 
of  thought,  and  in  the  statement  of  its  results 
theology  inevitably  puts  forward  a  general  view 
of  the  world.  In  giving  determinate  expression 
to  this  view  the  earlier  theologians  made  them- 
selves debtors  to  the  speculative  heritage  of  the 
past,  and  used  it  where  they  consistently  could. 
Nevertheless  the  theological  Weltanschauung  has 


the  Ritschlian  Standpoint.  321 

commonly  presented  sharp  points  of  contrast  to 
the  philosophical ;  and  this  might  be  expected 
from  the  fact  that  the  former  sets  out  from  par- 
ticular, the  latter  from  universal,  experience. 

Now  it  is  just  in  forming  this  general  view  of 
things  that  the  need  of  co-operation  between  phil- 
osophy and  theology  is  evident.  As  a  result  of 
the  growth  of  science  and  the  activity  of  phil- 
osophic thought,  new  conceptions  of  the  world  have 
been  formed  and  exist  alongside  those  which  the 
traditional  theology  presents  to  us.  And  where 
there  is  opposition  and  contradiction  between  them, 
reconciliation  is  called  for.  Both  cannot  be  right, 
and  reason  demands  consistency.  Theology  can 
only  be  indifferent  to  this  demand  at  the  expense 
of  losing  its  interest  and  vitality  for  the  present 
age :  decadence  is  always  the  consequence  of  iso- 
lation. In  so  far,  then,  as  theology  finds  it  neces- 
sary to  put  forward  a  theoretical  view  of  the 
world  which  is  in  harmony  with  the  knowledge 
of  the  age,  it  must  have  the  co-operation  of  phil- 
osophy. The  fear  about  the  intrusion  of  a  foreign 
and  hostile  influence  into  theology  under  these 
conditions  argues  a  strange  distrust  of  human 
nature.  For  reason  is  one  and  the  same,  whether 
it  is  exercised  in  the  sphere  of  theology  or  meta- 
physics ;  and  its  effort,  whatever  be  the  object, 
is  to  think  out  the  meaning  of  the  object 

x 


322  Philosophy  and  Theology : 

coherently.  And  as  theology  cannot  exclude  reason, 
it  must  accept  the  task  which  reason  imposes, 
and  strive  after  a  view  of  things  into  which 
the  existing  body  of  knowledge  may  enter  con- 
sistently. 

In  following  out  this,  the  theoretical  aspect  of 
its  mission,  theology  passes  gradually  into  the 
philosophy  of  religion.  And  Christian  Dogmatics 
has  been  treated  by  some  in  the  spirit  of  a 
religious  philosophy.  But  though  there  is  a  real 
contact  between  the  two,  it  is  not  desirable  that 
theology  should  be  identified  with  a  philosophy  of 
religion.  The  former  has  a  practical  aspect,  which 
the  latter  has  not.  Then  the  object-matter  of  the 
philosophy  of  religion  is  the  religious  consciousness 
as  a  whole :  it  sets  out  to  investigate  this.  But 
theology  begins  by  taking  as  its  object-matter  the 
Christian  consciousness  and  the  historical  experience 
out  of  which  it  has  grown.  No  doubt  the  Christian 
consciousness  is  not  to  be  isolated  from  the  general 
religious  consciousness  ;  but  we  must  remember  that 
the  former  has  a  special  value  on  which  the 
theologian  lays  stress.  He  holds  that  the  ex- 
perience, which  is  the  basis  of  his  doctrine,  has 
an  authority  that  does  not  belong,  in  the  same 
degree  at  least,  to  other  manifestations  of  the 
religious  consciousness.  And  this  fact  has  im- 
portant bearings.  Human  knowledge  is  partial, 


the  Ritscklian  Standpoint.  323 

and  faith  has  a  real  part  to  play  in  life.  If 
the  speculative  reason  could  give  us  a  complete 
and  convincing  interpretation  of  the  universe,  it 
might  be  urged  that  theology  only  states,  in  a 
figurative  form,  ideas  which  are  presented  in  their 
true  form  in  the  system  of  philosophy.  But  if 
we  renounce,  as  we  must  do,  any  claim  to  com- 
plete and  absolute  knowledge,  then  a  theology,  so 
far  as  it  succeeds  in  presenting  in  general  and  con- 
nected fashion  the  truths  involved  in  a  divinely- 
wrought  experience,  has  a  special  significance  and 
value. 

But  the  point  we  wish  to  press  is  that  spiritual 
experience  is  not  to  be  severely  separated  from 
general  experience.  Those  who  insist  on  doing  this 
appear  to  forget  that  the  value  they  claim  for 
spiritual  experience  implies  a  contrasted  aspect  of 
experience  which  makes  the  valuation  possible. 
And  if  theology,  as  the  science  of  Christian  ex- 
perience, enters  into  relation  with  philosophy,  as 
the  science  of  general  experience,  it  is  only  follow- 
ing out  a  connexion  implied  in  its  own  existence. 
Such  a  relation,  if  cultivated  in  the  right  spirit 
by  both  sides,  will  be  helpful.  For  neither  in 
theology  any  more  than  in  philosophy  do  we  have 
a  pure  and  final  system  of  truth.  Both  are  capable 
of  development,  and  live  only  as  they  develop. 
Now  though  the  unification  attempted  by  specula- 


324  Philosophy  and  Theology, 

tive  science  is  provisional  only,  yet  there  are  advan- 
tages in  considering  religious  doctrines  in  relation 
to  it.  This  lets  us  see  in  what  degree  our  theology 
coheres  with  experience,  in  so  far  as  we  are  able 
to  think  it  as  a  consistent  whole.  Philosophy, 
be  it  remembered,  is  in  no  position  to  discredit 
the  value  of  Christian  experience.  But  it  is  in  a 
position  to  affect  theology  in  its  theoretical  aspect. 
For  it  will  set  problems  to  the  theologian,  and 
indicate  the  line  of  advance.  He  will  be  led  to 
recognise  the  points  where  doctrine  must  be  recast 
and  developed,  and  so  brought  into  organic  relation 
with  the  growing  whole  of  knowledge. 

For  these  reasons  I  venture  to  doubt  that  the 
Eitschlian  standpoint  will,  in  the  long  run,  be 
found  to  subserve  the  best  interests  of  theological 
science.  The  gospel  of  the  limitation  of  knowledge 
is  a  wholesome  doctrine,  but  speculative  agnosti- 
cism is  a  dangerous  kind  of  error.  When  faith 
can  give  no  reason  for  itself,  and  is  constrained 
to  appeal  simply  to  feeling,  it  is  only  another  step 
to  the  conclusion  that  religion  is  nothing  but  the 
shadowy  projection  of  human  hopes  and  fears. 
And  then  theology,  once  named  the  queen  of  the 
sciences,  becomes  a  futile  endeavour  to  give  form 
and  body  to  a  baseless  vision  of  our  own  creation. 


INDEX. 


Absolute,  its  relation  to  individ- 
uals, 201  ;  to  God,  255,  256. 

Activity,  idea  of,  examined,  222- 
224. 

Anaxagoras,  41. 

Ancestor- worship,  115-119. 

Animism,  110  ff.,  175. 

Anselm,  295. 

Apollo,  133. 

Aristotle,  11  n. ;  on  the  sciences, 
51 ;  final  cause,  59  ;  on  choice, 
66 ;  view  of  matter,  189  n.  ; 
theology,  291. 

Athene,  133. 

Augustine,  90. 

Avenarius,  R.,  171,  175. 

Bacon,  on  final  causes,  58. 
Belief,  and  sentiment,  158. 
Berkeley,  185  n. 
Biedermann,    A.    E.,    his     'Dog- 

matik,'  7,  8. 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  199,  229,  237  n. 
Brahma,  131  n.  ;  137. 
Breath,  primitive  idea  of,  174. 
Buddhism,  143,  154. 

Caird,  E.,  33;  on  evolution  of 
religion,  152  ff. ;  on  inner  and 
outer  experience,  179  ff. ;  201. 

Caird,  J.,  his  'Philosophy  of  Re- 
ligion,' 9,  10. 

Causality,  55. 

Cause,  and  end,  63,  64 ;  and 
ground,  218. 

Character  and  freedom,  67  ff. 

Christ,  141,  143,  304. 

Christianity,  143,  144. 


Christian  metaphysics,  316  ff. 
Cicero,  114. 
Comte,  36. 

Continuity,  principle  of,  61,  190; 
in  religious  development,  148  ff. 
Coulanges,  F.  de,  116,  117. 

Dante,  286. 

Darwin,  C.,  'Descent  of  Man,'  42, 

43. 

Deism,  296,  297. 
Determinism,  67  ff. 
Doctrine,  growth  of,  291  ff. 
Dreams,  in  early  culture,  112,  173. 

Erigena,  J.  S.,  295. 

Ethical  predicates,  applied  to  God, 
260,  261,  267. 

Ethical  societies,  48. 

Ethics,  a  normative  science,  63 ; 
and  Religion,  46  ff.,  82-84. 

Evolution,  scientific  idea  of,  42,  43. 

Experience,  perceptual  and  con- 
ceptual, 170,  171  ;  in  relation 
to  thought,  237,  238. 

External  experience,  implies  trans- 
subjective,  185-188. 

Faith,  85  ff.,  145,  262,  263. 
Feeling,    and    origin    of    religion, 

107  ;    it    implies    thought,    37, 

108,   109. 

Fetishism,  119,  120. 
Fichte,  J.  G.,  20. 
Final  Cause,  58,  59. 
Finite  personality,  defects  of,  252, 

253. 
Frazer,  J.  G.,  121. 


326 


Index. 


Freedom,  of  will,  65  ff.  ;  its  re- 
lation to  sin,  273,  274  ;  social 
aspect  of,  71  ff. 

God,  not  a  pure  unity,  256,  257  ; 
the  ground  of  religious  con- 
sciousness, 277  -  279  ;  as  im- 
manent, 269,  276,  277  ;  as 
transcendent,  282-284. 

Gods,  of  moment,  108,  109  ;  social 
meaning  of  gods,  132-134. 

Goethe,  8,  132. 

Greater  gods,  nature-origin  of,  131, 
132. 

Green,  T.  H.,  68,  79. 

Harnack,  A.,  300,  310. 

Hebrew  prophets,  47,  143,  154. 

Hegel,  his  'Philosophy  of  Re- 
ligion,' 3  ff.  ;  view  of  natural 
sciences,  53,  54 ;  273  n. 

Henotheism,  135. 

Herrmann,  304. 

Hoffding,  his  'Philosophy  of  Re- 
ligion,' 25  ff.,  101. 

Holy  places,  113. 

Homer,  112  n.,  127  n.,  138. 

Ideal,  and  real  self,  78-81. 

Individual  reals,  197,  198,  201, 
228. 

Individual  selves,  247-249. 

Individuals,  influence  on  religious 
development,  139  ff. 

Inner  and  outer  experience,  genesis 
of  distinction,  173  ff.  ;  both  de- 
velop together,  180. 

Inters  ubjective  intercourse,  171, 
191. 

Introjection,  171-173. 

Isolation,  unfavourable  to  religious 
development,  129. 

James,  W.,  his  '  Varieties  of  Reli- 
gious Experience,'  30-32. 
Jerusalem,  W.,  173  n. 
Jones,  H.,  256  n. 
Judgment,  a  feature  of,  199. 
Jupiter,  131,  138. 

Kaftan,  18,  312  n. 
Kant,     20,     his     'Critique'    and 
natural    sciences,    52,    53  ;    on 


inner     and     outer     experience, 

176  ff.  ;    on    ontological    proof, 

239 ;  on  religion,  298. 
Kathenotheism,  135. 
Kingdom  of  God,  Ritschlian  idea 

of,  302-304. 

Lang,  A.,  122,  123. 

Language,  and  religion,  104 ;  and 
thought,  171. 

Laws  of  nature,  56,  57. 

Leibniz,  61,  190,  192,  225,  245  n. 

Lipsius,  R.  A.,  23  n.,  254,  306. 

Locke,  189. 

Lotze,  his  contribution  to  philos- 
ophy of  religion,  13  ff. ;  on 
value  -  judgment,  14,  15;  on 
space  and  time,  192 ;  on  ultimate 
unity,  201,  202,  226,  227;  on  per- 
sonality of  the  Absolute,  249  ff. 

M'Taggart,  J.  E.,  248,  249,  273  n. 

Magic,  120-122. 

Mars,  133. 

Materialism,  45,  46. 

Mechanism,  and  explanation,  60. 

Menzies,  A.,  105. 

Metaphysics  and  philosophy,  task 
of,  210. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  188. 

Minor  nature-worship,  113;  rela- 
tion to  greater,  114. 

Monarchism,  137,  138. 

Monotheism,  137-139. 

Moral  obligation,  and  freedom,  64. 

Morality,  growth  of,  73  ff.  ;  sub- 
jective side  of,  74,  75. 

National  religion,  rise  of,  129  ff. 

Natural  religion,  296,  297. 

Natural  sciences,  their  dispute 
with  Church,  42 ;  method  of, 
55  ff. ;  do  not  disprove  freedom, 
64,  65. 

Necessity,  scientific  notion  of,  57. 

Nietzsche,  237  n. 

Nirvana,  264. 

Occam,  295. 
Odin,  133. 

Ontological  proof,  239,  240. 
Ontology  of  religion,  its   problem 
and  method,  217-219. 


Index. 


327 


Organic  growth,  idea  as  applied  to 

religion,  146  ff. 
Origen,  294. 
Osiris,  133. 

Pantheism,  136,  137,  160. 

Parmenides,  197. 

Pascal,  25. 

Paulsen,  F.,  202  n.,  248  n. 

Percepts  and  concepts,  184,  185. 

Personality,  its  part  in  religious 
development,  279  ff. 

Personality  of  God,  its  relation  to 
religion,  284-286. 

Pfleiderer,  0.,  his  'Philosophy  of 
Religion,'  10  ff.  ;  his  view  of 
ontological  argument,  239,  240. 

Philosophy  and  Religion,  differ- 
ences between,  212  ff. 

Philosophy  of  Religion,  its  relation 
to  Philosophy,  92,  93  ;  to  Reve- 
lation, 281,  282  ;  its  standpoint, 
211,  212. 

Plato,  and  sciences,  50,  51  ;  86,  98, 
283,  287. 

Pluralism,  arguments  against,  ex- 
amined, 195  ff. 

Polytheism,  growth  of,  131,  132. 

Pragmatism,  33,  301. 

Psychology,  and  religious  develop- 
ment, 101,  102,  158  ff. 

Ra,  134. 

Rationalism,  160. 

Rauwenhoff,  his  '  Philosophy  of 
Religion,'  19  ff. 

Reason  and  Religion,  36,  37. 

Religion,  and  moral  ideal,  82-84 ; 
origin  of,  103  ;  a  definition  of, 
105  ;  factors  involved  in,  106  ; 
implies  a  personal  relation,  213. 

Religious  bond,  meaning  of,  276, 
277. 

"Religious  consciousness,"  am- 
biguity in,  163. 

Religious  development,  its  psycho- 
logical key,  101,  102 ;  an 
endeavour  after  harmony,  164, 
165,  274. 

Reville,  A.,  113,  114. 

Rita,  136. 

Ritschl,  A.,  his  attitude  to  philo- 
sophy, 17,  18,  306  ff.  ;  to  ecclesi- 


astical dogma,  304 ;  his  theo- 
logy, 302  ff.  ;  view  of  value- 
judgment,  312. 

Ritual,  reaction  against,  142. 

Rohde,  E.,  117  n. 

Royce,  J.,  33,  228. 

Sabatier,   A.,   his    'Philosophy   of 

Religion,'  22  ff. 
Sayce,  A.,  135. 
Schelling,  107. 
Schleiermacher       and       Romantic 

School,  6,  33,  298. 
Scholasticism,  295,  296. 
Science  and  Religion,  41  ff. 
Self,  in  relation  to  character,  68  ff. 
Self -consciousness,  importance  of, 

241,  242. 

Self-realisation,  76  ff. 
Sentiment,    conservative   force   of, 

129,  130. 
Siebeck,    H.,   his    'Philosophy   of 

Religion,'  16,  17  ;  285. 
Sin,  272,  273. 
Smith,  W.  R.,  127  n. 
Soul,  and  Absolute,  203,  204,  231. 
Space  and  time,  nature  of,  192  ff. ; 

not    applicable    to    God,    257, 

258. 

Speculative  theology,  298-300. 
Spencer,  H.,  115. 
Spinoza,  25,  26,  213. 
Spiritism,  111  ff. 
Statius,  107. 

Stout,  G.  F.,  173  n.,  238  n. 
Substances,    idea     of,    191,    202 ; 

ground     of     their     interaction, 

224  ff. 
Supreme  Being,   idea  of,  in  early 

culture,  122  ff. 

Teleology,  in  nature  and  conduct, 

63,  64. 

Tertullian,  37. 
Thales,  112. 
Theism,  and  value- judgment,  265, 

266. 

Theistic  proofs,  238  ff. 
Theology,  nature  of,  320. 
'  Thing  in  itself,'  189,  235. 
Things   and    their   qualities,    195, 

196. 
Thought,  and  reality,  198,  236  ff.; 


328 


Index. 


and  the  religious  consciousness, 

34-37. 
Tian,  133. 
Tiele,  98,  153,  156. 
Totemism,  117-119. 
Transsubjective,  nature  of,  188  if. 
Tribal  religion,  features  of,  124  ff. 
Tylor,  E.  B.,  98,  99,  116. 
Tyndall,  45. 

Unconscious  will,  242  ff. 
Unity  and  experience,  204,  205. 
Universal  religion,  145. 
Universal  self,  246  ff. 
Usener,  H.,  108,  109,  126  n. 

Value -judgment,    38,    91,    262  ff. 
Vid.  also  Lotze,  Ritschl. 


Varuna,  133. 
Veda,  137. 
Vedanta,  137. 

Ward,  J.,  60  n.,  65,  171,  200. 

Will,  in  relation  to  the  organism, 
232,  233 ;  does  not  create 
thought,  242-244. 

World,  religious  view  of,  88-90. 

World-ground,  compared  to  soul, 
231  ;  as  will,  233-236  ;  as  self- 
conscious,  241  ;  not  purely  im- 
manent, 246  ff. 

Wundt,  202,  221,  260  n. 

Xenophanes,  47,  135. 
Zeus,  134,  138. 


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IV 1 

1934 


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